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Abstract 
The Dak Lak Plateau of Viet Nam is dominated by intensive smallholder coffee 
production. The Plateau has sustained decades of rapid economic and population 
growth and now faces challenges of water scarcity. The water supply economy of 
the Dak Lak Plateau is mature and the potential for developing more 
economically viable large-scale water supply infrastructure is limited. In contrast, 
the implementation of demand side water management policies and integrated 
water resource planning in the Dak Lak Plateau is at best in a formative stage, in 
spite of demand side and integrated water management being at the core of Viet 
Nam's ten y~ar old Law on Water Resources. The implementation of demand side 
water management and integrated water resource planning in the Dak Lak 
Plateau is partly held back by a scarcity of information about the economic value 
of water, and of regional social preferences for in-situ water allocation for public 
good purposes. This lack of information is confounded by a limited understanding 
of how the surface and groundwater systems of the Plateau would respond to 
water reallocation, and circumscribed knowledge of the sectoral water use 
efficiencies of the Plateau. 
The bulk of research undertaken in this thesis aims to shift the national water 
policy of Viet Nam from principles towards implementation in the Dak Lak 
Plateau. The research of this thesis achieves this .aim by closing key information 
gaps that have historically barred the development of effective demand side and 
integrated water resource management in the Plateau. The research of the thesis 
• estimates the marginal economic value of water in 
smallholder irrigated coffee production, dry season irrigated 
rice production, and household usage; 
• estimates monetised preference strengths for the in-situ 
allocation of water in the Dak Lak Plateau; 
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• quantifies the scope for increasing short run irrigation water 
use efficiency on the coffee and rice smallholdings of the 
Plateau; 
• measures household willingness to pay to support public 
programs to strengthen the resilience, stability, and 
productivity of the hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem of 
the Dak Lak Plateau; and 
• measures the change in aggregate social welfare in the 
Plateau that would result from the reallocation of scarce 
water from lower to higher valued uses during the annual dry 
season. 
The thesis research is based on frameworks and methods drawn from neoclassical 
economics, non-market valuation, production economics, cost-benefit analysis, 
New Institutional Economics, and the integrated hydrologic-agronomic-
economic modelling literature. The thesis makes unique contributions to the 
disciplines of stochastic production frontier analysis, simulation-optimisation 
modelling of irrigated agriculture, the contingent behaviour and contingent 
valuation methods of non-market valuation, and to integrated hydroeconomic 
modelling. 
-
The work of this thesis demonstrates that 
1. eoffee and rice smallholders of the Plateau could achieve considerable 
increases in the technical and allocative efficiency of irrigation water 
input, on average. Moreover, increasing the technical and allocative 
efficiency of irrigation water input in the coffee and rice smallholder 
sectors would reduce the aggregate water . demand of these sectors 
substantially. 
a. the stochastic production frontier analysis of smallholder coffee 
production undertaken in this thesis shows that the adoption of 
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the technically efficient irrigation schedule would lift forecasted 
yield per tree from an average of 4.3 kilograms to 4.9 kilograms. 
Moreover, the simultaneous adoption of the allocatively efficient 
water input by coffee smallholders would reduce the annual 
irrigation input per tree from 4,000 litres to 1,700 litres, on 
average. 
Based on the 2005-06 Robusta farmgate price, a shift to the 
technically and allocatively efficient irrigation schedule of coffee 
would increase the operating surplus of the average coffee 
smallholder by 20 percent. Further, the 2,300 litre decrease in the 
average annual water input per coffee tree would reduce the 
aggregate irrigation water demand of coffee smallholders in the 
Plateau by 340,000 ML per annum. As a point of comparison, this 
annual demand reduction is equivalent to 30 percent of the 
average annual rainfall recharge to the unconfined aquifer of the 
Plateau. 
b. the technical and allocative efficiency of dry season rice irrigation 
could be increased by shifting from continuous submergence (CS) 
irrigation to alternate wetting and drying (A WD) irrigation. In 
normal climatic conditions, an average rice smallholder shifting 
out of CS into A WD would reduce irrigation water input by 
2,300 cubic metres per hectare and increase operating surpluses 
by approximately 10 percent. Achieving this per hectare 
reduction on all irrigated rice smallholdings in the Plateau would 
release around 38,000 ML of water for other uses during the 
annual dry season. 
2. household water demand in the Plateau is inelastic, at least for the range of 
water prices evaluated. The marginal economic value of municipal water in 
household usage varies between urban and peri-urban households, 
- ix-
. 
principally as a function of whether the household has access to substitute 
private household well water, and also as a function of in-household water 
supply infrastructure. The inelasticity of short run household water 
demand shows that municipal water pricing cannot be used to affect short 
run urban and peri-urban water consumption . 
3. households of the Dak Lak Plateau have positive monetised preferences for 
the in-situ allocation of water in the Plateau. These preferences are largely 
based in existence and bequest motivations, and in the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household. Showing that households in the Dak Lak 
Plateau are willing to pay for public programs that will likely return 
positive hydro-agro-environmental externalities establishes a clear signal 
to Provincial authorities about the capacity for such a public program to 
self-finance, and also to increase social welfare in the Plateau. 
4. increasing technical and allocative irrigation water use efficiency on the 
coffee smallholdings of the Plateau would generate potential Pareto 
improvements. The potential Pareto improvements have two main bases; 
Firstly, reducing irrigation water input on farms translates directly into a 
reduction in on farm irrigation costs. Secondly, increasing technical and 
allocative water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings would reduce the 
se\ferity and geographic extent of binding water shortages imposed on 
coffee smallholders in the Platea. This relaxation of the water scarcity 
constraint on production enables coffee smallholders to increase annual 
coffee yield. 
5. the subcatchments of the Dak Lak Plateau fare differently in the size of the 
welfare wedge that is generated by regulating what is currently an open 
access shallow groundwater resource. 
6. increasing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings of the 
Plateau appears to only marginally improve the hydrologic balance of the 
Plateau. This result provides only weak support for an argument that 
-x-
increasing water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings of the Dak Lak 
Plateau would also increase the resilience, productivity, and stability of the 
hydroecosystem of the Plateau. 
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Metric tonne 1,000 Kilograms 
Millimetre depth 10 Cubic metre per hectare 
Cubic metre 1,000 Litres 
1 Megalitre 1,000,000 Litres 
1 Hectare 10,000 Square metres 
1 Square kilometre 100 Hectares 
1 United States Dollar 16,200 Vietnam Dong (at 4/06/2008) 
1 Australian Dollar 15,600 Vietnam Dong (at 4/06/2008) 
--
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Introduction 
Before the Law on Water Resources (L WR) was ratified in 1998, water scarcity in 
Viet Nam was mainly managed by supply augmentation. The L WR shifted the 
focus of Viet Nam's national water strategy from supply augmentation towards 
demand management based on the principles of rationality, economy, efficiency, 
fairness, and sustainability. The L WR ratified the State to 'manage, protect, and 
rationally, economically, and efficiently exploit water resources' (Article 4.1). 
Water resource plans are now required for all major river basins in Viet Nam, and 
economic developments must account for 'regional water potential' (Article 20.1). 
The L WR requires the economical and efficient usage of water (Article 23.1.b), 
water users to implement water saving measures (Article 26.2), and also that 
water users 'take measures to prevent and overcome droughts' (Article 43.2). To 
be in conformance with the L WR, regional economic and water resource 
planning therefore requires a minimum understanding of (i) regional surface and 
groundwater stocks and system functioning, including being able to forecast how 
the dynamics of surface and groundwater systems would be likely to change 
given water reallocations; (ii) where water is scarce, the economic value of water 
in competing usages; and (iii) the regional potential to increase water use 
efficiency through behavioural, technical, structural, and institutional 
interventions. 
Viet Nam is the second largest global coffee producer, with coffee exports in 2006 
exceeded 900,000 tons worth USDl.1 billion (Investment and Trade Promotion 
Center of Ho Chi Minh City 2007; The World Bank 2007). Approximately forty 
per cent of national coffee output originates in the Dak Lak Plateau in the Central 
Highlands region of Viet Nam .. Almost 70 per cent of the non-urban area of the 
Dak Lak Plateau is cropped with Robusta coffee ( Coffea canephora). Robusta is 
largely grown on privately owned smallholdings of less than one hectare. 
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Figure 1.1 Location of the Dak Lak Province in Viet Nam (left panel), and 
the extent of the Dak Lak Plate~u in Dak Lak Province (right panel). 
Robusta grown in the Dak Lak Plateau requires intensive irrigation during the 
Plateau's dry season that lasts from December to April. This irrigation breaks 
flower bud dormancy and ensures uniform fruit set and berry size. Coffee 
smallholders mainly source irrigation water from the Plateau's unconfined 
aquifer using privately owned wells and mobile pumps. 
The sustained and largely uncontrolled expansion of coffee smallholdings in the 
Plateau over the past three decades has been the catalyst the rapid economic and 
-population growth of the region. Growth but has also strained the natural 
resource base of the Plateau however. One fundamental consequence of regional 
growth is that the water resources of the Dak Lak Plateau may now be over-
allocated. In recent years, sustained declines have been reported in the water 
table elevation of the unconfined aquifer, which is potentially indicative of 
groundwater mining (Riddell 1999; Ahmad 2001; D'haeze et al. 2005a). In recent 
years drought conditions have caused widespread crop losses and household 
water shortages in the Plateau. The confluence of the hydrodynamics of the 
Plateau, high private well and pump numbers and densities, and no real control 
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over irrigation groundwater extractions have created an open access resource 
dilemma. 
The National Water Resources Strategy of Viet Nam for 2006-10 targets achieving 
sustainable water management in Dak Lak as a high priority project (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam 2006). Economic growth in Dak Lak is expected to average 
nine per cent per annum until 2010 (Dak Lak Peoples' Committee 2001). The 
State faces the challenge of achieving this regional economic growth within the 
constraints of regional water supply. The water supply economy of the Dak Lak 
Plateau is in the mature stage (Riddell 1999), and presents few remaining 
opportunities to develop economically viable large scale water supply 
infrastructur.e. Moreover, interdependences and competition for the scarce water 
resources of the Plateau are increasingly evident. Conversely, policies and 
programs in the Plateau that aim manage water usage through demand side and 
integrated water resource planning approaches are generally in their formative 
stages, at best. The implementation of demand side water management and 
integrated water resource planning in the Plateau is partly held back by a scarcity 
of information about the economic value of water in the Plateau's main uses. This 
information scarcity is confounded by the limited understanding of how the 
surface and groundwater systems of the Plateau would alter following water 
reallocation, and a circumscribed understanding of regional water use 
efficiencies. 
Research objectives and thesis outline 
Research objectives 
This thesis contributes to moving the L WR and the National Water Resources 
Strategy of Viet Nam for 2006-10 from principles towards implementation in the 
Dak Lak Plateau. This dissertation's research would be unnecessary if an efficient 
market for water operated in the Plateau. An efficient water market would see 
each unit of water being traded at prices that equalling social cost, aggregate 
social welfare would be maximised from uninhibited water trading, and the 
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steady state water allocation would be sustainable and would stabilise at a level 
that allocated water in-situ to preserve the functioning of non-substitutable water 
dependent assets that are essential to human welfare. However, water in the 
Plateau is either unpriced or imperfectly priced in all usages. Indeed, the 
imperfect pricing of water in the Plateau has resulted in part from the historical 
preference of the State for subsidising water investments in agriculture in order to 
stimulate regional growth. As a result of imperfect prices for water alternative 
non-market approaches are needed to estimate the economic value of water. 
These non-market valuations of water can subsequently be used as the basis for 
the estimation of potential for gains from increasing water use efficiency, and to 
estimate regional changes in social welfare following the reallocation of scarce 
water. 
The thesis has five research objectives and rests on three presumptions. The five 
research objectives are: 
1. To estimate the marginal economic value of irrigation water in smallholder 
coffee production, dry season irrigated rice production, and household usages; 
2. To estimate monetised preference strength for allocating additional water in-
situ for public good and other purposes; 
3. To e-Valuate the scope to increase short run irrigation water use efficiency 
over on coffee and rice smallholdings in the Plateau; 
4. Tq:-evaluate the willingness to pay of households in the Plateau to support 
public programs that aim strengthen the functioning of the Plateau's 
integrated hydro-agro-environmental system; and 
5. To estimate the change in aggregate social welfare of the region that results 
from reallocating dry season water from lower to higher valued uses in the 
Dak Lak Plateau. 
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The thesis research will close fundamental information gaps that hinder the 
development of demand side and integrated water management policies in the 
Dak Lak Plateau. Estimates of the economic value of water as input in coffee and 
rice production, and in household and other allocations are needed to be able to 
evaluate the efficiency, economy, rationality, equity, and sustainability trade-offs 
of reallocating water. Further, estimates of demand for water in smallholder 
coffee and rice production and household usages can be employed for water 
demand planning and forecasting in the Plateau. Estimation of the extent and the 
sources of irrigation inefficiency in smallholder coffee and rice production will 
target opportunities for increasing the technical and allocative efficiency of on-
farm irrigation water management. Increasing irrigation water use efficiency in 
tum should improve smallholder returns on investment and potentially reduce 
total on-farm water demand. Estimates of the willingness of households in the 
Plateau to pay for hydro-agro-environmental benefits that could be gained by the 
successful implementation of programs that increase on farm water use efficiency 
in the Plateau will provide a clear signal to resource and cash strapped Provincial 
authorities whether such a program could be self-financing. Further, monetised 
estimates of preference strength for allocating additional water in-situ in the 
Plateau will indicate the regional social preferences for allocating scarce water for 
this purpose. The integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic analysis measures 
how aggregate social welfare changes at the Plateau and sub-catchment levels 
compared to the status quo when irrigation water use efficiency is increased on 
the Plateau's coffee and rice smallholdings. These estimates of aggregate social 
welfare change can be compared to ex ante estimates of the cost of policy 
implementation to determine whether intervention is warranted on social 
welfare grounds. 
A primary assumption made in.this thesis is that the State has a legitimate role in 
managing the water resources of the Dak Lak Plateau. More pointedly, the 
assumption made is that the State has the right to complete natural resource 
inventories and demand assessments; to produce and disseminate information 
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that encourages public participation in natural resource management; to assign, 
enforce, and rescind property rights; and to intervene and manage natural 
resources when there is an expectation that social welfare will increase as a result 
of the intervention, but would not increase if the State did not intervene. A 
second assumption underlying this thesis is that the preferences of informed 
individuals matter, that the aggregation of informed individual preferences 
measure a general social will, and that the State should normally develop policies 
that are consistent with informed social will. This second underlying assumption 
is rooted in social contract theory and the public interest, market failure model of 
government (Randall 1987). Third, it is assumed that among public policy 
decisii:>n-making alternatives, aggregate economic efficiency is an appropriate 
objective for managing scarce mrtural resources. Applied to water resources, 
aggregate economic efficiency is the state that results when all water reallocations 
that can unambiguously increase net social welfare after processing have been 
exhausted. The basic result of the aggregate economic efficiency is that the 
efficient allocation of scarce water resources maximises the total net benefits from 
water usage across all sectors in society. On aggregate economic efficiency 
grounds, water reallocations are justified in the Dak Lak Plateau whenever the 
sum of utilities shows that more is gained from the reallocation than is lost 
(Griffin, 1995). 
Outline 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a background to the 
supplf- and demand dynamics of water resources in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
Following this background, Chapter 2 formally develops the economic goal this 
thesis employs as the decision rule for the management of scarce water resources 
over time; aggregate economic efficiency. The antecedents for, and consequences 
of, inefficient water allocation over time are subsequently developed formally, 
and a rationale for coordinated water resource management developed based on 
institutional cost theory. A review of the Gisser-Sanchez Effect (GSE) and 
subsequent theoretical and empirical analyses addressing the GSE yields a 
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summary of the physical, producer, economic, and institutional characteristics 
that extenuate the GSE. This summary of extenuating factors is subsequently 
employed to predict whether welfare gains are likely in the Dak Lak Plateau as a 
result of water reallocation, and to identify ex ante the most likely sources of 
these social welfare gains. Chapter 2 concludes by summarising the approach this 
thesis employs for measuring irrigation water use efficiency, which is based on 
Farrell's (1957) notion of firm-specific production efficiency, and by developing 
the role of the State in surmounting public good information failures that cause 
private production inefficiencies. 
Chapter 3 develops the research objectives and methodologies of the thesis. The 
welfare foundations for non-market resource valuation are formally developed. 
The requirements for ensuring that estimated water values are commensurable 
are discussed. A selection of non-market water valuation approaches are outlined, 
with a concentration on the approaches employed in this thesis. The second 
section of the Chapter introduces approaches for modelling integrated 
hydrologic, agronomic, and economic systems. In discussing agronomic systems, a 
distinction is drawn between static approaches to measuring crop output as a 
function of total water applied during the crop growth cycle, semi-dated models 
that estimate crop output as a function of timed water inputs but generally do not 
model interactions between biotic and atmospheric systems, and dated 
production models that define crop output as a function of the relationship 
between timed water input, other inputs, and biotic and atmospheric systems. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the main integration approaches used in integrated 
hydrologic-agronomic-economic modelling are discussed. Research methods for 
each research objective are developed in the final section of the Chapter. 
The marginal economic valu_es of water in dry season smallholder coffee 
production, dry season smallholder rice production, and household usage are 
estimated in Chapters 4 through 6. 
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A stochastic production frontier approach is developed in Chapter 4 to estimate 
the short run marginal economic value of water as dry season irrigation input in 
coffee production. The stochastic production frontier model is semi-dated as it 
incorporates information on the timing and dated quantities of irrigation water 
input during the dry season. The Chapter also empirically derives the semi-dated 
economically efficient dry season irrigation schedule for Robusta smallholders. 
Chapter 5 estimates the short-run, at-source marginal economic value of water as 
input in dry season irrigated rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau. Reliable data 
on the production relationship between water input and rice output in the Dak 
Lak Plateau is lacking. As a result, a dated simulation model of irrigated rice 
production is developed and calibrated to agro-environmental production 
conditions representative of irrigated rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
Outputs from the agronomic simulation model are used to estimate generalised 
dated production and soil moisture transition functions for the representative rice 
plot in a normal climatic year. These generalised production and soil moisture 
transition functions are subsequently used in a non-linear mathematical 
programming model to estimate the constrained profit maximising dry season rice 
irrigation schedule. The marginal economic value of dry season water in irrigated 
rice production is then estimated from the inverse demand schedule for water in 
dry sea~g.n irrigated rice production. The inverse demand schedule is obtained 
from shadow prices that are estimated by imposing different levels of seasonal 
water stock constraint in the mathematical programming model. 
Chapter 6 estimates the private, short-run, at-site marginal economic value of 
delivered water to urban and peri-urban households in Buon Ma Thuot, the 
capital city of the Dak Lak Plateau. A fixed, volumetric tariff is charged for 
municipal water supplied to households in Buon Ma Thuot. Moreover, household 
water taken from other sources, such as private household wells, is unpriced 
other than for direct costs of extraction. The challenges in the estimation of the 
economic value of water in household usage that are posed by imperfect water 
pricing are overcome by pooling results from a novel survey that evaluates the 
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current water usage of households subject to the existing municipal tariff, and 
stated water usage contingent on a schedule of hypothetical municipal water and 
shadow well water prices. Elasticity estimates are used to evaluate consumer 
surplus losses from disrupted water supply for households using municipal water 
supplies only, and households consuming municipal water and household well 
water. 
Chapter 7 evaluates the willingness of households in the Plateau to pay for the 
implementation of a hypothetical irrigation water use efficiency program on 
coffee smallholdings of the Plateau. The public good attributes of the hypothetical 
program are highlighted by linking increasing irrigation water use efficiency on 
coffee smallholdings to potential and uncertain water balance and agro-
environmental ecosystem improvements off farm. The novel survey approach 
enables willingness to pay to be expressed as a function of certainty and of 
experiential, socio-economic, and attitudinal covariates. The parametric 
willingness to pay estimator uses covariates to define the monetised preference 
strength of respondents for the hypothetical irrigation water use efficiency 
program to indirectly allocate additional water in-situ in the Plateau for public 
good purposes. 
Chapter 8 utilises the estimated demands and values for dry season water of 
coffee and rice smallholders from Chapters 4 and 5 to develop a distributed, 
physically based, hydro-agronomic-economic model of the Dak Lak Plateau. The 
hydrologic-agronomic-economic model is used to measure how increasing water 
use efficiency on coffee and rice smallholdings in the Plateau alters the 
hydrologic balance of the Plateau and the social welfare of its residents. The 
integrated analysis of the Chapter constitutes a large step towards the integrated 
river basin planning objective <;>f the LWR (Article 20.1). The integrated analysis 
also enables an economic assessment of the feasibility of Article 26 in the L WR, 
which requires efficient agricultural water use, implicitly irrespective of the cost 
of implementing these efficiencies. Analysis of the Chapter also identifies 
whether increasing water use efficiency on coffee and rice smallholdings will 
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move the Dak. Lak. Province towards a sustainable water balance regime, which is 
a high national priority of the State per the 2006-10 National Water Resources 
Strategy. Chapter 9 concludes and incorporates a discussion about possible State 
water management interventions in the Dak Lak Plateau, based on the thesis 
research findings. 
Aside from the practical contributions this thesis makes towards informing the 
development of demand side water management in the Dak Lak. Plateau, unique 
contributions are made in this thesis to the production efficiency literature, the 
simulation-optimisation literature, the contingent behaviour literature, and the 
contingent valuation. literature. The stochastic coffee production frontier reported 
in Chapter 4 develops the sparse empirical literature that estimates semi-dated 
production frontiers, and highlights the potential for measurement errors when 
static production frontiers are estimated for crops that are sensitive to the timing, 
not just the quantity, of water input. The simulation optimisation model of 
irrigated rice production developed in Chapter 5 is the first known application of 
economic optimisation analysis of irrigated rice scheduling. Moreover, the 
Chapter develops methods for addressing estimation issues unique to crops 
unaffected by aeration stress. The approach developed in Chapter 6 to estimate 
single and simultaneous source household water demands when water prices are 
highly ~perfect or invariant is a unique development to the household water 
demand literature. Consistently, the contingent valuation study developed in 
Chapter 7 to estimate household willingness to pay for hydro-agro-
enviroomental goods and services is the first known contingent valuation study 
to incorporate measures of respondent preference certainty in South East Asia. It 
is also the first known application of the random payment card sorting contingent 
valuation approach in South East Asia. 
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2 
Background and conceptual framework 
Introduction 
The first section of this Chapter provides a background to the dynamics of water 
supply and demand in the Dak Lak Plateau. Following this, the goal of aggregate 
economic efficiency is formally developed. The antecedents for, and 
consequences of, inefficient water allocation over time are subsequently outlined, 
and a rationale for the coordinated management of water resources developed 
based on ins.titutional cost theory. A review of the Gisser-Sanchez Effect (GSE) 
and subsequent theoretical and empirical analyses addressing the GSE yields a 
summary of the physical, producer, economic, and institutional characteristics 
extenuating the GSE. These extenuating factors are subsequently used in an ex 
ante assessment of whether the reallocation of water resources in the Dak Lak 
Plateau are likely to yield social welfare gains, and to identify the most likely 
sources of the social welfare gains. The approach employed in the thesis to 
measure irrigation water use efficiency, which is based in Farrell's (1957) notion 
of firm-specific production efficiency, is then developed. Chapter 2 concludes 
with a discussion of the role of the State in surmounting public good information 
failures that cause private production inefficiencies. 
Background to the Dak Lak Plateau 
Hydrogeology and water resources 
The Dak Lak Plateau is located in the Central Highland region of Viet Nam, 
which is approximately 350 kilometres northeast of Ho Chi Minh City1• The 
Plateau encompasses 2,380 square kilometres in the centre of Dak Lak Province, 
and forms part of the northern boundary to the Srepok River. The Plateau is 
generally flat, with low and undulating hills in the central plain region. Average 
1 12°40'-13°00'N, 107°70'-108°20'E 
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elevation ranges from 350 metres in the west of the Plateau to 700 metres in the 
central region, with higher peaks located in the north-central region. Surface 
water drains to the Krong Buk River in the eastern part of the Plateau, to the 
Krong Ana to the south, and to the Srepok River to the west. The Plateau entirely 
encompasses the six subcatchments of Krong Buk, Ea M'roh, Ea Tul, Ea Knir, Ea 
Pour, and West Buon Ma Thuot. 
The geologic structure of the Plateau is complex but can be characterised simply 
as an upper unconfined aquifer and a lower semi-confined aquifer. The upper 
unconfined aquifer consists of descending layers of Rhodi-Humic Ferralsols 
covering more than 90 per cent of the Plateau, semi-weathered basalt, and mixed 
compact and porous basalt. The upper Rhodie Ferralsols layer is up to 40 metres 
deep and comprises the upper unconfined aquifer. The depth to the water table in 
the unconfined aquifer varies between nil and 40 metres, with artesian conditions 
near surface water systems. Transmissivity, a measure of aquifer permeability 
calculated as the product of hydraulic conductivity and aquifer thickness, ranges 
between one and 270 square metres per day in the upper unconfined aquifer, and 
averages around 120 square metres per day (Moller 1997b: 57, 59). Specific yield, 
a dimensionless measure of the water volume released from an unconfined 
aquifer for a unit decline in head elevation, ranges between 0.002 and 0.07, and 
average~_..around 0.01 (Moller 1997b: 57, 59; Basberg et al. 2008: 22). Groundwater 
drains from the northern uplands of the Plateau towards the east and the west, 
and to the south in the upland's southern regions. -A granite aquitard located 
between five and 40 metres below the land surface separates the upper 
unconfined and lower semi-confined aquifer systems across most of the Plateau. 
Water flows into the Plateau mainly through rainfall. Average annual rainfall is 
1,500 millimetres in the region to the east of the central dividing range of the 
Plateau and 1,800 millimetres per annum to the west of the range. Most rainfall 
occurs during the annual wet season that lasts from May to November. Rainfall 
recharge to the unconfined aquifer averages 480 millimetres to the east of the 
central 
- 12 -
1.450.00 
Ea Soup 
1.440,0 
1 430. 
.- .. 
1 420, 
Ea T ~ua~9 Phu 
1 410.0 
1.400.00 
1.390, 
Khue Ngoc Dien 
1.380,00 
Lien Son 
1.370,000'--~---....-----~------..----,------,----..------+ 
200 000 210.000 220.000 230.00( 160.000 170.000 
lown 
Road 
LJ River & reservoir 
Contour (m ams[) 
~ Sub-catr;hment boundary 
180.000 
--
• 
.. 
190.000 
UTM 49 
Boundary basalt 
Boundary Plaleau 
Rainfall station 
Climate station 
Runoff station 
rt 
Figure 2.1 Subcatchments of the Dak Lak Plateau 
Source: Moller, K. N., 1997. Hydrogeology and water resources of the Dak Lak Plateau, Action 
Plan for Water Resources Development Phase III, Upper Srepok Basin, Vietnam. Working 
Paper 19, Hanoi. 
dividing range of the Plateau, compared to 500 millimetres in the west (Moller 
1997b: 14). Average annual recharge to the unconfined aquifer is approximately 
1.2 million megalitres (ML); of which the majority comes from rainfall. 
Approximately 150 millimetres of the average annual recharge becomes available 
for extraction from the upper unconfined aquifer during the dry season, or 
approximately 360,000 ML for the Plateau. Under pristine conditions, all annual 
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recharge would progressively be released from the unconfined aquifer as 
baseflow. During the dry season all surface water flows in the Plateau are from 
baseflow, with the exception of reservoir releases. 
The Central Highlands region has highest drought index in Viet Nam. Since 1983, 
severe dry season droughts have occurred every five years in the Dak Lak Plateau, 
and in consecutive years between 2003 and 2005. 
Water demand and its attributes 
Intensive smallholder coffee cultivation accounts more than 70 per cent of the 
land area allocated to agriculture in the Dak Lak Plateau, but other cash and 
subsistence crops including lowland rice are also grown. Since 1976, the Plateau 
has been transformed from almost entirely forest cover to predominantly 
smallholder coffee plantation. Local climatic conditions result in only the Robusta 
coffee variety ( Coffea canephora) being propagated in the Plateau. The rapid and 
largely uncontrolled expansion of smallholder coffee production in the Plateau 
follows from the sustained migration of lowland Viet Kinh to the region since 
independence in 1975. The influx of Viet Kinh is attributable to favourable agro-
environmental production conditions, State collectivisation and population re-
distribution policies following independence in 1975, Doi Mal market reforms 
initiated in the early 1980s, the semi-privatisation of land starting in the early 
1990s, and favourable global coffee market prices during the mid 1990s 
(Cheesman and Bennett 2005). 
Coffee:=-and lowland rice production are the largest and second largest sources of 
annual water demand in the Plateau by a sizable margin. Assuming that the 
130,000 hectares of coffee in the Plateau have an average planting density of 
1,050 trees per hectare, and that each coffee tree receives three cubic metres of 
dry season irrigation, the total annual dry season irrigation demand for coffee is 
around 400,000 ML. The irrigation water demand of dry season rice is 
approximately 200,000 ML, assuming that 16,000 hectares in the Plateau are 
allocated to wetland rice production, and that each hectare requires 12,000 cubic 
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Table 2.1 Land allocation in the Dak Lak Plateau, 2000 and 2002 
2000 2002 
Land use 
Per cent Per cent 
agricultural Per agricultural 
Hectares Per cent area Hectares cent area 
Coffee 130,785 55.18 71.8 128,974 54.1 73.5 
Rubber, cashew and 
black pepper 14,158 5.97 7.8 582 0.2 0.3 
Paddy rice 12,808 5.4 7 16,542 6.9 9.4 
Annual crops (including 
upland rice) 24,429 10.31 13.4• 29,504 12.4 16.8 
Residential and water 36,693 15.48 48,173 20.22 
Forest and unused 18,143 7.65 14,430 6.06 
Total 237,016 100 100 238,205 100 100 
Source: National Institute of Agricultural Policy and Planning 
metres of irrigation input. Coffee needs irrigation from late December to early 
January to break flower bud dormancy and induce even fruit setting (D'haeze et 
al. 2005b). Lowland rice requires constant irrigation throughout the Winter-
Spring crop that is propagated between November and March. Previous research 
in the Plateau suggests coffee smallholders over-irrigate (Riddell 1999; Chi and 
D'haeze 2005; D'haeze et al. 2005a). Less is known about the water use efficiency 
of lowland rice producers in the Plateau. However, the fact that all lowland rice is 
cultivated using the continuous submergence method suggests there is scope for 
increasing water use efficiency at the plot level. 
More than 70 per cent of coffee smallholders in the Plateau are estimated to draw 
groundwater from the unconfined aquifer for dry season irrigation, while less 
than 20 per cent exclusively use surface water (Luu 2002). Most coffee 
smallholders own an irrigation pump, irrigation piping, and at least one hand-dug 
production well (Ahmad 2001). Based on the 2002 coffee area, these figures 
suggest there are at least 100,000 hand-dug wells in the Plateau. Importantly, the 
upper aquitard of the Plateau constrains the depth of these hand dug wells to 
between five and 40 metres, depending on the location. Coffee smallholders use 
highly mobile irrigation infrastructure, rigging hand tractors to convert into 
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water pumps. AB a result, outside of irrigation systems, both surface and 
groundwater extraction is unregulated and only effectively limited by the length 
of the irrigator's piping and the pumping capacity of their mobile pump. In the 
past, provincial authorities in Dak Lak have reportedly attempted to regulate 
groundwater extraction by capping well depths and by issuing groundwater 
extr-action licenses (Ahmad 2001). There is no evidence that these regulations 
have been followed through however. Starting in 2001, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development also aimed to manage water by reducing the 
land area under Robusta plantation by 20 per cent, and by introducing alternative 
cash crops requiring less water; again, this program has not been widely 
implemented however. 
To enable a continuous water supply, irrigated rice is mainly cultivated on fields 
in former swamps, near streams, at reservoir outlets, and within irrigation 
systems. The State has not attempted to regulate water extractions from the 
natural surface waterways of the Plateau, although local governments have 
reportedly targeted micro-reservoirs built alongside rivers and streams for 
dismantling, despite the State explicitly supporting small private reservoir 
construction for 'daily life purposes' in the Central Highlands (Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam 1996: 6). Water allocation within irrigation schemes are ostensibly 
planne~3nd regulated, but the irrigation organisations managing the schemes are 
generally weak. Free riding, allocation violations, head tail distribution 
imbalances, and low rates of irrigation fee collection are the result of this 
weakness (Dupar et al. 2002). Backed by international development agencies 
some Communes established Water Use Associations (WUA) during the late 
1990's. All of these WU& have since failed, anecdotally because the WUAs did 
not receive the support of the local Commune Peoples' Committees. 
Urban and agricultural water demands are increasingly intersecting in the Dak 
Lak Plateau. In 2002, a State funded water supply and sanitation infrastructure 
project was completed in provincial capital of Buon Ma Thuot. The system 
provides potable municipal water to approximately 100,000 consumers with a 
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purported 18.25 million cubic metre annual capacity. Household water 
consumption from the municipal system has increased sharply since the project's 
completion. Increasing household water consumption in Buon Ma Thuot has 
reduced flows to lowland rice systems and larger downstream agricultural areas 
(Carl Bro International als 1998). Further, the municipal well production system 
has reduced stream and river baseflows in some regions during the dry season by 
lowering water tables in the unconfined and confined aquifers (Moller 1997a; 
Carl Bro International als 1998). As part of the economic development program 
of the Province smaller rural water supply and sanitation projects are being 
completed in District capitals. It is likely that the pattern of rural-urban water 
transfers will be replicated when these projects are completed. 
In addition to agricultural and urban water demands, the natural environment of 
the Plateau also requires water input to maintain its system functions. The Law 
on Water Resources and the 2020 Water Strategy of Viet Nam both formally 
recognise the importance of environmental water allocations. In the Dak Lak 
Plateau however, the linkages between water stocks, flows, and broader agro-
environmental ecosystem functioning remain un-researched. D'haeze et al. 
(2005b) conjectured that the minimum monthly river discharge needed to avoid 
stream, spring, wetland, and water-dependent ecosystem degradation equalled 
the historical monthly river discharge that was exceeded 90 per cent of the time 
during a very dry rainfall year. On this basis, D'haeze et al. (2005b) estimated the 
minimum environmental flow allocation in the Ea Tul region of the Plateau was 
15,300 ML per annum. 
Synthesis 
The confluence of hydrodynamics, water demand simultaneity, and largely 
unregulated water usage create. an open access resource dilemma in the Dak Lak 
Plateau. The dry season irrigation water demands of coffee and irrigated rice 
account for roughly half the average annual groundwater recharge of the Plateau. 
After accounting for other water demands, Moller (1997b: 97) concluded that 
irrigation water usage in the Plateau during the mid-1990s was sustainable, but in 
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a delicate balance. However, the water balance analysis of Moller failed to 
recognise that the accessible water stock in the upper unconfined aquifer at the 
beginning of the coffee irrigation season is, on average, lower than average annual 
recharge. Further, the drainage gradients of the Plateau show that smallholders in 
the northern and upland regions of the Plateau likely experience pronounced dry 
season fluctuations in the groundwater table, whereas smallholders in the 
southern and lowland regions likely benefit from more stability in the local water 
table. Similarly, the hydrodynamics of the unconfined aquifer mean that 
withdrawals in some regions will cause the water table to decline rapidly and 
diffusedly, whereas pumping effects are more isolated in other regions. Analysed 
in this manner the pervasive interdependencies between the water users of the 
Plateau become clear, and arguments that current extraction levels in the Plateau 
may be unsustainable gain credence. 
Conceptual framework 
The economics of socially optimal water allocation over 
time 
A question central to resource, agricultural, and environmental economics is how 
to allocate scarce resources over time in order to maximise social welfare. Welfare 
economics uses the normative Paretian criterion to identify social welfare 
_ _,. 
increasing resource reallocations. The Pareto criterion, which limits itself to 
welfare conclusions that do not depend on interpersonal comparisons, requires 
that a resource is reallocated whenever the reallocation results in the utility of at 
least one person increasing and the utilities of all other people remaining 
unchanged. A resource reallocation meeting this criterion is characterised as 
Pareto improving. An economy where all Pareto improving reallocations have 
occurred is in a Pareto optimal state. This welfare maximum state is also known 
as neutral economic efficiency, and is characterised by efficiency in consumption, 
production, and product mix (Griffin 1995; Perman et al. 1999). Within an 
economy an infinite number of neutrally efficient allocations exists, each having 
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a unique and non-comparable distribution of individual utilities (Freeman 2003: 
20; Griffin 2006: 50). Because these Pareto optima as equally efficient by the 
standard of neutral economic efficiency, the Pareto criterion is normally too 
ambiguous to guide the practical development of resource management policy. 
Policy precision increases by enforcing an ordinal ranking on the neutrally 
efficient resource allocations, but this ranking first requires that individual 
utilities are somehow aggregated using welfare weights (Freeman 2003: 20). 
Aggregate efficiency, the economic goal accepted in most applied resource, 
agricultural, and environmental economics, achieves an ordinal ranking by first 
using commodity prices and income as proxies for the marginal utility impact that 
a resource reallocation has on each individual within the economy, and secondly 
by summing up these individual impacts (Griffin 1995: 4; Hartwick and Olewiler 
1998: 11). The aggregate economic efficiency approach compares the monetised 
utility outcomes for a policy to those with the status quo, and the policy is 
warranted if the aggregate of monetised utility gains exceeds monetised utility 
forfeits. This is termed a potential Pareto improvement (Pearce et al. 2006: 280). 
Renzetti (2004: 167-70) sets out the necessary conditions for the maximisation of 
aggregate social welfare from the allocation of a renewable stock of water over 
time. Assume water is scarce, homogenous and has an initial known stock of w0 • 
Further, assume that water stock dynamics are characterised by a constant 
replenishment rate, r, and a constant extraction return flow coefficient a . Water 
is allocated in a simple economy characterised by fixed production and extraction 
technologies, and inputs and outputs and priced by competitive markets. In each 
time period (t) an individual (1) gains b(yit) in private benefits by withdrawing 
(0 water units, and incurs c(yit, W1 ) in private pumping costs. The economy 
wide benefit from using water in each time period is the sum of individual 
benefits B(r,) = i)(yJ and the economy wide water withdrawal cost is 
i=l 
- 19 -
C(Y,, w,) = £ c(y;" w,). Further, assume that extraction costs and the water stock are 
i=I 
inversely related so that 
ac(yit• w,) < 0 and ac(r,,w,) <0 
aw, aw, 
(1) 
The resource allocation problem terminates at T. Aggregate social welfare is 
maximised by allocating the scarce water resource over time to maximise the 
present value of the future net benefit stream 
T 
maxr, J [ B(Y, )-C(Y,, w,) ]e-01 dt (2) 
0 
subject to the hydrologic constraints 
wt =r+(a-t)r; (3) 
w, ~o (4) 
w{o)= w0 (5) 
Equation (3) describes the dynamics of the water stock as a function of the 
exogenous recharge and endogenous return flows, and (4) and (5) constrain the 
water stock to non-negative quantities and the upper bound initial known stock. 
With a social discount rate of 8 solving the current valued Hamiltonian, which 
is assumed to be continuous and strictly concave so that conditions for sufficiency 
are satisfied and there is an interior solution, suppressing the time index and 
using subscripts for the partial derivative2 yields the maximum, portfolio balance, 
equations of motion and boundary conditions of dynamic aggregate economic 
efficiency 
2 For the full derivation see Renzetti, S., 2004. 'Water economics. Q Grafton, R. Hill, W. 
Adamowicz et al (eds). Economics of the Environment and Natural Resources. Blackwell 
Publishers. 
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(6) 
µ=<>+cw 
µ µ 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
where µ 1 = e
01 A1 , which is the water stock's present valued shadow price. The 
solution shows that over time, aggregate economic efficiency is characterised by 
(i) equi-marginal value, meaning the present valued net benefit of water is 
equalised across all users and time periods. When the equi-marginal value 
condition does not hold, at least one welfare increasing water reallocation can be 
made; (ii) marginal cost pricing, showing the price of water equals its social cost 
(Dinar et al. 1997: 6). In this simple economy, externalities do not result from 
using water and so the RHS of Equation (6) captures extracted water's social cost 
as the sum of the private extraction cost and the resource scarcity rent; (iii) 
movement in the water shadow price in Equation (7) is determined by two 
conflicting variables; the first term is the social discount rate, which is positive 
and compensating for delaying resource consumption. The second term describes 
the stock effect and is negative with increasing resource stocks. If current period 
extractions have little impact on marginal extraction costs, that is, if Cw 
approaches zero, then the capital gain from retaining water in-situ equals the 
social discount rate, which reflects Hotelling's Rule (Conrad 1999: 80). With 
increasing stocks the Hotelling rule is modified to account for the additional 
return flow (lower extraction costs) that are the result of not extracting a 
marginal amount of water in the current period. As more water is extracted, 
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stocks are reduced and extraction costs increase, thereby reducing the residual 
value of the remaining water stock. The transversality condition in Equation (10) 
shows that at the terminal time either the resource shadow price must be zero, in 
which case the water stock constraint is non-binding, or the resource stock has 
been exhausted. At the steady-state equilibrium the rate of extraction equals the 
replenishment rate (Renzetti 2004: 169). 
Inefficient allocation of water resources over time: 
antecedents and consequences 
In order for the social welfare maximising water economy of the previous section 
to operate, water must be homogenous, perfectly divisible and mobile. Further, 
perfect information must exist for the water stock and the cost and benefit 
functions of extractors, and property rights to the water stock must be efficiently 
defined. Efficient property rights are characterised by (1) legal and physical 
exclusivity to the benefits and costs of the resource, (2) full transferability of 
rights, (3) universality, meaning rights are privately owned and entitlements and 
obligations are completely specified, ( 4) perfect quality of title, meaning all rights 
and obligations are fully enforced, and (5) symmetric treatment by source, 
meaning that water resources with similar quality, quantity, and reliability 
attributes are assigned equivalent rights irrespective of source (O'Mara 1988). 
Perfect information means all individuals operating in the economy know the 
social cost of water in all possible uses and in all time periods (Seyam et al. 2003). 
The combination of efficient property rights and perfect information makes 
enforcing water entitlements a costless activity. Moreover, trading water is also 
costless because water is perfectly mobile, and perfect information obviates the 
need for information searches, contracting, and contract enforcement (Bromley 
1991). Diseconomies cannot occur because they are irrational (Vatn and Bromley 
1997). If water allocation occurs through trade in an. efficient marketplace, price 
path deviations from the modified Hotelling rule present arbitrage opportunities 
that would be taken advantage of instantaneously. As a result, the general 
equilibrium that the modified Hotelling rule defines will hold whenever perfect 
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property rights and perfect information prevail. Moreover, as long as property 
rights are perfectly defined and perfect information operates, social welfare will 
be maximised irrespective of the initial distribution of water property rights 
within the economy. In other words, the aggregate social welfare maximum will 
be achieved regardless of whether rights are initially concentrated in the hands of 
a perfectly benevolent central planner, or in the hands of decentralised and self-
interested profit maximising economic individuals who then engage in free trade 
(Bromley 1991; Wills 1997: 43). In a perfect marketplace, the equilibrium prices 
paid in the exchange of water are realised Pareto improvements (Perman et al. 
1999: 114). 
Imperfect ioformation is the necessary and sufficient condition for water 
allocations over time to diverge from the allocation schedule that maximises 
social welfare (Kasper 1998: 32). Incomplete information creates friction within 
the economy, and any party attempting to overcome imperfect information 
incurs information costs. Incomplete information can hinder the establishment 
and enforcement of property rights. In the extreme case when the information 
costs of establishing an efficient property right regime surpasses the expected 
gains from establishing these rights, the efficient solution is to leave the resource 
in open access (North 1992). A property right is eroded when incomplete 
information violates the universality or perfect quality of title of the resource, or 
prevents symmetric resource treatment by source. In these cases, incomplete 
property rights rooted in information failure prevent the efficient allocation of 
resources. 
Information costs are normally positively correlated with the spread of the 
physical resource; its geographical spread, sparsity of distribution, and the degree 
to which the resource conform~ to being a fugitive good (Dasgupta 1990; Swallow 
1995). Information asymmetries also drive information costs upwards, typically 
increasing as a function of the number of individuals extracting the resource, 
heterogeneity in production and consumption technologies (adverse selection), 
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and the extent to which extractions of individuals are unobservable (moral 
hazard) (Smith and Tsur 1997). 
When extraction from a common pool resource is unregulated individuals follow 
either a non-cooperative myopic extraction path or incorporate some form of 
feedback to determine their extraction schedule over time (Rubio and Casino 
2003; Brozovic et al. 2004; Roseta-Palma and Brasao 2004). The limited evidence 
from the Dak Lak Plateau suggests groundwater extractors do not strategically 
plan their water withdrawals by taking the likely extraction schedules of their 
neighbours (Ahmad 2001). As a result, a non-cooperative myopic extraction 
strategy (Negri 1989; Rubio and Casino 2003; Roseta-Palma and Brasao 2004) 
provides an adequate simple representation of the extraction behaviour of 
unregulated water user under normal conditions of the Plateau. The non-
cooperative myopic strategy means water users ignore the impact that their 
extraction has on water stock dynamics and on the extraction potential and costs 
of other water users (Brozovic et al. 2004: 9; Roseta-Palma and Brasao 2004: 1). In 
this case, the dynamic resource allocation problem reduces to a series of single 
period profit maximisation problems (Brill and Burness 1994; Rubio and Casino 
2003: 73) 
w 
--
max f[ b(yit)-c(yit> wJ) dw (11) 
and results in the privately optimal withdrawal in each time period of 
(12) 
Comparing Equation (6) with Equation (12) shows that the privately optimal 
extraction strategy of the myopic water user excludes the scarcity value of water, 
µ . Ignoring scarcity rents means that the private price of water is lower than the 
social water price. When water is scarce the privately optimal myopic extraction 
rate exceeds the socially optimal extraction rate (Koundouri 2004b). 
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The extraction of a larger quantity of water than is socially optimal causes the 
welfare maximising outcomes of the myopic and social welfare cases to diverge 
for at least two reasons. First, given the water stock is finite, a current withdrawal 
of water prevents this water from being allocated elsewhere in the economy in 
the future. A stock externality is thereby created that equals the present value 
opportunity cost that the foregone water would have if it were allocated to the 
highest value alternative use. Second, an extraction (pumping) cost externality is 
imposed. The extraction cost externality is the additional cost that results in the 
non-cooperative strategy as the result of having to lift water a greater distance 
due to the water table being lower in the myopic strategy than in the cooperative 
strategy. When the water stock is the only available resource, at the margin the 
sum of the stock and pumping externalities equals µ 1 (Provencher and Burt 1993: 
146-147). When a stochastic surface water supply is used in conjunction with a 
backstop ·groundwater source with higher extraction costs, groundwater over-
extraction also imposes a buffer stock externality on conjunctive extractors that 
equals the opportunity cost of the groundwater whenever surface water supplies 
are exhausted (Tsur and Graham-Tomasi 1991). The buffer stock externality 
therefore reflects the risk premium that a risk aversive conjunctive water user 
places on the future private income protection role that the groundwater stock 
provides. 
Should the State_ manage water in the Dak Lak Plateau? 
Defining the efficient boundaries of the State. Prima fade, a public 
interest rationale exists for the State to intervene in the management of the water 
resources of the Dak Lak Plateau, given that water users of the Plateau have not 
recognised that myopic non-cooperative water usage may result in lower social 
welfare outcomes than a coordinated withdrawal strategy. While the State does 
not need to be the entity responsible for the coordination of the water resources 
of the Dak Lak Plateau, the term is used throughout this thesis for convenience 
and also in recognition that the L WR vests the State ·with overall responsibility 
for managing water resources in Viet Nam. 
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The follow-on question concerns what structure State intervention should take. 
Regardless of the form that State intervention takes, institutions are required to 
support the implementation of the intervention. Institutions are defined here as 
the formal and informal societal rules that either directly allocate resources, or 
define structures in which economic individuals are making resource allocation 
decisions (Challen 2001). Institutions therefore operate to provide structure to, 
and increase the surety of, water usage (North 1990). Clearly, different 
institutional arrangements will impose different information costs and give 
individuals differing incentives to cooperate or defect from the institutional rules 
and norms. The central questions posed by institutional economics are (1) given 
the physical resource, the existing institutions, and the evolving 
interdependencies and attributes· of the affected parties, which institutional 
bundle will be the most cost effective in achieving the stated policy objective; and 
(2) will the most cost effective, successfully implemented institutional 
intervention yield a social welfare surplus relative to the status quo. 
Transaction and transformation costs provide the analytical basis for the 
comparison of alternative institutional arrangements. Transaction costs arise 
whenever human interaction needs to be coordinated, while transformation costs 
arise as institutions evolve. Both transaction and transition costs are path 
dependi:gt (Challen 2001: 11). At the level of individual exchange, transaction 
costs arise from the need for information searches, bilateral and multilateral 
contracting, and contract enforcement (Bromley 1991: 63). At the State level, 
transitfun and transaction costs are incurred researching alternative policies, 
enacting legislation, monitoring for compliance, and prosecuting violators 
(McCann and Easter 2004). The fundamental question of institutional choice 
thereby reduces to a cost-effectiveness problem that seeks to minimise the 
aggregate of transaction and transition costs. 
New Institutional Economics suggests the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the State intervening in water management and allocation is that the intervention 
cost is anticipated to be less than the welfare gains that the intervention generates 
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relative to the status quo. The efficient boundaries of the State are defined on this 
basis alone (Birner and Wittmer 2004). The ex ante intervention rule reduces to 
(Young 2005a: 13) 
DB;+ !Bk~ FDBj + F!Bk + TPC +CC (13) 
here, D~ represents direct economic benefits to the receiving sector; !Bk are 
indirect benefits to affected sector(s); FDBj values the foregone direct benefits 
from the sector water is taken from; F!Bk are foregone indirect benefits in other 
sectors; TPC are the transition and transaction costs of the policy option net of 
status quo transaction costs; and CC are the net physical re-distribution costs, for 
example con.veyance costs. Both TPC and CC could be negatively or positively 
signed. Smith and Tsur (1997) demonstrate numerically that an economy is better 
off without regulation when high transaction costs are imposed, as may be the 
case when irrigators operate using heterogeneous production technologies. 
When State management of groundwater and conjunctive 
groundwater and surface water systems is justified. 
The Gisser-Sanchez Effect (GSE) characterises a common finding of numerous 
empirical and theoretical studies that study dynamic solutions to groundwater 
exploitation. The GSE shows that the social welfare gain realised by the 
regulation of an open-access groundwater resource over time can be numerically 
insignificant (Gisser and Sanchez 1980; Feinerman and Knapp 1983; Kim et al. 
1989; Brill and Burness 1994). The GSE has been influential in framing debates 
about the legitimate role of the State in water governance literature. 
A GSE is observed whenever (Koundouri 2004b) 
(14) 
where k is the unit decrease in water demand per unit price increase; C is the 
increase in pumping cost per unit caused by a unit dedine in the aquifer's water 
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table elevation; a is a return flow coefficient and; A and S are respectively the 
constant surface area of the aquifer and its specific yield. 
The GSE effectively shows that whenever the slope of the uncompensated 
groundwater demand curve or the incremental pumping cost is small relative to 
the storage of the aquifer, then the difference between social welfare maximising 
and open access extraction regimes is numerically insignificant (Koundouri 
2004b). After accounting for the institutional costs of regulating water resources, 
the policy implications of the GSE are clear: frequently there may be no 
justification for State intervention to regulate water resources on social welfare 
grounds because the information costs incurred in the management of the water 
resource would exceed the welfare gains from the optimal regulation of the water 
resource. 
If the GSE were to extend to being a general rule of groundwater management it 
would carry significant implications for intervention by the State in the Dak. Lak. 
Plateau. Further, the GSE as a general rule would also carry implications for the 
L WR, which strictly requires that the State to regulate water resources whenever 
demand exceeds supply (Article 20.2). On the other hand, showing how the 
water demand and supply dynamics in the Dak. Lak Plateau deviate from those 
required for a GSE to be observed provides an ex ante social welfare justification 
for State .... intervention in the demand management of water resources in the 
Plateau. 
The GSE is based on a simplified representation of hydrologic, economic, and 
agronomic systems. The aquifer is a homogenous and isotropic 'bathtub', with a 
constant specific yield; hydraulic conductivity is infinite, resulting in withdrawals 
and recharge causing instantaneous and uniform lateral shifts in the permanently 
uniform water table, and the aquifer never being fully exhausted; and water users 
are identical because they share the same water demand and pumping cost 
functions. Combined, these assumptions mean all extractors are uniformly 
affected when groundwater is recharged and withdrawn. In tum, this means the 
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location and spatial density of water users is irrelevant (Zimmerman 1990; 
Brozovic et al. 2004; Koundouri 2004a) and that welfare outcomes are 
symmetrical (Brozovic et al. 2004: 10). 
Dynamic models that incorporate more realistic hydrologic, economic, and 
agronomic parameters than those in Gisser and Sanchez (1980) identify the 
conditions where the GSE is reduced or eliminated. The literature following 
Gisser and Sanchez (1980) shows the GSE is reduced or eliminated when (1) 
water users have asymmetric or elastic demand for groundwater (high k) 
(Feinerman and Knapp 1983; Brill and Burness 1994: 1879). These conditions are 
observed whenever producers have concave water crop production functions, 
whenever l:µid productivity varies between producers drawing on the same 
groundwater stock (Worthington et al. 1985; Kim et al. 1989; Roseta-Palma and 
Brasao 2004), and also whenever water demand is non-stationary over time (Brill 
and Burness 1994). Koundouri (2004b) concludes the sensitivity of the GSE to the 
demand function is the central result that can be derived from reviewing the 
welfare analytic groundwater literature; (2) non-linear groundwater extraction 
costs are incurred (high C). This normally occurs when well yields fall as 
pumping depth increases (Worthington et al. 1985; Brill and Burness 1994: 1877). 
The effect of nonlinear extraction costs may become more obvious when 
hydraulic conductivity is small enough to induce a cone of depression around 
extraction wells and there is close spatial proximity between wells (Zimmerman 
1990; Brozovic et al. 2004); (3) stock effects are important either because demand 
exceeds the accessible water stock. This would coincide with an aquifer being 
nearly exhausted (Burt 1993), or when water users withdraw from a thin aquifer 
(Brill and Burness 1994: 1876) (low AS); (4) when surface water supplies are 
unreliable and risk averse water users use groundwater as a backstop to the 
surface water stock failing (summarised in Tsur and Graham-Tomasi 1991; Knapp 
and Olson 1995; Renzetti 2004 pp170); (5) when irreversible physical changes 
with negative welfare outcomes are brought about by the depletion of the aquifer 
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system (Tsur and Zemel 1995); and (6) when a low social discount rate is applied 
in the dynamic analysis (Brill and Burness 1994: 1876). 
Excepting Tsur and Zemel (1995) the welfare analytic groundwater models set 
aside the issue of groundwater stocks and their relationship to the provision of 
groundwater dependent ecosystem services that affect social welfare. The causal 
linkage between the stock and flow of ecosystem services as a function of 
groundwater stock means that a comprehensive welfare analysis would include 
account for these relationships however. Arrow and Fisher (1974) were amongst 
the first to show the socially optimal development strategy for systems 
characterised by imprecise and potentially irreversible environmental risk is far 
more conservative than that for an otherwise equal but less risky decision 
environment. 
The preceding discussion of the GSE literature suggests that the transition from a 
largely unregulated water access regime to some form of regulated water 
management regime in the Dak Lak Plateau could yield substantial social welfare 
gains, for several reasons. The hydrologic, agronomic, and economic systems of 
the Plateau are heterogeneous and complex, meaning the marginal value of water 
will differ as a result of differences in land productivities (Riddell 1999; Mueller 
2003; D'haeze 2004; Chi and D'haeze 2005; Dridi and Khanna 2005). The 
marginar value of water will also differ as a result of different production 
technologies being in employment (Smith and Tsur 1997), the end use to which 
water !s put, and the differences in risk preferences of water users (Groom and 
Swanson 2002). Because pumping yields should decline in the Plateau as the 
depth to the water table increases, pumping costs will likely vary, possibly non-
linearly. The confining aquitard beneath the Plateau's unconfined aquifer means 
the readily accessible groundwater resource is thin in many parts of the Plateau, 
especially in the western fringe of the Plateau where the aquitard depth averages 
just five metres. Combining high well densities, the rapid dispersion dynamics of 
the unconfined aquifer, storage and drainage gradient properties, as well as ·non-
stationary demand resulting from economic and population growth suggests high 
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incidences of dry season stock and buffer stock externalities. These externalities 
presence in tum imply potential for increasing social welfare by regulating the 
Plateau's water resources. 
Water, smallholder irrigation efficiency, and the State 
A substantial body of empirical literature shows that agricultural producers in 
developing and developed economies are generally inefficient (Ali and Byerlee 
1991; Battese 1992; Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro 1993; Sherlund et al. 2002; 
Karagiannis et al. 2003). This empirical literature stands in stark contrast to the 
assumption of the social welfare analytic groundwater models discussed in this 
Chapter, which assume producers operate on the production frontier. The 
welfare analytic groundwater literature assumes information failures and 
asymmetries exist between producers and planners, but that producers know 
their idiosyncratic production functions, the prices of their inputs and outputs, 
and also that producers are efficient water users, in the sense that water inputs 
cannot be reduced without reducing profits. In the Dak Lak Plateau, an ex ante 
assumption that smallholders are efficient water users cannot be made. 
Eliminating water usage inefficiencies in the smallholder sector is one promising 
avenue for realising potential Pareto improvements. 
Farrell (1957) defined productive efficiency as the capacity of a production 
organisation to produce a well-defined output at minimum cost (Kopp 1981). 
Productive efficiency requires that the production organisation simultaneously 
realises technical, allocative, and scale efficiency. Technical efficiency (TE) 
measures the aptitude of the producer in transforming physical inputs into 
outputs. A TE producer cannot reduce their input to achieve the same output 
level, or equivalently, cannot increase output given input and a production 
technology. Allocative efficiency (AE) measures whether a producer uses the cost 
minimising input mix given output prices, input prices, and their fixed 
production technology. Allocative efficiency equates to allocating scarce 
production factors to their highest valued uses. Scale efficiency (SE) is achieved 
when the marginal cost of producer output and its market price are in 
- 31 -
equilibrium. Allocative and scale efficiency combine as price efficiency, which is 
the necessary condition for profit maximisation. 
Figure 2.2 reproduces an output orientated depiction of allocative and technical 
inefficiency for a single input, single output producer from McGuckin, Gollehon 
et al. (1992). Noting that allocative and scale efficiency are inseparable in the 
single input case, the producer's production function, which is characterised in 
the Figure by decreasing returns to scale, is defined by the lowest concave 
function where the producer is located at A. Maximum possible output for each 
input combination is defined by the outermost concave function, which is the 
production frontier. The producer's production function lies below the 
production frontier for input Xo, and the level of technically inefficiency of the 
producer is (YB - YA)/YB. Output could be increased from A to B by improving 
information, managerial aptitude, or the timing of input supplies (Ali and Byerlee 
1991). At B, the producer becomes technically efficient but is allocatively 
inefficient because profit is maximised at the tangency between the production 
frontier and the input output price ratio, which is C. Relative price inefficiency is 
measured as the percentage profit (Jr ) loss from producing at B instead of C. 
Taking the intercept of the price line (a) as a profit measure (a = Jr /PY), relative 
price inefficiency is (a'-a)/a'. Price inefficiency is caused by imperfect 
informa_t;ion, potentially leading to risk aversion or bounded rational decision 
making (Simon 1982). Price inefficiency may also be caused by market failures for 
input supplies, institutions or capital constraints (Ali and Byerlee 1991). The 
overalr productive efficiency of the producer is defined as the product of 
technical and allocative efficiency. 
As noted, technical and allocative inefficiencies are frequently based in 
information failures. New information that increases production efficiency has an 
economic value to a producer equal to the expected profit gain from bringing 
their production processes closer to the production frontier. For the producer, the 
economic value of information depends on the information they already hold, the 
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Figure 2.2 Price and technical efficiency 
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Source: McGuckin, T. J., Gollehon, N. R. and Ghosh, S., 1992. 'Water conservation in irrigated 
agriculture: a.stochastic production frontier model', Water Resources Research, 28(2):305-31. 
type of data being collected, the accuracy and relevance of the data to production 
decisions, and also the producer's decision criteria (Lawrence 1999). 
In intensive agriculture, when information has public good characteristics, 
meaning it is non-rival and non-excludable, and agricultural production systems 
are information intensive, Osgood (2002) shows that the first best outcome is 
always for a superordinate social planner such as the State to make information 
investments until the marginal improvements in sector wide profits equal the 
marginal information investment cost. Private information investments are 
always inferior because the private information benefits of the individual farmer 
exclude the positive externalities that the information could provide to other 
farmers. Attempts to privatise information provision in this milieu will be 
susceptible to free riding. The result of information hoarding is that the uptake of 
efficient farming practices is inferior to when it is a public good, and this leads to 
suboptimal production. Osgood (2002) further shows that disparities between 
public and private solutions are accentuated when the input is inefficiently 
priced. The implication is when factor input prices are distorted and 
implementing price-based policy tools somehow infeasible, information subsidies 
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provide one alternative for the State to increase on farm input use efficiency and 
generate positive externalities. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter developed the aggregate social welfare maximisation goal that is the 
accepted foundation in this thesis for the management of scarce resources. A 
simple model economy was developed to establish the necessary conditions for 
maximising aggregate social welfare from the allocation of a scarce water stock 
over time. The main externality classes that result from unregulated extraction 
from a common water stock were introduced by modifying the simple stylised 
economy in a way that likely provides a reasonable first characterisation of 
. 
groundwater withdrawal behaviour in the Dak Lak Plateau under normal 
climatic conditions. The analysis of the Gisser-Sanchez Effect and related models 
completed in the Chapter suggests the social welfare gains resulting from State 
intervention in water usage in the Dak Lak Plateau could be sizable compared to 
the status quo alternative of leaving water as a largely unregulated open access 
system. The literature review in the Chapter suggests the welfare gains from State 
regulation of water resources in the Plateau would result from water users in the 
Plateau having asymmetrical demands, non-linear water withdrawal costs, and 
the potential for large stock and buffer stock externalities. Further, given the tight 
-
coupling of the hydrologic and agro-environmental systems of the Plateau, it is 
feasible that additional welfare gains would be realised from regulated water 
management. 
The Chapter established that from the perspective of New Institutional 
Economics, the potential for realising social welfare gains from regulating water is 
a necessary but insufficient condition for the State to intervene. The necessary 
and sufficient condition is that the most cost-effective institutional bundle that 
can realise the resource management objective is less costly to implement than 
the expected social welfare gain. In the Dak Lak Plateau, generalised empirical 
production frontiers are public goods in the sense that the information is non-
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rival and non-excludable once it is in the public domain. By extension, Osgood's 
(2002) analysis suggests the Plateau's social planners have a legitimate role in 
generating and disseminating this type of public good information. 
The water supply and demand dynamics of the Dak Lak Plateau are clearly more 
complicated than the simplified welfare analytic models of groundwater 
allocation discussed in this Chapter. The aquifer system of the Plateau does not 
conform to a homogenous, isotropic, and bottomless bathtub. Water supplies are 
spatially variable, shortages historically pervasive, and land and producers are not 
equally productive. Water usage in the Plateau is complex, and water is always 
imperfectly priced. Given the complex physical and socio-economic milieu, and 
the sensitivijy of social welfare estimates to differing water demand curves, a 
detailed empirical analysis is needed to estimate demand for water and its 
economic value in the main water using sectors in the Plateau. Moreover, a 
detailed analysis is required to estimate the likely social welfare changes that 
would result from the reallocation of scarce water in the Plateau. Non-market 
estimates of the economic value of water and a modelling framework that 
interconnects realistic representations of the hydrologic, agronomic, economic, 
and institutional subsystems of the Plateau are necessary cornerstones of this 
analysis. 
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3 
Research objectives and methods 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 developed the framework of aggregate economic efficiency as the 
overarching water management objective and organising conceptual framework 
of the thesis. Moreover, perfect information was shown to be a necessary 
precondition to being capable of allocating scarce water over time to maximise 
social welfare. Irrigated coffee and rice smallholdings were shown to have the 
greatest consumptive demand for water in the Plateau, and further that these 
smallholders are likely inefficient water users by the standard of Farrell (1957). 
On these bases, in Chapter 2 it was suggested that institutions to increase water 
use efficiency in the irrigated coffee and rice sectors could provide the foundation 
for a sustainable and Pareto improving water management policy. The Chapter 
concluded that the economic value of water in its main usages in the Plateau 
must be estimated as a path to understanding the social welfare implications of 
potential water reallocations. Both these arguments are consistent with the 
requirements of the L WR and the National Water Resources Strategy of Viet 
Nam for 2006-10. 
In the f1ak Lak Plateau, information failures based in biological uncertainty, 
natural variability, and information asymmetries are pervasive. These information 
failures make the identification of the social welfare maximising water allocation 
over time an impractical applied research objective. As a result, this thesis 
research targets reducing epistemic uncertainty where it is believed that the 
information gains will yield the largest net benefits in terms of informing the 
development of real demand side water policies in the Dak Lak Plateau. The GSE 
discussion in Chapter 2 showed that the attributes of and interdependencies 
between water demand, supply, and a common water stock determine the 
magnitude of social welfare gains that can be realised by shifting from an 
unregulated open access water regime to some form of institutional regulation. 
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This thesis research concentrates on estimating and modelling linkages between 
demand, supply, and water stocks in the Dak Lak Plateau that enable these social 
welfare implications of shifting water allocations to be parsed out. 
This Chapter develops the methodologies that are subsequently used to evaluate 
the research objectives of the thesis. The Chapter has four sections. After a re-
statement of the research objectives in the following section, section two 
develops the social welfare foundations for the valuation of water as an economic 
good. The main categories of economic values are outlined in the two subsequent 
sections, and revealed and stated preference approaches to the estimation of non-
market values overviewed. Approaches to the estimation of non-market water 
values are then outlined, with discussion concentrating on those methods used in 
the thesis for the estimation of the economic value of water in the Dak Lak 
Plateau. Section three develops foundation issues in hydrologic, agronomic, and 
cost-benefit analysis, and then introduces core concepts in integrated hydrologic-
agronomic-economic-institutional modelling. The thesis research methods are 
detailed in Section four. 
Research objectives 
Restating, the thesis research objectives are 
1. To estimate the marginal economic value of irrigation water in smallholder 
coffee production, dry season irrigated rice production, and household usages. 
2. To estimate monetised preference strength for allocating additional water in-
situ for public good and other purposes. 
3. To evaluate the potential for increasing irrigation water use efficiency over 
the short-run on coffee and rice smallholdings of the Plateau. 
4. To evaluate willingness to pay to support public programs that strengthen the 
hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem functioning of the Dak Lak Plateau. 
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5. To estimate the change to aggregate social welfare from the reallocation of 
water during the dry season in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
Consistent with the discussion in Chapter 2, irrigation water use efficiency is 
evaluated in this thesis using production economics rather than agronomic or 
engineering approaches. These latter methods normally define water use 
efficiency as the ratio of water the crop uses for growth over the applied water 
volume (Omezzine and Zaibet 1998). Irrigation water use efficiency is defined in 
this thesis in the terms of Farrell (1957), that is, as the allocatively and technically 
efficient irrigation schedule conditional on production technology and observed 
output or input levels. Further, allocative efficiency is evaluated in this thesis by 
testing whether a producer employs an input until the marginal output value of 
the input equals its price. This approach is compared to using the more 
constraining test of allocative efficiency, which is whether the producer is 
operating on the expansion path (Ali and Byerlee 1991). Note further that the 
agronomic and engineering definition of irrigation water use efficiency is not 
directly comparable to technical or allocative efficiency since it is only one 
dimension of input use (Karagiannis et al. 2003). The distinction is that the 
economic concepts of technical and allocative efficiency measure management 
aptitude, whereas the agronomic and engineering measure of irrigation water use 
efficien~ is largely a physical measure of the performance of irrigation 
technology (McGuckin et al. 1992). 
The integrated hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem construct developed in this 
thesis is based on the concepts of productivity, stability and resilience, and 
diversity. Ecosystems are broadly definable as complex systems that include biotic 
and abiotic components (King 1993). Productivity is defined as output per unit of 
input. Thus, a productive hydrologic system minimise system losses, and a 
productive agro-environmental ecosystem maximises yield per unit of water 
input. Stability and resilience are closely related properties and lack a clear 
demarcation in the agro-ecology literature. In this thesis, stability is defined as 
the ability of a system to resist departure from its equilibrium condition, and 
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resilience as the ability of a system to return to equilibrium following departure 
(Okey 1996). Applying these stability and resilience definitions, increasing hydro-
agro-environmental ecosystem functioning implies that the productivity of these 
systems become increasingly stable in the face of stressors, and also returns 
quickly to stable productivity following shocks. Diversity measures the structural 
and functional variability of a system. It is generally assumed that increasing 
diversity increases redundancy between the components of a complex system and 
thereby generates fallbacks in the event of stressors. System stability is increased 
on this basis (Okey 1996). 
Measuring natural resource values 
The value concept of neoclassical welfare economics is employed in this thesis as 
the conceptual basis for the estimation of the economic value of water. The 
welfare economics foundations for valuing natural resources are well developed, 
as is the non-market environmental valuation literature (Freeman 2003) and 
valuation of water resource literature (Gibbons 1986; Whittington and Swarna 
1994; Boyle and Bergstrom 1995; National Research Council 1997; Agudelo 2001; 
Ward and Michelsen 2002; Birol et al. 2006a; Griffin 2006). As a result, discussion 
in this section outlines the welfare theory underlying non-market valuation at a 
high level, and only discusses in detail the non-market valuation approaches 
employed in the thesis research. 
Welfare foundations of non-market valuation 
Welfare economics makes four assumptions about the structure of individual 
preferences (Ostrom and Ostrom 2000; Rosenberger 2001). First, individuals aim 
to maximise their own utility, which is preference satisfaction. Second, for any 
two given bundles comprising market and non-market goods and services, 
individuals can establish preferential ordering. Preferences are a unique function 
of each individual's values, background, beliefs, objectives, and a variety of other 
motivating factors that cannot be directly observed. These same factors also 
define the options an individual perceives to be available to them within a choice 
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set (Vriend 1996). Third, individuals are instrumentally rational. This means 
preferences are reflexive, transitive, and continuous (Binger and Hoffmann 1998). 
Assuming non-satiation, instrumental rationality also means that an individual 
facing a bundle with more of one normal good will prefer it to an otherwise 
identical bundle with one less of the same normal good. Fourth, individuals are 
assumed to be able to substitute different goods, services, and states of the world 
between bundles in order to become indifferent between the bundles. 
The basis for deriving measures of the economic value of changes to resource and 
environmental systems is based in how these changes affect individual utility. 
Where self-interested decision markers choose between market and non-market 
goods, the individual's utility change for an increase in a market or non-market 
good is measured as the maximum the individual is willing to forego or pay 
(WTP) in other market and non-marketed goods and services in order to obtain 
the additional quantity of the good being valued. Conversely, for an increase in a 
good, service, or state of the world that reduces the utility of an individual, the 
metric is the minimum compensation the individual would accept (WTA) to be 
indifferent to suffering this change (Agudelo 2001; Young 2005b). 
Willingness to pay and WTA are based on the core assumption of substitutability. 
Substitutability means that the individual can be compensated for the loss of one 
good, s~ce, or state of the world with some other good, service, or state of the 
world so they are indifferent between the two states of utility. Indifference means 
that th~ individual is located on the same utility curve for the two allocations, but 
at different points on that curve. The trade-off ratio defined by the substitution 
defines the economic value of the good the question. Compensation is normally 
based on a monetary numeraire, however it could take any factor form that 
returns the losers in the exchange to their original level of utility (Adler and 
Posner 1999). When money is the numeraire, the trade-off ratio estimates a 
monetised economic value for the good or service being substituted. 
-40-
Following Haab and McConnell (2003: 5), Freeman (2003), Lusk and Hudson 
(2004), Johansson (1993), and Perman et al. (1999), the individual utility ( U) 
function is typically defined by a vector of private goods (x), a public good (q), 
and income ( }}. Private goods include all goods and services whose consumption 
level is under the control of the individual. Public goods are all goods and services 
that have exogenously determined supply. 
Water could be either a private or public good. Assume for simplicity the vector p 
contains the price of all private goods. The individual maximises utility, with the 
indirect utility function given by 
v(p,Y,q)= max { u(x,q)I px::;; Y} 
x 
(15) 
The dual minimum expenditure function is 
e(p,u,q)=min{ px I u(x,q)~u} (16) 
x 
From Equation (15) the Marshallian demand function is obtained via Roy's 
Identity and the derivative of the indirect utility function 
av(p,q,y)/ 
(p ) /8p; x; ,q,y =- av(P % 
,q,y 
8y 
(17) 
The compensated Hicksian demand function, which shows the relationship 
between the price of a good and the quantity purchased on the assumption that. 
other prices and utility are held constant, is obtained from Equation (16) 
u(p u )= ae(p,u,q) 
X; ' ,q 8 
'P; (18) 
Letting superscript o indicate the state of the world prior to the implementation 
of a well defined policy intervention, superscript n describe the state of the world 
following the policy intervention, and superscript • define a vector with one 
missing element, the maximum utility before and following a change in the price 
of one private good are defined by 
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U0 = v{p; ,p*,Y,q) (19) 
and 
(20) 
The?, the welfare effect of a price change to a private good is 
CV= e(p; ,p*,U0 ,q)-e(p; ,p*,U0 ,q) 
PF 
=-J X~ (p;,p*,U 0 ,q)dp; (21) 
pf 
Compensating variation ( Ci-j defines the lump sum payment the individual is 
willing to pay in order to obtain the price decrease in Xi. Marshiallian Consumer 
Surplus (MCS) is measured by 
PF 
MCS = J X;(pi'p*,Y,q)dpi 
pf 
(22) 
Note that when the private good subject to price change has an income elasticity 
greater than zero, then estimated CV will be less than MCS when the price falls 
and greater than MCS when price increases. Freeman (2003) defines the approach 
for estimating equivalent variation from the Hicksian demand, which is defined 
as the additional expenditure necessary to reach a new utility level given an 
initial set of prices and also the implied property right bases for both approaches. 
Assum~ng that o~q > o, the compensating variation measure of a change in the 
level of public good supplied is 
CV= v(p,Y,qn )-v(p,Y,q 0 ) (23) 
For the expenditure function, the compensating surplus is 
CS= e (p,U 0 ,q0 )-e(p,u0 ,qn) (24) 
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In other words, the economic value of a public good to the individual equals the 
amount of income the individual is willing to sacrifice to obtain the good and be 
indifferent between their new and original states of utility. Expressions for WTA 
are provided in Haab and McConnell (2003: 8). These expressions are not 
repeated here given all analyses in this thesis are based on WTP. 
Producer surplus equivalents can readily be derived for the single output, profit 
maximising producer with a profit function defined by output (z), the output 
price (.z}, a vector of private input prices (p), private inputs (x), an exogenously 
determined public good (q). Assume a production relationship z = z(x,q), and 
further assume that q somehow constrains the output of the producer given their 
inputs and production technology. The producer's profit maximisation objective 
IS 
n(p,r, q) = max{n(p, r, q) I px ~ y} 
" 
(25) 
The profit maximising producer equates marginal benefits and costs for each 
input resulting in 
(26) 
Where Jr/\ , z(x/\, q), and x/\ denote maximum profit, and the profit 
maximising output and input levels, given the constraint of q. By Hotelling's 
lemma, demand for a private good is 
(27) 
o n 
An increase in the price of a private factor from P to P results in a change in 
producer surplus defined by 
Pn 
PS= Jin /\-Jr 0 /\= - f X; /\ (p,r,q)dp; (28) 
Po 
Moreover, for an increase in the public good supplied 
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(29) 
In other words, at the margin WTP equals the additional profit gain from shifting 
from q 0 to qn. Lusk and Hudson (2004) derive producer surplus estimates for 
the cost minimising equivalent to these functions. 
The· inverse demand function of water users for a water supply is defined by the 
WTP of water users for each increment of water supply, with willingness to pay 
being equal to the marginal benefit the user obtains at each supply increment. 
The inverse water demand function is the appropriate function for the estimation 
of the economic value of water when water markets do not operate competitively 
or do not exist (Young 2005b: 33). Moreover, when water users are willing to pay 
more for water than the observed ~arket price, they receive an economic surplus 
equal to the additional value they are willing, but are not required to pay. 
In Figure 3.1 the inverse water demand schedule of user (1), in period (t), and in 
the usage (J) is defined by the downward sloping marginal benefit (MB) function. 
The downward slope indicates that each additional increment of water supplied 
to the individual provides decreasing marginal benefits for the user. Total WTP is 
the area under the WTP frontier from the origin up to the water quantity 
supplied. The acquisition cost of the user is MCtj. Accounting for the marginal 
cost of -ebtaining water, increasing water supply to the user from W1 to W2 
generates the user surplus, which is the area bounded by ABCD. This economic 
surplus defines the economic value of the increment of water to the user, which 
is the maximum income the water user would be willing to trade off to obtain the 
supply increment. 
Figure 3.1 defines the economic surplus of a single producer or consumer from 
using water in a single and separable usage, and in _a well-defined time period. 
When water is scarce and a private good characterised by excludability and 
consumption rivalry, the location of the aggregate MB function at each supply 
point equals the highest willingness to pay of an individual within a group. When 
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water is a public good characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry in 
consumption, the inverse water demand function is defined by the aggregate 
willingness to pay of all water 'users'. 
Value commensurability 
Policy analysis requires that inter-sectoral water values are commensurable. 
Value commensurability requires that values are derived using a common 
(compensated or uncompensated) demand estimation approach, a similar 
planning timeframe, that the marginal supply cost estimate includes costs with 
the same length of run, and also that the same measurement unit is used to 
quantify the amount of water. This section considers each of these issues in tum. 
As already stated, unless the income elasticity for an estimated demand function 
is zero, the Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions and their associated 
welfare estimates differ by the size of the income effect that results from the price 
change of the private good. Strictly, economic surpluses calculated from 
compensated and uncompensated demand functions are incommensurate. 
However, Willig (1976) showed that when the good or service being purchased is 
Price 
a' 
a 
QuantityW 
Figure 3.1 Quantity effects and change in econoII1ic surplus from a non-
marginal water supply shift 
Source: Young, R., 2005. Determining the Economic Value of Water: Concepts and Methods, 
Resources for the Future, Washington D.C. 
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a small percentage of the total budget of an individual, the Marshallian consumer 
surplus measure for a price change is normally within five per cent of the 
Hicksian compensating variation. Willig's result implies that the uncompensated 
demand function reasonably approximates the compensated function. Bockstael 
and McConnell (1993) show on the other hand that in the case of the supply of 
exogenous public goods Marshallian consumer surplus does not provide a 
reasonable approximation for the Hicksian measure (Perman et al. 1999: 410). 
Planning timeframes define the length of run over which resources are 
committed and their costs sunk (Ward and Michelsen 2002). Over the short-run, 
plant capacity is fixed and treated as a sunk cost, but variable inputs are alterable. 
The practical upshot is that when calculating the short-run economic value of 
water, it is estimated as the difference between the individual willingness to pay 
for water and variable costs only. Over the long-run, all fixed capital becomes 
variable and these costs must be added to the short-run marginal cost. Logically, 
where fixed costs are non-zero, the short-run economic value of water will be 
greater than its long-run economic value for a single site and production process. 
This naturally raises questions about the appropriate timeframe for policy 
analysis. Young (2005) suggests the short-run economic value of water is the 
appropriate basis for modelling temporary variations in water supply, such as 
during 9Jought shortage periods. Long-run values are more appropriate when 
longer run investment and inter-sectoral allocation policies are modelled. 
The eC?nomic value of water also depends on whether it is estimated at site or at 
source. The economic value of water at source defines the maximum amount an 
individual is willing to pay for an increment of water supplied in its raw 
untreated form at the water source. Because water demand functions are 
normally estimated for water at-site, water treatment, delivery, and storage costs 
must be subtracted to obtain an at source value. The at site economic value of 
water is normally higher than the at source value, with the value difference 
attributable to costs incurred to convert the water from its raw into preferred end 
use form. When inter-sectoral allocation decisions are informed by each sectors' 
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inverse demand for raw water, policy decisions are made based on a common 
place, form, and time denominator (Ward and Michelsen 2002). 
Young (2005b) identifies three measures used to the quantity of off-site water 
usage: withdrawal, delivery, and consumptive. Withdrawal defines the water 
supply quantity as the amount removed from the source. Delivered water defines 
supplied water quantity as the volume delivered to the usage site, meaning it is 
source withdrawal less transmission losses. Consumptive use defines the water 
quantity as the amount of water lost from the water cycle. In irrigated 
agriculture, this equals the amount of water lost through evapotranspiration and 
permanent storage within the plant. Defining the water supply quantity based on 
consumptive use recognises that in nearly closed water cycles, most water from 
the source is recycled. The standard practice for evaluating inter-sectoral water 
allocations and demand analyses uses the quantity of water delivered at site as 
this is the amount controlled by the end user. When all other factors are held 
constant, the economic value of water based on withdrawal will be lower than 
the same water valued on delivery, and both of these measures will be lower than 
estimated economic value of consumed water. 
The final value dimension is whether the economic value of water is estimated 
using an average or at the margin. The average economic value of water is the 
ratio of a water user's total willingness to pay for a quantity of water over the 
quantity supplied. The ~arginal value of water is the consumer's willingness to 
pay at each small increment of water supplied. While the average economic value 
of water is easily calculated, it is a misleading basis for the development of water 
policy, excepting the case when average and marginal values for water 
approximate each another (which will occur when demand approaches perfect 
elasticity and supply costs are. constant). In agricultural production, household 
use, and in-situ allocation, the average economic value for water can hide 
important marginal relationships between water input and utility. These marginal 
relationships between water supply and utility are important given the 
propensity for water to have decreasing marginal utility from use. The average 
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value of water is generally larger than its marginal value in irrigated agriculture, 
household use, and in-situ use. As a result, basing investment decisions on 
average water values distorts the true demand for additional water supply 
capacity (Ward and Michelsen 2002). Intra and inter-sectoral water allocation 
and supply infrastructure analyses should be based on marginal water values. 
Further, marginal and average water values should not be treated as nearly 
commensurate unless demand is nearly perfectly elastic. 
Use, non-use, and Total Economic Value 
The economic value of an asset is defined by the encompassing measure of Total 
Economic Value (TEV). Total Economic Value decomposes into use and non-use 
values. Use values are gained from either directly consuming the asset or 
somehow using it without subtracting from the resource stock. Moreover, users 
demonstrate an option value for an asset if they have a non-zero WTP to preserve 
the asset in order to have the choice of using it in the future. Assets have a passive 
or non-use value whenever an individual states they have a positive WTP for 
maintaining an asset even though they have no potential for actual, planned, or 
possible future use (Bateman et al. 2002). Individuals with passive use values can 
be motivated by the continued existence of the good for its own sake (existence 
value), or through non-reciprocal paternalistic altruism for others (benevolence 
value) (;McConnell 1997). Paternalistic altruism is based on an individual having 
the preference for others to experience a non-market resource. Resources used 
passively are pure public goods. Freeman (2003) defines passive use values as the 
residual between a resource's TEV and the net of use values ofWTA and WTP. 
Revealed and stated preference approaches for the 
estimation of the economic value of natural resources 
Non-market valuation uses either revealed or stated preference approaches to 
estimate economic values. The fundamental difference between the revealed and 
stated preference approach is the data used (Boyle 2003b). Revealed preference 
approaches use data about the observed behaviours of individuals. Stated 
preference approaches rely on the individual stating their preference for a 
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hypothetical good or service. Revealed preference approaches require weak 
complementarity between the non-marketed resource being valued and actual 
purchases of related private goods to maximise utility or profit subject to 
constraints (Maler 1985). Whenever the weakly complementary private good or 
service is not consumed, the economic value of the non-market resource is zero. 
The stated preference method can be used to define the non-market value of 
goods and services irrespective whether weak complementarity exists between 
the asset or service flow and marketed goods. Freeman (2003) and Champ, Boyle 
et al. (2003) provide comprehensive outlines of the utility theoretic 
underpinnings of the revealed and stated preference methods. 
A selective overview of non-market water valuation 
approaches 
Valuing water as an intermediate good 
When water is used as an intermediate input factor in a production process, its 
economic value is defined by the additional output value that it generates in 
isolation from other inputs and production technology. Young (2005b) provides 
comprehensive accounts of the product exhaustion and economic rent 
foundations for valuing water as an intermediate production input, noting both 
approaches lead to the same underlying residual formula. Gibbons (1986), 
Agudelo (2001), Young (2005c), and Griffin (2006) summarise the non-market 
approaches for valuing water as an intermediate good. The following discussion 
draws extensively on the above sources. 
The basic inductive approach estimates a generalised production function from 
empirical data 
y = J(X; w;L,N,K,E) (30) 
Where X defines a vector of variable inputs directly involved in the production 
process, such as seed type and fertiliser, Lis a labour input vector, N is a vector of 
exogenous agro-environmental production conditions such as soil type or 
- 49-
temperature, Z defines a vector of facilitating crop management practices and 
socio-economic variables, K is fixed capital, and E equity capital. All other inputs 
have been previously defined. Recall production economics theory identifies y as 
the maximum attainable output from fixed input and production technology, 
meaning the production process is technically efficient and the generalised 
function is a production frontier (Battese 1992; Coelli et al. 1998: 12). 
The producer aims to maximise profits while operating in market where all factor 
inputs other than water are competitively priced. Competitive pricing requires 
that the value of all other non-marketed agro-environmental inputs such as soil 
condition and land slope are fully reflected in land market prices, and also that 
labour prices fully reflect the differential management aptitude of producers. 
There is perfectly elastic demand for output so that prices for all non-water inputs 
and output are known and constant. Water is not priced, but volumetric 
irrigation costs (pw) are defined and inversely related to pumping depth (n). 
Further, the relationship between the distance between the water source and the 
production site (R) defined by p w (D, R). w , p' w > 0, p" w > 0. Assume that both the 
pumping depth and distance to the water source remains constant throughout the 
analysis. Then, following Acharya et al. (2000) and Young (2005a: 54) the 
irrigator's long-term profit function is 
JT(X, w,L,N,K,E,py,Px,Pw'pL ,PN,PK ,PE) 
=Py ·f(X, w,L,N,K,E)-(P, ·X+pw ·w+PL ·L+PN ·N +PK ·K+PE ·E) 
(31) 
Holding all other inputs constant, the profit-maximising irrigator applies water 
until the value marginal product,P . 8/(X,w,L,N,K,E), equals the marginal 
y aw 
irrigation cost 
8JT 8/(X, w,L,N,K,E) 
aw =Py. aw = Pw (32) 
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Maximising Equation (31) involves optimising maximising returns from water 
inputs [Equation (32)] and all other growth and facilitating inputs 
81C _ BJ(X, w,L,N,K,E) _ p 
-a -Py· a - X; Vxj 
'Xj 'Xj 
(33) 
(34) 
The first oraer conditions defined in Equations (32) through to Equation (34) 
result in allocative efficiency, and combined with technical efficiency, the 
producer is overall efficient in Farrell's (1957) sense. 
Changes to production surpluses resulting from marginally changing the water 
supply are measured by 
81C = . 8J(X, w,L,N,K,E) = VMP 
aw Py aw Pw w 
(35) 
The right hand side of Equation (35) is the value marginal product of water 
(VMP). Value marginal product is the producer's maximum willingness to pay for 
the additional water and is also the marginal economic value of water. For larger 
supply increments, the area evaluated under the demand curve and between the 
supply points defines the average economic value of water for that non-marginal 
amount. When all other inputs are held constant, so that only the water supply 
increases, the Le Chatelier's Principle shows these changes define the lower 
bound of the producer's welfare change, because the producer maximises 
constrained profits (Johansson 1993). The fact that the producer maximises 
subject to constraints reflects the reality that with in.creased water supplies the 
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producer could feasibly reorganise other production inputs to obtain a higher 
profit; they cannot do this of course when all other inputs are fixed. 
The residual imputation approach estimates the economic value of water by 
allocating the total output value from the production process between production 
factor inputs. Residual imputation is based on two axioms (Agudelo 2001: 29). 
First, there are efficient market prices for all inputs other than (in this case) 
water, so that resource prices are equal to the value marginal product for each 
input. The rational profit maximising producer then allocates inputs to equate 
VMP and price, thereby ensuring that all possible profit obtainable from the use 
of these inputs is captured. Second, total value product can be divided into shares 
so that each input is paid according to its value marginal product and the total 
value of output is exhausted. This latter assumption is based on Euler's Theorem. 
Assuming the production function in Equation (30), if a competitive market exists 
then prices can be treated as constants. By the second condition the value of total 
product can be expressed as 
y· Pv = VMP, ·X+VMPw ·w+ VMP1 ·L+ VMPn ·N + VMPk ·K+ VMPe ·E (36) 
where VMP; describes the value marginal product of input 1. By the first 
condition 
(37) 
Rearranging Equation (37) obtains the average economic value of water 
y·py -(P, ·X+P1 ·L+Pn ·N +Pk ·K+Pe ·E) 
Pw = 
(38) 
w 
The residual imputation approach and its extensions are sensitive to changing 
input and output prices, and the omission of production factors. As a 
consequence, the approach should mainly be applied when water is a sizable 
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production input. Several technical issues need addressing to ensure the residual 
imputation approach is correctly applied. Young (2005b) discusses these issues in 
detail, and these methods are applied in Chapter 5 of this thesis to estimate the 
marginal economic value of water in irrigated rice production in the Plateau. 
Despite the recognised limitations of the residual imputation method the 
approach provides an acceptable basis for the estimation of the shadow price of 
irrigation water in settings where agricultural production activities are relatively 
simple, are characterised by stable production over time and water is a dominant 
determinant of yield. 
Consumer and public good values of water. 
When wate~ is not an intermediate input in a production process, this Chapter 
has already shown that economic valuation is based on the willingness of an 
individual to substitute other goods or services for the water. Freeman (2003) 
provides a comprehensive outline of non-market approaches for valuing natural 
resources as private consumer and public goods. The discussion in this section 
focuses on one econometric and two stated preference approaches that are 
employed in this thesis to estimate the marginal economic value of water in 
household usage and to estimate household willingness to pay for uncertain 
hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem improvements, which is also a monetised 
measure of preference strength for allocating water for these purposes. 
Inductive econometric analyses are one main approach for the valuadon of water 
as a final consumption good Household water demand is most frequently 
analysed using this approach. Consumer water demand is generally expressed as a 
function of a municipal water tariff, prices of substitute water, income, and other 
environmental and consumer specific attributes 
(39) 
Where water has no market price, the marginal opportunity costs of obtaining 
water can be used as a proxy (Nieswiadomy 1985; Omezzine and Zaibet 1998). 
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The economic value of water at site is normally estimated by subtracting delivery 
costs from a Marshallian gross consumer surplus estimate, which is obtained from 
an empirical uncompensated inverse demand function derived from household 
water consumption records. Hausman (1981) provides an approach for estimating 
Hicksian demand functions when income elasticity is not zero. 
Econometric approaches to the estimation of household water demand functions 
require that water is priced and further that the water price varies. When these 
conditions are lacking (as occurs when urban water has a fixed tariff), inverse 
demand can be derived from data obtained from using stated preference 
techniques. Revealed and stated preference data on water demands can also be 
pooled. Pooling revealed and stated preference data confers several advantages: 
first, the revealed preference data ensures the demand estimate is partially based 
on actual consumption behaviour, whereas stated preference methods enable 
demand preferences to be understood for novel water supply scenarios. Second, 
convergent validity between the revealed and stated preferences of respondents 
can be tested to confirm respondents apply the same underlying preference 
structure in both elicitation formats, which is fundamental for preference 
consistency (McConnell et al., 1999). Third, by using panel data econometric 
methods, individual level heterogeneity can be controlled (Englin and Cameron 
1996). :f;:]Jlpirical analyses pooling revealed and stated preference data generally 
show pooling obtains more efficient and robust estimates, especially when small 
datasets are used (Adamowicz et al. 1994; Ben-Akiva et al. 1994; Englin and 
Cameron 1996; Adamowicz et al. 1997; Huang et al. 1997; Acharya and Barbier 
2002; Bo:xall et al. 2002; Earnhart 2002; Hanley et al. 2003) .. 
The two main stated preference approaches for measuring consumer and public 
goods are the contingent valuation method (CVM) and the attribute-based stated 
choice method (SCM). In the CVM approach, respondents are asked to directly or 
indirectly indicate their WTP for shifting from a baseline status quo situation to a 
hypothetical alternative world that can be realised by implementing a specific 
policy. The CVM normally elicits an aggregate willingness to pay for the 
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composite of the objectively defined policy benefits. In other words, the CVM 
approach does not typically decompose individual stated WTP for an asset or 
bundle of goods and services into independent implicit values, even though this 
can be achieved with a repeated contingent valuation design (Kuriyama et al. 
1999). The attribute based stated choice method does the opposite of the CVM 
approach. SCM decomposes the asset value of a good or service into independent 
part-worths for the main attributes of the asset. The asset is then valued as the 
sum of the independent attribute values. The SCM approach assumes the 
underlying preference framework is based on Lancastrian consumer theory 
(1966). Lancastrian consumer theory asserts that individuals demand the 
characteristics inherent in goods and services, not the goods and services .per se. 
When the attributes of an asset are entirely defined, summing the attribute values 
provides a TEV estimate of the asset (Train 2003). 
Compared to CVM, attribute based SCM has an in principle advantage of being 
able to decompose the asset outcomes of a policy into implicit values for direct, 
indirect, option, and passive usages. Authors suggest SCM has several other 
advantages over CVM, and these are summarised in Boxall, Adamowicz et al. 
(1996) and Birol, Karousakis et al. (2006a). A practical limitation of the SCM 
approach is its task complexity. Task complexity generally increases with the 
number of attributes used to define a good, and this generally results in the 
number of attributes used to define a good being limited to seven or less. SCM 
studies that have employed more than seven attributes have encountered 
preference instability (Carson et al. 1994). 
Further, to date SCM applications have not developed approaches to incorporate 
measures of respondent preference certainty. In the CVM literature, several 
approaches have been developed to measure preference uncertainty, and to 
incorporate this uncertainty into willingness to pay estimates. Collectively, the 
preference certainty CVM literature suggests not allowing respondents to express 
preference uncertainty causes willingness to pay to be over-stated for both public 
and private goods (Holmes and Kramer 1995; Champ et al. 1997; Welsh and Poe 
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1998; Ready et al. 2001; Vossler et al. 2003). The literature is not entirely in 
consensus on this point however (Carson et al. 1998; Alberini et al. 2003). 
Incorporating respondent uncertainty in CVM also appears to improve criterion 
validity between the stated and real purchasing behaviour of respondents for 
private and public goods. Experimental and applied research shows that 
respondents who indicate they are at least "probably sure" they would be willing 
to pay a stated amount for a good or service actually do then proceed to pay that 
price in real markets (Vossler et al. 2003). 
Contingent valuation and SCM are based on the same underlying (stochastic) 
utility preference framework, meaning stated WTP for an asset should be similar 
when comparing CVM and SCM results for the same individual. Excepting Boxall 
et al. (1996), studies comparing WTP between CVM and SCM show WTP 
estimates from SCM studies are generally significantly higher than those obtained 
using the CVM method. Stevens, Belkner et al. (2000) summarise potential 
sources for this observed divergence in WTP, which include that the WTP 
estimates are typically derived from separate models. On the other hand, studies 
that pool CVM and SCM data suggest respondents do appear use the same 
underlying preference structure when responding to CVM and SCM surveys 
(Adamowicz et al. 1995; Cameron et al. 2002; Tuan and Navrud 2007). Combined, 
these results suggest the divergence in WTP observed between the SCM and 
--
CVM formats is more likely to result from differences in the design and 
implementation of the formats and how these differences frame respondent 
WTP,::and not from respondents utilising different preference structures to value 
the good in question. 
The contingent behaviour method (CBM) is a less widely used stated preference 
valuation estimation approach, and is closely related to contingent valuation. 
Instead of asking respondents to indicate their WTP for a hypothetical program 
or policy relative to a status quo baseline, CBM asks respondents how their 
behaviours would change in response to some exogenous variable changing in the 
status quo (Hanley et al. 2003). 
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IBtimately, the underlying research objective determines whether a contingent 
valuation, contingent behaviour, or stated choice modelling value elicitation 
approach is preferable. If the research focuses on evaluating consumer 
preferences for attributes of an asset, then the stated choice approach provides the 
superior methodology. If on the other hand, the research objective is to estimate 
welfare changes emanating from changes in a single attribute or a composite 
good, then the contingent valuation or contingent behaviour approaches are 
likely preferable. This may especially be the case when the composite good is a 
complex system that cannot be decomposed into independent attributes due to 
system feedback effects. Moreover, common sense suggests that if respondents are 
already purchasing an imperfectly priced good and are likely to respond in 
. 
changes in price by changing quantities consumed, then a CBM approach is 
preferable to CVM. 
Modelling hydrologic, agronomic, economic, 
and institutional systems 
Topics in hydrologic, agronomic, economic, and institutional system modelling 
have been extensively reviewed. Discussion in this section is primarily drawn 
from Hexem and Heady (1978), Vaux and Pruitt (1983), Dinar and Letey (1996), 
and McKinney, Cai et al. (1999) for crop production; McKinney, Cai et al. (1999), 
Jakeman and Letcher (2003), Letcher, Cuddy et al. (2005), Hafi (2006), Gorelick 
(1988), Cai (2007), and Letcher, Croke et al. (2007) for hydrologic modelling and 
integration approaches; and McKinney, Cai et al. (1999), Groom, Koundouri et al. 
(2003), Young (2005b), and Griffin (1995; 1998; 2006) for social welfare 
economics. 
Agronomic systems 
Equation (30) defined a functional production relationship between crop output, 
some measure of water applied to the crop, other conventional and 
environmental inputs, and a fixed production proc~ss. The marginal physical 
productivity (MPP) of water from Equation (30) was 
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8y = af(X, w,L,N,K,E) (40) 
Ow Ow 
Marginal physical productivity is the fundamental building block in the 
estimation of MVP, water demand, and the economic value of water in irrigated 
agriculture (Conradie and Hoag 2004). Estimates of the economic value of water 
are sensitive to the specification of the physical production system, meaning it is 
very important to accurately characterise this relationship (Dinar and Letey 1996; 
Cai et al. 2003: 54; Young 2005b: 167). The accurate characterisation of crop 
water production functions is particularly important in the integrated hydrologic-
agronomic-economic modelling of groundwater systems, as the most important 
cause of the GSE is very inelastic. water demand curves, meaning groundwater 
usage is unresponsive to price signals (Koundouri 2004b). 
Four main approaches are normally used to model water crop relationships: 
estimated empirical models, evapotranspiration models, simulation models, and 
hybrid models (Hexem and Heady 1978). Discussion in this Chapter concentrates 
on estimated empirical, evapotranspiration, and simulated models, which are the 
approaches directly relevant to this thesis. 
Estimated empirical models. 
The an~ic method for the valuation of water using estimated models has 
already been introduced in this Chapter. Statistical approaches define the crop 
water production relationship using empirical data, normally as a function of 
delivefed water. A holistic production function can be estimated when different 
irrigation and management practices are tested across multiple plots using a 
controlled experiment (Hexem and Heady 1978: 35-42; Dillon and Anderson 
1990; Frank et al. 1990; Dillon and Hardaker 1993: 198-202; McKinney et al. 
1999: 27; Finger and Hediger 2007). More typkally, estimated production 
functions are based on cross sectional micro or aggregate survey data. The crop 
water production relationship is generally defined first by assuming an 
underlying production function form. Commonly employed functional forms are 
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reviewed in Frank, Beattie et al. (1990). Dinar and Letey (1996) conclude that no 
single functional form dominates in all production situations, meaning the locally 
appropriate functional form is a matter for empirical investigation. Dinar and 
Letey (1996) suggest a production function should comply at a minimum with 
basic plant physiology, such that (1) output is increasing as the water volume 
applied increases beyond some minimum value; (2) output is decreasing in most 
crops in a zone of excessive water application due to aeration stress; (3) output is 
decreasing as the initial soil salinity in the crop's root zone or the salt 
concentration in the applied irrigation water increases beyond some minimum 
value; and ( 4) the final level of root zone soil salinity generally decreases with 
increasing irrigation. 
Production relationships can be defined in estimated models using non-frontier 
or frontier approaches. For a simple water crop relationship, non-frontier 
approaches, defined here using the term production functions, estimate the 
statistical average production relationship between water input and crop output. 
A production frontier estimate envelopes the firm-specific production functions 
in order to define the technically efficient output for all feasible levels of water 
input (McGuckin et al. 1992). The non-frontier approach allows the relative 
efficiency of producers to be established, but prevents estimation of the absolute 
deviations of producers from the technically efficient production frontier. To be 
consistent with microeconomic theory of the firm, which assumes production 
efficiency, production frontiers provide the appropriate basis for the estimation of 
marginal production relationships, because VMP estimates based on frontier 
estimates then define the maximum willingness to pay of the technically efficient 
producer. Using a generalised production function estimate, VMP is the marginal 
willingness to pay of the statistically average producer. Water pricing policy 
should be based on production frontier estimates of WTP, as these estimates 
define scarcity prices based on the absolute highest value water use and compel 
less efficient producers to either increase efficiency or .exit the market. Chapter 4 
develops these issues in more detail when a stochastic production frontier 
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approach is developed to estimate the marginal value irrigation water in 
smallholder coffee production. 
Most estimated crop water production models define water crop production 
functions as a function of total water applied in the growing season (Bosch et al. 
1987). Excluding the timing of water defines the water crop production 
relationship as a static function of average water input throughout the growth 
cycle of the plant, which is a key limitation in crops whose productivity is 
sensitive to the timing of water input (Yaron and Bresler 1983). The static 
estimation approach cannot directly define technically efficient irrigation 
scheduling behaviours for an irrigation technology, nor estimate how the VMP of 
water changes during the crop growth cycle as a function of crop sensitivity to 
water stress, among other factors. Moreover, omitting irrigation scheduling 
covariates could result in under-specified models being estimated. Irrigation 
scheduling dynamics can be incorporated in estimated models via covariates 
describing irrigation behaviours like irrigation frequency and spacing, however 
estimation may be confounded by high collinearity of these variables (Bosch et al. 
1987). Estimated models that include covariates for the timing of irrigation are 
termed semi-dated because they do not explicitly model interactions between 
biotic and atmospheric systems. 
Evapofi"anspiration models. 
Evapotranspiration models characterise yield as a deterministic function of the 
growth stage dependent water requirements of a crop, actual water applied in 
each C""rop growth stage, and the crop's growth stage dependent sensitivity to 
water deficits. The dated production function models developed by Doorenbos 
and Kassam (1979) and Jensen (1968) have been most widely used in water 
resource planning. Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) empirically derived yield-
response factors (Ky) for crops' establishment, vegetative, flowering, yield 
formation, and ripening growth stages. Yield response factors relate final relative 
yield to water stress via the crop's growth stage dependent sensitivities to water 
stress 
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(41) 
where Ya is the actual harvested yield, Ym is the maximum crop yield under given 
management conditions that can be obtained when water is not limiting, ETa is 
actual evapotranspiration, and ETm evapotranspiration when water is not 
limiting. Equation (41) is valid for most crops for water deficits where 
1- ETa / ETm < 0.5 (Doorenbos and Kassam 1979). When growth is not limited by 
water constraints, maximum evapotranspiration (ETm) occurs. In this case 
ET m =kc ·ET 0 (42) 
reference ev.apotranspiration (ETo) is the evapotranspiration rate of an extended 
surface of 8-15 centimetre tall green grass cover that is completely shading the 
ground and not subject to water stress. The empirically derived crop coefficient 
(kc) varies between crops, their development stage, and agro-climatic conditions. 
Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) provide more details, and empirically derived kc 
and Ky values for different crops and production climates. 
Jensen's (1968) approach models yield as a dated multiplicative function of yield 
in each growth stage 
ym IT (ET a,i Jw; 
i=I ET . 
C,l 
(43) 
where i is the crop growth stage, Nis the number of sensitivity stages, and w. is a 
yield response weighting factor for each growth stage. 
Doorenbos and Kassam and Jensen's basic evapotranspiration models assume 
water is the only factor that can potentially limit crop production, and therefore 
have limited real world application (McKinney et al. 1999). Although some 
authors have suggested these simple evapotranspiration models can be used for 
deficit irrigation analyses (Kipkorir et al. 2001), the limited empirical research in 
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this area suggests use of these simplified models may result in inaccurate yield 
estimates (Ghahraman and Sepaskhah 2004). 
Simulation models. 
Simulated crop water production functions extend the evapotranspiration models 
discussed above beyond simple water input, crop output production relations. 
Dinar and Letey (1996) differentiate between holistic simulation models that 
simulate crop production encompassing all input combinations, and specific 
models estimating crop production as a function of one input or input subsystems. 
Simulation models generally include soil moisture functions that model soil 
moisture dynamics based on local climatic conditions, soil properties, the timing 
of water input and its quality, and other inputs such as fertiliser. Simulation 
models have been widely developed for the optimisation of irrigation schedules 
based on agronomic, engineering, or economic objectives, and also for estimating 
dated growth and irrigation stage MPP and VMP. Simulation models 
disaggregating applied water between water used by the crop 
(evapotranspiration) versus water lost to deep drainage or runoff can also be used 
to extend water use efficiency analyses beyond the plot level. 
Hydrologic systems 
Agronomic and economic systems are embedded within a hydrologic system 
involving interactions between groundwater, surface water, atmospheric 
conditions, and land use systems. A hydrologic system broadly encompasses 
source components such as rivers, canals, reservoirs, and aquifers; demand 
components including irrigation fields arid households; and intermediate 
components such as drainage and recycling facilities. The hydrologic model is 
upper bounded by the atmosphere, and mass and energy exchanged through this 
boundary determines the hydrologic characteristics (Cai 1999). 
Hydrologic system models differ in their level of spatial and temporal aggregation 
and handling of certainty. 
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Spatial aggregation. 
The handling of spatial aggregation in hydrology models can be categorised on a 
continuum ranging from non-spatial to distributed parameter systems (Letcher et 
al. 2005). Non-spatial models do not reference space at all. Lumped parameter 
models define individual system components using a single set of parameters for 
the entire modelling domain, resulting in system perturbations being 
symmetrically distributed. Most of the groundwater and conjunctive water 
models discussed in Chapter 2 are lumped parameter models. Regional models are 
lumped parameter model extensions, grouping data from homogenous sub-
regions and treating them as individual analytic units. Land units for example, 
can be defined as areas with homogenous land qualities influencing crop 
performance, and with the same management practices (Letcher et al. 2005). 
Distributed parameter models reduce homogeneity to a grid basis of dimensions 
defined by the modeller. Distributed parameter models allow for a finer 
demarcation of the spatially distributed impacts and individual responses to water 
resource policies and programs. This information gain is offset by the approach 
being data intensive. When a region does not have spatially distributed (water) 
observation data, a substantial amount of interpolation is required in developing 
distributed parameter models. Where the hydrologic system is complex and 
observation data sparse, a distributed parameter approach may be unwarranted 
because the dynamics in the interpolated region cannot be validated. 
Temporal aggregation. 
If water dynamics in the current time period do not impact future water 
availability, or if the hydrologic system always returns to a steady state after a 
shock, the hydrologic system can be model using a single period static model 
(Hafi 2006). When these conditions do not hold, a dynamic model is preferable. 
The treatment of time in dynamic models varies, often as a function of the 
physical or decision process being modelled. The assumptions made about aquifer 
dynamics in the early economic groundwater models discussed in Chapter 2 
resulted in the impacts of extraction being instantaneously transmitted across 
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extractors (Brozovic et al. 2004). Time steps in physically based hydrologic 
simulation models are defined by the developer, and as with spatial aggregation 
there is generally an inverse trade-off between the size of the time step and 
model computation time. Integrated distributed parameter simulation models 
generally do not employ a single time dimension. For example, the dynamics of 
an ttnconfined aquifer may be modelled using a sub-hourly basis, whereas a less 
dynamic confined aquifer system could be modelled using a daily time-step. 
Social welfare systems 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) provides one main approach for moving the social 
welfare foundations developed in Chapter 2 from theoretical underpinnings into 
the applied policy analysis domain. Recall the hypothetical market economy 
discussed in Chapter 2, where water trade resulted in Pareto improvements. All 
water trades made both parties better off and water was traded to its highest value 
use. Cost-benefit analysis attempts to mimic the Pareto improvement test with 
the potential Pareto improvement test. Recall from the discussion in Chapter 2 
about aggregate economic efficiency that the potential Pareto improvement test 
states that when aggregate social welfare in an alternative world state exceeds 
aggregate social welfare in the status quo state, the initiative that shifts the world 
to the alternative state should be undertaken. In CBA, potential Pareto 
improv~!Jlents are normally evaluated with the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky test. The 
Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky test states that a reallocation, policy, or program is 
desirable on social welfare grounds if the gainers can compensate the losers and 
still bebetter off, and also if the losers cannot compensate the winners to have 
the reallocation not occur and still be as well off as they would have been if the 
reallocation did not occur. Cost-benefit analysis therefore effectively evaluates 
whether a generally large change from the current state of the world moves 
aggregate welfare towards Pareto efficiency. Defining i as individuals and t as 
time, WTP as willingness to pay, G indexing "gainers", Las "losers" ands as the 
social discount rate, the basic decision rule is 
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LWTP;7(1+st -L:WTP;;(l+st >0 
i,t i,t (44) 
and equivalently 
L:(Bi1 -ciJl+st >0 
i,t (45) 
Here, B denotes the project's benefits, and C project costs. Cost-benefit analysis, 
its theoretical underpinnings, practice and limitations have been discussed 
extensively (Hanley and Spash 1993; Perkins 1994; Boardman et al. 1996; Nas 
1996; Griffin 1998; Gowdy 2004; Just et al. 2004; Pearce et al. 2006) including in 
application to water resource projects and management (Young 1996; Brouwer 
and Pearce ~005; Griffin 2006). This thesis does not comprehensively overview 
the approach or its critiques. It is notable however that the Kaldor-Hicks-
Scitovsky compensation test by itself does not guarantee a Pareto improving 
outcome, for at least two reasons surmised in Adler (2000). First, where 
individuals with standing have substantially different endowments differences in 
marginal utility for the compensating item will make some people more 
productive at converting the (hypothetical) compensation into individual utility. 
Without cardinal utility functions, conversion differences and aggregate social 
utility outcomes cannot be directly evaluated. Second, distributional issues will 
decrease aggregate social welfare if the potential Pareto improving resource 
reallocation reallocates disproportional benefits to sectors within the economy 
not warranted to require it, while also reallocating disproportional losses to social 
sectors that are perceived to require it. This second point goes directly to the 
distribution of benefits in society, something that compensation tests subsequent 
to the Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky test have attempted to address. 
The Law on Water Resources calls for managing water using rationality, 
economy, efficiency, fairness, and sustainability principles (Articles 4.1, 20.1). 
This means the water allocation policies of Viet Nam do not necessarily have to 
be based on the aggregate efficiency criterion. Policy decisions are seldom based 
solely on aggregate efficiency grounds, and cost-benefit analysis should be viewed 
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as a mechanism for guiding but not dictating policy choices. Cost-benefit analysis 
provides a formal framework for organising information, evaluating possible 
alternative courses of action, and testing the robustness of assumptions about 
costs and benefits of alternative courses of action (Brouwer and Kind 2005). The 
approach also provides an opportunity for interdisciplinary collaboration towards 
the objective of integrated policy decision-making. 
Integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic-
institutional modelling 
Integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic-institutional models combine 
information about the hydrologic system of a region, the input output 
relationships between water applied to, or evapotranspired from, plants and land 
surfaces, agronomic functions and systems, consumer and producer surpluses 
from using water, and institutional, technical, and physical constraints and rules. 
Ideally, the hydrologic-agronomic-economic-institutional modelling domain is a 
closed physical system, such as a river basin or watershed. River basins and 
watersheds are logical natural units for integrated modelling, because water 
interacts with, and to a large extent controls, other biotic and abiotic systems (Cai 
1999). Integrated modelling has several advantages relative to modelling 
hydrologic, agronomic, economic, and institutional subsystems independently. 
--
The most obvious gain is the ability to model interrelations between domain-
wide land and w:ater allocations and welfare outcomes. For example, subsystem 
analysis may identify potential for increasing irrigation water use efficiency, a 
widely advocated agronomic objective, or production efficiency, a widely 
advocated economic objective. While agronomic or economic based efficiency 
gains may benefit individual producers, the regional aggregate welfare affect of 
irrigators collectively increasing water use efficiency may be indeterminate. 
Within a closed system, water use efficiency gains within one system component 
may drive negligible whole system gains in water balance terms, because whole-
system water use efficiencies are already high due to water recycling within the 
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closed system. When privately inefficient irrigation water usage results in excess 
water percolating to a depleted aquifer, irrigator inefficiency may increase 
aggregate social welfare as a result of generating positive pumping, stock, and 
buffer stock externalities. Irrigator surpluses are reduced by the pumping cost of 
the unneeded water, but this is offset at the regional level when the aggregate 
value of the positive, stock, pumping, and buffer stock externalities exceeds these 
costs, and the opportunity costs of the water that has been recharged in next best 
use. Integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic-institutional models provide a 
holistic approach to evaluate these system level relationships. 
Modelling objectives 
Integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic-institutional models have either a 
simulation-indicator or simulation-optimisation objective. Simulation-indicator 
models "simulate water resources' behaviour in accordance with a predefined set 
of rules (actual or hypothetical) governing water allocations and infrastructure 
operations" (McKinney et al. 1999: 16). Where the economic outcomes of the 
simulations are evaluated in net benefit terms, the integrated model evaluates 
potential for Pareto improvements based on a cost-benefit analysis framework. 
Simulation-optimisation models optimise water resources based on an objective 
function and constraints. Where the objective function is defined by social 
welfare maximisation the resulting allocation is Pareto optimal, assuming the 
production processes underlying the water demand of producers are technically 
efficient. 
Different simulation-indicator and simulation-optimisation approaches are not 
reviewed here in detail. Gorelick (1988), McKinney, Cai et al. (1999), and Hafi 
(2007) each provide detailed reviews in this area. It is sufficient to note that 
steady state and lumped param~ter hydrologic-agronomic-economic-institutional 
models are generally based on the optimisation objective. Dynamic state lumped 
parameter models form the historical basis for economic optimisation models of 
groundwater and conjunctive use systems (Burt 1964; Provencher and Burt 1993; 
Knapp and Olson 1995; Tsur 1997). Adopting a lumped parameter approach 
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allows for tractable optimisation algorithms to be defined but increasingly 
sacrifices realism as hydrologic, agronomic, and economic subsystem complexity 
increases. Indeed, this is one of the challenges to the robustness of the GSE. 
Distributed parameter hydrologic-agronomic-economic-institutional models 
generally adopt a simulation-indicator approach, although there are some recent 
and-notable simulation-optimisation exceptions to this rule (Stubbs 2000; Schoups 
et al. 2006). By using increasingly realistic biotic and abiotic system 
representations, these models identify the physically distributed welfare impacts 
that water policies generate over time at a detailed level. 
. Integration approaches 
Hydrologic-agronomic-economic-institutional models are either holistic or 
compartmentally integrated. Holistic models have one single control unit, with 
both components embedded in the consistent model. Holistic models have the 
advantage of being able to make water related decisions endogenous within the 
integrated model (Bockstael et al. 1995). The holistic approach recognises that the 
operation of the hydrologic system is driven by the water use systems, and 
moreover, that these water use systems are constrained by and respond to 
changes in the hydrologic system (McKinney et al. 1999). The simplified optimal 
control models discussed in Chapter 2 are generally holistic models. The primary 
challeng~ for holistic model development lies in creating realistic couplings 
between the biotic and abiotic subsystems. 
Holist~ modelling becomes challenging when using distributed parameter 
models that simulate complex physical, economic, and institutional systems. 
Compartmental modelling is more widely applied to analyse problems involving 
large and complex systems, since solving each compartment separately is easier 
than solving an entire system simultaneously (Cai et al. 2003). In the 
compartmental modelling approach, sub-models operate independently and 
output data are transferred between the modelling components. Subcomponent 
models can therefore be very complex and realistic. One disadvantage of the 
compartmental modelling approach is that analysis can be complicated by the 
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loose coupling between the model components, and also due to scale 
inconsistencies in information exchanges (Bockstael et al. 1995). A second 
disadvantage is that relationships across the compartmentalised hydrologic-
agronomic-economic-institutional models are not endogenous. This point is 
particularly important for modelling individual irrigation decisions, because 
compartmental modelling enforces a myopic decision making framework. In this 
case, producers and consumers do not respond to changes in their environment 
by updating their consumption or production plans. 
Research methods 
Having outlined the welfare foundations for non-market valuation, select non-
market valuation approaches, and the modelling and integration of hydrologic, 
agronomic, social welfare, and institutional systems, this section establishes the 
thesis research methods. 
Research objective one 
Objective. To estimate the marginal economic value of irrigation water in 
smallholder coffee production, dry season irrigated rice production, and 
household usages. 
The economic value of irrigation water in smallholder coffee 
production: a marginal productivity analysis. 
In Chapter 4, the at-sourc~, short-run, marginal economic value of delivered 
irrigation water in smallholder coffee production is estimated using a cross-
sectional survey dataset and the inductive marginal productivity analysis 
approach. The stochastic production frontier approach is used to estimate the 
MPP of water. By including irrigation scheduling covariates in the production 
frontier specification, semi-dated estimates of the MPP of irrigation water are 
obtained. The semi-dated marginal physical productivity estimates are combined 
with output prices to define the gross value marginal product of irrigation water 
to coffee smallholders. Lacking efficient prices for dry season irrigation water, the 
short-run marginal irrigation cost of smallholders is estimated as a function of 
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energy and labour input. Using the estimated short-run marginal irrigation cost as 
a proxy for efficient irrigation water prices, the semi-dated short-run at-source 
VMP of delivered water is obtained. 
The marginal economic value of water in irrigated rice 
production: a simulation and optimisation analysis. 
Irrigated rice is more sensitive to water deficits during some growth stages than 
others, making it preferable to estimate the marginal economic value of water in 
irrigated rice production based on a water crop production relationship that 
specifies rice output as a function of timed water input. Dated water production 
functions could be based on controlled local field experimentation or detailed 
farmer surveys. Such experimental rice irrigation research has not been 
undertaken in Dak Lak Province however. Moreover, preliminary field research 
indicated rice farmers in the Plateau were unable to reliably estimate their on-site 
water use on account of using gravity irrigation and the continuous submergence 
method. As a result, a non-empirical, non-survey based approach is needed to 
estimate dated marginal economic values for water in irrigated rice production. 
Chapter 5 develops a dynamic simulation-optimisation model of lowland rice 
irrigation scheduling. The simulation-optimisation model combines crop growth 
simulation outputs as a function of timed water input, farm budget data, and a 
non-lin~gr mathematical programming extension of the residual imputation 
approach to estimate the short-run, at-source, marginal economic value of water 
in dry season irrigated rice · production. The mathematical programming 
algorithm schedules irrigations to maximise constrained profits. A short-run, at-
site inverse demand function for water in irrigated dry season rice production is 
estimated using shadow prices obtained from the mathematical programming 
model by parametrically constraining the seasonal water stock. 
The marginal economic value of water in household use: a pooled 
revealed and stated preference analysis. 
Chapter 6 estimates the at-source, short-run, willingness to pay of households for 
delivered water using a cross-sectional survey dataset from Buon Ma Thuot, 
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which is the capital city of Dak Lak Province. Households in Buon Ma Thuot pay 
a flat tariff per cubic metre for municipal water. As discussed in this Chapter, 
household water demand cannot be revealed using only this invariant tariff 
information. As a result, in Chapter 6 household municipal water demand is 
estimated by constructing a panel dataset that combines households' revealed 
preferences for water based on their actual metered household water 
consumption at the existing municipal water tariff, and the stated preferences of 
each household for municipal water consumption contingent on hypothetical 
water tariffs. Because many households in Buon Ma Thuot supplement municipal 
water with water from a second source, most often a private household well, 
water demand from household wells is also estimated using the same contingent 
behaviour approach. For household using more than one water source, the value 
elicitation approach allows for switching between water sources when 
responding to varying tariffs. Consumer surpluses are estimated using the point 
expansion approach and the estimated own price elasticities. 
Research objective two 
Objective. To estimate monetised preference strength for allocating additional 
water in-situ for public good and other purposes. 
Monetised preferences for in-situ water allocation: results from a 
randomised payment card contingent valuation analysis. 
Chapter 2 noted that water generates direct and indirect utility when in-situ, 
including by supporting agro-environmental ecosystem functioning. The 
potentially large individual utility impacts generated by water in uses other than 
irrigation and household consumption means there is a policy rationale for 
gauging the strength of social preferences for allocating scarce water to these 
other uses. A stated preference approach is needed to estimate preferences for 
allocating water to non-agricultural and non-household uses, because the uses 
can be public goods or otherwise not amenable to having their economic value 
directly or indirectly revealed through market exchanges. 
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To estimate monetised preferences for in-situ water allocation, Chapter 7 
develops a novel contingent valuation stated preference approach. The composite 
good that households are asked to value is an irrigation water use efficiency 
program for the Plateau's coffee smallholders. Because irrigation used in coffee 
production accounts for the largest groundwater withdrawals in the Plateau, it is 
reasoned that increasing water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings will 
contribute to increasing the dry season water balance and groundwater water 
table elevation in the Plateau. An increasing groundwater balance would in tum 
potentially reduce the frequency of wells drying out in the Plateau, increase dry 
season baseflows in larger rivers and streams, reduce the frequency of small 
streams running dry, and also strengthen the functioning of water dependent 
agro-environmental ecosystems. ·Because the benefits of the hypothetical 
irrigation water use efficiency program extend beyond coffee smallholders, all 
households in the Plateau stand to gain from the hypothetical program. The CVM 
survey is administered to a random sample of households in the DLP as a result. 
The CVM is favoured over SCM for two main reasons. First, respondents must 
state their willingness to pay for the hypothetical program based on sparse 
information, and with this supply and likely demand uncertainty, an approach 
that allows respondent preference certainty to be formally evaluated is preferable. 
The CV1a. approach developed in Chapter 7 allows for preference strength to be 
directly estimated from the respondent data, and also to obtain a conservative 
willingness to pay estimate through data recoding methods. Second, pre-testing 
also snowed that respondents in the Dak Lak Plateau were more amenable to the 
CVM elicitation format. The parametric willingness to pay estimate developed in 
Chapter 7 includes covariates that describe the water usage, experiential, 
attitudinal, and socio-economic characteristics or respondents. These covariates 
allow the monetised preference strength of in-situ water allocation to be defined 
as a function of these characteristics. The covariate approach does not define the 
economic value of water in usages other than irrigated agriculture and the 
household, but does define the relative monetised preference strength of 
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respondents for allocating additional water to non-irrigation and non-household 
uses, including allocating additional water in-situ for public good and other 
purposes. 
Research objective three 
Objective. To evaluate the potential for increasing irrigation water use efficiency 
over the short-run on the coffee and rice smallholdings of the Plateau. 
The economic value of irrigation water in smallholder coffee 
production: a marginal productivity analysis. 
Chapters 2 and 3 developed the production economic foundations for measuring 
irrigation water use efficiency. The semi-dated stochastic production frontier 
developed iu Chapter 4 estimates the set of input specific technically efficient 
irrigation scheduling behaviours, and also the allocatively efficient irrigation 
water input. The private economic value of increasing technical and allocative 
irrigation water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings in the Plateau is estimated 
by comparing the efficient coffee irrigation schedule to the statistically average 
irrigation schedule from the survey data. 
The marginal economic value of water in irrigated rice 
production: a simulation and optimisation analysis. 
The constrained profit maximising irrigation schedules defined by the non-linear 
optimisation model in Chapter 5 defines the technically and allocatively efficient 
irrigation schedule of a representative irrigated rice smallholder under the 
conditions where seasonal water is freely available or constrained. The potential 
for increasing irrigation water use efficiency on irrigated rice smallholdings in the 
Dak. Lak Plateau is evaluated by comparing these constrained profit maximising 
irrigation schedules to the locally advised seasonal water requirements for 
irrigated rice. 
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Research objective four 
Objective. To evaluate willingness to pay to support public programs aiming to 
strengthen the Dak Lak Plateau's hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem 
functioning. 
Monetised preferences for in-situ water allocation: results from a 
randomised payment card contingent valuation analysis. 
Non-parametric and parametric central tendencies of willingness to pay for the 
hypothetical irrigation water use efficiency program and its likely positive water 
balance and agro-environmental ecosystem externalities is evaluated in Chapter 
7. 
Research objective five . 
Objective. To estimate the change to aggregate social welfare from reallocating 
dry season water in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
Welfare from water in the Dak Lak Plateau: an integrated 
hydrologic-agronomic-economic analysis. 
Chapter 8 uses a partial cost-benefit analysis framework and an integrated 
hydrologic-agronomic-economic model for this research objective. The complex 
water systems of the Plateau, combined with the thesis research objectives, result 
in a physically distributed simulator-indicator, compartmental integration 
modelli!l.,g approach being favoured. Rather than attempting to allocate water 
within the Plateau to maximise aggregate social welfare, the integrated model 
evaluates how changes from the status quo coffee and rice irrigation schedules 
alter the water balance dynamics and aggregate social welfare of the Plateau. The 
approach therefore aims to identify potential Pareto improvements using a partial 
cost-benefit analysis framework. Three benefit cost scenarios are evaluated: a 
baseline scenario characterised by the statistically average coffee and lowland rice 
irrigation schedules and land allocations of the Plateau, and two scenarios 
characterised by increasing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee and lowland 
rice smallholdings. The baseline scenario simulates the aggregate social welfare 
achieved with the now predominantly open access water regime where the 
- 74-
majority of irrigation withdrawals by coffee and nee smallholders are 
unregulated. The two scenarios characterised by increasing plot level irrigation 
water use efficiency model irrigation behaviours being managed to equate private 
marginal benefits from water use with marginal irrigation costs, and also using 
the technically efficient irrigation schedules from Chapters 4 and 5 for coffee and 
rice production. 
Outputs from the distributed hydrologic model allow for operating surplus 
changes between the scenarios to be traced back to either (1) changing irrigation 
costs from using less water in irrigation, (2) changing pumping cost resulting from 
changes to the water table elevation as a result of changing groundwater stock as 
a function of total pumping volume, or (3) changing stock effects, which impose 
binding constraints on production potential as a function of dated constraints on 
irrigation water supply. This approach allows an evaluation of how regulating 
water resources on coffee and rice smallholdings in the DLP specifically 
contributes to changing aggregate social welfare, if at all, and also to evaluate 
simulation results against the GSE to define the causes for its elimination in the 
Dak Lak Plateau, if relevant. The hydrologic model also outputs detailed water 
balance data, which augments the monetised social welfare estimates to show 
how increasing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee and rice smallholdings of 
the Plateau change regional water balance dynamics. These hydrologic balance 
metrics are used as indicators of the direction and likely magnitude of non-
monetised social welfare changes. 
The integrated hydrologic-economic-agronomic-institutional analysis aggregates 
the hydrologic and partial welfare estimates at the Plateau level, and also for each 
of the Plateau's seven subcatchments. Land use, climatic, hydro logic, topographic, 
and water supply infrastructur~ vary across the Plateau, and by implication the 
direction and magnitudes of physical and social welfare changes that result from 
increasing irrigation water use efficiency in the Plateau will likely differ. 
Analysing hydrologic balance and social welfare outcomes at the subcatchment 
level crystallizes these variations. Moreover, due to irrigation water drainage 
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being reused the whole-system water use efficiency of closed subcatchments may 
be high, even if plot level water use efficiency is low. If system-level water usage 
efficiencies are high, increasing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee and rice 
smallholdings in the Plateau may not substantially affect the regional hydrologic 
balance or the hydrological dynamics of the system. This in tum may result in 
the:re being no material difference in the incidence and magnitude of pumping 
and stock effects between the status quo and efficient irrigation scenarios. If this 
is the case, the only difference likely to be observed between the scenarios will be 
the change in plot level pumping costs from using less irrigation water input. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research objectives and method of the thesis. The 
welfare foundations of non-market valuation were established, and select non-
market valuation issues and methods outlined. In the second section of the 
Chapter, approaches for modelling hydrologic, agronomic, and social welfare 
systems were introduced. Approaches for integrating hydrologic, agronomic, 
economic, and institutional models were reviewed. 
The research methods developed in the last section of the Chapter will fill key 
information gaps currently hindering demand side and integrated water 
manage~ent policies from being implemented in the Plateau. Estimating the 
marginal economic value irrigation water in smallholder coffee and rice 
production and household use will provide a basis for evaluating allocation trade-
offs on the equity, efficiency, fairness, econoniy, and rationality grounds required 
by the Law on Water Resources. These ordinary water demand estimates derived 
from these analyses will inform future demand planning in the Plateau. 
Identifying technical and allocative irrigation water use inefficiencies in 
smallholder coffee and rice production will identify practical opportunities to 
increase on-farm irrigation water use efficiency, improve return on coffee 
smallholder investment, and also potentially reduce total annual on-farm water 
demand in the Plateau. The integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic cost-
- 76-
benefit analysis provides a spatially distributed part basis for determining the 
direction and magnitude of social welfare change likely from regulating to 
increase irrigation water use efficiency on the coffee and rice smallholdings of the 
Plateau compared to the open access status quo. These aggregate social welfare 
simulations can subsequently be compared to ex ante estimates of the 
institutional cost of increasing water use efficiency to determine whether State 
intervention is warranted based on the cost-benefit decision rule in Equation (13) 
for State intervention. Estimates of household willingness to pay for a composite 
of uncertain hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem benefits realised by 
successfully implementing irrigation water use efficiency training in the Plateau 
will provide crucial information to local resource and cash strapped authorities 
. 
about whether such a program could be self-financing. Estimates of the aggregate 
monetised preference strength for allocating additional water to non-irrigation 
and non-household uses indicates the strength of social preferences for allocating 
additional water to these uses. 
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4 
The economic value of irrigation water in 
smallholder coffee production: a marginal 
productivity analysis 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2 the smallholder coffee growing sector of the Dak Lak Plateau was 
emphasised as being the driving force behind the rapid economic and population 
growth of the region during the last 30 years. The smallholder coffee sector was 
also identified as the driving force for the degradation and depletion of the 
natural resource base of the Plateau. The smallholder coffee sector has the largest 
total annual water demand in the Dak Lak Plateau by a large margin. Moreover, 
previous agronomic research shows the coffee smallholders of the Dak Lak 
Plateau over-irrigate, on average (Riddell 1999; Chi and D'haeze 2005; D'haeze et 
al. 2005a). The combined evidence of coffee smallholders having the greatest 
aggregate water demand and applying excessive irrigation makes increasing 
irrigation water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings a logical candidate for 
becoming a cornerstone of any feasible demand side water management strategy 
for the Dak Lak Plateau. The Law on Water Resources requires the rational, 
economic, and efficient allocation of water resources (Article 4.1), and that water 
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users exploit water economically and efficiently (Article 23.lb). For the 
smallholder coffee sector of the Plateau, implementing these requirements 
requir@s that the value marginal productivity of irrigation water to the sector be 
estimated, as well as the understanding of irrigation water use efficiency of the 
sector, as measured by their technical and allocative irrigation water use 
efficiencies. 
Using the marginal productivity analysis approach introduced in Chapter 3 and 
stochastic production frontier analysis, in this Chapter the at-site, short-run, 
marginal economic value of delivered dry season irrigation water is estimated for 
coffee smallholders in the Dak Lak Plateau. The surplus accruing to a smallholder 
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practicing technically and allocatively efficient irrigation scheduling is compared 
to the surplus of the smallholder following the statistically average irrigation 
schedule. Socio-economic and institutional bases for productivity differences 
between and within coffee smallholder groups are investigated. The analyses 
provide bases for developing approaches to strengthen the smallholder coffee 
sector of the Dak Lak Plateau. Estimates of the marginal economic value of 
irrigation water in smallholder coffee production are a cornerstone for the 
development of formal water allocation rules in the Plateau, given the regional 
dominance of coffee as a crop and its seasonal water demands. Identifying the 
bases of irrigation water use inefficiency provides the necessary foundation to 
develop targeted policies to improve coffee plot irrigation management, increase 
return on investment to coffee smallholders, and potentially also reduce the total 
annual water demand of the smallholder coffee sector in the Plateau. 
The Chapter is organised into six sections. Section two details smallholder coffee 
production processes in the Dak Lak Plateau. Section three outlines productive 
efficiency measurement approaches and briefly reviews previous coffee 
production frontier literature. Section four proceeds to the empirical application. 
An overview of the data collection method is provided and then descriptive 
statistics are presented. Departing from the mainstay static production frontier 
analysis approach, a semi-dated stochastic production frontier is specified that 
includes covariates for irrigation scheduling. The single stage stochastic 
production frontier estimation approach means the marginal physical 
productivity of water, as well as the marginal physical productivity of irrigation 
scheduling behaviours, can be directly estimated from the frontier. A short-run 
variable irrigation cost is estimated as a substitute for efficient irrigation water 
prices, given efficient irrigation water pricing is non-existent in the Plateau. 
Policy implications are laid out in section five, while section six synthesises the 
production frontier and irrigation cost analyses by comparing producer surpluses 
using different irrigation schedules and water inputs. Section seven concludes. 
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Smallholder coffee production in the Dak Lak 
Plateau 
Climatic conditions result in only the Robusta coffee variety ( Coffea canephora) 
being propagated in the Dak. Lak Plateau. Robusta favours lower altitudes ( < 1,200 
met_res), moderately sloped land ( <30 per cent), medium to heavy textured and 
well-aerated soils, and annual temperatures ranging between 20 and 30 degrees 
Celsius (D'haeze et al. 2003). Robusta trees reach maximum productivity after 5 
years and maintain these yield levels for a further ten years. The coffee growing 
year in Dak Lak runs from October (the start of the new crop harvest) to 
September in the following year. During its production phase, Robusta has a 
minimum growing cycle lasting approximately 270 days, separating into four 
stages: (1) flower bud initiation, (2) blossoming, (3) fruit growth, and (4) ripening. 
In Dak Lak, the growing season lasts for around 225 days, with the practical result 
that irrigation is required to break bud dormancy roughly two months after the 
onset of the dry season in late December to early January. The critical water 
period of coffee therefore coincides with the mid to late stages of the dry season. 
After breaking bud dormancy, irrigation scheduling is one of the key controllable 
determinants of yield output and quality. Poor irrigation scheduling causes 
uneven flower onset, berry ripening and size, bean quality, and also raises 
harvesthfg costs by increasing the number of selective pickings required when 
smallholders practice this method (D'haeze et al. 2003; Titus and Pereira 2007). 
Most ~ffee smallholders in the Plateau cultivate using the micro-basin irrigation 
system on Rhodie Ferralsols. Rhodie Ferralsols have a very low bulk density, very 
high porosity, and very low water retention capacity at high moisture content 
(Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 1974). These physical 
soil properties mean Rhodie Ferralsols drain water .rapidly near saturation but 
decrease drainage rapidly as the soil moisture content decreases. In the micro-
basin irrigation system used by the majority of the Plateau's coffee smallholders, 
individual coffee trees stand in dug basins and irrigation water is hand piped in. 
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The micro-basin irrigation approach minimises evaporation and runoff losses 
compared to overhead sprinkler irrigation but is generally more labour intensive 
(Chi and D'haeze 2005). For the micro-basin irrigation method, the locally 
advised dry season irrigation requirement for production stage coffee is three to 
four applications of 650 litres per tree (Bau 1984; Luu 2002). The total 
recommended seasonal irrigation volume therefore ranges between 1,950 and 
2,600 litres per tree. Moreover, based on the locally recommended planting 
density of 1,111 trees per hectare (spaced 3.0 x 3.0 metres), a total dry season 
irrigation requirement in the range of 2,170 to 2,900 cubic metres per hectare is 
implied. 
From experimental Robusta plots D'haeze, et al. (2003) showed that Robusta 
achieved maximum blossom set, uniform berry ripening, and maximum yield 
when 60 millimetres of irrigation water was applied whenever average soil water 
content in the top 60 centimetres dropped to 30 per cent volume in Rhodie 
Ferralsols. D'haeze, et al. (2003) concluded that in the Dak Lak Plateau, this soil 
moisture condition normally coincides with a first irrigation before mid January, 
followed by irrigations every 20 to 25 days until the dry season ends. The 60 
millimetre application depth corresponds to a per tree application of 540 litres per 
tree, assuming a planting density of 1,111 tree per hectares. Moreover, using a 
calibrated simulation model D'haeze, et al. (2003) concluded 30 to 35 millimetres 
(270 to 315 litres per tree) in three to four seasonal applications was theoretically 
sufficient to maximise yield. This input level implies a seasonal requirement of 
between 900 and 1,400 cubic metres per hectare should be sufficient for 
maximum yield. Because most blossoming is induced by the first irrigation, a 
deeper first irrigation is normally advised for Robusta (Titus and Pereira 2007). 
Improving overall production efficiency on the coffee smallholdings of the Dak 
Lak Plateau is pivotal to increasing total factor productivity on these 
smallholdings, investment returns to coffee smallholders, and also potentially to 
buttressing the underling hydro-agro-environmental ecology of the Plateau. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the coffee output of Dak Lak increased by 30 per cent 
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per annum on average. Increasing farm productivity accounted for less than one 
third of this increase, with the remainder coming from new coffee plantations 
becoming productive (ICARD and OXFAM 2002: 13). The reported marketable 
output from coffee smallholdings in Dak Lak averages between 1.7 and three 
metric tons per hectare, lagging potential production by anywhere between 17 
and 250 per cent, depending on the reference base (ICARD and OXFAM 2002; 
D'haeze 2004; Chi and D'haeze 2005). 
The scope for increasing coffee smallholders' production efficiency motivates the 
question of how this is best achieved. Factor input amounts and their mixing and 
scheduling is one area where near term efficiency gains should be able to be 
realised. The excessive irrigation and fertiliser use of coffee smallholders 
compared to locally advised requirements has been recently well established 
(D'haeze et al. 2003; Chi and D'haeze 2005; D'haeze et al. 2005a). Smallholders 
have been estimated to apply around 3,500 cubic metres of irrigation water per 
hectare on average, with a 2,700 and 5,000 cubic metres per hectare range, 
depending in part on local climatic conditions (D'haeze 2005). Chi and D'haeze 
(2005) report excessive fertiliser use on coffee smallholdings compared to the 
advised elemental nutrient requirement for production stage coffee trees in Dak 
Lak, which are 0.25 kilograms nitrogen per tree, 0.09 kilograms phosphorous tree 
per tree! .... and 0.27 kilograms potassium tree per tree per annum (Lich et al. 2005). 
In part, the excessive use of irrigation and fertiliser by smallholders is based an 
the expectation that increasing these inputs will generate near linear yield 
increa:Ses. While coffee smallholders' allocative inefficiencies are well understood 
in irrigation water and fertiliser use, less is known about how technically efficient 
coffee smallholders are, that is, how well coffee smallholders organise their 
production processes given their inputs and production technology. Further, no 
systematic analysis of the relationships between coffee smallholder allocative and 
technical efficiency and agro-environmental, socio-economic, and institutional 
factors has been completed in Dak Lak. 
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Literature review 
Chapter 3 discussed marginal productivity analysis, and further discussed that the 
crop specific relationship between water input and harvestable mass can be 
estimated inductively via frontier and non-frontier approaches. Recall that non-
frontier approaches estimate the average response relationship between water 
input and crop output from firm-specific production functions, whereas frontier 
approaches envelope the firm-specific production functions to define the 
maximum possible output given input and production technology. Moreover, 
recall this thesis maintains that when the research objective is to estimate the 
maximum willingness to pay for water of sector that uses water as a production 
input, the mverse demand function for water should be estimated based on a 
production frontier, because the inverse demand function is then defined by the 
maximum willingness to pay of the most efficient producers .. When a production 
sector is technically inefficient, the shape and location of the production frontier 
and average production function will normally differ, as will first order 
conditions for single factor allocative efficiency (Weir 1999; Weir and Knight 
2006). These differences will in turn result in the estimated economic value of 
water differing between the approaches. 
Efficiency frontiers are estimated using either mathematical programming or 
econometric approaches. Both approaches envelop the dataset, but differ in their 
approaches to accommodating flexibility and random noise in the structure of 
production technology (Lovell 1993a). The dominant programming approach is 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). Data envelopment analysis estimates the 
production frontier through a convex envelope curve formed by line segments 
joining observed efficient production units. Monotonic and concavity properties 
are enforced, but otherwise no assumptions are made about the production 
frontier's functional form or distribution (Sherlund et al. 2002). While DEA does 
not impose a functional form on the production relationship, its most widely 
applied format is deterministic, which means that the method assumes technical 
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inefficiency is the cause of all deviations from the production frontier. As a result, 
unmeasured random shocks that influence the location of the production frontier 
(such as localised droughts or disease outbreaks) are confounded with the derived 
technical inefficiency measure. Hence, deterministic DEA is generally not 
recommended for analysing agricultural production processes in developing 
countries (Coelli et al. 1998: 219). Production in these settings is frequently 
characterised by random shocks that are beyond the control of producers, 
moreover survey data can contain measurement and other errors. Introductions 
to DEA are found in Coelli, et al. (1998), Ali and Seiford (1993), and Lovell 
(1993b). 
The main parametric approach employed to estimate production frontiers is the 
stochastic production frontier analysis approach. The original specification of the 
stochastic production frontier comprises two components (Liu 2006): (1) a 
stochastic production frontier defining the maximum possible output for a given 
set of inputs and production technology, and (2) a one-sided error term with an 
independent and identical distribution across observations that separates 
systematic determinants of a producer's technical inefficiency from random 
disturbance. The stochastic production frontier approach assumes a functional 
form for the production frontier and also the probability density functions of the 
asymm~!,.ric technical inefficiency parameter, with the latter generally taking 
either the half-normal, truncated normal, exponential or gamma distribution. 
The symmetric statistical error parameter is usually specified using a normal 
distribtltion. The frontier function and technical inefficiency models are 
generally estimated in a single stage using maximum likelihood estimation to 
achieve efficiency and consistency (Liu 2006). Because the approach separates 
technical efficiency from random noise, it is the most widely employed means to 
assess the technical efficiency of smallholders in developing countries (Ali and 
Byerlee 1991; Coelli et al. 1998; Sherlund et al. 2002; Kibaara 2005; Tesfay et al. 
2005; Liu 2006; Nchare 2007). The main limitations of the stochastic production 
frontier approach are its need to specify a functional form for the frontier, its 
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sensitivity to outlier data, and also to assumption made about the distribution of 
the technical inefficiency (Coelli et al. 1998). Accessible introductions to 
efficiency measurement using stochastic production frontiers are provided in 
Coelli, et al. (1998), Ali and Byerlee (1991), and Lovell (1993b). 
The applied stochastic production frontier literature differs in the covariates that 
are used to specify the production frontier and those used to explain the sources 
of observed technical inefficiency. These specification differences can have 
fundamental implications for the level of observed technical inefficiency. Lovell 
(1993b) suggests the stochastic production frontier should include all variables 
that are directly controlled by the producer, whereas the technical inefficiency 
estimate should include variables not directly under the producer's control, 
including site specific, climatic, socio-economic, and quasi-fixed factors. Ali and 
Byerlee (1991) recommend including environmental variables in the production 
frontier, given these agro-environmental production conditions operate to 
constrain the production possibility frontier of each producer. Adopting Ali and 
Byerlee's approach, Sherlund, Barrett et al. (2002) demonstrated that omitting 
asymmetrically distributed agro-environmental variables from the production 
frontier upwardly biased technical inefficiency estimates in both stochastic 
production frontier and DEA estimators. Their analysis did not estimate the same 
production frontiers following Lovell's (1993) recommended approach. 
McGuckin, Gollehon et al. (1992) also included exogenous agro-environmental 
factors in their production frontier analysis of water conservation in irrigated 
agriculture. Weir and Knight (2006) suggest the research question dictates the 
variables included in the frontier from those employed for evaluating the causes 
of technical inefficiency. If the research aims to understand production efficiency 
given the variables under the farmer's control, then all exogenous variables 
should be allocated to the second stage consistent with Lovell (1993). If, at the 
other extreme, the research is interested in defining the relative performance of 
producers between and within categories, then all variables can be included in 
the frontier (Lovell 1993a: 20). 
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There is an extensive literature that estimates smallholder production efficiency 
in developing countries using either the stochastic production frontier analysis or 
DEA approaches. Ali and Byerlee (1991) and Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) 
comprehensively review this literature. A small body of literature analysing 
coffee smallholder allocative and technical efficiency exists (Table 4.1). One 
collective limitation of this research is that no studies include water input in their 
production frontier specifications. This may suggest omitted variable bias given 
the known importance of water as a determinant of coffee yield. Further, no 
studies in the coffee production literature include agro-environmental inputs in 
their production frontiers, nor in the technical inefficiency models. Based on the 
findings of Sherlund, Barrett et al (2002), the omission of agro-environmental 
factors may suggest omitted vafiable bias and upwardly inflated technical 
inefficiency estimates if agro-environmental production conditions are 
asymmetrically distributed. 
Of the previous coffee production efficiency research, the work of Rios and 
Shively ('RS') (2006) is immediately relevant to this research. RS used a 2004 
survey dataset to estimate the technical and allocative efficiencies of coffee 
smallholders in the Dak Lak Plateau, and also explored correlates for the observed 
inefficiencies. RS categorised smallholdings with more than 1.5 hectares allocated 
to coffe~as large producers and investigated whether production efficiency was 
related to farm size. Using deterministic DEA, RS estimated that the average 
technical efficiency of small farms was 75 per cent and the average cost efficiency 
was 38 per cent. These results indicate small farms in Dak Lak could increase 
output by 25 per cent without altering input quantities and could also reduce 
input costs by 62 per cent. The estimated average technical efficiency of large 
farms was 84 per cent and cost efficiency was 58 per cent. Tobit analyses revealed 
farm characteristics rather than farm size per se caused lower efficiency on small 
farms. Lower technical efficiency was found on small farms with higher 
household income shares from coffee. Higher education on small farms was 
correlated with lower cost efficiency, which RS conjectured resulted from 
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reducing on-farm management intensity. Rios and Shively also found technical 
efficiency was correlated with irrigation infrastructure: technical efficiency 
increased with the number of pumps on farm regardless of farm size and 
decreased on small farms with increasing irrigation tubing length. This latter 
result was taken to indicate diseconomies of scale from irrigation infrastructure 
were operating on smaller farms. The irrigation infrastructure results lead to RS 
to advocate in their conclusions for policies to assist coffee producers in Dak Lak 
towards optimal irrigation technology uptake and adaptation. The conclusions of 
Rios and Shively relating to irrigation are therefore broadly consistent with one 
implication of the now classic "poor but efficient" hypothesis of Schultz (1964), in 
the sense that RS advocate that productivity of coffee smallholders can be 
. 
improved through improved irrigation technology, as compared to altered 
irrigation behaviours using existing irrigation infrastructure. 
One notable limit of RSs research is that in 2004 when RS surveyed, Dak Lak was 
in the midst the 2003-05 extreme droughts, which had significant productivity 
impacts in the coffee smallholder sector. In 2004, roughly 70,000 hectares of 
coffee was either lost or damaged in Dak Lak as a result of the random drought 
production shock (Vietnam News Agency 2004). For longer-term water planning 
and the estimation of the marginal economic value of irrigation water to the 
smallholder coffee sector, it is preferable to estimate technical efficiency using a 
dataset taken when more typical agro-environmental production conditions 
prevail. 
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Table 4.1 Previous empirical studies of coffee smallholder technical and allocative efficiency 
Study and location Estimation Sample Functional Survey Water Agro- Estimated Findings 
approach size form year included environmental technical 
variables inefficiency 
included 
Binam, Sylla et al. Two-step DEA and 81 n.a. 1998 No No 36-47% Family size, agricultural club membership, and farmer origin 
(2003) econometric increase technical efficiency 
Cote d'Ivoire analysis 
Gowa, Bashbsha et al. Ordinary least 120 Cobb- 1999 No No NA Land and capital were the most limiting factors in coffee 
(2001) squares Douglas production for poor farmers, while land and labour were most 
Uganda limiting for rich coffee farmers. 
Mwakalobo (2000) Ordinary least 90 Cobb- 1997 No No 49% Farmers would best increase productivity by better use of 
Tanzania squares Douglas capital-intensive inputs. 
Nchare (2007) One-step stochastic 140 Translog 2004 No No 90% Educational level and access to credit were the major socio-
Cameroon production frontier economic variables influencing technical efficiency. 
Rios and Shively (2006) Two-step DEA and 209 n.a. 2004 No No 75%• Higher household income share in coffee lowered technical 
Dak Lak, Viet Nam econometric 840/ob efficiency on small farms; higher education correlated with 
analysis lower cost efficiency on small farms; technical efficiency on 
small farms with increasing number of pumps, decreasing 
with irrigation piping length 
Note: • small farm b large farm 
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Empirical application 
Data 
The research data comes from a small but comprehensive coffee smallholder 
survey developed as part of this thesis research and implemented in early 2007 for 
the 2005-06 production years. The 2005 wet season of the Dak Lak Plateau was 
characterised by average rainfall, meaning the farm management practices and 
output of coffee smallholders during 2005-06 is more likely to resemble more 
typical production practices than those of the three preceding years. The survey 
obtained production data for the most important production stage coffee plot of 
each respondent, as well as broader farm, agro-environmental, irrigation 
scheduling, ·infrastructure, and socio-economic, and institutional data. One 
conjecture is that a smallholder's most important plot is also their best-managed 
plot, which could result in superior plot performance compared to the statistically 
average plot. Amongst respondents the most important field accounted for 
approximately 65 per cent of each respondent's total farmed area, and it is 
therefore assumed to be sufficiently representative. 
In view of the challenges in obtaining reliable survey data based on the best recall 
of respondents, substantial effort was directed towards developing a survey 
instrument that allowed for cross-validation in order to detect and resolve 
discrepancies during the interview. The final survey is included at Appendix 1. 
An on-site walk through survey approach was used to estimate total dry season 
irrigation on the production plot. The enumerator randomly selected and 
measured the micro-basin dimensions of four coffee shrubs in the respondent's 
plot. At each shrub the enumerator asked the smallholder to indicate the level to 
which the basin was normally filled with irrigation water. While the approach 
does not account for the water that percolates during irrigation, these losses are 
probably a negligible percentage of the total irrigation water input per tree each 
year. The total dry season irrigation input of the plot was estimated using the 
average dimensions of the four micro-basins surveyed, their irrigation depth, and 
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the number of dry season irrigations that the respondent reported. This intensive 
approach was favoured given evidence that coffee smallholders in Dak. Lak. 
generally cannot accurately estimate their dry season irrigation water inputs by 
reasoning (D'haeze 2005). 
Primary data was collected from 106 Robusta smallholdings, unevenly but 
randomly selected from the six districts in the Dak Lak Plateau: Buon Don, Cu 
m'gar, Krong Ana, Krong Buk, Krong Pak and Buon Ma Thuot. Each of these 
districts fall into one of four distinct climatic zones (D'haeze 2004: 17). The farm 
survey was supplemented by key informant interviews with experienced local 
coffee agronomists. Rainfall and reference evapotranspiration data were obtained 
from seven government-run observation stations in the research area. Regional 
soil and topography classification were based on field survey work reported in 
D'haeze (2004). 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are categorised on the basis of the irrigation method (basin 
or sprinkler) and the soil classification of the production plot (Table 4.2). Output 
prices as well as fertiliser, pesticide, and labour prices are summarised in Table 
4.3. Paired t-tests confirmed common prices across sprinkler and micro-basin 
irrigators. Eleven respondents used the sprinkler irrigation, while 16 micro-basin 
irrigatois' cultivated on soils other than Rhodie Ferralsols. Subsequent discussion 
in this Chapter concentrates on micro-irrigators operating on Rhodie Ferralsols, 
given t_hese smallholders are the largest coffee producing group in the Plateau. 
Average production amongst micro-basin irrigators farming on Rhodie Ferralsols 
was approximately 3.9 metric tons per hectare and 3.8 kilograms per tree. A joint 
skewness and kurtosis test did not reject the null hypothesis that per hectare 
yields followed a normal distribution. These yield figures are higher than 
previous surveys from Dak Lak, but below the suggested maximum achievable 
yield per tree of five kilograms (Lich et al. 2005). On average, respondents over-
apply fertiliser and irrigation water compared to local agricultural service advice, 
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which is consistent with previous research discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
Recall the advised elemental nutrient requirement for production stage coffee 
trees in Dak Lak is 0.25 kilograms nitrogen (N) per tree, 0.09 kilograms 
phosphorous (P) per tree, and 0.27 kilograms potassium (K) per tree per annum 
(Lich et al. 2005). Respondents averaged 0.44 kilograms N, 0.19 kilograms P, and 
0.41 kilograms K per tree. The distribution of elemental nutrient input is 
negatively (left) skewed. Smallholders receiving extension training during the 
previous 12 months (n=17) averaged lower fertiliser inputs at 0.34 kilograms N, 
0.13 kilograms P, and 0.29 kilograms K per tree. One-sided two-sample t-tests 
assuming unequal variances rejected the null hypothesis of mean equivalence for 
the trained and untrained sub-samples at the one per cent level for P(t = 2.45 P > t 
= 0.008) and at the 5 per cent level for N (t = 1.80 P > t = 0.039) and K (t = 2.01 P > 
t = 0.024). 
The average respondent applied 1,050 litres of water per tree per irrigation and 
irrigated 3.8 times during the dry season. These figures are substantially higher 
than the locally recommended irrigation application of 650 litres per tree in three 
to four irrigations over the dry season. No respondents used less than the 320 
litres per tree per irrigation simulated by D'haeze, et al. (2003) to be the 
theoretical maximum irrigation requirement to ensure full blossom set. Eight 
respondents used less than the 540 litres per tree D'haeze et al. (2003) empirically 
demonstrated was sufficient for optimal blossoming. Sixteen respondents applied 
less than the 650 litres per irrigation advised in Bau (1984) and Luu (2002). 
Notably, the same 17 respondents who had participated in extension training in 
the previous 12 months had significantly higher average irrigation volumes, at 
1,300 litres per tree compared to smallholders who did not receive training whose 
average dose was 900 litres per tree. The total total dry season irrigation volume 
of trained smallholders was 4,960 cubic metres per hectare, compared to 3,480 
cubic metres per hectare for farmers not receiving training. A one sided two-
sample t-test assuming unequal variances rejected the null hypothesis of equal 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of coffee smallholders a 
Variable Unit Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Micro-basin irrigation, Rhodie Micro-basin irrigation, all soils Sprinkler irrigation, all soils 
Ferralsols 
Output 
Yield kg 79 3,863 1,055 739 6,167 95 3,832 1,112 739 6,167 11 3,569 1,373 1,143 6,000 
Input 
Labour 
Total 79 282 142 24 850 94 297 145 24 850 10 243 120 115 539 
Applying fertiliser ld 79 15 15 1 75 95 15 15 1 80 11 14 15 2 42 
Applying pesticide ld 79 1 2 - 9 95 2 3 23 11 1 1 - 2 
Irrigating ld 79 28 22 5 160 95 29 21 5 160 11 17 15 2 48 
Pruning ld 7 38 23 6 120 93 44 34 4 240 10 29 25 5 86 
Weeding ld 78 27 24 4 120 94 32 31 4 175 10 39 48 3 165 
Harvesting ld 76 138 103 4 625 92 137 96 4 625 10 121 so 45 235 
Other ld 76 69 17 208 92 75 18 - 208 10 53 14 1 38 
Fertiliser 
Total kg 79 3,002 2,058 400 11,000 95 2,901 1,965 400 11,000 11 2,874 1,588 700 6,600 
Urea kg 79 421 621 - 3,000 95 369 581 - 3,000 11 514 550 1,571 
SA kg 79 168 371 2,500 95 185 356 - 2,500 11 138 241 588 
Super phosphate kg 79 495 727 3,000 95 473 688 - 3,000 11 604 530 - 1,300 
NPK kg 79 1,475 1,316 5,000 95 1,450 1,238 5,000 11 1,070 1,468 5,000 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of coffee smallholders a 
Variable Unit Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Micro-basin irrigation, Rhodie Micro-basin irrigation, all soils 
• 
Sprinkler irrigation, all soils 
Ferralsols 
KCl kg 79 321 652 5,208 95 281 606 5,208 11 465 530 1,650 
Elemental nutrient supply 
Nitrogen kg 79 465 323 64 1,538 95 447 307 64 1,538 11 436 265 92 891 
Phosphorus kg 79 200 159 813 95 194 150 813 11 185 150 26 565 
Potassium kg 79 429 431 3,292 95 401 404 3,292 11 450 304 112 1,043 
Pesticide 
Pesticide lt 79 6 14 105 95 8 14 - 105 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Irrigation 
Average irrigation per irrigation m3 78 1.06 0.36 0.45 2.02 94 1.00 0.37 0.31 2.02 11 1.69 1.41 0.07 2.62 
Total seasonal irrigation per tree m3 78 3.81 1.61 1.12 10.08 94 3.79 1.55 1.12 10.08 11 4.46 3.71 0.20 6.91 
Total seasonal irrigation per 
hectare m3 77 3,960 1,731 602 9,451 93 3,938 1,659 602 9,451 11 4,786 3,977 211 7,418 
Irrigation management practices 
Water source 
Hand-dug well l=yes 49 0.65 n.a n.a n.a 56 0.58 n.a n.a n.a 2 0.18 n.a n.a n.a 
Deep drilled well l=yes 3 0.()4 n.a n.a n.a 4 0.04 n.a n.a n.a 1 0.09 n.a n.a n.a 
Surface water l=yes 16 0.18 n.a n.a n.a 18 0.16 n.a n.a n.a 4 0.36 n.a n.a n.a 
Hand dug well + second source l=yes 7 0.09 n.a n.a n.a 12 0.11 n.a n.a n.a 3 0.27 n.a n.a n.a 
Other l=yes n.a n.a n.a 6 0.06 n.a n.a n.a 1 0.09 n.a n.a n.a 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of coffee smallholders a 
Variable Unit Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Micro-basin irrigation, Rhodie Micro-basin irrigation, all soils Sprinkler irrigation, all soils 
Ferralsols 
Distance source to plot m 79 164 189 - 800 95 151 185 - 800 10 228 197 - 500 
Irrigation start date d/m/y 79 21/12/5 23.1 15/9/5 20/2/6 95 20/12/5 21.33 15/9/5 12/2/6 10 13/1/6 27.66 12/12/5 20/2/6 
Irrigation end date d/m/y 79 24/3/6 20.5 27/1/6 15/5/6 95 27/3/6 21.35 27/1/6 15/5/6 10 14/3/6 26.41 2/2/6 15/4/6 
Number of irrigations Unit 79 3.62 0.95 2.00 7.00 95 3.95 1.31 2.00 9.00 11 2.64 1.29 1.00 4.00 
Irrigation season duration· Day 79 85 29 10 175 95 97 27 17 181 11 60 48 121 
Average days between 
irrigations Day 79 24 7 3 39 96 22 7 2 47 7 25 6 20 35 
More water applied first 
irrigation l=yes 79 0.82 0.38 1.00 95 0.81 0.39 - 1.00 9 0.78 0.44 1.00 
Micro-basin dimensions 
Width m 79 2.34 0.35 2.78 95 2.32 0.34 2.78 
Length m 79 2.55 0.38 3.13 95 2.53 0.37 - 3.13 
Depth m 79 0.18 0.05 - 0.31 95 0.18 0.06 - 0.31 
Average time to fill basin Minute 79 3.57 1.02 0.88 6.50 95 3.65 1.07 0.88 6.50 
Use irrigation tubing l=yes 79 0.97 0.16 - 1.00 95 0.98 0.14 - 1.00 10 0.70 0.48 1.00 
Total tubing length m 77 233 145 25 800 93 221 136 25 800 
Use a pump l=yes 77 0.94 0.42 1.00 93 0.95 0.41 - 1.00 
Engine horsepower HP 46 16 9 1 54 59 14 9 1 54 
Main production well depth m 63 23 7 8 41 76 22 8 8 41 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of coffee smallholders a 
Variable Unit Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Micro-basin irrigation, Rhodie 
Ferralsols 
Micro-basin irrigation, all soils 
• 
Sprinkler irrigation, all soils 
Agro-environmental production conditions 
Tree density per ha Unit 79 1,045 181 200 1,371 95 1,044 169 200 1,371 11 1,073 73 966 1,200 
Tree age Year 79 14.85 4.66 6.00 30.00 95 14.53 4.83 4.00 30.00 11 17.36 6.73 10.00 29.00 
Shade trees l=yes 79 0.48 0.50 1.00 95 0.43 0.50 - 1.00 11 0.09 1.00 
Intercropping l=yes 79 0.34 0.48 1.00 95 0.34 0.48 - 1.00 11 0.64 0.50 1.00 
l=Steep 
Slope 3=flat 79 2.49 0.70 1.00 3.00 95 2.42 0.72 1.00 3.00 11 2.45 0.52 2.00 3.00 
Socio-economic and institutional factors 
Age Years 79 43 12 24 80 92 44 12 24 80 10 48 13 33 69 
Gender Male=l 79 0.86 0.35 - 1.00 95 0.86 0.35 - 1.00 11 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ethnicity Kinh=l 79 0.97 0.16 1.00 95 1.11 0.61 1.00 5.00 11 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Education Years 76 8.74 3.29 - 16.00 92 8.58 3.30 - 16.00 11 9.91 2.81 7.00 15.00 
Household inhabitants Head 77 2.00 0.92 5.00 93 2.03 1.00 - 7.00 10 1.60 0.70 1.00 3.00 
VND 
Non-farm income million 79 9.89 24.42 200.00 95 8.99 22.68 - 200.00 11 13.27 14.45 40.00 
Farm area ha 79 1.03 0.74 0.10 3.50 95 0.99 0.72 0.10 3.50 11 1.02 0.46 0.22 2.00 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of coffee smallholders a 
Variable Unit Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Micro-basin irrigation, Rhodie Micro-basin irrigation, all soils Sprinkler irrigation, all soils 
Ferralsols 
Area planted with coffee ha 79 0.98 0.70 0.10 3.00 95 0.93 0.67 0.10 3.00 11 0.94 0.36 0.22 1.50 
Mono cropping coffee l=Yes 79 0.84 0.37 - 1.00 95 0.82 0.39 1.00 11 0.64 0.50 - 1.00 
Number of plots Unit 79 1.52 0.77 1.00 5.00 95 1.48 0.74 1.00 5.00 11 1.18 0.40 1.00 2.00 
Number of pumps owned Unit 79 0.73 0.47 - 2.00 95 0.80 0.56 - 3.00 11 0.64 0.67 2.00 
Well l=Yes 79 0.85 0.36 - 1.00 95 0.83 0.38 - 1.00 11 0.45 0.52 1.00 
Drying yard l=Yes 79 0.95 0.22 - 1.00 95 0.96 0.20 - 1.00 11 0.73 0.47 - 1.00 
Re1;1istered land title l=Yes 79 0.62 0.49 1.00 95 0.61 0.49 
-
1.00 11 0.36 0.50 - 1.00 
Notes: • All production outputs and inputs are for a standardised hectare 
n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
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Table 4.3 Input and output prices for the 2005-06 production year 
Variable Unit Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Output price VNDkg-1 106 20,515 2,239 2,100 24,000 
Input prices 
Mineral fertilisers 
Urea VNDkg-1 53 4,905 576 1,450 5,500 
SA VNDkg-1 36 2,624 379 2,000 4,000 
Super phosphate VND kg-1 55 1,277 367 1,000 2,700 
NPK VNDkg-1 88 4,507 634 3,000 6,500 
KCl VNDkg-1 51 4,254 982 1,000 8,700 
Pesticides 
Pesticide VND It-1 59 22,657 24,126 600 100,000 
Fuel 
Fuel VND lr1 83 6,879 3,335 670 9,500 
Labour 
Family labour VND day-1 106 37,000 37,000 37,000 
Hired labour VNDday-1 78 40,564 7,718 30,000 65,000 
Irrigation 
Irrigation tubing VNDm-1 99 18,052 5,936 7,000 32,000 
Average pump cost VND million 73 3.07 2.78 15 
means for the trained and untrained sub-samples at the one per cent level (t=-
3.29 P < t= 0.002) and also total dry season water input (t = -2.63 P < t = 0.008). 
The statistically average irrigation scheduling behaviour of respondents 
approximates those advised by local agricultural authorities, but substantial 
deviations from mean practice exist. Recall D'haeze et al. (2003) concluded the 
efficient irrigation schedule required a first irrigation before mid January, 
followed by irrigation every 20 to 25 following days until the end of the dry 
season end, further that the first irrigation was the most important to ensuring 
even flower set. The average irrigation spacing for respondents was 24 days, with 
a seven-day standard deviation. More than 40 per cent of respondents' average 
irrigation spacing exceeded the· maximum recommended 25 days. Approximately 
20 per cent of all respondents did not apply more water on the first dry season 
irrigation, and a further 15 per cent commenced irrigation after mid-January. 
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Respondents had an average planting density of 1,050 trees per hectare, which is 
marginally lower than the advised optimal spacing of 1, 111 trees per hectare. 
Average tree age was just under 15 years, which is at the upper bound of the 
maximum productive age range of Robusta. The age distribution shows there are 
30 year old coffee trees still in production in the Plateau, which suggests older 
Robusta cultivars are being used on some plots. Older cultivars have longer 
productive lives and are more resistant to agro-environmental stress, but yield 
less than newer Robusta varieties. Shade trees were in use on approximately 50 
per cent of the plots. The average plot slope was between moderately sloped to 
flat, consistent with recommendations that coffee grows best on plots with land 
slopes less than 30 degrees. Eighty per cent of respondents using the micro-basin 
technique drew groundwater fat their irrigation, with 70 per cent using 
groundwater exclusively and just over 20 per cent relying exclusively on surface 
water supplies for irrigation water. These water source breakdowns are consistent 
with previous research (Luu 2002). The average distance between smallholders' 
main dry season irrigation water source and the plot was around 160 metres. 
Lowland Viet Kinh account for the majority of respondents, reflecting their 
domination of coffee production in Dak Lak. Total average farm area was one 
hectare, spread over an average of 1.5 plots. Eighty per cent of the respondents 
mono-C!!Jpped coffee, while 60 per cent had registered land titles. 
Stochastic production frontier estimate 
Specification 
The input, irrigation scheduling, agro-environmental, and socio-economic-
institutional variables used in the analysis are summarised in Table 4.4. The 
output variable is the 2006 dry harvest yield per coffee tree measured in 
kilograms. The production frontier is estimated directly using yield as the 
dependent variable instead of a profit or cost function as inferential problems can 
occur when input prices are imperfectly priced (Barrett, 1997). Moreover, the 
prices coffee smallholders receive in Dak Lak often does not reflect the quality of 
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their harvest as smallholders normally pool their harvests to sell to middle men 
and these middle men pay based on the lowest coffee grade in the pool (D'haeze 
2007). 
Elemental nutrient, labour, and operating capital inputs are also measured on a 
per tree, per annum, basis obtained by dividing total estimated inputs for the plot 
by the estimated number of trees on the plot. Elemental nutrient estimates were 
obtained using conversion tables obtained from the Dale Lale Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. Irrigation water input measures the average 
water volume applied to a tree per irrigation. This measure provides a better 
index of each plant's dry season root zone soil moisture condition compared to 
using the al~matives of using total dry season irrigation volume per tree or per 
hectare. Applying organic fertiliser in combination with chemical fertiliser 
should increase production and improve soil moisture retention (Chi and D'haeze 
2005), however the sample size is too small to justify the inclusion of these 
variables. Manure is modelled using a dummy variable as a result. 
Irrigation season length is measured by the number of days between the first day 
of irrigation on the plot and the first day of the last irrigation of the season. 
Average spacing between irrigations is measured as the ratio of each respondent's 
irrigation season duration and the number of dry season irrigations. A dummy 
variable is constructed to differentiate between smallholders who commenced 
irrigation after mid-January. The dummy variable 'First irrigation' talees a value of 
one if respondents applied more water in the first irrigation of the season. 
Dummy variables were employed to evaluate the marginal physical productivity 
of receiving agricultural training in the previous 12 months, coffee mono-
cropping, and land registration, with each of these variables taking the value of 
one for occurrence and zero otherwise. Variables for respondent age and years of 
education are also included. The variables 'Plots', 'Area', 'Pumps', 'Non-farm 
income', and 'Household labour potential' measure ·the number of plots the 
respondent farms on, total farmed area, number of irrigation pumps owned, total 
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annual household income from non-farm employment, and the total number of 
permanent household members over the age 13. A variable measuring the 
number of pumps used on the farm is included to evaluate Rios and Shively's 
(2006a) finding that technical efficiency on coffee smallholdings in Dak Lak 
increased with the number of pumps, regardless of farm size. 
Five observations were discarded from the dataset due to missing data for key 
input variables. Three further observations were discarded out of concern for 
potential measurement errors and excessive influence on estimation results. 
There is a large body of econometric literature on the selection of functional 
forms in the estimation of production functions (Beattie and Taylor 1985; Dillon 
and Anderson 1990; Dillon and Hardaker 1993; Coelli et al. 1998). The objective 
is to estimate input specific marginal physical productivity while controlling for 
the effects of plant physiology, plot and farm level management practices, and 
exogenous agro-environmental production conditions. The frequently employed 
Table 4.4 Candidate variables for the stochastic frontier production function 
Variable 
Yt 
Nt 
Pt 
Kt 
Lt 
Wti 
Ct 
Manure 
PestHerb 
Description 
Dependent variable 
Dry harvest yield per coffee tree 
Explanatory variables 
Production input variables 
Elemental nitrogen input per tree per annum 
Elemental Phosphorous input per tree per annum 
Elemental Potassium input per tree per annum 
Labour per tree per annum (family and hired) 
Average water applied per tree per irrigation 
Total all other variable costs 
Dummy variable describing whether organic fertiliser applied 
Dummy variable describing whether pesticide and I or herbicide 
applied · 
Irrigation management factors 
IrrSeasonDur Irrigation season duration 
Irrlnt 
IrrSLate 
Average interval between irrigations 
Dummy variable if irrigation commenced after 15 January 
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Unit 
kg 
kg 
kg 
kg 
Days 
m3 
VND 
Yes=l 
Yes=l 
Days 
Days 
After 
_ . ..ill' 
Table 4.4 Candidate variables for the stochastic frontier production function 
Variable Description Unit 
1511=1 
Firstlrr Dummy variable if more water applied for the first irrigation Yes=l 
GW Dummy variable if groundwater being used for irrigation Yes=l 
Endogenous plot factors 
Shade Dummy variable for shade trees on plot Yes=l 
InterCrop Dummy variable for intercropping on plot Yes=l 
TreeAge Average tree age Years 
Density Tree density per hectare Unit 
Exogenous agro-environmental factors 
Steep Dummy variable for steeply sloped plots Yes=l 
Moderate Dummy variable for moderately sloped plots Yes=l 
Dry_06 Dummy variable for whether the main irrigation water source ran 
dry in the 2006 irrigation season Yes=l 
Socio-economic, farm and institutional factors 
Registered Dummy variable describing whether producer has land title Yes=l 
Area Total farm area ha 
Plots Number of plots farmed Unit 
Pumps Number of pumps used in production Unit 
Dummy variable describing whether smallholder received 
Ext extension training Yes=l 
Dummy variable describing whether smallholder mono-crops 
Mono coffee Yes=l 
Edu HH years of education Years 
Age HHage Years 
HH Number of adult family members available to farm Unit 
VND 
NFI Non-farm income million 
Notes: MIL=Million 
Cobb-Douglas production function specification uses degrees of freedom 
sparingly, but imposes strong assumptions about the nature of production due to 
its constant input elasticity and unitary elasticity of substitution assumptions. 
Further, neither a global maximum nor decreasing total product can occur using 
the Cobb-Douglas specification, which is at odds with most crops' physiology, 
including Robusta which is susceptible to aeration stress and decreasing yield 
from excessive fertiliser application (Chi and D'haeze 2005). Because the Cobb-
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Douglass specification assumes constant elasticity of scale and unitary elasticity of 
substitution, varying elasticity of scale or substitution may be erroneously 
attributed to inefficiency (Lovell 1993a). The transcendental and translog 
production specifications are flexible generalisations of the Cobb-Douglas 
specification that allow for variable production elasticity. Both functions can 
suffer from high collinearity however. To overcome this limitation, reduced form 
transcendental and translog functions can be specified, although this increases the 
potential risk of omitted variable bias. 
In this research, the transcendental form is used to define the unknown coffee 
production frontier 
J J • J K 
lnyi =a0 + Iaj1xji + Iaj2 1nxji + LLajkxjixki 
j=I j=I j=I k=I 
J J J J (46) 
+aw1w; +aw2 1n W; + Iajwxjiwi + Iajeji + Iajsj; + Iajcji +vi -u; 
j=I j=I j=I j=I 
Where the dependent variable y is the yield per tree in the 2005-06 production 
year measured in kilograms, i indexes the respondent, j identifies the Jh factor 
input amount per tree ( x) and environmental ( e) and irrigation scheduling ( s ) 
input, w; is the average irrigation application in cubic metres per tree, and the a 
are unknown parameters to be estimated. The symmetric and normally 
distribut.ed error term vi is assumed to be i.i.d., N(O,crv2), and independent of the 
one-sided non-negative error term that has a truncated normal distribution, ui ~ 
0, reflE'._cting the shortfall of farm output from its production frontier due to the 
existence of technical inefficiency. Following the specification of Battese and 
Coelli (1995), the one-sided inefficiency term is 
(47) 
here zi defines a vector of variables used to explain efficiency differences 
between producers, 5 is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and li1 i 
is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variance defined by the 
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truncation of the normal distribution. When Z; contains only a constant, the 
model reduces to the truncated normal specification in Stevenson (1980), where 
Oo has the same interpretation as the µ parameter in Stevenson (1980). The 
maximum likelihood function's variance parameters are estimated by cr2= cr,J+ aJ 
and y= aJ/(al+ aJ), with y taking a value between zero and one. A y 
approaching one increasingly indicates variance is explained by systematic 
production efficiency differences between the respondents, whereas values 
nearing zero increasingly show variation is due to pure randomness. When aJ is 
approximately zero (46) collapses to a specification that can be consistently 
estimated using ordinary least squares. See Coelli et. al (1998) and Coelli (1996) 
for more details. 
The production frontier specified in Equation (46) includes all variables of 
interest in the production frontier and estimates technical efficiency in a single 
state (Weir and Knight 2006). The single-stage estimation approach is favoured in 
this research because it allows the value marginal productivity of individual 
irrigation scheduling behaviours to be directly estimated. The approach also 
allows for the testing and investigation of technical efficiency differences 
between producers who are essentially identical in input, irrigation behaviour, 
agro-environmental, and socio-economic-institutional terms. The approach 
therefore attends to the concerns of Hall and Winsten (1959) and Muller (1974) 
about the efficiency measurement work of Farrell (1957), which is whether 
comparing outputs across differing production conditions can provide useful 
information towards improving managerial performance. 
Hypothesis 
Factor inputs. The estimated coefficients for elemental nutrient, irrigation water, 
labour and other variable inputs should satisfy the basic assumptions of crop 
response discussed above. The descriptive statistics show respondents on average 
input excessive irrigation water and fertiliser compared to local 
recommendations. As a result, an insignificant coefficient for these variables is 
-103-
possible given the rapid drainage properties of Rhodie Ferralsols given the tree 
may never experience soil nutrient or moisture stress if excessive irrigation drains 
rapidly from the root zone. Production should be increasing in variable operating 
cost variables assuming these costs are general indices for production intensity. As 
a growth facilitating input, pesticide and herbicide inputs should have a negative 
relationship with physical productivity (Zhengfei et al. 2006). Herbicides and 
pesticide inputs abate coffee crop damage but do not directly increase yields, 
meaning a positive relationship should never be observed in principle. When 
farmers apply herbicides or pesticides reactively to an infestation, a negative 
coefficient is expected given some yield losses will probably already have 
occurred. 
Irrigation scheduling. The null hypotheses are that (1) the length of the irrigation 
season depends on the local climate, specifically on the observed duration of the 
dry season; (2) a longer irrigation season is a proxy for drier climatic conditions, 
which increases the potential for yield losses due to soil water stress; (3) the 
optimal irrigation spacing is within the range of 20 and 25 days; (4) recalling that 
the first dry season irrigation is responsible for opening the majority of buds and 
ensuring homogenous blossoming and ripening, a positive main effect is 
anticipated for farmer who apply more irrigation water on the first irrigation; and 
(5) sma!!!iolders commencing irrigation after January 15 will have lower yields all 
other factors held constant. 
Plot 8£ecific agro-environmental conditions. Shade and wind-shield trees on the 
production plot should increase marginal physical productivity by reducing plant 
stress (ICARD and OXF AM 2002). Moreover, maximum productivity per tree is 
expected between the age of 5 and 15 years. 
Given the recommended planting density of 1,100 trees per hectare, the 
hypothesis is that lower planting densities will increase yields per tree as 
crowding competition is eliminated. 
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Recalling that Robusta favours land gradients less than 30 degrees, it is 
hypothesised that yield per tree will be greater on flat land compared to 
moderately and steeply sloped land. 
Socio-economic, demographic, and institutional factors. The empirical impact of 
tenancy status on agricultural productivity in developing countries is not 
conclusive (Ali and Byerlee 1991). Rios and Shively (2006a) found tenancy did 
not explain technical or cost efficiency amongst coffee smallholders in Dak Lak in 
2004. However, defensible land tenure has been linked to long term increases in 
farm productivity when it provides an incentive to maintain and improve the 
underlying land asset instead of maximising short term returns through 
exploitative .production technologies (Ray 2005). The hypothesis tested here is 
that secure tenure, expressed by registered land titles, encourages investment and 
higher productivity over the long-run. 
The relationship between farm size and technical efficiency are mixed (Liu 2006). 
Rios and Shively (2006a) found farm size did not directly contribute to technical 
inefficiency amongst coffee smallholders in Dak Lak, but their features did. Land 
fragmentation, measured by the number of plots farmed by the smallholder, has 
recently been found to increase technical inefficiency, family labour use, and 
other monetary expenses in Viet Nam (Hung et al. 2007). On these grounds, the 
null hypothesis is that increasing fragmentation will correlate with decreasing 
productivity. Productivity is anticipated to be incre<lsing with farm size. 
Empirical evidence suggests that farmers who have recently participated m 
training programs should be both technically and allocatively more efficient than 
untrained counterparts (Ali and Byerlee 1991). Participation in local extension 
programs is therefore expected to have a significant positive correlation with 
productivity. 
It is hypothesised that marginal physical productivity should be increasing in line 
with the number of years respondents have been farming (Ali and Byerlee 1991). 
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This may be due to attrition of less productive smallholder or as an index of 
technical skill. 
Better education has been linked to increasing productivity but has also been 
linked to reduced labour availability for farming (Ali and Byerlee 1991; Liu 2006; 
Rios and Shively 2006b). Here, it is hypothesised that increasing education will 
result in managerial skill being withdrawn from the farm, which will increase 
technical inefficiency. This is consistent with findings from Rios and Shively 
(2006). 
Increasing non-farm income should increase productivity, with this effect caused 
by the relaxation of financial constraints on the production possibility frontier. 
This argument is similar to the explanation for why credit is generally found to 
increase on-farm productivity (Liu 2006). The coffee growing cycle includes 
several periods where production bottlenecks can occur, for example during 
harvesting. Smallholders facing financial constraints may be less able to arrange 
production to optimise returns from timing; this constraint may be relaxed with 
increasing off-farm income. 
Households with larger labour endowments have been found to be more 
technically efficient, possibly due to having slack labour available for peak 
production times (Tesfay et al. 2005). A consistent productivity effect is 
---
hypothesised to hold in this analysis. 
Results 
Coffee smallholders may determine the length of their irrigation season length 
from local climatic conditions, in particular the preceding wet season rainfall. 
Climatic zone dummy variables were therefore tested as instruments for 
irrigation season duration. Noting that the hottest and driest climate zone was 
used as the reference category, the estimated climate zone variables were 
significantly correlated with irrigation season duration, and had the expected 
signs (Table 4.5). The F statistic in each model is less than 10 however, indicating 
the optimal instrument combination is weak (Bound, et al., 1995). As a result, the 
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Table 4.5 Irrigation season duration, ordinary least squares estimate 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Dependent variable: Irrigation season duration in days 
Climate zone 2 
Climate zone 3 
Climate zone 4 
Constant 
Observations 
F(3,70). 
Prob> F 
-38.19 b -2.35 
(16.23) 
-32.54 b -2.06 
(15.83) 
-49.04 a -2.74 
(17.91) 
118.67• 7.77 
(15.27) 
74 
2.73 
0.05 
Notes:• band c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels 
respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
stochastic frontier model was implemented assuming irrigation season duration 
was exogenous. Based on concerns about loosing estimation efficiency to 
collinearity, input interaction terms that either lacked a meaningful agronomic 
basis or were individually or jointly statistically insignificant were dropped from 
the transcendental production frontier specification. 
The inefficiency component of the disturbance term in the estimated stochastic 
production function (Table 4.6) is significantly different from zero, indicating 
technical inefficiency is present. The gamma (y) value of 99 per cent 
demonstrates that all departures from the estimated production frontier are 
caused by systematic technical inefficiency, not random disturbance. Even 
though technical inefficiency exists between respondents, average technical 
efficiency is 92 per cent. Moreover, the estimated technical efficiency for nearly 
three quarters of the respondents equals or exceeds 90 per cent (Table 4.7). These 
high technical efficiency scores indicate that essentially identical smallholders 
have similar levels of technical efficiency. 
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With the exception of the coefficients for labour, the estimated input coefficients 
are either insignificant or do not satisfy the assumption of diminishing returns 
from factor inputs. These results are logically attributable to most respondents 
using more than the locally advised input requirement, with the result that well-
behaved input-output relationships could not be generalised from the survey 
dataset. The most important estimation result given the thesis research focus is 
that the coefficients for irrigation water input per tree and its logarithm are 
insignificant. This result suggests the marginal physical productivity of irrigation 
water is zero for the observed input range. This result makes intuitive sense. 
Recall from the descriptive statistics that amongst the survey respondents, the 
minimum irrigation was 450 litres per tree per irrigation, which is substantially 
higher than the simulated maximum input requirement of 320 litres per tree of 
D'haeze et al. (2003). Further, only eight respondents applied less than 540 litres 
of water per tree per irrigation on average, which is the empirical maximum 
irrigation water requirement estimated in D'haeze et al. (2003). Moreover, only 
sixteen respondents applied less than 650 litres irrigation water per tree per 
irrigation, which is the maximum advised irrigation in Luu (2002). Recall also 
that Rhodie Ferralsols drain water rapidly at high soil water content. Combined, 
the zero marginal physical product estimate of irrigation water input can be 
explained as the coffee trees of respondents never received less than their 
~·...., 
minimum water requirement to maximise yield. Morover, coffee trees were also 
never subject to aeration stress because any excess irrigation water would rapidly 
drain from the root zone. 
Estimates highlight the relative importance of plot and local agro-environmental 
conditions on productivity. Farmers responding to infestation with pesticides 
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Table 4.6 Stochastic production frontier estimate 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Dependent variable: log of Yt 
Lt -1.86 -2.10 
(0.883) b 
In.Lt 0.29 1.85 
(0.155) c 
Nt -1.28 -1.99 
(0.645) c 
lnNt 0.02 0.19 
(0.082) 
Pt 1.59 2.11 
(0.753) b 
In Pt 4.02E-04 (0.027) 0.01 
Kt 0.59 0.83 
(0.706) 
LnKt -0.05 (0.031) -1.60 
Wti 0.38 0.66 
(0.574) 
lnWti -0.21 (0.624) -0.33 
Ct l.56E-05 (1.68E-05) 0.93 
LnCt -0.08 -2.77 
(0.029) a 
NtxPt 1.81 2.40 
(0.752) b 
NtxKt 0.54 1.09 
(0.491) 
NtxWti 0.42 0.76 
(0.552) 
Ptx Kt -3.62 -4.68 
_..., 
(0.773) a 
Pt xWti -1.54 -2.21 
(0.697) b 
KtxWti 0.93 1.72 
(0.540) c 
Manure -3.99E-03 (0.056) -0.07 
Pest -0.23 (0.043) a -5.25 
Shade -0.22 (0.048) a -4.57 
Steep 0.02 0.30 
(0.067) 
Moderate -0.10 -2.68 
(0.036) a 
GW 4.40E-03 0.06 
(0.068) 
Intercrop -0.01 (0.069) -0.10 
Dry06 0.06 1.37 
(0.036) c 
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Table 4.6 Stochastic production frontier estimate 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
T 3.42E-03 (3.74E-04) • 9.13 
LnT -3.46 (0.245) a -14.09 
TreeAge -0.07 -1.83 
(0.037) c 
lnTreeAge 1.12 1.89 
(0.591) c 
IrrSeasonDays 0.01 0.88 
(0.008) 
lnlrrSeasonDays -0.65 (0.571) -1.15 
Firstlrr 0.35 4.88 
(0.071) a 
IrrSLate -0.10 -1.62 
(0.060) 
Irr Dur -0.06 (0.024) b -2.45 
LnlrrDur 1.09 1.95 
(0.562) c 
Ext -0.01 (0.066) -0.15 
Mono -0.24 -2.78 
(0.085) b 
Plots -0.04 (0.032) -1.28 
Pumps -0.06 (0.092) -0.68 
Area 0.10 2.38 
(0.040) b 
Re gist 0.15 2.12 
(0.072) b 
NFI l.44E-03 (6.08E-04) b 2.36 
Edu O.Dl 0.29 
(0.031) 
Edu2 
__ ...., 
-l.53E-03 (0.001) -1.04 
Age 0.02 1.84 
(0.009) c 
Age2 -1.86E-04 (9.85E-05) c -1:89 
HH 0.03 1.85 
(0.014) c 
Constant 20.61 20.92 
(0.985) a 
a 2= av2+ au2 0.01 4.20 
(0.002) a 
y= au2/(av2+ au2) 0.99 14.89 
(0.066) a 
Observations 72 
Log likelihood 14.82 
Notes: ab and c indicate statistical significance at the l, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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recorded 20 per cent lower yields on average compared to those not experiencing 
infestation. Production increases by nine per cent on flat land compared to 
moderate land, while the lack of a significant estimate for steep land gradients is 
probably attributable to the small number of observations for that group. 
Marginal physical product is maximised at around 16 years, which is just beyond 
the upper limit of Robusta's maximum productivity age range. As suggested 
earlier this result may occur because older Robusta varieties are still in use in the 
Plateau and these recover faster from drought stress (Titus and Pereira 2007). As 
tree density per hectare increases, yield per tree declines, possibly due to 
crowding and resource competition. 
Estimates show the clear impact of irrigation scheduling on productivity. 
Smallholders who applied more water on the first dry season irrigation achieved 
40 per cent greater production. Moreover, farmers commencing irrigation after 
mid-January had 10 per cent lower yield per tree, significant at the 15 per cent 
level. The optimal average irrigation spacing is between 16 and 21 days, which 
overlaps the recommended 20 to 25 day interval. In aggregate, these results are 
broadly consistent with experimental results of D'haeze, Deckers et al. (2003) for 
Robusta production in Dak Lak. 
Irrigation season duration was not a significant predictor of productivity in these 
estimates. The insignificance of the covariates for irrigation season duration do 
not imply that irrigation season length is unimportant in the Dak Lak Plateau 
however. Rather, the results indicate that 90 per cent of respondent irrigation 
season durations exceeded 60 days. This indicates the majority of respondents 
maintained adequate soil moisture via irrigation for the entire dry season. 
Results for estimated socio-economic and institutional variables are also generally 
consistent with hypothesis. Land fragmentation, which was measured by the 
number of plots the smallholder cultivated, increases technical inefficiency, 
significant at the 15 percent level. Having a registered land title translates into a 
productivity increase of 15 per cent. Results also suggest productivity increases 
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with farmed area, which is consistent with the findings of RS. Productivity also 
increases with household non-farm income. Against expectations, smallholders 
mono-cropping coffee were less productive then their diversified counterparts. 
Productivity increases with household adult labour endowment, supporting a 
production premium based on labour flexibility. Respondents who had received 
technical irrigation and fertiliser training in the previous twelve months were not 
more productive than their counterparts. 
The impact of omitting the irrigation scheduling covariates from the production 
frontier was evaluated with a log likelihood-ratio test comparing the semi-dated 
stochastic production frontier including the irrigation scheduling covariates to 
the nested static stochastic production frontier that excluded irrigation 
scheduling covariates. The log likelihood-ratio test rejected the null hypothesis of 
equivalence (Log likelihood-ratio (6 d.f)= 88.04, Prob LR > X~d.f. =0.000). This 
result shows the restricted static production function does not correctly 
characterise smallholder coffee production processes in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
Marginal short-run irrigation cost estimate 
Specification 
Irrigation water is not priced in Dak Lak. As a result, a short-run marginal 
irrigati~g. cost is estimated in this section in substitute for pw in Equation (31), 
Equation (32), and Equation (35) from Chapter 3. The specification for the total 
irrigation cost of smallholders includes variable costs resulting from transferring 
water =between the water source and the production plot, and long-run fixed 
irrigation capital costs. The survey dataset included many incomplete irrigation 
capital observations, and a short-run irrigation cost model was estimated as a 
result. Moreover, practical issues also arise when attempting to apportion 
irrigation capital depreciation to specific plots · in multi-plot, multi-crop 
smallholdings. As a result, in this analysis the short-run irrigation cost is 
estimated by energy and labour costs only, which are variable within a single 
irrigation season. 
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litres of fuel required to deliver one cubic metre of water from the source to the 
production plot is used as the dependent variable in the energy cost function. 
Fuel price fluctuations in the Plateau make this approach preferable to directly 
estimating the irrigation energy cost per cubic metre. The dependent variable was 
constructed using respondent reports of the average amount of fuel required to 
pump irrigation water per hour, and the average reported time to fill a micro-
basin. The average number of minutes to irrigate one cubic metre of water during 
the dry season is used as the dependent variable in the irrigation labour cost 
estimate. The same logic applies for not directly estimating irrigation labour cost 
per cubic metre. The irrigation labour time dependent variable is the ratio of the 
average time requirement to fill the average micro-basin and the average 
irrigation volume. 
linear functions are used to specify the unknown energy and labour inputs 
[f;: a 10 +a11 HPli +a12 D~stli +a13WDli +a14Di~tWDli +a15BDli +v1; ( 4S) I; - a 20 + a 21 HP2; + a 22 Dzst2i + a 23WD2; + a 24 DzstWD2; + a 25 BD2; + v2; 
Where f and 1 are the dependent variables, fuel litres to pump one cubic metre of 
water from the source to the production plot, and minutes of labour time to do 
the same. Fuel and labour requirements to deliver one cubic metre of water to the 
coffee plot are explained by the same variables: pump horsepower; the distance 
between the irrigation plot and the water source; well depth, which takes the 
value of zero if groundwater is not used; and a dummy variable for smallholders 
producing in Buon Don region. Buon Don is located on the western fringe of the 
Dak Lak Plateau and has a very shallow depth to aquitard compared to the other 
surveyed regions. The effort requirement of irrigation may differ in this region as 
a result. Note also that well depths are used in substitute for pumping depth, as 
the well depth figures are considered more reliable. Collinearity between the well 
depth and well dummy variable resulted in a well dummy variable being 
excluded in the final estimate. 
- 113 -
Table 4.7 Summary characteristics of efficiency groups 
Variable Unit of measure 
Efficiency ranking 
=> 90% 80-90% < 80% 
Observations Number 53 15 4 
Observations % 74 20 6 
Yt kg 3.95 3.62 3.26 
nt kg 0.52 0.36 0.40 
pt kg 0.22 0.20 0.17 
kt kg 0.48 0.32 0.40 
Wti m3 1.11 0.94 1.14 
Wt m3 3.81 3.72 4.83 
dmanure % 17 20 25 
Pest % 58 60 100 
Shade % 49 53 50 
Steep % 11 13 
Moderate % 30 20 25 
GW % 79 87 75 
Intcrop % 30 40 50 
dry06 % 30 47 50 
T Unit 1040 1041 1000 
TreeAge Year 13.8 17.2 18.8 
Irrigation Season 
Day 80.64 88.07 101.50 Duration 
Firstlrr % 83 73 100 
·4rrSLate % 15 20 
Irr Dur Day 24.14 21.78 23.60 
Ext % 17 20 50 
Mono % 81 93 100 
Plots Unit 1.62 1.27 1.50 
Pumps Unit 0.75 0.73 0.75 
Area ha 1.05 0.95 1.03 
re gist % 58 60 100 
NFI VND'OOO 8.28 4.80 5.50 
Edu Year 9.04. 8.40 9.75 
Age Year 41.92 47.80 43.25 
HH Head 4.38 4.40 2.75 
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Hypotheses 
Null hypotheses are that increasing pump capacity increases fuel demand and 
lowers the labour time required to deliver one cubic metre of water between its 
source and the plot. Energy and labour time requirements should increase with 
increasing distance between the water source and production plot, and also with 
increasing well lift. When irrigators use surface water, labour and energy 
requirements per cubic metre should be lower compared to an otherwise 
identical delivery from a groundwater source. 
Results 
The energy and labour functions are estimated as a system of equations using 
seemingly unrelated regression to control for contemporaneous correlation 
between the error terms across equations (Baum 2006). Table 4.8 summarises the 
results. Both models are significant at the one per cent level and the signs of 
estimated coefficients are consistent with expectations. The labour and fuel 
required to deliver one cubic metre of irrigation water decreases with increasing 
pump horsepower, and increase in distance and well depth. For the labour 
estimate, each of these estimates is significant at the 15 percent level. Combined 
with the distance and interaction effect however, the fuel requirement to deliver 
a cubic metre of water is marginally decreasing in energy cost and marginally 
increasing in labour cost. Coffee smallholders in Buon Don require approximately 
100 millilitres more fuel to deliver a cubic metre of water to their production 
plot, and 4.8 minutes additional labour time, both significant at the one percent 
level. 
Policy implications 
The production and cost estimates convey the policy message that there is 
substantial scope amongst the micro-basin coffee smallholder sector of the Dak 
Lak Plateau to increase irrigation water use efficiency. By many standards the 
coffee smallholders surveyed in this work are the antithesis of the enduring "poor 
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Table 4.8 Seemingly unrelated regression fuel and labour estimates 
Variable Coefficient z-ratio 
Dependent variable: lt fuel required to pump one cubic metre of irrigation water 
Pump horsepower -2.97E-03 b -2.09 
(1.42E-03) 
Dist~nce between water source and production plot 4.67E-04 • 3.56 
in metres (1.31E-04) 
Well depth in metres 2.95E-03 b 2.18 
(1.36E-03) 
Distance • well depth -2.44E-05 • -3.80 
(6.43E-06) 
Buon Don (Yes=l) 0.12 a 3.42 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.11 • 2.80 
(0.04) 
Observations 50 
Chi square 36.36 
Adjusted r-square 0.42 
Dependent variable: minutes labour required to pump one cubic metre of irrigation water 
Pump horsepower -0.04 -1.45 
(0.03) 
Distance between water source and production plot 3.05E-03 1.22 
in metres (2.SOE-03) 
Well depth in metres 0.04 1.51 
(0.03) 
Distance • well depth -1.36E-04 -1.11 
_ _,. 
(1.22E-04) 
Buon Don (Yes=l) 4.77 • 7.30 
(0.65) 
Constanj 3.38 a 4.46 
(0.76) 
Observations 50 
Chi square 68.60 
Adjusted r-square 0.58 
Notes: •hand c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
but efficient" smallholder characterised by Schultz (1964), who is reasonably 
efficient at allocating production resources and responding to price signals. To 
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shift the production frontier of Schultz's efficient smallholders outwards requires 
new inputs and technologies. Coffee smallholders in the Dak Lak Plateau do not 
operate in the same relatively stable production environment as in Schultz 
however. Coffee smallholders of the Dak Lak Plateau operate in a more dynamic 
technical and economic environment, and are more likely to be in disequilibrium 
as a result (Ali and Byerlee 1991). For the coffee smallholders of the Dak Lak 
Plateau, substantial returns could result from programs that increase their 
aptitude for irrigation scheduling. These programs will assist coffee smallholders 
to reduce the magnitude of their allocative and technical water use inefficiencies. 
The second main policy implication is that, even between relatively homogenous 
smallholders, plot and local agro-environmental conditions have a clear impact 
on productivity. The bottom line of this observation is that local natural 
production constraints must be taken into account when tailoring irrigation 
efficiency training programs to local conditions, Moreover, the same local 
constraints must be accounted for when the magnitude of on-farm productivity 
gains achievable from changing coffee smallholder irrigation behaviours are 
forecast. Combined, the estimates highlight the complexity of the Robusta 
production process and the importance of irrigation scheduling aptitude, plot, and 
exogenous agro-environmental conditions on the productivity of coffee 
smallholders relative to the importance of irrigation infrastructure and socio-
economic factors. 
It is also notable that the fact that coffee smallholders averaged 3.8 metric tons 
output per hectare immediately following three consecutive years of severe 
drought. These relatively high yields suggests that the hydrological system and 
coffee smallholders of the Dak Lak Plateau are resilient in terms of their ability to 
quickly return to stable productivity following a sustained drought shock. 
The policy implications drawn from the analysis in this Chapter stand in direct 
contrast with one central policy conclusion of Rios and Shively (2006b), being 
that technically inefficient coffee smallholders in the Dak Lak Plateau could best 
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increase productivity by optimising the technical features of their irrigation 
infrastructure. The estimates of this Chapter show that when the coffee 
smallholder production frontier is specified to include irrigation scheduling and 
agro-environmental production conditions the relative importance of socio-
economic, institutional and irrigation infrastructure factors as productivity 
determinants are diminished. Estimates of this Chapter suggest the irrigation 
technology that micro-basin coffee smallholders are using in the Dak Lak Plaetau 
to transfer water between their main water source and the coffee tree is less 
important than how the smallholder chooses to schedule these irrigation 
deliveries. 
The finding that technical inefficiency dissipates when the specification of the 
production frontier includes variables that control for heterogeneous agro-
environmental production conditions is consistent with other recent smallholder 
agricultural production research (Sherlund et al. 2002). Estimates in this Chapter 
reinforce the concern expressed in Sherlund, Barrett et al. (2002) that when 
heterogenous agroenvironmental production conditions prevail the estimation of 
smallholder production frontiers that exclude these agro-environmental 
covariates will lead to omitted variable bias, inflated estimates of technical 
inefficiency and biased estimates of the factors contributing to the estimated 
technicaj)nefficiency. Erroneous policy guidance is the end result. 
The final policy implication concerns how much the water demand of coffee 
smallh~lders in the Plateau could be reduced via increasing plot level irrigation 
water use efficiency. The statistically insignificant estimates for irrigation water 
inputs in the stochastic production frontier show that irrigation water has a VMP 
of zero above 550 litres of intput per tree per irrigation. Conservatively assuming 
that the allocatively efficient dry season irrigation schedule includes three equally 
spaced irrigations totalling 550 litres per tree per irrigation, and further assuming 
a planting density of 1,050 trees per hectare and an areal extent of 130,000 
hectares of Robusta in the Plateau, suggests that dry season diversions to Robusta 
could be reduced by around 340,000 ML per annum. As a point of comparison, 
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this demand reduction is roughly equivalent to 30 per cent of average annual 
recharge to the unconfined aquifer of the Plateau (Moller 1997b: 95). 
The marginal economic value of irrigation 
water in smallholder coffee production in the 
Dak Lak Plateau 
The stochastic production frontier estimate shows irrigation water has a VMP of 
zero above 550 litres per tree per irrigation. The MPP estimates for irrigation 
water mean a crop water production function below 550 litres per tree cannot be 
estimated with the survey dataset. In substitute, this section constructs profit 
comparisons. between coffee smallholder subcategories using the estimated 
production frontier and short-run marginal irrigation cost functions. The baseline 
condition is defined by the statistically average irrigation water input of 
respondents, which is just above 1,000 litres per tree per irrigation, and the 
average irrigation schedule of respondents. In the other three scenarios, the 
average irrigation is set at 550 litres per tree per irrigation, which corresponds to 
the fifth percentile of respondents' water inputs, and approximates the 540 litres 
of irrigation input that D'haeze, et al. (2003) demonstrated was sufficient for 
optimal flower set in Dak Lak. 
The alternative scenarios are: (1) same as the baseline but assuming a 40 day 
irrigation season, more irrigation on the first irrigation, and a 20 day irrigation 
rotation; (2) same as (1) but not applying more irrigation on the first irrigation; 
and (3) same as (1) but assuming a 100 day irrigation season, which is equivalent 
to commencing irrigation in mid-December and finishing at the end of March. 
All other input variables are set at their statistical means. The short-run irrigation 
cost is estimated using the SUR estimates for labour and fuel from Table 4.8, 
holding all variables at their mean values, and average fuel and labour costs from 
Table 4.3. Because all other inputs are held constant, the scenarios analyse 
constrained changes to the operating surpluses of coffee smallholders. 
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Estimates for the statistically average smallholder (Table 4.9) show shifting from 
the baseline to a shorter irrigation season and an optimal 20-day irrigation 
interval increases yield per tree from 4.3 to 4.9 kilograms and reduces total dry 
season irrigation per tree from 3.8 to 1.65 cubic metres. The estimated yield of 4.9 
kilograms per tree in scenario one approximates the five kilogram per tree 
maximum yield suggested as being possible in Lich et al. (2005). This is the 
expected result given the estimated production frontier model defines yield per 
tree for technically efficient producers using the technically efficient irrigation 
schedule and the most allocatively efficient water input determinable from the 
survey data. Shifting from the baseline scenario to scenario one reduces short-run 
variable irrigation costs by approximately VND3.7 million per hectare, and lifts 
output to 5.1 tonnes. This in tum results in revenue increasing by VND 12 million 
based on the average 2006 farm gate price. Comparing scenarios one and two 
Table 4.9 Coffee smallholder irrigation simulation estimates 
Unit of 
measure Scenario 
Baseline One Two Three 
Assumptions 
Irrigation per tree per application m3 1.06 0.55 0.55 0.55 
More wa.u:,r applied in the first dry 
season irrigation Yes=l 
Irrigation late start Yes=l 
Irrigation season duration Days 85.04 40.00 40.00 100.00 
Interva_t between irrigations Days 23.79 20.00 20.00 20.00 
Trees per hectare Unit 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Output price VNDkg-1 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 
Irrigation cost per cubic metre VND 1,653 1,653 1,653 1,653 
Total irrigation per hectare m3 4,016 1,733 1,733 3,465 
Estimates 
Total physical product per tree Kg 4.34 4.89 3.44 4.30 
Total physical product per hectare kg 4,553 5,135 3,614 4,518 
Total revenue per hectare VNDMIL 93.4 105.3 74.1 92.7 
Total short-run variable irrigation cost 
per hectare VNDMIL 6.6 2.9 2.9 5.7 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL= Million 
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highlights the importance of applying more water during the first irrigation. Not 
applying more water on the first irrigation reduces yield to 3.4 kilograms per tree, 
causing a revenue decline of approximately VND30 million. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has estimated the short-run, at-source, marginal economic value of 
irrigation water to coffee smallholders in the Dak Lak Plateau. Results suggest 
coffee smallholders are allocatively inefficient in their input levels of elemental 
nutrients and irrigation water. Information failure and risk aversion are both 
plausible explanations for the excessive amount of irrigation water and fertiliser 
input obseryed. Estimates show it costs the average coffee smallholder in the 
survey around VNDl,650 to deliver one cubic metre of irrigation water to their 
plot. Moreover, the MPP of irrigation water is shown to be zero above 550 litres 
input per tree per irrigation. 
Incurring irrigation costs without at least offsetting these costs with production 
gains is inconsistent with the allocative efficiency principle of production 
economics. Production economics assumes that producers know their production 
function, cost function and factor price relationships with certainty however, and 
then organise production to maximise the advantage of this information (Beattie 
and Taylor 1985). Estimates from this Chapter suggest that coffee smallholders in 
the Dak Lak Plateau are a long way from understanding these input-output 
relationships with anything near certainty. Estimates from the Chapter suggest 
that during the 2005-06 dry season the average coffee smallholder in the Dak Lak 
Plateau over-irrigated by around 2,300 cubic metres per hectare, and thereby 
incurred VND3.7 million in short-run irrigation costs without an offsetting 
benefit. Diverting this unproductive water to other sectors in 2006 could have 
occurred without imposing revenue losses on the coffee smallholders so long as 
the technically efficient irrigation schedule was also adopted. The research 
findings of this Chapter are consistent with recent experimental agronomic 
research on maximising Robusta yields with irrigation scheduling in the Dak Lak 
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Plateau. The research is consistent with previous research that suggests relatively 
unmanageable agro-environmental factors and manageable irrigation scheduling 
behaviours are the fundamental determinants of production outcomes on the 
coffee smallholdings in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
The small sub-samples used in the analysis make it difficult to draw reliable 
conclusions about the ability of State extension services to strengthen coffee 
smallholders' crop management practices in the Plateau. The estimated effect that 
training does not increase technical efficiency shows that smallholders who 
received irrigation and fertiliser management training during the previous year 
were not more productive than other respondents. However, trained respondents 
did use significantly less elemental nutrient input than their un-trained 
counterparts, and their fertiliser application rates approximated the amounts 
advised by local State agricultural extension services. Combined with the 
insignificant coefficients for elemental nutrients, qualified support for the 
argument that fertiliser training "works" on coffee smallholders in Dak Lak is 
provided by that result. In contrast, the same trained smallholders used 
significantly more water per tree per irrigation, showing they are less allocatively 
efficient water users. There are several possible explanations for this outcome 
however none of them are compelling. One plausible explanation is that 
smallh~~ers simply have no idea how much water they apply to each tree, 
whereas it is easier to estimate dry chemical fertiliser inputs based on the number 
of bags purchased and the elemental nutrient breakdown that is printed on each 
bag. Alternatively, as a result of training smallholders may be sensitised to the 
importance of irrigation water in coffee production and given the shadow price of 
water is substantially lower than other substitutable inputs such as fertiliser, 
producers attempt to substitute fertiliser with lower cost irrigation water. 
Whatever the cause, the research findings point towards the need for a more 
detailed outcomes analysis of the irrigation training provided by Dak Lak's 
various State and non-government extension service providers. 
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Despite being unable to estimate the marginal economic value of dry season 
irrigation water when coffee is subject to soil moisture deficit, this research 
provides valuable information for developing the Dak Lak Plateau's smallholder 
coffee sector and the water policies of the Dak Lak Plateau in line with the Law 
on Water Resources. The research provides information on how much water use 
could be decreased without altering output, production technology, and the 
quantities of other inputs used in the coffee production process. Moreover, the 
results suggest that programs training coffee smallholders to improve irrigation 
scheduling behaviours may be able to achieve sizable technical and allocative 
efficiency gains without requiring that smallholders make additional irrigation 
technology investments. 
One criticism of the agricultural production econometrics literature is its near 
exclusive focus on the relationship between static input quantities and output 
(Vaux and Pruitt 1983). By showing that omitting semi-dated irrigation 
scheduling covariates from the production frontier significantly reduces overall 
model efficiency and the precision of the nested model coefficients the 
production frontier estimate in this Chapter supports this critique. From a 
practical perspective, these results highlight the importance of the timing of 
agricultural inputs, as compared to the total amount of input in the coffee 
smallholder sector of Dak Lak. From a statistical standpoint, the results raise quite 
serious misspecification concerns about the widespread practice of estimating 
production functions and frontiers based on static input-output relationships 
alone. 
The Law on Water Resources of Viet Nam requires that regional development 
planning accounts for the regional capacity to supply water. Chapter 2 discussed 
previous research in the Dak Lak Plateau that suggests dry season water resources 
are over-allocated at a minimum during dry and very dry years. Reducing dry 
season diversions to coffee irrigation by 340,000 ML per annum by increasing 
irrigation water use efficiency at the coffee plot level could set fundamental 
changes in the hydrology of the Plateau in motion. Potential for moving towards 
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a more sustainable and social welfare increasing water management regime in 
Dale Lak via increased irrigation efficiency on coffee smallholdings is therefore 
suggested. 
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5 
The marginal economic value of water in 
irrigated rice production: a simulation and 
optimisation analysis 
Introduction 
In the Dak Lak Plateau, flooded rice fields proliferate around streams, at reservoir 
outlets, and within irrigation systems. After coffee, lowland irrigated rice has the 
second largest annual water demand of the Plateau. On area basis flooded rice has 
the greatest per hectare water demand. Irrigation of rice diverts or delays water 
deliveries to.alternate competing uses, such as irrigated coffee, household, or in-
situ uses. Reflecting on the requirements of the Law on Water Resources of Viet 
Nam, a fundamental question is whether the allocation of scarce water in the 
Plateau to dry season irrigation of lowland rice is an efficient, economical, 
rational, fair, and sustainable water allocation strategy. Estimation of the marginal 
economic value of water in dry season lowland irrigated rice production can 
partially answer this question. 
Lowland irrigated rice is very sensitive to soil water stress, and also demonstrates 
different sensitivity to water stress throughout its growth cycle. The differing 
sensitivity of lowland irrigated rice to water stress across its growth cycle means 
the marginal economic value of water in rice production changes during the crop 
growth cycle, potentially substantially. The time dependency of MPP in rice 
makes it preferable to estimate the economic value of irrigation water with a 
dated water production function. Dated water production functions could be 
based on controlled local field experiments or detailed farmer surveys. Controlled 
rice irrigation research has not _been undertaken in Dak Lak however. Moreover, 
preliminary field research indicated rice smallholders in the Plateau could not 
reliably estimate their irrigation water usage. 
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As a result of the complications in attempting an empirical estimation of the VMP 
of water in irrigated lowland rice proudction, a non-survey based approach is 
developed in this Chapter to estimate the dated water production function, 
marginal physical product, and value marginal product of lowland irrigated rice 
in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
The primary objective of this Chapter is to estimate the at-site, short-run, 
marginal economic value of delivered water in dry season lowland irrigated rice 
production in the Dak Lak Plateau. A simulation optimisation modelling 
approach is employed. A deterministic simulation model relating timed water 
inputs to crop output is first developed and calibrated to local environmental 
production conditions. This simulation model is then used to define dated MPP 
for irrigated rice using a four-day irrigation rotation. Non-linear water 
production and soil moisture transition functions are estimated from the outputs 
of the crop growth simulation model using parametric regression techniques and 
flexible higher order polynomial specifications. In the second stage, the water 
production and soil moisture transition functions are employed in the 
development of a non-linear mathematical programming model of optimal 
irrigation scheduling. The non-linear maximisation model defines the irrigation 
schedule that maximises the operating surplus of the representative, risk-neutral 
produc~E .. of irrigated lowland rice in the Plateau. The optimisation algorithm is 
used to evaluate three policy questions about dry season irrigated rice cultivation 
in the Dak Lak Plateau: (1) what is the irrigation schedule that maximises the 
operating surplus of the the representative lowland rice smallholder during the 
dry season under conditions of unconstrained and constrained seasonal water 
supply; (2) what is the inverse demand function of the economically efficient 
lowland rice producer during the dry season; and (3) does the irrigation schedule 
recommended by local agricultural extension services approximate the irrigation 
schedule that maximises operating surplus when seasonal water availability is not 
constrained. 
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This Chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides background to 
irrigated dry season rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau. Section three 
outlines the basis for valuing irrigation water via dynamic methods, and 
introduces simulation-optimisation approaches to estimate the marginal 
economic value of irrigation water. The irrigated rice simulation-optimisation 
model is developed and estimated in section four, while section five considers 
policy implications. Conclusions are drawn in section six. 
Smallholder irrigated rice production in the 
Dak Lak Plateau 
In 2002, approximately 16,500 hectares in the Dak Lak Plateau were cropped 
with lowland irrigated rice. Irrigated rice is grown over a 105 to 120 day period in 
the Plateau on smallholdings that typically total less than 0.4 hectares. Lowland 
rice is typically cropped twice a year, once during the Winter-Spring season from 
November to late March or early April, and again during the Summer-Autumn 
season between May and August. Rainfall is sufficient for lowland rice to 
normally not require supplementary irrigation during the Summer-Autumn 
season. During the dry Winter-Spring cropping season rainfall is insufficient and 
irregular and production is only possible with irrigation. To enable a continuous 
water supply, irrigated rice is generally cultivated on fields in former swamps 
near streams, at reservoir outlets, and within irrigation systems. Lowland rice in 
the Plateau is mainly gown in medium to heavy textured Vertisols, which is a 
swelling and shrinking soil with high clay content. Vertisols have high water-
holding capacity, resulting in low hydraulic conductivity and water infiltration 
rates (Eswaran and Cook 1988). These water retention properties make Vertisols 
especially well suited to irrigated rice production, but other crops such as maize, 
soybean, and cotton can also be.grown. 
Under the cropping system practiced in Dak Lak, irrigated lowland rice is grown 
in level basins under near continuous submergence, with the result that the soil is 
saturated and anaerobic from after crop establishment to close to harvest time. 
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Smallholders practice direct wet seeding, primarily due to the higher labour costs 
of the transplanting method. For the Winter-Spring rice crop, farmers usually 
tiller and level the plot in preparation for seeding at the end of September. The 
plot is prepared with an initial flooding one to two weeks prior to seeding to 
bring soil water content up to saturation. Excess water is drained from the plot 
prior to seeding, and seeds are broadcast directly on the saturated soil. Following 
seeding, the crop is allowed to grow to approximately two centimetres height 
before submergence, and is then subject to continuous flooding at depths 
between 10 and 20 centimetres until just prior to harvesting. Smallholders in Dak 
Lak generally attempt to maintain at least 10 centimetres submergence to control 
weeds and reduce irrigation frequency. 
Reported yields for Winter-Spring rice in Dak Lak vary between sources. The 
Agriculture and Forestry Service of Dak Lak reported yields of up to 5,500 
kilograms per hectare in 1995. Lower yields of 3,300 kilograms per hectare for the 
Ea Tul catchment have also been reported (DANIDA 2000). Winter-Spring 
irrigated rice production fluctuates considerably in Dak Lak based on water 
availability. 
Historically, local authorities have recommended a total Winter-Spring irrigation 
of around 12,000 cubic metres per hectare, including a 2,000 to 3,000 cubic metre 
land preparation (Moller 1997a: 75). Based on the 2002 cropland allocation, this 
suggests the Dak Lak Plateau's irrigated rice sector's dry season irrigation water 
deman_d is approximately 200,000 ML. 
Valuing irrigation water using simulation and 
optimisation methods 
Conceptual framework 
The residual imputation approach for estimating the marginal economic value of 
water as an intermediate production input was introduced in Chapter 2. The 
residual imputation approach estimates the economic value of water by allocating 
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non-marketed water the residual rents from the production process. The 
approach requires that efficient market prices can be assigned to all other inputs, 
and also that the total value product can be divided into independent shares, so 
that each input is paid according to its marginal value. Dividing the residual by 
the volume of water supplied obtains water's average shadow price, which is the 
maximum amount the producer would be willing to pay for the water supply 
increment on average. 
When the water stock available for irrigation is known at the beginning of a 
cropping season, the rational, risk-neutral producer will schedule their irrigation 
water input and other inputs .to maximise their economic surplus from 
production .• The economically optimal irrigation schedule requires that water 
cannot be reallocated or the schedule changed to achieve a higher surplus, given 
agro-environmental production conditions, input and output prices, irrigation 
technology, and other farm-level and institutional constraints. In other words, 
the economically optimal irrigation schedule is characterised by joint technical 
and allocative efficiency. This basic logic forms the conceptual basis for the 
mathematical programming extension to the residual imputation approach for the 
estimation of the marginal economic value of water in irrigated agriculture. 
Bontemps et al. (2002), Blanco Fonseca et al, (2002), and Young (200Sb) each 
characterise the basic irrigation scheduling problem of the producer in discrete 
time, with a limited time horizon, and no discounting. Following these authors, 
assume a risk-neutral profit maximising irrigator who has a known stock of water 
available at the beginning of the planting season ( Q, and a fixed irrigation 
technology. Water is unpriced, but the producer incurs a constant volumetric 
cost ( c) for every irrigation water unit used. The crop yield function is defined as 
a function of final harvestable mass at terminal time T, Y(M T) , Cft), and other 
t=l 
fixed production costs are FC . The initial soil moisture condition is V . The 
irrigator schedules irrigation inputs q0 , ... .,T) to maximise their constrained profit 
function given physical and technical production constraints 
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T 
max;rq(I, ,T) = pY(MT)- L:(cq,)-FC (49) 
l=l 
(SO) 
(Sl) 
(S2) 
(S3) 
(S4) 
Equation (SO) defines the dynamics of crop yield as a simple function of the 
previous period yield and initial soil water available to the crop for uptake in 
period t. The soil moisture motion Equation (Sl) states soil moisture in the 
current period is a function of the initial soil moisture of the previous time 
period, less the water extracted by the crop and plus irrigation water applied in 
the previous period. Water extraction by the crop extraction is defined as a 
function of the crop biomass. The seasonal water stock is depleted according to 
Equation (S2), and standard non-negativity (S3) and boundary constraints (S4) 
apply. 
The constrained profit maximising irrigation decision sequence is 
q • (Q) = ( q: )i=l, ... T (SS) 
And tlfe maximised constrained profit function 
T 
;r'(Q)= pY*(M T )- L (cq;)- FC (S6) 
l=l 
Recall this is a constrained profit function by the Le Chatelier's Principle from 
Chapter 3. As all non-water inputs are fixed the producer is constrained by not 
being able to alter non-water inputs to maximise profits. The optimal irrigation 
decision sequence therefore defines a lower bound profit, as well as a lower 
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bound estimate of the marginal economic value of water. At Q, the willingness to 
pay of the producer for an additional unit of water is its value marginal product. 
Analytically this is 
(57) 
With a schedule of shadow prices (A), the uncompensated inverse irrigation 
water demand function of the producer can be directly estimated (Conradie and 
Hoag 2004). 
Mathematical programming algorithms of irrigation scheduling assume the 
producer either uses an open-loop, ex ante strategy or feedback, ex-post strategy 
in formulating their optimal irrigation schedule (Bontemps and Couture 2002). 
The open-loop strategy is deterministic, assuming that the irrigator knows the 
seasonal water stock available, as well as the agro-environmental and other 
production conditions that they will face during the growing period. The 
producer uses this perfect information to maximise their irrigation objective. The 
feedback strategy assumes the water stock and other information is unknown to 
the irrigator at the beginning of the season, and becomes available during the 
season. With updated information, the irrigator modifies their crop irrigation 
schedule to maximise their irrigation objective. Procedurally, mathematical 
optimisation using the feedback strategy is more complex than the open-loop 
strategy, however a feedback strategy is generally warranted . if key agro-
environmental production variables, such as rainfall and future water stocks, are 
stochastic and influential on the outcome (Burt and Stauber 1971). In a stochastic 
production situation, additional information obtained during the growing season 
generates economic value for the producer because it can be used to modify 
production activities in ways that increase production returns on investment. If 
agro-environmental production conditions are relatively stable, or their changes 
have little bearing on the maximisation objective, an open-loop model suffices 
because the feedback strategy will approximate it. 
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Literature review 
Implemention of the irrigation scheduling decision framework developed in the 
previous section requires price data of inputs and outputs, knowledge of the 
source water stock and its dynamics, as well as knowledge of climatic data, the 
dated production and soil moisture transition functions, assumptions about the 
producer's risk preferences, and an optimisation algorithm. Chapter 3 introduced 
the simulation approach for generating production and soil moisture functions, 
and noted that this approach had the advantage of being able to model complex 
soil-water-atmosphere-crop relationships. There is an extensive agricultural 
economics literature that utilises the outputs of crop simulation models to define 
goal maximising irrigation schedules for crops other than irrigated lowland rice 
(Burt and Stauber 1971; Matanga and Marino 1979; Yaron and Dinar 1982; 
Bryant et al. 1993; Epperson et al. 1993; Scheierling 1995; Botes et al. 1996; Dinar 
and Letey 1996; Acharya 1997; Bontemps and Couture 2001; Rinaldi 2001; Borges 
et al. 2003; Kuo and Liu 2003; Paudel et al. 2005). Mujumdar (2002) overviews 
the main mathematical approaches for the optimisation of irrigation system 
operation and crop water allocation. Further, lowland rice simulation models 
have been developed and applied to analyse rice productivity under water deficit 
and other stresses (Rosengrant and Shetty 1994; Wu and Wilson 1998; Singh et al. 
2001; Confalonieri. and Bocchi 2005; Belder et al. 2006; Pirmoradian and 
Sepaskliah 2006). However to date, there have been no known analyses 
combining simulation modelling and mathematical programming to define profit 
maxirnjsing irrigation schedules at the plot level for lowland rice when water is 
freely available and limiting. 
Simulation and optimisation models of irrigation scheduling vary in the extent 
they approximate the empirics of the physical growth processes of the crop and 
the production environment. Chapter 3 noted that the use of pre-specified 
production functions informed by economic theory is a prevalent approach in the 
applied agricultural economics literature. Dinar and Letey (1996) and Hexem and 
Heady (1978) discuss the theoretical appropriateness of different functional forms 
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in the evaluation of agronomic problems. Pre-specified functional forms have 
been critiqued in the literature as being inadequate in their representation of the 
biological and physical processes of crops (Botes et al. 1996; Bontemps and 
Couture 2002). 
The approximation of non-linear crop production relationships using linear 
approximations is also widespread in the applied agricultural economics 
literature. Benli and Kodal (2003) survey optimal cropping pattern studies that 
use linear approximations for non-linear crop production functions. Belni and 
Kodal show that enforcing a linear production function on a production 
relationship that is non-linear can result in suboptimal irrigation and land 
allocation decisions being identified by the optimisation algorithm. Moreover, 
because optimal values in linear models are defined by the model constraints, the 
linear approach always generates comer solutions, even when the real optimal 
solution occurs within the feasible region. While the same type of analysis has 
not been applied to the investigation of soil moisture dynamics, it is clear the 
same problem will occur when non-linear soil moisture dynamics are 
approximated by linear soil moisture transition functions. 
Empirical application 
Overview 
The simulation-optimisation model of rice irrigation scheduling developed in this 
section is broadly consistent with the approaches in Bryant et al. (1993) and 
Paudel et al. (2005) for non-rice cereal crops. A deterministic simulation model 
that relates dated water inputs to crop output is first calibrated to local 
environmental production conditions. The model is then used to define dated 
yield response functions for irrigated lowland rice using a four-day irrigation 
interval. Non-linear water yield production functions and soil moisture transition 
functions are estimated using outputs from the crop growth simulation model. 
These funcations are estimated using parametric regression and flexible higher 
order polynomial specifications. The constrained profit maximising irrigation 
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schedule of the producer is defined by an open loop, discrete, non-linear 
mathematical programming algorithm that is based on the generalised dated yield 
and soil moisture transition functions. Profit maximisation is constrained by the 
crop production function, that all other non-water inputs being fixed, the non-
linear soil-moisture dynamics, the available seasonal water stock, and technical 
and-agro-environmental production factors. 
Components 
The crop growth simulator 
The relationship between the soil moisture available for crop uptake and relative 
yield at each irrigation decision stage is modelled us,ing BUDGET (version 5.0) 
(Raes 2002). BUDGET simulates p!ant growth, plant water extraction, and water 
and salt movement in the soil profile, assuming an otherwise pristine production 
environment. Relative to other crop simulation models, BUDGET is simple to 
operate and requires minimal input data. Final relative yield in BUDGET is 
specified using a dated production function based on a modified form of the 
approach of Jensen (1968) approach, first introduced in Chapter 3. The subscripts 
a, m, i, and j are actual, maximum, growth stage, and irrigation interval index 
respectively. Further, Y is yield, ET evapotranspiration, Ky is the growth stage 
specific sensitivity index of the crop to soil water stress, and N the number of 
crop growth stages. Relative yield is defined by the relationship 
~= TI[l - K .(1- ~)] y i=I Y• ET . 
m ~ 
(58) 
Defining Mas the number of time steps of !it j day duration, and Las the growth 
M1 +Mz + ... +!it M 
stage's length in days, such that L; = 1 , the Nfunctions are replaced 
by 
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1 - K . ( 1 - ET ai ) = TI [ 1 - K . ( 1 - ET aj ) ] A:: 
Y' ET . ·;1 Y' ET . 
Cl j CJ 
(59) 
Using this approach allows the yield response of a crop under water deficit to be 
estimated at time steps smaller than the growth stage. This overcomes a limitation 
of the approach of Doorenbos et al. (1979). 
A finite difference model, defined by soil depth and time dimensions, describes 
the retention, movement, and uptake properties of the soil profile. Raes (2002) 
provides more information on these routines. In simplified terms, the available 
soil moisture at the start of a day ( t) is defined by 
(60) 
Where SM in is the initial soil moisture condition, IN is water infiltration into 
t 
the soil profile, D is drainage out of the crop's root zone, and ET actual 
evapotranspiration from the soil profile. Infiltration for day t is obtained by 
rearranging 
(61) 
where SW;n is the initial level of puddled surface water, IR irrigation, R 
t 
rainfall, 0 surface runoff, and E sw evaporation from the surface water body. 
Surface runoff in BUDGET is defined as all water applied above a user-specified · 
bund height. Procedures for calculating rainfall and irrigation water lost to 
surface runoff, the water infiltration rate, potential crop transpiration, soil 
evaporation, and other physiological functions are detailed in Raes (2002). 
The generalised water-crop production and water stock transition 
functions 
The BUDGET simulation model output files include daily values of relative yield, 
soil moisture, and irrigation depth. These output data are used to estimate 
generalised non-linear production and soil moisture transition equations for each 
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irrigation decision stage. The generalised non-linear production and soil moisture 
relationships are estimated with higher order polynomials. Higher order 
polynomials are simple to implement and provide precise smoothed estimates for 
the dynamic production function and soil moisture relationships. Non-parametric 
smoothing methods can also provide good fit to this type of observation data 
(Royston and Altman 1997). However the non-parametric approach lacks a 
corresponding equation, which limits the usefulness of the approach in this 
application. 
A fifth-order polynomial is used to estimate the generalised relative yield 
function from each irrigation decision stage, K 
(62) 
Where 
(63) 
andaz are coefficients for the higher order polynomial expression for available 
soil water at the beginning of the irrigation decision stage A W;n, of degree z. 
Available soil water at the beginning of an irrigation decision stage in Equation 
(63) is the sum of surface water and soil moisture in the root zone. The error term 
& in Equation (62) defines the residual between the polynomial regression 
estimate of relative yield and the relative yield simulated by BUDGET. 
To account for potential non-linearity in the soil moisture depletion function, the 
generalised water balance transition equation between two irrigation intervals is 
defined as a quadratic function of carry over soil moisture plus irrigation 
w~2 
A W;n K = Ir WA W;~_, + floIRI( + v (64) 
=l 
-136-
A w;n K defines the water available to the crop at the beginning of the irrigation 
decision stage, r w are the estimated coefficients for the polynomials ( w1 
describing the soil water depletion rate from the beginning of the previous 
irrigation decision stage A w;~_1 , the /30 coefficient describes the effective 
increase in available water following an irrigation depth of IR/( , and v is the 
error term defining residual between the estimated initial soil moisture at 
irrigation decision stage K , and the initial soil moisture condition simulated by 
BUDGET. 
The mathematical programming algorithm 
The mathematical programming algorithm maximises the constrained operating 
surplus of the producer by identifying the technically efficient irrigation schedule 
subject to prices for inputs and output, agro-environmental production 
constraints, a known seasonal water stock, the dated relative yield and soil 
moisture transition functions, and boundary conditions. When the seasonal water 
stock is not constrained, the algorithm also defines the allocatively efficient dated 
and seasonal water input 
J.-=30 y J 
max Jr q<i. ,T> = pn l D y:: -~ (cIR,. )- FC (65) 
Here, p is the rough rice farm gate output price, H is the maximum potential 
. K=30 y 
rough rice yield, f1 yaK is the final relative yield estimated as the product of 
TC=l mK 
relative yield in each irrigation decision stage, cdefines the constant variable cost 
per cubic metre of irrigation water, other production costs are FC, and all other 
variables have already been defined. 
Equation (65) is subject to the non-linear constraints on the relative yield 
production function and soil moisture transition functions, which are defined by 
Equation (62) and Equation (64) respectively. Additional constraints of the model 
are 
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(66) 
K=30 
IIRK~Q (67) 
K=I 
(68) 
(69) 
SMin =SM, Qin= Q (70) 
Equation (66) describes the depletion dynamics of the seasonal water stock 
between irrigation decision stages; Equation ( 67) specifies that total irrigation 
applied in all irrigation decision stages must not exceed the seasonally available 
stock; Equation (68) constrains available water in the root zone to within upper 
and lower bounds; Equation (69) constraints irrigation decision stage soil 
moisture, relative yield, and the available water stock for irrigation to non-
negative values; and (70) defines the initial soil moisture and irrigation water 
stock. 
Application 
The BUDGET crop growth simulator was initialised with agro-environmental 
and crop"" parameters representative of Winter-Spring irrigated rice production in 
the Dak Lak Plateau. Parameters used are summarised in Tables 5.1through5.3. 
Irrigat<:_d rice planting dates and crop parameters (Table 5.1) were obtained from 
Dak Lak DARD. The cropping cycle was set at 120 days, which is near the upper 
bound of the Winter-Spring crop cycle length in Dak Lak. Dry season irrigated 
rice production costs and non-irrigation input and output prices (Table 5.2) were 
obtained from a smallholder farm survey undertaken by Tay Nguyen University 
in 2004. An average irrigation cost of VNDl,420 per millimetre application depth, 
equivalent to VND142 per cubic metre per hectare, was used, and was derived 
from the same Tay Nguyen survey data. Incomplete data resulted in this cost 
-138-
estimate being based on estimates of the labour cost only, and the estimate is 
therefore likely lower than the actual variable irrigation cost of lowland rice 
production in the Plateau. As the majority of the irrigated rice plots of the Plateau 
are gravity fed and located outside irrigation systems, it is probable that the 
difference between the variable irrigation cost used in this analysis and the real 
variable irrigation cost is negligible as a percentage of the total costs of irrigated 
lowland rice production. Bund depth was set at 20 centimetres based on local 
observations (D'haeze 2004: 188). It was assumed that irrigation water quality was 
slightly saline, which is also consistent with the local production environment. 
The soil properties of the simulated production plot (Table 5.3) are based on 
empirical soil profiles from irrigated rice plots in the Dak Gan area of the Dak Lak 
. 
Plateau, reported in D'haeze (2004). The representative plot is set on a 30 
centimetre upper layer of moderately fine-textured clay loam and an underlying 
clay pan. The upper soil layer has very slow hydraulic conductivity, whereas the 
clay pan layer has extremely slow hydraulic conductivity. 
The approach of Hoogland et al. (1981) was used to model water extraction from 
the root zone. This involved specifying that the maximum amount of water that 
can be extracted by the root system of a crop was a function of root volume at 
each layer. An extraction pattern of 45 per cent, 32 per cent, 18 per cent, and 5 
per cent of total water extraction for the upper, second, third, and bottom quarter 
of the root zone was assumed. Almost all annual crops growing in a well-watered 
uniform soil approximate this type of water extraction pattern (Raes 2002), 
including rice grown under intermittent irrigation (Won et al. 2005). 
The assumption that effective rainfall is zero between December to mid-April 
was tested with frequency analysis using rainfall records from 1994-2003 (Table 
5.4) and the climatological analysis software RAINBOW (version 2.2) (Raes 
2006), after confirming data homogeneity (Buishand 1978). Zero rainfall was 
confirmed at 50 per cent probability of exceedence for January and February, but 
was rejected for December and March. In December and March rainfall at 50 per 
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cent probability of exceedence was 17 millimetres and 22 millimetres 
respectively. Relative to the total water demand or irrigated lowland rice, these 
Table 5.1 Winter-Spring rice crop characteristics 
Pai;:ameter 
Planting date 
Harvesting date 
Total duration (days) 
Establishment 
Vegetative (early) 
Vegetative (late) 
Flowering 
Yield Formation 
Ripenir:~ 
Maximum effective rooting depth 
Maximum soil water depletion fraction under no stress 
Maximum root extraction over root zone per day 
Max soil moisture uptake top 1,4 root zone 
Max soil moisture uptake bottom 1,4 root zone 
Root zone extraction pattern 
LAI max 
Time to LAI max 
Maximum yield 
Source: Dak Lak DARD 
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Unit of 
measurement 
Day 
kc 
Ky 
Day 
kc 
Ky 
Day 
kc 
Ky 
Day 
kc 
Ky 
Day 
kc 
Ky 
Day 
kc 
Ky 
M 
p value 
mm 
m3 day-1 
m3 day- 1 
% 
day 
kg 
Value 
1 December 
30 March 
120 
10 
1.1 
1.0 
20 
1.1-1.13 
1.0 
30 
1.14-1.2 
1.5 
15 
1.2 
2.0 
25 
1.2 
0.8 
20 
1.18-0.86 
0.3 
0.3 
0.10 
9.0 
0.0480 
0.0120 
40/30/20/10 
4.70 
50 
6,500 
·""' 
monthly rainfall depths are immaterial, and rainfall in all months was set at zero 
as a result. Probabilities of exceedence for monthly reference evapotranspiration 
were estimated following the same procedure and are reported in the same Table. 
Homogeneity tests did not reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity and 
independence at the one per cent level for any of the monthly reference 
evapotranspiration data. For the analysis, monthly reference evapotranspiration 
at the 50 per cent probability of exceedence was used to simulate normal dry 
season conditions. These climatological conditions are observed in Dak Lakin one 
of every two years. 
The simulation assumes farmers follow the recommended land preparation 
procedure f~r direct wet seeding in Dak Lak, applying a 2,500 cubic metre land 
preparation wetting, then draining the plot and sowing when soil moisture is at 
or near saturation. Initial soil moisture content was set at saturation in the 
simulation model with no surface water puddling as a result. 
Data needed to calibrate the rice simulation model are not available in the Dak 
Table 5.2 Winter-Spring representative farm rice production costs 
Unit 
Variable Unit value Quantity Total cost 
Production costs (excluding irrigation) 
Seed VND '000 4.8 203 992.3 
Fertiliser VND '000 2,994.9 
Pesticide VND '000 261.6 
Other production costs VND '000 496.5 
Hired labour VND '000 22.0 68 1,494.3 
Family labour (opportunity cost) excluding 
irrigation labour VND '000 22.0 89 1,965.5 
Land rent 300.0 
Total production costs (including family labour) 8,505.1 
Total production costs (excluding family labour) 6,539.6 
Revenue per kilogram VND'OOO 2.0 
Shadow price of irrigation water per cubic metre VND 142 
Source: Kham, T. N., 2004. Smallholder rice survey report, Tay Nguyen University Research 
Papers, Buon Ma Thuot. 
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Table 5.3 Soil parameters for irrigated rice 
Variable Unit of measure Soil layer 
Depth cm 0-30 30-60 
Soil texture n.a Clay loam Clay 
Water content at saturation % vol (cm3 cm-3) 50 55 
\Yater content at field capacity % vol (cm3 cm-3) 45 54 
Water content at wilting point % vol (cm3 cm-3) 35 39 
Saturated hydraulic mm day-1 30.0 2.0 
conductivity 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
Lak Plateau. As a broad test of the model's ability to simulate accurately the water 
production relationship for dry Sfason irrigated rice, a 9,500 cubic metre per 
hectare irrigation simulation was first estimated. This is the irrigation input 
recommended by agricultural extension services in the Dak Lak Plateau for 
continuous submergence rice cultivation, net of a 2,500 cubic metre land 
preparation watering. It was assumed the simulation model would provide an 
acceptable approximation for irrigated dry season rice production if (1) yield was 
maximised, and (2) a surface submergence depth between 10 and 20 centimetres 
was maintained following flooding during the early vegetative stage. Consistent 
with local cultivation practices, soil moisture was set at saturation for the 
establishment period of the rice crop with no surface ponding. Irrigation was 
then applied to result in surface water progressively increasing through the 
vegetative stages and then being maintained at the same surface water depth until 
immediately before to harvesting. The irrigation strategy returned an average 
submergence depth of approximately 12.1 centimetres after the initial saturation 
period and maximised yield. Both calibration criteria were thereby met. Without 
local field experiment data that could define the empirical relationship between 
physical soil properties, climatic conditions, irrigation amounts, and yields for 
Dak Lak, these calibration results broadly support the contention that the 
simulation model provides an acceptable approximation of local production . 
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Table 5.4 Rainfall and reference evapotranspiration probabilities of 
exceedence at Buon Ma Thuot 1994-2003 
Probability of 
exceedence Return period December January February March 
Rainfall (mm) 
10 10 83 33.54 34 
20 s 49 19.37 30.66 
so 2 17 0.61 22.11 
Evapotranspiration (mm) 
10 10 4.34 4.99 S.34 S.92 
20 s 4.13 4.86 S.17 S.69 
so 2 3.77 4.60 4.8S S.26 
Notes: n.a. noi: applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
conditions for dry season irrigated rice cultivation in Dak Lak. 
To generate the simulation model outputs to be used in the polynomial 
parametric regressions, seventy irrigation schedules were simulated in BUDGET 
using the four-day irrigation decision stage interval. Seasonal irrigation volumes 
in the simulations ranged between 870 and 22,000 cubic metres per hectare, and 
were generated using a random number generator. Maximum surface water 
depth for the simulations was set at 18 centimetres due to the higher risks from 
waterlogging in wet-seeded rice (Guera et al. 1998). Irrigation applications that 
resulted in the available soil moisture content dropping below permanent wilting 
point were not evaluated as this strategy causes the crop to fail. Crop failure is 
infeasible given the profit maximisation objective of the deterministic 
optimisation model. 
The generalised non-linear relative yield functions from Equation (62) and the 
soil water transition function from Equation (64) were implemented using 
regression-through-origin (RTO). Regression-through-origin is appropriate for 
Equation (62) because if available soil moisture is zero in the preceding irrigation 
decision stage and no water irrigation water is added in decision stage K , then 
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available water is zero. In Equation (64), RTO is appropriate on empirical 
grounds, given when the available water is zero, soil moisture content as 
percentage of soil volume is well below the permanent wilting point of rice, in 
which case the final relative yield will equal zero given that the production 
function specification is multiplicative. 
Due to the length of the summary tables, the soil moisture transition equation 
and production function ratio estimates are summarised in Appendix 2. R-
squared statistics are not reported for these RTO estimates because they are not 
directly comparable to R-square values from intercept regression models. The F 
statistics are also not directly comparable with standard OLS estimates, but the 
estimated standard errors are (Eisenhauer 2003). The main point to note for the 
soil moisture and production function estimates is that the flexible parametric 
estimation procedure resulted in very precise matching of the parameter 
estimates to the crop growth simulation data. To test for specification error 
stemming from omitting the intercept term, the soil moisture functions were also 
estimated including the intercept. The intercept was significant at the one per 
cent level in approximately one third of these models, however visual inspection 
of the predicted and observed yield response functions showed the RTO models 
provided a better fit to the simulation data, and these were retained as a result. 
Similar ,,S.esting for omitted variable bias in the production function estimates 
showed two of the nine estimated yield functions had significant intercepts. 
Visual inspection of the predicted production functions showed the OLS 
estimates did not approximate the BUDGET simulation data as well as its nested 
RTO estimates however, and the RTO estimates were again retained as a result. 
Relative yields for irrigated rice are not reduced by anaerobic conditions. By 
implication, relative yield will always equal unity when the available water 
exceeds the minimum water required for maximum relative yield. The higher 
order polynomial yield response provided very efficient estimates of the 
calibration data, however discontinuities in the yield response function above and 
below the minimum amount of water required to maximise stage returns caused 
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waviness in the yield response function predictions. Waviness is characteristic in 
polynomial approximations when the function being evaluated is very non-linear 
(Royston and Altman 1997). In this application, the practical limitation of 
waviness was that in some instances the estimated relative yields dropped below 
unity at water amounts exceeding the minimum amount required to maximise 
relative yields. This caused a multiple local optima problem for the optimisation 
algorithm. To overcome this estimation artifice, a positive penalty was applied to 
relative yields above the minimum water level required to achieve unit relative 
yields when estimating the polynomial functions. 
The irrigation scheduling problem was solved using GAMS/CONOPT2, which is 
suited to models with non-linear constraints (Drud 1996; Rosenthal 2006). The 
non-linear yield function is made continuous by implementing a smoothing 
function at the discontinuity point in the GAMS code (Appendix 3), which is the 
available water breakpoint point where relative yields fall below unity and above 
which relative yield always equals unity. This smoothing technique results in 
relative yields approximating unity at all water amounts above the minimum 
water amount required to set relative yield at unity. Because the smoothing 
function results in relative yields that are approximately unity, multiple local 
optima are still present in this model. The absolute deviation between the 
smoothed approximation and the maximised relative yield is very small however, 
and when irrigation costs are introduced to the algorithm this problem 
disappears, because the additional irrigation costs incurred between the global 
and local yield optima always exceed the revenue gains. Figure 5.1 provides a 
graphical example of a production function for one irrigation decision stage with 
the smoothing function applied, and the non-smoothed polynomial expression 
included for comparison. The importance of accounting for non-linearity in the 
relative yield function is apparent in the Figure. Note also that when. available 
water during an irrigation decision stage is less than the minimum required for 
relative yield to be unity, relative yield first decreases gradually and then declines 
at an accelerating rate. In Figure 5.1, relative yield is non-linear over the IO to 30 
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millimetre range. The advantage of controlling for waviness in the estimated 
yield function by means of the smoothing function is also apparent in the Figure. 
Fourteen irrigation scheduling optimisation scenarios were implemented. In the 
first scenario, the objective function was maximised assuming that seasonal water 
was freely available. This unconstrained case defines the economically efficient 
irrigation schedule, and also the seasonal water requirement for dry season 
irrigated rice production during a normal climatic year. Thirteen constrained 
irrigation scenarios were also implemented, with each imposing different seasonal 
water stock constraints. For comparison purposes, the operating surplus from 
following the locally recommended irrigation strategy was also simulated. 
Results 
With dry season irrigation water freely available, the representative smallholder 
maximises profit by using 7,180 cubic metres of irrigation water per hectare 
during a normal climatic year (Table 5.5, column B). Assuming a 2,500 cubic 
metre pre-sowing inundation impies that irrigated lowland rice has a· total dry 
season water demand of approximately 9,700 cubic metres per hectare in the Dak 
Lak Plateau. The irrigation schedule that maximises operating surplus when the 
seasonal water stock is unconstrained increases operating surplus by just under 10 
percent-~ompared to the continuous submergence strategy that uses 9,500 cubic 
during within the season (Table 5.5, column A) by 9.5 per cent, from VND3.15 
million to VND3.45 million per hectare. The. average return to water input in the 
scenario is VND48 per cubic metre, compared to VND33 in the 950-millimetre 
irrigation scenario. These results suggest the locally recommended irrigation 
strategy produces an agronomic optimum as it maximises rice yields, but does not 
maximise irrigator profits during normal climatic years. 
Operating surplus is maximised when the seasonal water stock is unconstrained 
by adopting a very shallow alternate wetting drying (A WD) irrigation schedule. 
Soil moisture is maintained between saturation and the minimum soil moisture 
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1.2 
8 15 22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71 78 85 92 
Available water (mm) 
~'""'*"-· -~Relative yield 
- - - - Srno othed relative yield 
Figure 5.1 Graphical representation of yield response polynomial regression 
parameter· estimates (unbroken line) and smoothed estimator (broken line) 
needed for the rice crop to not suffer from water stress (Figure 5.2). The irrigation 
sequence is characterised by frequent irrigations with depths increasing from the 
first irrigation decision stage to the onset of the late vegetative stage at the 60 day 
mark, and are then maintained around 26 millimetres depth in subsequent 
irrigation decision stages until harvesting. Intermittent surface water puddling 
occurs in the first 50 days when the crop has a shallow root zone, but only once 
exceeds 10 millimetres depth. After 50 days, no surface water ponding occurs, 
and soil moisture is maintained between saturation and the minimum soil 
moisture content required for the rice crop to not experience water stress. Table 
5.5 shows that when the seasonal water stock is not constrained, the A WD and 
CS schedules result in markedly different deep percolation and surface water 
ponding volumes. The A WD strategy (Table 5.5, column B) results in 1,100 cubic 
metres of deep percolation per hectare, compared to 2,250 cubic metres of deep 
percolation when 9,500 cubic metres is applied during the season (Table 5.5, 
column A). There is no residual surface water at harvest time in the A WD 
schedule, whereas approximately 900 cubic metres are retained and drained prior 
to harvesting in the CS schedule. In sum, when irrigation water is freely available 
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during the season the profit maximising irrigation schedule reduces total water 
usage by 2,300 cubic metres per hectare compared to the locally advised irrigation 
depth of 9,500 cubic metres per hectare. This 24 per cent reduction in total water 
usage is consistent with the 30 per cent reduction in water useage reported in 
empirical research that has compared the water demand of CS and A WD 
irrigation in heavy soils in South East and South Asia (Mao 1996; Tuong and 
Bhuiyan 1999; Belder et al. 2006). 
Soil -10 
moisture 
Day 
11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 
(mm) 0---...--....._,.,.-..-~.......,,,_,..-..----__,,.,__,,.--+-+---t-lr'---o-~-__._,,~~-~-~ 
20 -------------- -- ---- -- -- ----------------------------------------------------------
40 ----------------------------------------------------
50 
14 Surface 
water 
12 (mm); 
Ky 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
-,.TAW --RAW --RZD --Surfacewater(RHS) --Ky(RHS) 
---
Figure 5.2 Simulated soil moisture and surface water depth, unconstrained 
water stock optimisation scenario 
Notes: TA W is Total Available Water for the rice crop to uptake; RAW is Readily Available 
Water for the rice crop to uptake without experiencing soil water stress. RZD is root zone 
depletion. RZD returns to 0 following an irrigation that results in soil moisture capacity 
reaching saturation. When RZD falls above RAW, the rice crop is not subjected to water stress. 
When RZD falls below RAW, the rice crop is experiencing soil moisture stress, which inhibits 
crop growth. Ky (RHS) is the growth stage dependent crop yie~d response factor. Higher Ky 
values indicate greater growth stage sensitivity to soil moisture stress. The growth stages 
corresponding to the changing Ky values are provided in Table 5.5 Surface water (RHS) is the 
surface water ponding depth. 
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Table 5.5 Optimised and simulated irrigation schedules for dry season wetland rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau 
• Seasonal water stock constraint, millimetres 
Growth ................. ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 
stage+ crop A B c D E F G H 
sensitivity 
· Irrigation index Simulated Not 
Irrigation decision stage day (Ky) 950 constrained 700 675 650 625 600 575 
Irrigation schedule 
Establishment 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
2 5 (1.0) 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
3 9 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
4 13 Vegetative 17 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
5 17 (early) 70 22 22 22 22 22 22 11 
6 21 (1.0) 60 25 25 25 24 24 24 30 
7 25 35 34 34 33 33 32 20 16 
8 29 35 28 28 27 27 14 20 19 
9 3q Vegetative 35 33 33 20 18 22 22 22 
10 37 (late) 35 26 26 35 20 19 19 18 
11 41 (1.5) 35 27 27 25 30 21 20 20 
12 45 35 25 25 24 17 19 19 18 
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Table 5.5 Optimised and simulated irrigation schedules for dry season wetland rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau 
Seasonal water stock constraint, millimetres 
Growth .............................................................................................................................................................................. , .......................................................................................... 
stage+ crop A B c D E F G H 
sensitivity 
Irrigation index Simulated Not 
Irrigation decision sta~e day (Ky) 950 constrained 700 675 650 625 600 575 
13 49 35 25 25 24 20 19 19 18 
14 53 35 24 24 24 31 32 22 20 
15 57 35 25 25 25 25 25 20 20 
16 61 Flowering 35 22 22 23 23 23 30 31 
17 65 (2.0) 35 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
18 69 35 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
19 73 35 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
20 77 Forming yield 35 25 25 24 24 24 24 24 
21 81 (0.8) 35 25 25 25 25 25 24 24 
22 85 35 25 25 25 25 25 24 24 
23 89 35 25 25 25 25 25 24 24 
24 93 35 27 26 26 26 26 26 26 
25 97 35 27 26 26 26 26 26 26 
26 101 Ripening 35 26 26 16 15 14 5 1 
27 105 (0.3) 35 25 16 21 21 20 15 14 
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Table 5.5 Optimised and simulated irrigation schedules for dry season wetland rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau 
• Seasonal water stock constraint, millimetres 
Growth .,., ................ . ........................................................................................................................ ················ ............................................. 
stage+ crop A B c D E F G H 
sensitivity 
. Irrigation index Simulated Not 
Irrigation decision stage day (Ky) 950 constrained 700 675 650 625 600 575 
28 109 35 25 30 31 31 32 36 37 
29 113 23 14 13 12 11 11 
30 117 - 21 18 16 5 4 4 8 
Water balances 
Unit of Unit of 
measure measure 
Total irrigation mm mm 947.0 718.0 700.0 675.0 652.0 626.0 603.0 578.0 
Evaporation mm mm 103.0 104.8 104.8 104.8 104.8 104.8 104.8 104.8 
Transpiration mm mm 529.3 526.6 520.9 515.9 505.9 495.2 475.4 458.2 
Runoff mm mm 
Infiltration mm mm 259.6 594.8 576.8 590.7 593.9 581.6 561.7 551.3 
Deep percolation mm mm 224.6 109.6 106.4 95.0 81.4 72.0 63.4 56.3 
Surface water at T mm mm 90.1 
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Table 5.5 Optimised and simulated irrigation schedules for dry season wetland rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau 
Seasonal water stock constraint, millimetres 
Growth ................................................................................................................................ ., .... _ .. ,.................................................................................. 
stage+ crop A B c D E F G H 
sensitivity 
Irrigation index Simulated Not 
Irrigation decision sta~e day (Ky) 950 constrained 700 675 650 625 600 575 
Production 
Final relative yield % % 100 100 96.2 93.2 89.9 86.2 81.2 75.2 
Final biomass kg kg 6,500 6,500 6,250 6,059.3 5,846 5,600 5,275 4,890 
Gross benefit VND'OOO VND'OOO 11,655 11,955 11,507 11,160 10,769 10,313 9,699 9,368 
Net benefit VND'OOO VND'OOO 3,150 3,450 3,002 2,655 2,264 l,808 1,194 863 
Average value per cubic meter VND VND 33.3 48.1 42.9 39.3 34.8 28.9 19.9 8.0 
Value marginal product per millimetre VND VND - - 650 7,021 12,341 21,899 22,635 34,341 
Approximate VMP per cubic meter per 
hectare VND VND - 65 702 1,234 2,190 2,264 2,822 3,829 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
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Table 5.5 also summarises the results for seven of the thirteen profit maximising 
irrigation schedules with binding seasonal water constraints ranging from 7,000 
to 5,650 cubic metres per hectare (columns C through H). Results show that 
when seasonal water supply is constrained, irrigation water is first withdrawn 
from the ripening stage; this stage has the second lowest sensitivity to water 
stress. The irrigation schedule remains characterised by frequent shallow 
irrigations, instead of following a limited puddling strategy that would allow no 
water to be input in some irrigation decision stages. This result would likely 
change if a fixed irrigation set-up cost was charged at each irrigation decision 
stage where irrigation occurs. As the available seasonal water stock becomes 
increasingly constrained, irrigation water is also withdrawn from the late 
. 
vegetative stage. At first this strategy appears counter-intuitive because the 
establishment, early vegetative, and yield formation stages are all less sensitive to 
water stress. Priority allocation to the yield formation stage likely results from the 
higher reference evapotranspiration during the early vegetative stage, whereas 
the establishment and early vegetative stages likely receive preferential 
allocations due to their shallow root zone. As the root zone deepens during the 
late vegetative stage, more in situ water becomes available in the root zone for 
uptake and less irrigation is required. 
There is some evidence of estimation error between the optimisation and 
simulation models. The optimisation models do not reduce irrigation depths 
during the early vegetative phase in any of the deficit scenarios, despite this 
growth stage having lower sensitivity to soil water stress than the late vegetative 
stage when deficit irrigation does occur. This outcome is attributable to a small 
difference in the soil moisture state variable in this decision stage in the 
mathematical programming model. This difference results from the generalised 
second-degree polynomial soil moisture transition function departing from the 
'actual' soil moisture condition simulated in BUDGET. The optimisation model 
understates available soil moisture by approximately five millimetres at each 
irrigation decision stage during the early vegetative period. This small 
-153 -
underestimation is sufficient to motivate small over-allocations of irrigation water 
in the early vegetative period. Attempts were made to heuristically re-distribute 
irrigation water from the early vegetative period to the late vegetative period in 
an attempt to increase final yield, but a better solution was not obtained by this 
method. On this basis, any difference between the optimal outcome estimated 
with the mathematical programming model and the 'real' optimal allocation is 
likely to be negligible. These outcomes serve to highlight the extreme sensitivity 
of lowland irrigated rice to water deficits, and the importance of using accurate 
representations of crop water production and soil moisture transition 
relationships in the development of optimal irrigation schedules for lowland rice. 
The profit functions and seasonal inverse demand for dry season irrigation water 
in lowland rice production in a normal climatic year are summarised in Figure 
5.3. The inverse water demand function is estimated from the shadow prices 
estimated in the non-linear mathematical programming model. In this case, value 
marginal product equals the operating surplus that an additional cubic meter of 
water supply would generate for the smallholder producing on one hectare, and is 
therefore also the irrigator's maximum willingness to pay for dry season water 
over the short-run. The short-run profit function, which is increasing from left to 
right on the graph, shows profit growth is near linear as a function of water input. 
The rer_~sentative irrigator's short-run willingness to pay for water is generally 
decreasing from left to right on the graph, with the point estimates suggesting the 
relationship is non-linear. The profit function shows that below a seasonal water 
supply totalling around 5,650 cubic metres per hectare it is irrational for the 
farmer to crop their hectare with rice because they incur a loss. When the 
seasonal water stock exceeds 7,200 cubic metres, the technically efficient risk 
neutral irrigator is unwilling to pay for additional water because profits are 
already maximised at this seasonal water input. 
Caution is required in interpreting the value marginal product estimates 
individually. In particular, the assumption that a linear arc can describe the value 
marginal product between two points does not appear valid. For example, while 
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the profit maximising irrigation schedules in Table 5.5 show that increasing water 
supplies from 7,000 to 7,200 cubic metres per hectare increases profit by around 
VND450,000, the value marginal product point estimates imply a low willingness 
to pay for water over this range. Clearly, this implication is wrong given the 
residual imputation approach used in the analysis. To avoid misattribution, a 
generalised inverse demand function for water was estimated assuming seasonal 
water demand is a quadratic function of price (Table 5.6). Table 5.7 reports point 
elasticity estimates based on the estimated inverse demand function, and shows 
demand is price inelastic at all points, with elasticity increasing with price. 
Demand is nearly perfectly inelastic when water is priced below VND700 per 
cubic metre. Both these results stem from the quadratic demand function being 
near linear. The own price elasticity estimates are consistent with those reported 
for other cereal crops (Griffin 2006). 
Table 5.6 Inverse demand for dry season irrigation water 
in lowland rice production, normal climatic year 
Variable Coefficient 
Dependent variable: seasonal water stock 
WTP 
WTP2 
Constant 
F-statistic(2, 11) 
Adjusted R-squared 
Observations 
-51.16 a 
(5.172) 
0. 31 b 
(0.140) 
7128.85 a 
(38.583) 
327.50 
0.98 
14 
t-ratio 
-9.89 
2.24 
184.77 
Notes: •band <indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent 
levels respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 5.1 Own price elasticity for irrigation water in dry 
season lowland rice production 
Seasonal demand, cubic 
VND per cubic metre metres per hectare Own price elasticity 
700 6,786 - 0.05 
1,604 (average) 6,435 - 0.12 
2,500 6,046 - 0.18 
3,500 5,723 - 0.25 
Policy implications 
Several policy implications arise from the analysis in this Chapter. First, while 
A WD substantially reduces total on-plot within season water demand, the 
research of this Chapter shows A WD increases the profit of the technically 
efficient, risk neutral lowland rice producer with perfect foresight by less than 10 
per cent. Alternate Wetting Drying irrigation has been widely advocated for rice 
production because it maximises the ratio of water used by the rice crop to 
applied water (De Datta 1981; Mao 1996; Zhi 1996; Guera et al. 1998; Nwadukwe 
and Chude 1998; Tuong and Bhuiyan 1999). The research in this Chapter suggests 
that when water is unpriced and unregulated, as it is through most of the Dak Lak 
Plateau, A WD is a less than convincing irrigation strategy for dry season lowland 
rice producers, largely because the profit incentive is modest. This economic 
result is a central policy implication for the uptake of A WD in regions where 
water is unpriced and water usage poorly regulated. In a risky production 
environment where water supplies are uncertain and unpriced, water diversions 
are mainly uncontrolled, and irrigators are generally risk adverse, the small 
observed profit gain is unlikely to motivate irrigated lowland rice smallholders to 
migrate from CS to A WD. While increasing within season plot level water use 
efficiency may be a prima facie intuitive and persuasive reason for advocating 
A WD on broader aggregate social welfare and river basin planning objectives, 
private irrigators will likely view the strategy as being less desirable than the 
status quo. The key implication is that the successful implementation of broad 
- 156-
Willingness 45,000 
-to-pay 
VND per 40,000 - -.., 
cubic m 35,000 
30,000 
25,000 
20,000 --
15,000 
10,000 
5,000 
0 
.. 
.. .. 
.. 
----- .. -- . 
-"I--
--.-
-5,000 +-~-~~~-~~-~~-~~~-~~-----+ 
5.7 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 
Seasonal water stock, '000 cubic metre per hectare 
4.0 Profit 
35 
VNDmil 
3.0 
2.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
Figure 5.3 Production efficient rice smallholders' dry season profit and 
inverse seasonal water demand functions, normal climatic year 
scale A WD uptake in unregulated water systems will require that irrigators come 
to believe there is a real potential for positive payoffs to them from the adoption 
of A WD. The most obvious basis for making this argument is the chance of 
increased water supply reliability. There is an existing literature on institutions 
and common pool irrigation resources that can be used to direct this policy 
development {Tang 1994; Ostrom 2000; Ostrom and Gardner 2000; Weissing and 
Ostrom 2000; Herath 2001). 
The second policy implication relates to the marginal economic value of water in 
dry season irrigated rice production in the Dak Lak Plateau. The research of this 
Chapter shows that water has an economic value in dry season irrigated rice 
production in the Dak Lak Plateau, but only above a seasonal allocation of 5,650 
cubic metres per hectare. Below this seasonal input, rice producers will be 
unwilling to pay for dry season irrigation water during a normal or drier climatic 
year because they will be incapable of generating profit on a hectare of land, even 
when using technically efficient irrigation scheduling. The results also suggest 
that if irrigation water in the Plateau were priced and fully enforced above 
VND48 per cubic metre, dry season irrigated rice farming would become 
unprofitable on one hectare during normal or drier climatic years. The low return 
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to total water input implies that irrigated rice farmers will be very sensitive to the 
introduction of enforced agricultural water prices. 
Third, while this research suggests that within season on-plot irrigation can be 
reduced by around 25 per cent on average while yielding a moderate profit gain 
to irrigators, the Plateau level social welfare impact of successfully implementing 
this plot level water conserving strategy is unclear. Assuming 16,500 hectares of 
dry season irrigated rice in the Plateau, reducing water diversions by around 
2,300 cubic metres per hectare would release around 38,000 ML for other usages 
during the dry season. The social welfare question is whether releasing this water 
from irrigated rice actually generates aggregate social gains. The research in this 
Chapter shows CS rice plots act as micro-reservoirs, and recharge more water to 
the aquifer than in A WD scheduling. A CS farmer operating on one hectare deep 
drains approximately 2,250 cubic metres of their irrigation water to the local 
aquifer, and also releases an additional 900 cubic metres from the plot prior to 
harvesting. The A WD schedule without binding water constraints recharges the 
local aquifer with 1,100 cubic metres and retains no surface water. Without 
empirical investigation, the relative social welfare outcomes of the two strategies 
are indeterminate. Both strategies generate externalities, but their sign and 
magnitude will differ depending on location and climatic conditions. 
Finally,-caveats are warranted in moving from simulation optimisation modelling 
results to economic and policy implications and recommendations. The 
simulation-economic optimisation model this Chapter developed is based on a 
simple, deterministic model relating timed ·water inputs to rice yield in an 
otherwise non-limiting production environment. Given there are no farmers in 
the Dale Lak Plateau practicing A WD, the analysis assumes all non-water inputs 
are equal between the CS and A WD irrigation strategies, as is the variable 
irrigation cost. Seasonal water stock for the plot is also known at the beginning of 
the season. In most production environments, these conditions will not hold. 
Further, there are empirical differences between A WD and CS other ·than 
ponding depth and soil moisture content that need considering. Alternate 
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Wetting Drying irrigation potentially increases nutrient application efficiency, 
meaning A WD farmers could use less fertiliser than CS farmers on otherwise 
identical plots (Buresh and Datta 1990; Datta et al. 1990). Alternate Wetting 
Drying irrigation has also been connected with improved soil aeration, plot 
microclimate, and reduced rice disease and pest infestation (Mao 1996). Equally, 
A WD is generally found to increase irrigation costs due to its management 
intensity, and may also increase other production costs (De Datta 1981). Within a 
system of interconnected rice plots, some submergence will be required to effect 
water transfer between plots, which implies it may be economically optimal to 
maintain some level of surface water for this purpose. On these basis, the 
economically efficient irrigation schedule, value marginal product estimates, and 
dry season irrigation water demand function this Chapter defined may diverge 
from those empirically observed. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has estimated the within season, short-run, at-site marginal 
economic value of delivered water in dry season irrigated lowland rice 
production to a risk neutral, technically efficient smallholder in the Dak Lak 
Plateau. The Chapter has also explored the potential for reducing water input in 
the lowland rice producing sector of the Dak Lak Plateau. Despite the caveats 
noted in the previous section, the analyses in this Chapter are policy relevant to 
the Dak Lak Plateau for several reasons. Results indicate how much dry season 
water demand can be reduced at the plot level via increasing technical and 
allocative irrigation efficiency without reducing rice yields, and also potentially 
without requiring substantial changes to existing flood irrigation technology. The 
estimated water demand function for dry season lowland rice is a key input for 
water resource and broader economic planning in the Dak Lak Plateau. The 
results of this Chapter can be used as a basis to evaluate the aggregate social 
welfare changes that result from reducing dry season .diversions to irrigated rice 
production using integrated hydro-agronomic-economic analysis. The results can 
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also be used to inform cost benefit analyses of new irrigation supply 
infrastructure in the Plateau. Sustainable pricing policies within irrigation 
systems could also be initiated using the estimates from this Chapter. 
Although A WD has been widely promoted in the rice agronomics and water 
policy literature on 'more crop per drop' grounds, the results of this Chapter 
suggest that the limited private profit incentives for small-scale irrigators to adopt 
A WD will result in low rates of spontaneous adoption. This is the first known 
analysis that identifies this production economics gap in the rice irrigation 
literature, and it carries significant policy implications for how A WD programs 
should be developed. Whether A WD or some other intermediate irrigation 
strategy is preferable to CS in terms of production economics depends on whether 
water is priced, the irrigation cost structures, water supply reliability, the risk 
preferences of rice producers, as well as complementary and supplementary 
relationships between irrigation water and other inputs. The analysis of this 
CHapter suggests as a general rule that if water is not priced and the A WD is 
more cost intensive than CS but obtains the same yield, a myopic farmer 
operating outside a regulated water supply system will rationally follow a CS 
strategy. The CS strategy will deliver the smallholder an at least near equivalent 
profit to the A WD schedule, but it will also reduce the production risk to the 
irrigato~Jrom uncertain seasonal water supply. In this case, policies to encourage 
A WD uptake will need to concentrate on arguing a case for the potential gains to 
irrigators from increasing water supply reliability through collective cooperation 
and pfut level water use efficiency. Some water supply settings will be more 
amenable to this approach then others. For example, the approach should work 
well in small irrigation systems that contain farmers who are relatively 
homogenous, where their irrigation behaviours are easily observed, where 
moderate water scarcity prevails, and where irrigation violations are enforced by 
irrigators within the system (W eissing and Ostrom 2000). 
Several opportunities for extending the research of this Chapter are evident. ·First, 
the simulation optimisation model that is developed in this Chapter could be 
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extended to include increasingly realistic assumptions, such as a stochastic 
climate, variable input and output prices, and variation of seasonal water supplies. 
The irrigator could be modelled as being averse to risk, and the irrigator decision 
making framework could be modelled based on a feedback strategy. Second, 
because pre-sowing water accounts for a sizable percent of total seasonal water 
demand in irrigated lowland rice production, the opportunity to identify the 
optimal land preparation water input is evident. The economic potential for 
producing alternative crops on Vertisols in the Dak Lak Plateau also warrants 
investigation. 
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6 
The marginal economic value of water in 
household use: a pooled revealed and stated 
preference analysis 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2 increasing competition for water by the agricultural and urban 
sectors of the Dak Lak Plateau was identified as a key unfolding water 
management issue. This unfolding conflict is most evident in the region around 
the provincial capital, Buon Ma Thuot (BMT). An urban water supply and 
sanitation project completed in 2002 now provides pressurised water to the 
. 
20,000 urban and peri-urban households in BMT, and has lead to a rapid increase 
in household water consumption. The municipal water supply to BMT is drawn 
from springs and deep wells in lower confined aquifers in predominantly coffee 
and rice producing areas of the Plateau. As a result, water diversions to BMT 
impose opportunity costs on smallholder irrigators in the form of foregone 
production, and also potentially from increasing pumping costs when the water 
table in the upper aquifer is lowered. Rural water supply and sanitation projects 
are being completed in other regional centres in the Plateau, and it is likely the 
situation and impacts of localised rural-urban water transfers evident in BMT will 
be replicated in these areas. 
Little is known about the structure of household water demand in the Dak Lak 
Plateau and the marginal economic value that households place on municipal 
water supplies. A fixed, volume-based municipal water tariff operates in Buon Ma 
Thuot. By itself, the flat tariff cannot indicate the marginal value that households 
gain from using municipal water. Marginal value estimates are required to assess 
the trade-offs from rural to urban water transfers in line with the Law on Water 
Resources however. Regional development planning would also gain from 
understanding the demand responsiveness of households to water prices and 
other household specific factors such as income. Because municipal supply costs 
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are not fully recovered by the incumbent tariff structure, estimates of household 
water price elasticity would also provide a solid foundation for the development 
of a tariff structure that would offset supply costs. 
In this Chapter the short-run marginal economic value of untreated water at 
source is estimated for urban and peri-urban households in Buon Ma Thuot. The 
Chapter is structured in seven sections. Background to the research issues is 
provided in the following section. A general household water demand framework 
is introduced in section three, and previous household demand literature 
reviewed. Section four develops the application, beginning by discussing the 
novel survey approach the research used to elicit household water preferences, .. 
then summ~rising survey descriptive statistics before presenting the household 
water demand estimates. Policy implications are discussed in section five, and the 
demand estimates are used to forecast household municipal water usage and the 
Buon Ma Thuot water supply company's revenue stream following a hypothetical 
increase in the municipal water tariff. Consumer surplus losses imposed by 
binding water supply constraints are evaluated in section six in light of dry season 
water shortages that have historically plagued BMT. Section seven concludes. 
Household urban water usage in the Dak Lak 
Plateau 
Buon Ma Thuot is located in the central region of the Dak Lak Plateau (Figure 
2.1).The municipal water supply system provides potable water to approximately 
100,000 people, and has a purported maximum daily production capacity of 
49,000 cubic metres. The Buon Ma Thuot Water Supply Company (BMTWSC) is 
the autonomous State agency responsible for the municipal supply system. The 
BMTWSC is meant to achieve full cost recovery from operation of the municipal 
water supply system. Households are charged a fixed VND2,250 tariff for every 
cubic meter of municipal water they consume. This tariff is too low to recover the 
full VND4,000 per cubic metre cost the BMTWSC estimates it incurs to deliver 
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one cubic metre of water. All households receiving municipal water supplies in 
BMT are metered and receive monthly household water bills. 
The BMTWSC draws water from a system of spring water infiltration galleries 
and production wells located in the deep aquifer in the region east of BMT. These 
urban water collection sites were developed or expanded as part of the water 
supply and sanitation upgrade project. The main spring collection systems are 
located in rice and coffee producing areas, and the main production wells are in 
coffee producing areas. It has always been recognised that diverting water to 
BMT would substantially reduce flows to local irrigated rice systems, larger 
downstream coffee and rice production areas, and would also lower the 
groundwater table in the upper aquifer as a result of pumping from the lower 
aquifer (Carl Bro International als 1998). 
Approximately 75 per cent of all permanent households in BMT are now 
connected to the municipal water supply system, and the BMTWSC is currently 
formulating plans to extend their services to the remaining households. A 
percentage of households already connected to the municipal system combine 
municipal water and water from at least one alternative source, such as private 
wells or from water vendors. Little is known about household water usage from 
non-municipal sources, including why households may prefer water from sources 
other tha'"n the municipal system. Madanat and Humplick (1993) found found that 
the water source preference of Pakistani households was use specific, and it is 
reasonable to expect the same thing here. For example, consumers may prefer 
using municipal water for cooking and well water for drinking because they 
think municipal water has a chemical taste or smell. Nothing is known about how 
households using secondary water sources would alter consumption between 
sources in response to changes in the water attributes of either the municipal or 
secondary water source. These substitution strategies carry important economic 
and water planning implications however, meaning a system of conditional water 
demands for households using more than one water source should be estimated. 
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Water demand and value 1n household use 
Conceptual framework 
In Chapter 3 the general approach for the estimation of the economic value of 
water in household use was introduced via a basic inductive econometric 
approach. Household water demand was expressed in Equation (39) as a function 
of price, substitute water source prices, income, and other household and 
environmental attributes. In this way, the basic household was characterised as a 
pure consumption unit, and its demand for water resulted from an underlying 
household decision making process that accounted for preferences for household 
water uses and income constraints. 
This simple household decision framework can be expanded to recognise that 
households are joint production and consumption units. Some household water is 
used as a final consumption good, while the remainder is used as an intermediate 
input in production processes generating final consumption goods. When 
households use labour to collect and prepare water for use, a non-separable 
conceptual model is needed to estimate household water demand, because the 
household must choose between allocating its scarce labour between water 
collection and preparation activities, and activities that generate income. Acharya 
and Barbier (2002) develop a production model describing the household decision 
making framework when two water sources are available, with one source being 
free but requiring labour input, and the other priced and not requiring labour 
input. The household seeks to maximise utility from water given the water 
sources available, and household income and labour constraints. The end result is 
the household water demand function, conditional on water source 
(71) 
where Qj is the water quantity used from source j, p P is the purchased water's 
price, sc is the collected water's shadow price, which is the marginal opportunity 
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cost of foregone income from work, A p,, Ac, are two vectors describing water 
quality attributes such as turbidity, smell, and taste of priced and collected water 
respectively, and Z is a vector of household specific characteristics, including 
income and labour potential. When water is perfectly substitutable between 
sources, the utility maximising household consumes water from both sources 
until the marginal rate of substitution from purchasing water and collecting water 
are equal, meaning the marginal opportunity cost of foregone work income 
equals the marginal water price. This household decision framework includes two 
comer solutions. When the opportunity cost of foregone work income due to 
water collection and preparation always exceeds the marginal water price, the 
household consumes priced water only. Secondly, when the marginal water price 
always exceeds the marginal opportunity cost of labour, the household always 
collects water. 
Literature review 
Meta-analyses profiling the household water demand literature concentrate on 
applications from developed economies (Espey et al. 1997; Arbues et al. 2003; 
Dalhuisen et al. 2003). Developed economy applications typically estimate 
household water demand from observed household water purchases from a single 
municipal water supplier, a multi-part block municipal water tariff, household 
income • .socio-economic attributes, and sometimes climatic and structural factors. 
The developed economy research typically finds household water demand is both 
price and income inelastic. Price and income inelasticity in household water 
-demand is normally linked to water being a non-substitutable input in many 
household usages, and also because household water expenditures only account 
for a small percentage of most household budgets (Arbues et al. 2003). 
Less work has been directed at the estimation of household water demand in 
developing economies. Using a survey dataset from seventeen cities in Central 
America and Venezuela, Strand and Walker (2005) estimated a -0.32 own price 
elasticity for household water. Their analysis shows households drawing water 
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from more than one source have source specific water demand, and also that in-
household water infrastructure is a stronger demand determinant than water 
price. Using data from seven Cambodian towns, Basani, Isham et al. 
(forthcoming) estimated household own price elasticity for municipal water of 
between -0.40 and -0.50. Combining household data from El Salvador and 
Honduras, Nauges and Strand (2007) estimated non-tap own price elasticity as a 
function of water cost, defined as the sum of water's purchase price and hauling 
costs, between -0.40 and -0.70. Rietveld, Rouwendal et al. (2000) estimated an 
own price elasticity of -1.2 for a cross-section of Indonesian households. Acharya 
and Barbier (2002) estimated linear water demands for Nigerian households that 
either exclusively purchased water from water vendors, exclusively hauled water, 
or hauled and purchased water. Estimated own price elasticity for a household 
exclusively purchasing water was -0.067, whereas a household collecting and 
purchasing water had an own price elasticity for purchased water of -0.073. 
Estimating price elasticity requires that the price of water varies. Water can be 
purchased at a constant price however, as is the case when municipal water 
suppliers charge the same tariff for every cubic meter of water delivered, or 
unpriced in the sense of not having a tariff, as occurs when a household draws 
water from a private well. Both of these situations complicate household water 
demand estimation, but both frequently feature in household water use in 
developing economies. Stated preference techniques, which were introduced in 
Chapter 3, can be applied to construct the price-consumption schedule needed to 
estimate household water demand functions in both of these situations. When 
available, the real water purchasing history of a household, such as the household 
water bill, can be used as an empirical anchor point to investigate the 
consumption behaviour of the household in novel water pricing situations. 
Finding convergent validity bet:Ween a household's observed water purchases and 
their stated preferences for hypothetical water purchases shows that the same 
underlying preference structure is being used in both cases. Analyses that have 
pooled revealed and stated preference data generally show pooling increases the 
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efficiency of parameter estimates, especially when estimates are based on small 
datasets. In the household water demand literature, Acharya and Barbier (2002) 
estimated the household water demand of Nigerian households by pooling 
revealed and contingent behaviour data. 
EI!1pirical application 
Survey procedure 
The fixed volumetric water tariff in operation in BMT and the lack of a common 
shadow price for household well water means a stated preference technique must 
be used to obtain a price consumption schedule that household water demand can 
be estimated from. Price consumption schedules of household water usage as a 
function of water price were constructed in this research by pooling observed and 
contingent behaviour data of urban and peri-urban households. The observed 
behaviour data was the municipal water usage of households at the existing 
municipal water tariff. The contingent behaviour data was estimated by 
constructing how each household stated they would change water usage 
following hypothetical changes in water prices. Because all households connected 
to the municipal water supply system are metered, this meter data can be used to 
cross-validate household estimates of their current water usage, and also to 
anchor the contingent behaviour scenarios. 
Survey development is discussed in detail in Cheesman, Son et al. (2007a). The 
survey (Appendix 3) collected household background data, including details on 
-
in-hmrsehold water supply infrastructure, and estimated actual and contingent 
household water consumption for BMT households' seven main water usages, 
with these defined in pre-testing: (i) bathing and washing; (ii) preparing meals; 
(iii) drinking; (iv) cleaning; (v) laundry; (vi) outside (generally gardening); and 
(vii) home business. 
To estimate the revealed and stated preferences for water by household usage 
activity, the survey enumerator first assisted respondents to estimate ·their 
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average daily household water consumption by source for the seven household 
usages. To do this, the enumerator walked through the household and identified 
with the respondents where activities using water occurred. Following this initial 
identification, the enumerator worked with the respondents to estimate the 
amount of water consumed in each activity during a normal day. Because 
different household members are generally responsible for specific water usages, 
both the male and female household heads participated where possible. Having 
both household heads responding may also reduce the potential for strategic 
behaviour, because the respondents audited their spouse's answers and there was 
open discussion on points of difference (Thomas and Syme 1988). The household 
respondents estimated their daily water usage via observation and demonstration. 
For water usages that were not occur daily, weekly consumption figures were 
estimated. 
After household daily or weekly water consumption in the seven main household 
usages were estimated, the enumerator extrapolated the household monthly 
water consumption and water expenditure by water source and household usage. 
As a first step, the estimated municipal water consumption of the household was 
compared to their latest available municipal water bill to check whether the 
respondents accurately estimated their monthly municipal water consumption. 
Then, to estimate the monthly municipal water cost in each usage, the estimated 
monthly municipal water consumption in each usage was multiplied by the 
VND2,250 per cubic meter tariff charged by the BMTWSC. To calculate the 
monthly cost of well water in the seven household usages, estimated well water 
consumption was multiplied by a volumetric shadow price of VND450 per cubic 
meter. This shadow price was the well water extraction cost of households that 
participated in pre-testing. The shadow price was constructed using labour and 
pumping fuel costs only, with these being constructed from the average daily 
wage and fuel price observed from the pre-tested respondents. It would have 
been prefereable to estimate unique shadow price~ for well water of each 
household, however pre-testing showed this preferable approach was 
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prohibitively time consuming, distracting, and often lead to enumerators 
incorrectly calculating shadow prices. Because the survey focus groups, pre-tests, 
and discussions with local authorities suggested households were relatively 
homogenous in the way they acquire, store, and use well water (a finding also 
supported by the descriptive statistics detailed in this Chapter), using a common 
shadow price was favoured. 
After the enumerator checked that the respondents understood their monthly 
water cost by household usage and source, this water usage expenditure schedule 
was used as the anchor point to evaluate the demand responsiveness of the 
household to hypothetical changes in water prices. The hypotehtical price change 
of municipal water was an increasing or decreasing fixed municipal water tariff . 
. 
The hypothetical price change of well water was an increasing or decreasing 
groundwater shadow price, defined without directly specifying the basis for 
passing on these cost changes to the household. 
For each water source used, households were presented with two contingent 
behaviour scenarios, resulting in three observations per household per water 
source, comprising one revealed preference scenario based on actual water 
consumption at the existing price, and two stated preference contingent 
behaviour responses. Municipal water users each received one hypothetical price 
lower than the current VND2,250 tariff, either VND500, VNDl,000, VNDl,750, 
and one higher hypothetical price, either VND2,500, VND5,000, VND7,500, 
VNDl0,000, VND15,000, or VND25,000. The same approach was followed to 
elicit the contingent water consumption of households using well water, with the 
hypothetical prices VNDlOO, VND250, VNDl,000, VNDl,500, VND2,000, 
VND2,500, VND3,000, VND4,500, or VND7,500. 
For each hypothetical water price, the enumerator .first calculated and told the 
respondents their household's new monthly water expenditure assuming 
household consumption by source did not change. This approach allowed 
households to see their new monthly water expense by household usage, and also 
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by water source. Respondents were then asked whether they would change their 
household water consumption given their new water expenditure. For 
respondents indicating they would change household water consumption, the 
enumerator worked with the household to determine how the household would 
change their water consumption in each of the seven household usages. Water 
consumption can be altered by behavioural, technical, or structural means. In this 
survey most respondents focused on short-term behavioural adjustments, either 
changing the amount of water used, adopting water recycling, or substituting 
consumption between the water sources available to them. After respondents had 
revised their household water consumption, the enumerator calculated the new 
water expenditure of the household. Respondents satisfied with their new water 
expenditure· proceeded to the next scenario. The enumerator worked with 
unsatisfied households to revise their water consumption, with this procedure 
being repeated until the respondents accepted their new water expenditure. The 
procedural logic was the same for the well water scenarios. 
The stated preference elicitation approach in the survey was based on the 
contingent behaviour approach, given respondents indicated how they would 
change their water consumption by usage following hypothetical changes in 
water prices. While the revealed preference and contingent behaviour approach 
was procedurally intensive and time consuming, it has several advantages over 
previous stated preference approaches used in the household water demand 
literature. Simply asking a household to state how they would change their total 
water consumption in response to a hypothetical price change, as Acharya and 
Barbier (2002) did, may not produce reliable household estimates of water 
consumption as the approach makes the strong assumption that households know 
how much water they are consuming, and also the extent to which changing 
behaviours, introducing new technology, or undertaking structural alterations 
would change total household water consumption. Pre-testing showed 
households in BMT could not perform this type of calc.ulus without the assistance 
of the enumerator and the household walk-through estimation approach used in 
- 171 -
this research. The second advantage of the approach is that it can be used to 
estimate own price water demand elasticity by household activity. This Chapter's 
main objective is to derive price elasticity and consumer surplus for total water 
use, and the household activity elasticity approach is not developed in this 
Chapter as a result. Moreover, because the approach gives respondents the 
opportunity to revise their water allocations based on the hypothetical household 
water bill, it is consistent with the Discovered Preference Hypothesis, which 
suggests stable and valid preferences are gained through practice and repetition 
(Plott 1996). 
Descriptive statistics 
The household survey obtained 291 usable responses. Descriptive analyses show 
the respondents are characterised by a dependency on municipal water; view 
both municipal and well water quality favourably, but with some seasonal and 
income based variation; predominantly use municipal and well water for 
household activities; have sizable in-house water storage infrastructure, primarily 
to stock against municipal system outages; have mainly automated their well 
water extraction; excepting drinking water, do not devote effort to preparing 
water for use; have limited labour involvement in collecting and preparing water 
for household activities; and do not know the municipal water tariff pricing 
structure (Table 6.1). 
-
Approximately 43 per cent of respondents reported that their municipal 
connection was their only water source available to their household. Roughly 25, 
20, and 25 per cent of the surveyed households reported having a private well, 
purchasing bottled water, or having water from another unspecified source 
available to them. In terms of water sources in use by households, around 55 per 
cent of all respondents reported only using metered municipal water. With an 
average household size of 4.7 persons, these households consume approximately 
120 litres of municipal water per capita per day. Households augmenting 
municipal water supplies with a second source, either private well, bottled water 
or water from other sources, accounted for 11, 13, and 11 per cent of respondents 
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respectively. This implies approximately 95 per cent of respondents draw water 
from no more than two sources, including approximately 80 per cent of 
respondents using either municipal water exclusively or combining municipal 
and well water. Half the households with an available supply alternative to 
municipal water select not to use the alternative source for any household 
activities. Households augmenting municipal water with household well water 
only, or with well water and water from another source, have lower daily per 
capita consumption from the municipal system compared to households relying 
on the municipal system only, consuming 70 litres of municipal water per capita. 
During both wet and dry seasons, municipal water quality was regarded as good 
or better by _?Ver 60 per cent of the surveyed population. Less than three per cent 
of the surveyed population viewed wet or dry season water as poor quality. There 
is some evidence that perceived municipal water quality drops during the wet 
season. Similar quality perceptions hold for households using private wells. 
During the dry season, well water is reported as being of good quality or better by 
70 per cent of households using this source. This satisfaction drops to 55 per cent 
during the wet season, with reports of poor well water quality increasing to 25 
per cent. These results are consistent with local reports of increased municipal 
and well water turbidity and smell during the rainy season. For households using 
both municipal and well water, these results indicate high degrees of potential 
source substitutability. 
Almost nine out of ten respondents reported having some form of in-house water 
storage infrastructure, with around two-thirds of these respondents installing this 
infrastructure before the BMT water supply project was completed in 2002. With 
approximately 80 per cent of respondents only storing municipal water, it is 
evident that households with water supply infrastructure predominantly use their 
water storage to hedge against rolling dry season munidpal supply shortages that 
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Table 6.1 Household descriptive statistics 
Variable Unit Obs Mean SD 
Basic household information 
Household size Head 291 4.66 2.30 
Main occupation is farming Yes=l 291 0.10 n.a. 
Household income VND mil 291 3.29 2.27 
Operate a home business Yes=l 291 0.28 n.a. 
Sources used by the household 
Municipal water only Yes=l 291 0.56 n.a. 
Household monthly usage m3 163 15.98 15.19 
Per capita daily usage Lt 163 120.06 105.88 
Municipal water expenditure as a percent of % 119 1.37 1.67 
household income 
Municipal water and private well Yes=l 291 0.22 n.a. 
Household monthly municipal water m3 94 9.12 9.53 
usage 
Per capita daily municipal water usage lt 94 70.22 65.97 
Municipal water expenditure as a percent of % 92 0.81 0.75 
household income 
Municipal water situation 
Quality of (dry season) water good or better Yes=l 291 0.65 n.a. 
Quality of (wet season) water good or better Yes=l 291 0.60 n.a. 
Experienced water shortage in past 12 months Yes=l 291 0.08 n.a. 
causing substantial inconvenience 
Well water situation 
Have a dug or drilled well Yes=l 291 0.25 n.a. 
Quality ()f.{dry season) water good or better Yes=l 72 0.69 n.a. 
Quality of (wet season) water good or better Yes=l 72 0.55 n.a. 
Use motorized pump to bring water to surface Yes=l 72 0.83 n.a. 
Motorized pump HP HP 59 1.12 0.41 
Experi~ced water shortage in past 12 months Yes=l 71 0.04 n.a. 
causing substantial inconvenience 
Water storage tank situation 
Have in house water storage YeS=l 291 0.88 n.a. 
In house water storage is a storage tank Yes=l 257 0.81 n.a. 
Average storage tank capacity m3 208 2.41 1.86 
Municipal water goes to storage Yes=l 257 0.82 n.a. 
Private well water goes to storage Yes=l 257 0.16 n.a. 
Both municipal and well water go to the same storage Yes=l 257 0.03 n.a. 
Municipal water tariff correctly described Yes=l 291 0.15 Ii.a. 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
- 174-
have historically plagued BMT. Before the urban water supply and sanitation 
project was completed in 2002, municipal supply outages were mainly caused by 
unreliable and ineffective water supply infrastructure. More recently, the outages 
have been caused by the extreme dry season droughts. In-household cement 
storage tanks are the most frequent form of water storage, with these installed in 
almost seven out of every ten households surveyed. These concrete storage tanks 
have a 2.5 cubic metre average storage capacity, which is sufficient for supplying 
4.5 days water to an average-sized household consuming 120 litres per capita per 
day. Households using water from wells have largely automated withdrawal, with 
approximately 85 per cent using motorised pumps. Even though households using 
both well and municipal water recorded similar perceived quality levels for 
municipal aiid well water, less than 10 per cent of households with water storage 
blend municipal and well water in the same storage facility. 
Excepting drinking water, respondents did not treat water for the main 
household usages. Households with in-house water storage generally let 
impurities sink in the storage tank prior to use. This treatment requires no labour 
input because it occurs automatically during the storage process. In contrast, and 
consistent with expectations, almost all households prepared drinking water 
somehow. Of the 291 respondents, 230 used municipal water for drinking, 48 
purchased bottled water, and the remainder obtained water from other sources. 
Households purchasing bottled water used it exclusively for drinking and did not 
treat this water further. Of the 230 households using municipal water for 
drinking, only five per cent did not treat the water before consumption, despite 
the water being potable without treatment according to the BMTWSC. Ninety 
five per cent of all households that used municipal water for drinking boiled the 
water before consumption, and 16 per cent subsequently filtered the boilded 
water before consumption. 
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Econometric specification 
Econometric specification of at-site household water demands 
To obtain unbiased household water demand estimates when using parametric 
econometric methods requires that households that use a well do so as a result of 
a random selection process (Nauges and van den Bergh 2006). Latent variables 
may contribute towards whether a household has a well or not however. This 
source of potential sample selection bias is controlled for using the two step 
estimation procedure of Heckman (1979), which is outlined in the following 
section. 
Determining household well status 
The household decision to have a private well may not be entirely random. This 
selection bias must be controlled by first estimating a model that explains the 
household decision to have, or not have, a private well. The model characterises 
the discrete choice dependent variable (di) as taking the value one if the 
household has a private well and zero if they do not. Assuming a normal 
probability distribution for the error term (w), the decision model in probit form 
IS 
(72) 
where Xri is a matrix vector of explanatory variables describing the household's 
well status, /31 are the unknown coefficients to be estimated, and <l>(x1ipi) is 
the cumulative normal distribution. The inverse Mill's ratio is calculated with the 
estimated parameters of the profit model and included in the household water 
demand estimators to control for potential selection bias (Heckman 1979). The 
inverse Mill's ratio is 
(73) 
where <!>(.) and ¢(.) are respectively the univariate standard normal cumulative 
distribution and the probability density functions. 
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Conditional household water demand functions 
For households using the municipal water supply only, the conditional household 
demand function is assumed to be 
(74) 
Whereas the households using water from both municipal and private well 
sources have the conditional simultaneous demands 
{
lnQm =c2 +bml lnpm +bm2 lnsw +bm3Z+82 
lnQw =c3 +bwl lnpm +bw2 Insw +bw3Z+e3 
(75) 
(76) 
where the municipal water price is Pm, sw is the shadow price of well water, Z 
describes household socio-economic characteristics including water supply 
infrastructure such as storage tanks and booster pumps, and also the inverse Mill's 
ratio, li; is the normally distributed idiosyncratic error term, and the remainder 
are coefficients to be estimated. These demand specifications exclude the costs of 
preparing water for use because the descriptive analyses suggest these are 
immaterial. The demand equations also exclude water quality attributes, again 
because descriptive analyses showed survey respondents viewed water quality as 
being homogenous between municipal and household well sources, and also 
because water quality perceptions are likely correlated with socio-economic 
attributes such as income and education (Whitehead 2005). 
Results 
Comparing the descriptive statistics and results from the contingent behaviour 
scenarios showed some households who reported not having access to a private 
well in the survey's initial background section stated they would draw water 
from a private household well following the (hypothetical) increase in the 
municipal water price. For estimation purposes, respondents who were using 
municipal water and stated they would use a household well in at least one of the 
contingent behaviour scenarios where categorised as households having access to 
municipal and household well water. Households indicating in the scenarios that 
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they would only use municipal water were categorised as municipal only 
households. Categorisation on this basis resulted in a 133 household sub-sample 
of households using municipal water exclusively, and a sub-sample of 92 
households drawing from both a household well and the municipal system. The 
remaining 66 households drawing from several other secondary sources are 
excluded from the analysis due to the combined effect of small numbers in each 
sub-group. Eleven of the 133 municipal supply only households had missing 
income replaced with their sub-sample's average income. Similarly, four from 92 
households drawing on both well and municipal water had missing household 
income replaced by the average of their subgroup. Three influential outlier 
observations were dropped from the municipal water sub-sample and two from 
the well water group. This procedure results in a final sample of 130 municipal 
water only households and 90 households using municipal and household well 
water. 
The veracity of the household water demand estimates depends in part on 
respondents being able to accurately estimate their monthly household water 
consumption. Pair-wise correlations between households' own estimates of 
monthly consumption from the water usage analysis, and actual consumption 
based on the household's most recent municipal water bill on hand were used to 
test this assumption. The pair-wise correlation for households using municipal 
water only was 0.86, significant at the one percent level. Households using both 
municipal and well water had a pair-wise correlation of 0.93, also significant at 
the o~ percent level. These correlations suggest the respondents could estimate 
their household water consumption with an acceptable level of accuracy. 
Assuming that households using both municipal and well water could estimate 
their daily well water consumption as accurately as their municipal water usage 
suggests these households consume just under 100 litres of private well water per 
capita per day, on average. Aggregate well and municipal water consumption for 
these households totals roughly 170 litres per capita per day. These results suggest 
-178-
that at current prices, households using private wells in addition to municipal 
water get around 60 percent of their daily water from their well. 
The pooling of household responses to the revealed and contingent behaviour 
sceanrios created a panel dataset. Dummy variables were constructed to 
differentiate between the revealed and stated preference responses in the dataset 
in order to test whether the revealed and stated preferences of households were 
constructed using the same underlying preference structure. The null hypothesis 
that the dummy coefficients for revealed preferences were not different from 
zero was not rejected, leading to the conclusion that the two datasets are derived 
from the same underlying preference structure. 
Determinants of household well status 
The best fitting probit estimate for the 220 municipal only and municipal and 
well households is significant at the one percent level (Table 6.2). Increasing 
household income decreases the probability that a household has a well, which is 
consistent with observations from the household water usage profile. Farming 
households are more likely to have a well, which is unsurprising given farms are 
located in peri-urban areas in BMT and most farms use dug wells for irrigation. 
Pair-wise correlations between farming and income and self-employment and 
income show these variables are not significantly correlated. The inverse Mill's 
ratio was calculated using the probit model's estimated parameters. 
Contingent household demand for municipal water 
Water demand by households using municipal water only is estimated with 
random effects generalised least squares, because this approach allows for time 
invariant household specific explanatory variables to be included in the demand 
equation. The balanced panel dataset includes 390 observations, comprising the 
two contingent behaviour responses and one revealed preference response for 
each of the 130 households using municipal water only. The dependent variable 
is the log of monthly household water consumption. Several functional forms 
were evaluated and only the best fitting model is reported here. 
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The model for at-site household municipal water demand for a household (panel) 
(1) elicitation ('time') ( t) consuming municipal water only is 
lnQm,i,t =c1 +a, Inpm,i,t +a2Dknol<ji +a3 lnpkno"'1!i,t +a4 lninc; +a5 lnhhsize+ 
a6Dstore,i +a7 lnstore, +a8fa1711r +a9ow11i +a11millS; +w;,1 
(77) 
ln aenotes logarithms to base e and Qm is the dependent variable, monthly 
household consumption in cubic meters. The explanatory variables are, in order: 
municipal water price; a dummy variable describing whether the respondent 
knew the municipal water tariff before the survey; an interaction variable testing 
whether own price elasticity for households knowing the municipal water tariff 
differs from those who do not; income; household size, measured by the number 
of people living in the household for more than five months a year; a dummy 
variable describing whether the household has in-house water storage; the 
Table 6.2 Household well status, pro bit model estimates 
Coefficient 
Dependent variable: probability of having a household well 
Monthly household income 
In-house water storage (l=Yes) 
In-house water storage capacity in cubic meters 
Farming is main household employment (l=Yes) 
Self-employment is main household employment (l=Yes) 
Constant 
Log likelihood 
Likelihood ratio chi2(5) 
Pseudo R2 
Percentage correct predictions (overall) 
Observations 
-1.52e-07 • 
(5.20e-08) 
0.318 
(0.262) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.723 b 
(0.300) 
0.246 
(0 .207) 
-0.161 
(0.284) 
-138.89 
19.89 
0.07 
65 
220 
z-ratio 
-2.92 
-1.21 
-0.51 
2.40 
1.19 
-0.57 
Notes:• band c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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household's water storage capacity in cubic meters; a dummy variable identifying 
farming households; a dummy variable identifying households deriving their 
main income from home businesses; and the calculated inverse Mill's ratio. The 
additive composite error term w comprises a term for individual specific 
unobserved heterogeneity ui, and ei,t, which is the usual idiosyncratic 
disturbance term. These terms are assumed to be uncorrelated, have a zero mean 
and constant variances. The explanatory variables Dknow' Pknowm, Dsrore and store 
are coded using the approach in Battese (1997), which overcomes potential 
estimation biases resulting from assigning small values to zero valued 
observations before transformation into natural logarithms. Approximately 75 
percent of the respondents installed their water storage infrastructure before 2002 
when the municipal water supply system upgrade was completed, and it is 
assumed that water storage infrastructure is exogenous to current water demand 
on this basis. 
The estimated model is significant at the one percent level and has an adjusted R-
square of 0.43 (Table 6.3). The retained model coefficients are generally 
significant and are signed consistent with expectation. A Hausman test confirmed 
that the orthogonality conditions imposed by the random effects estimator were 
not violated. The Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier test rejected the null 
hypothesis that variance of U; is equal to zero, showing that there are significant 
individual effects. This results means that estimating the same equation using 
pooled ordinary least squares would be inappropriate (Baum 2006). 
The own price elasticity estimate is -0.059 and significant at the one percent 
level. The result shows that households using municipal water only have very 
inelastic water demand. The household elasticity estimate is lower than previous 
own price elasticity estimates for households using piped water exclusively in 
developing countries. Households who correctly identified the municipal water 
tariff in the survey had more elastic demand with an own price elasticity of -
0.081. Income elasticity is significant at the ten percent level, indicating a ten 
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percent increase in monthly household income lifts monthly household 
consumption by 1.4 percent on average. Household water consumption also 
increases with household size, such that doubling the number of permanent 
residents increases the monthly consumption of the household by approximately 
50 percent. The dummy variable for in-house water storage shows households 
with storage consume more water than households without storage irrespective 
of storage capacity, significant at the 15 percent level. Moreover, the significant 
water storage capacity elasticity shows increasing in-household water storage 
capacity increases these households' total monthly water consumption. 
Coefficients for operating a home-based business, farming, and the Mills ratio are 
insignificant. The inverse Mill's ratio estimate suggests household well stati.ls does 
not cause selection bias in the model. 
Simultaneous household demand for municipal water and well 
water 
The simultaneous demand demand of households for municipal water and private 
well water were estimated from the unbalanced panel dataset comprising 357 
observations from the 90 households that drew water from these two sources. A 
seemingly unrelated approach was used to estimate the conditional system of 
water demand. The seemingly unrelated approach combines the parameter 
estimates and the variance and covariance matrices from the separately estimated 
municipal and well water demand equations into a single parameter-vector and 
simultaneous variance covariance matrix of the robust type. The seemingly 
unrelat:ed estimator estimates the same coefficients as seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) and is less efficient than SUR, but is robust to cross-equation 
correlation and between group heteroskedasticity. Seemingly unrelated 
regression assumes homoskedasticity, however this assumption is likely to be 
violated in this dataset. The practical implication is the selected approach trades 
off some estimation efficiency in favour of robustness. 
The same explanatory variables are used for the municipal and household well 
water demand estimates 
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InQj,i,t =cj +al Inpm,i,t +a2D1cnow,i +a3lnpknowm,i,1 +a4lnsw,;,1 +asinine; 
+ a6 Inhhsize; + a7 pc; + a8Dstore,i + a9 Instore; + a10 farm; +all own; (78) 
+ a12know; + a13mills; + cj,i,t 
Subscript j identifies the water source, which is either municipal or well, sw; 1 is 
the shadow price for well water from the survey scenarios, pc stands for pump 
capacity measured in horsepower, and the other variables have been defined 
previously. 
The estimated coefficients are generally significant and have signs consistent with 
_ expectations in both demand estimates (Table 6.4). Own price elasticity for 
municipal and well water is -0.53 and -0.44 respectively, both significant at the 
one per cent level. Cross price elasticity for municipal and well water are .49 and 
.34 respectively, also significant at the one per cent level. The pattern of more 
elastic (but still inelastic) own price demand compared to households using 
municipal water only is consistent with estimates from Sri Lanka in Nauges and 
van den Berg (2007) for households using piped and non-piped water. Cross 
equation tests show the own and cross price elasticities of municipal water are 
inverse, meaning a one per cent increase in the municipal water price causes an 
equal percentage shift out of municipal water into well water. The same cross 
equation symmetry for well water was rejected. Here, increasing the well water 
withdrawal cost results in a less than proportional percentage shift out of well 
water into piped water. Recalling that households using both municipal and well 
water draw most of their household water from their well, these elasticity results 
show, at average household consumption, a municipal price increase will always 
cause households to increase their total monthly consumption as a result of the 
household consuming more well water in substitution for municipal water. In 
contrast, evaluated at the average current household consumption, an increasing 
- 183 -
Table 6.3 Random effects water demand estimates, households using 
municipal water only 
Coefficient z-ratio 
Dependent variable: log of total municipal water consumption per month in cubic meters 
Municipal price per cubic meter (VND) (log) 
Know water tariff (l=No, Yes=O) 
Municipal price per cubic meter (VND) (log) - households knowing 
water tariff 
Monthly household income (VND) (log) 
Household size (log) 
In-house water storage (l=No Yes=O) 
In-house water storage capacity in cubic meters (log) 
Farming (l=Yes, No=O) 
Operate a home business (l=Yes, No=O) 
Mills ratio 
Constant 
Wald chi2(9) 
---Adjusted R-square 
Observations 
Groups 
chi2(2) 
Prob> chi2 
Hausman test for random effects 
HO: Difference in coefficients not systematic. 
-0.059 a 
(0.005) 
-0.096 
(0.134) 
-0.022 c 
(0.013) 
0.141 c 
(0.085) 
0.507 a 
(0.086) 
-0.144 
(0.092) 
0.110 b 
(0.051) 
-0.016 
(0.153) 
0.101 
(0.079) 
0.086 
(0.150) 
0.161 
(1.139) 
294.24 
0.43 
390 
130 
0.10 
0.95 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
HO: Var(u) = 0 
chi2(1) = 
Prob> chi2 
349.19 
0.00 a 
-12.71 
-0.72 
1.71 
1.66 
5.91 
-1.57 
2.17 
-0.10 
1.28 
0.57 
0.14 
Notes: •hand cindicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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well water price results in a larger volumetric shift out of well water than into 
municipal water, with the result that households decrease their total monthly 
household water consumption. 
As income increases, monthly household well water consumption also increases, 
significant at the one per cent level. Increasing income does not appear to 
contribute to systematically increasing monthly municipal water consumption 
however. In-household water supply infrastructure is a significant determinant of 
total monthly household consumption. For every one horsepower increase in 
pump capacity, municipal consumption drops by approximately 16 per cent and 
well consumption increases by 60 per cent. This finding is intuitive, given 
household p;unp capacity acts as a supply constraint; increasing pump capacity 
increases the convenience of drawing water from the household well. Monthly 
household consumption increases in tum. 
Farming households and households operating a home business both consume 
more water from their wells every month than other households. These same 
households do not differ from other households in their municipal water 
consumption. Farming households use approximately double the volume of well 
water per month of an otherwise comparable household, while home businesses 
have well water consumption that is approximately 90 per cent greater. Farming 
households are located in peri-urban areas only, and these households higher well 
water consumption may indic~te differences in local municipal or well water 
quality. Another possibility is that there is a blurring of distinction between 
household and farm water usage, resulting in some upward bias in well water 
consumption estimates of farming households. This bias should strictly not occur 
because of the activity-based approach used to estimate household water 
consumption however. Analysis shows households operating home businesses use 
most of their additional water in their business operations. 
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Table 6.4 Seemingly unrelated water demand estimates, households using 
municipal and private well water 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
household municipal household well water 
water consumption usage per month 
per month (log) (log) 
Municipal price per cubic meter (log) -0.509 a -8.82 0.456 3 7.48 
(0.058) (0.061) 
Know water tariff (No=l, Yes=O) -0.562 -0.67 1.533 1.41 
(0.845) (1.079) 
Municipal price per cubic meter (VND) -0.112 -1.03 0.209 1.46 
(log) - households knowing water tariff (0.119) (0.144) 
Well opportunity cost price per cubic 0.347 3 5.59 -0.441 3 -6.38 
meter (log) (0.062) (0.069) 
Monthly household income (log) 0.003 0.06 0.186 3 3.24 
(0.057) (0.058) 
Household size (log) 0.192 1.08 0.401 1.39 
(0.178) (0.289) 
Well pump capacity -0.171 -1.56 0.633 3 3.95 
(0.110) (0.160) 
In-house water storage (l=No Yes=O) -0.155 -1.02 0.036 0.16 
(0.153) (0.227) 
In-house water storage capacity in 0.065 0.44 0.12 0.73 
cubic meters (log) (0.155) (0.164) 
Farming (l=Yes, No=O) -0.174 -0.69 0.685 3 2.35 
(0.252) (0.291) 
Operate""'i home business (1= Yes, No=O) 0.130 0.72 0.633 3 3.15 
(0.181) (0.201) 
Mills ratio 0.531 c 1.77 -0.063 -0.16 
(0.300) (0.386) 
Constant 3.40 b 2.25 -4.786 3 2.88 
(1.513) (1.659) 
F(l2, 89) = 16.91 17.44 
Adjusted R-square 0.35 0.39 
Observations 357 
Clusters 90 
Notes:• band c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Policy implications 
The conditional household demand estimates of this research carry several key 
policy implications for sustainable water management in the Dak Lak Plateau and 
the full cost recovery water pricing objective of the BMTWSC. The first 
implication is that the demand estimates of this Chapter show that municipal 
water pricing would likely be a blunt tool for water demand management in 
BMT, at least over the short term. For the minimum 40 percent of BMT 
households using municipal water exclusively, increasing the municipal water 
tariff would cause these households to only marginally reduce their municipal 
water consumption. For the minimum 25 percent of households in BMT 
augmenting -municipal water with well water, increasing municipal water prices 
will, somewhat paradoxically, cause them to increase their total household water 
consumption from all sources as a result of using more well water in substitute for 
their reduced municipal water consumption. The result that households who 
knew the municipal water tariff had more price elastic demand is consistent with 
recent results from developed economies which shows that increasing the price 
information content of water bills causes own price elasticity of households to 
increase by around 30 percent (Gaudin 2006). Combined, these results indicate 
that increasing the price awareness of households in BMT could result in 
households becoming more responsive to municipal water scarcity price 
signalling in the future. 
A second core implication from this research is that municipal water could 
feasibly be priced for full cost recovery, at least over the short term. Assuming 
households consuming municipal water only account for 40 percent of all 
households connected to the municipal water supply system, and further that 
these households average monthly consumption is around 16 cubic meters (Table 
6.1), increasing the municipal water tariff to VND4,000 per cubic meter to fully 
offset production costs according to the BMTWSC would result in the households 
consuming municipal water only reducing total monthly consumption by 
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approximately five percent to 15.25 cubic meters. These households' average 
monthly municipal water bill would increase from around VND35,955 to 
VND60,983. Assuming 20,000 households are connected to the municipal supply 
system suggests monthly revenue from this subgroup would increase from 
approximately VND288 million to VND488 million. The same price increase 
wol,lld also cause households combining municipal and well water to increase 
well water consumption by around 4.9 cubic meters per month and reduce 
municipal water consumption from around 9.1 to 5.5 cubic meters, resulting in 
their average monthly municipal water bill rising marginally from VND20,520 to 
VND22,041. Assuming these households account for 25 percent of households 
with municipal connections in BMT, monthly revenue increases from VND103 
million to VNDllO million from this subgroup. For both subgroups, the 
household budget impact of increasing expenditure on municipal water is modest. 
Municipal water expenditure as a percentage of average monthly income for 
households using municipal water exclusively rises from 1.4 to 2.3 per cent, and 
from 0.08 to 0.09 per cent for households using municipal and household well 
water. 
The third policy implication of this research relates to the role that socio-
economic factors and household water supply infrastructure have on household 
water demand. Increasing household income, size, and in-house water supply 
infrastructure changes water consumption in all estimates, but the consumption 
pattern differs notably between households using municipal water only and those 
using !.'Ilunicipal and well water. Households using municipal water only increase 
their total monthly consumption as their income, household size, and in-
household storage capacity increases. Households using municipal and well water 
increase well water consumption as household income, size (significant at the 15 
percent level), and well pump capacity increp.se, but municipal water 
consumption is insensitive to these changes. These results, combined with these 
households' lower municipal water and higher well water consumption, suggests 
households using municipal and well water only use municipal water in a limited 
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number of specific usages. Within a household utility maximising framework, the 
estimates suggest households use water from wells because they get water of a 
similar perceived quality, at least throughout the dry season, at a lower cost per 
cubic metre than municipal water. There are two immediate policy implications 
here. First, water planners in BMT should expect increasing household demand 
for municipal water as households using municipal water exclusively become 
more affluent, increase in size, and add storage capacity. Second, it does not 
appear that households using municipal and well water will shift into municipal 
water as they become more affluent, as their household size increases, and as they 
intensify the well water infrastructure of the household. The results in this 
Chapter suggests as these changes occur, these households will preferentially 
consume more well water. Perceived declines in well water quality, such as 
during the wet season, or availability may encourage these households to shift 
into municipal water however. 
Several limitations to this analysis should be noted. First, the low percentage of 
respondents correctly stating the municipal water price shows most households 
learnt the water price and their water demands as the survey proceeded. The 
implication is that if a new water tariff schedule were implemented in BMT, the 
actual change in household water consumption may not perfectly reflect the 
stated contingent behaviour. Here, one would expect actual demand to be more 
inelastic relative to stated demand (Gaudin 2006). The second main limitation of 
the research was the artificial well water shadow price used in the contingent 
behaviour scenarios. Because well water extraction costs likely differ between 
households, the use of a common well water shadow price may have sacrificed 
some incentive compatibility. This sacrifice may have resulted in some 
respondents simply 'playing by the rules of the game' when estimating their 
household water demand in the contingent behaviour scenarios. 
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Consumer surplus effects from quantity 
restrictions 
This final section considers the welfare impacts of municipal water supply 
shortages on households in Buon Ma Thuot. The analysis is pertinent to the 
rolling dry season municipal water supply disruptions that have plagued BMT in 
recent years, and also to the Law on Water Resources which requires priority 
based water allocations during times of regional shortage. AB long as constant 
elasticity does not equal 1.0, the gross value of an increase in water supply from 
Qg and~ to a consumer is exactly defined by (Gibbons 1986: 17) 
(79) 
p 0 and Qg define the initial price quantity locus,£ is the constant own price 
elasticity of demand, and ~ is the new supply quantity. Subtracting the water 
price isolates consumer surplus 
S=V-[p(Qi -Q)] (80) 
Implementing this approach shows the consumer surplus losses from reducing 
monthl)G.. household municipal water supplies in Buon Ma Thuot are more 
pronounced in households using municipal water only, and that the magnitude of 
consumer surplus losses increases exponentially' as supply shortages increase 
(Ta bl; 6.5). Note these gross surplus and consumer surplus estimates also define 
household willingness to pay to secure the additional water supply at the margin 
before and after the water tariff. This means that the estimates are also the at-
source and at-site short-run marginal economic value of water in monthly 
household usage. 
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Table 6.5 Household gross and consumer surplus losses from reducing 
monthly municipal water supply 
Variable Unit of 
measure 
Assumptions 
Per household supply reduction m3 per 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 
month 
Municipal water tariff (pO) VND 2,250 
Municipal water households 
Municipal consumption (QO) m3 per 16 
month 
Constrained municipal consumption m3 per 15.50 15.00 14.50 14.00 13.50 13.00 12.50 
(Ql) month 
Elasticity 0.06 
Municipal and well water households 
Municipal consumption (QO) m3 per 9.12 
month 
Constrained municipal consumption m3 per 
month 
8.62 8.12 7.62 7.12 6.62 6.12 5.62 
(QI) 
Elasticity 
Gross surplus loss 
Consumer surplus loss 
Gross surplus loss 
Consumer surplus loss 
Conclusions 
0.51 
Consumer surplus estimates 
Municipal water households 
VND'OOO 1.7 4.5 
VND'OOO 0.4 2.0 
Municipal and well water households 
VND'OOO 1.3 2.8 
VND'OOO 0.1 0.3 
9.5 18.6 35.1 66.1 125.6 
5.8 13.6 28.8 58.6 116.8 
4.5 6.4 8.6 11.1 14.1 
0.7 1.4 2.3 3.6 5.3 
Upgrades to the water supply and sanitation infrastructure in Buon Ma Thuot has 
led urban and peri-urban households to increase their municipal water 
consumption. Rural water supply and sanitation programs being implemented in 
regional urban centres throughout Dak Lak are likely to replicate this situation. 
When increasing urban water consumption diverts scarce water from other uses 
opportunity costs are imposed on those who forfeit, and this raises the question of 
the extent to which these transfers are justifiable on the economy, efficiency, and 
fairness grounds that the L WR requires scarce water reallocations be judged by. 
The household water demand functions, consumer surplus, and marginal 
economic water values that are reported in this Chapter establis a partial basis for 
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the objective evaluation of these issues. Estimates in this Chapter can be used to 
forecast municipal water demand following system expansion, either in Buon Ma 
Thuot or other regional centres in the Plateau. The minimum requirement for the 
transfer of the household demand estimates to other regions in the Plateau is a 
baseline similarity between the areas, comparable household populations, and an 
exp~ctation that the municipal system will deliver water of a similar quality to 
connected households. The estimates of this Chapter can also form the basis for 
the development of a sustainable municipal water pricing structure in BMT, and 
for forecasting the demand, revenue, and household welfare changes that would 
result from changes to the municipal water price structure. 
The analysis in this Chapter contributes to the limited but growing literature that 
estimates household water demand with pooled revealed and stated preference 
data, and also to the literature estimating household water demand in developing 
economies. The results of the analysis suggest the revealed and contingent 
behaviour survey approach used in this research can be employed to recover 
estimates of household own and cross price elasticities for water for municipal 
and non-municipal water sources in developing countries. Compared to other 
stated preference approaches, the contingent behaviour method developed in this 
Chapter has the advantage of setting household responses in the familiar 
behavioural context of actual household water activities. This may reduce the 
potential for hypothetical response bias. When the contingent behaviour 
approach is structured to allow respondents the opportunity to revise their water 
consu~ption based on outcome feedback, as was the case in this research, the 
Discovered Preference Hypothesis (Plott 1996) and its supporting literature 
(Bateman et al. 2004) predicts the consumer will learn their preferences. When 
this is the case, consumption, consumer surplus, and marginal economic value 
estimates will be increasingly precise and stable. 
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7 
Preference for in-situ water allocation: results 
from a randomised payment card contingent 
valuation analysis 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 noted that water generates direct or indirect utility when it is retained 
in-situ. For example, water held in-situ in groundwater and surface water systems 
generates regulatory, habitat, and biomass goods and services. These goods and 
services include controlling soil erosion, preventing land subsidence, maintaining 
soil fertility .and structure, retaining, filtering and exporting nutrients, regulating 
microclimates, and providing water to natural vegetation and fauna (Llamas 
2004). The potentially large utility affects generated by water in usages other than 
irrigated agriculture and household usages in the Dak Lak Plateau means a policy 
rationale exists for gauging social preferences for the allocation of the scarce 
water of the Plateau to non-agricultural and non-households usages. 
Individual willingness to pay for the goods and services generated by a policy or 
program is contingent on the benefit flow the individual anticipates that they will 
receive and the costs the individual expects to bear. In complex hydro-agro-
environmental ecosystems, the stocks and flows of hydrologic and agro-
environmental services likely generated by a proposed· policy are always 
characterised by varying degrees of supply uncertainty. Imperfect technical 
information renders the scope, magnitude, distribution, and duration of policy 
outcomes incomplete, policy outcomes are often affected by exogenous random 
shocks, and the capacity of agencies charged with implementing the policy to 
successfully execute it may be unclear. The rational individual weighs up all these 
supply uncertainties when deciding their preference strength for the proposed 
project to proceed. A fundemantal presumption of this thesis is that government 
policies and programs should be based on informed social preferences. Informed 
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preferences require at a minimum that individuals know what they will and what 
they will not get from a proposed policy (Carson et al. 2003: 263). With supply 
uncertainty, the policy maker evaluating social preference for a new policy must 
decide whether the proposed policy is described deterministically to the 
recipients of the potential policy, meaning uncertainty is assumed away in the 
policy explanation, or described so that supply uncertainty is made explicit to the 
recipients of the potential policy. Most contingent valuation analyses aiming to 
understand the social will for public goods have historically followed the 
deterministic policy description approach. This approach constrains respondents 
to expressing their monetised preference for the public good with imperfect 
information however. This violates the consumer sovereignty principle that 
requires an individual must have JlO less information than anyone else about the 
technical, scientific, and outcome attributes of a proposed policy for their 
preferences to count in policy development (Brock et al. 2000). 
There is a body of literature that demonstrates that individuals can still have 
uncertain preferences even when supply certainty is high. This preference 
uncertainty appears to especially occur when people define preferences for novel 
goods and services (Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Li and Mattsson 1995; Loomis 
and Ekstrand 1998). An individual may have uncertain preferences for a good as a 
result of not knowing their demand for the good in the future. Uncertainty of 
demand may result from the individual having incomplete information about 
substitutes, or from uncertainty about how their preferences -for a good will 
evlolv! over time. For policy and planning purposes, understanding the extent to 
which individuals are uncertain about their willingness to pay for a proposed 
program is clearly going to be beneficial. 
In this Chapter monetised preference strength for water in usages other than 
irrigation and the household is evaluated. The focus ·is on household preferences 
for in-situ allocation. The approach developed estimates willingness to pay for a 
composite of hydrologic balance and agro-environmental ecosystem goo&; and 
services obtained by by the implementation of an irrigation water use efficiency 
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program on coffee smallholdings in the Dak Lak Plateau. The CVM approach 
forms the basis for the analysis. The parametric willingness to pay estimate 
includes covariates that profile the water usage behaviour of respondents, and 
respondents' experiential, attitudinal, and socio-economic characteristics. These 
covariates allow the monetised preference strength for water to be defined as a 
function of these characteristics relative to a willingness to pay baseline. The 
covariate approach does not define the economic value of water in uses other 
than irrigated agriculture and the household, but does define respondents' 
relative monetised preference strength for allocating additional water in-situ, 
which is useful for water policy formation. 
The CVM with covariate approach is favoured over the SCM with covariate 
alternative in this analysis for three main reasons. Firstly, the approach developed 
in this Chapter allows respondents to indicate their willingness to pay certainty 
level, a feature that has not yet been developed in the SCM approach. The CVM 
approach is also preferred because the composite hydro-agro-environmental 
ecosystem good is definable by a large number of relevant attributes, possibly too 
many for a SCM analysis, which normally limits the number of attributes to 
seven or less due to task complexity leading to preference instability beyond this 
number (Carson et al. 1994; Hensher et al. 2005). Thirdly, the CVM approach is 
preferred because pre-testing of draft CVM and SCM surveys in the Plateau 
showed respondents had less difficulty understanding and completing the CVM 
survey. 
A novel randomised payment card contingent valuation approach was developed 
for the analysis of the Chapter. The randomised payment card approach measured 
household willingness to pay for an uncertain composite of hydro-agro-
environmental ecosystem outcomes that could be realised by the successful 
implementation of an irrigation water use efficiency training program on coffee 
smallholdings of the Dak Lak Plateau. The random card soring approach allows 
respondents to categorise their willingness to pay for the outcomes of the project 
into amounts they would definitely not pay, definitely would pay, and are 
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uncertain about paying. The approach has the advantages of allowing respondents 
to learn their preferences for the novel policy through practice and repetition, 
and also allowing respondents to explicitly state their payment uncertainty. The 
data coding approach used in this Chapter's analysis results in more efficient and 
conservative interval estimates of willingness to pay than other more prevalently 
use~ contingent valuation approaches, for reasons outlined later in the Chapter. 
The work of this Chapter contributes to the contingent valuation literature in 
three ways. First, it is the first known application of the randomised payment 
card contingent valuation approach in South East Asia. Second, it is first known 
application that identifies and controls for specific biases resulting from the 
randomised payment card's preference elicitation format. Third, it is the first 
known application of a stated pref~rence valuation method in the Mekong region 
that has included measures of preference certainty. 
Section two in this Chapter summarises the contingent valuation approach and 
reviews the literature on estimating willingness to pay with uncertainty. Section 
three is devoted to the Dak Lak Plateau application. The survey approach is 
outlined and household descriptive statistics summarised. Household willingness 
to pay is first estimated using a univariate non-parametric model, and 
subsequently with a parametric model including socio-economic, attitudinal, 
experierai.al, and other covariates. Central willingness to pay tendency is 
estimated for both the models. Aggregate willingness to pay for the proposed 
program is then estimated using the parametric WTP estimate. Section four is 
devoted to discussing research policy implications, while conclusions are drawn 
in section five. 
Conceptual framework 
Conceptually, the separate estimation and aggregation of an individual's 
economic values for all of the utility impacts flowing from the successful 
implementation of a policy would generate a comprehensive estimate of that 
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individual's willingness to pay for the policy. The aggreagate value of the 
individual would also be the the TEV of the policy outcomes to the individual. In 
practice however this approach would only work in a very simple world where 
the underlying agro-environmental production system was well defined, 
responded to perturbations in a deterministic and marginal way, and there was 
strong separability between the goods and services delivered by the policy. In 
practice, aggregating separately measured economic values can result in benefit 
double counting (El Serafy 1998). Further, separately derived willingness to pay 
estimates will be biased if the household does not account for substitution effects 
and budget constraints between these and other marketable inputs (Loomis et al. 
2000). For these reasons, an approach that simultaneously measures all of the 
benefits accruing to a household from a policy or program is desirable. Chapter 3 
discussed that both CVM and SCM can elicit willingness to pay estimates that are 
sensitive to the attributes of an aggregate good, and also control for potential 
substitution and complementary relationships, and the budget constraint of the 
respondent. 
Equation (23) in Chapter 3 is the utility theoretic basis of the contingent 
valuation approach. The equation can be re-written to define the asset value of 
the policy outcomes as the income the individual will sacrifice to obtain the 
exogenously supplied goods and services of the policy and be indifferent between 
having qn and less income, or q0 and their original income. If the individual's 
utility function is fixed and all elements are characterised by perfect information, 
willingness to pay will have a unique value (Wang 1997). The general contingent 
valuation approach in the agro-environmental economics literature aims to locate 
the individual's true willingness to pay for moving from the baseline quality q 0 
to the policy originated improved quality qn by implementing Equation (23) in 
theform 
(81) 
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recalling here that v(.) is the indirect utility function, p is a price matrix vector 
for private goods, and Yis income. The new term B defines the bid value, and the 
matrix vector Z incorporates respondents' socio-economic and other relevant 
individual attributes that capture preference heterogeneity. The respondent 
agrees to pay the presented bid amount only if it is less than or equal to their true 
latep.t willingness to pay ( wm 
v(p,q" ,Y-WTP;Z)~ v(p,q" ,Y-B;Z)-v (p,q 0 ,Y;Z) (82) 
Equation (82) defines the decision framework underlying deterministic 
contingent valuation, including the single shot dichotomous choice referendum 
approach recommended by the NOAA panel guidelines for value elicitation 
surveys (Arrow et al. 1993). For •the decision model in Equation (82) to hold 
strictly requires that the respondent is rational, knows their preferences 
completely, knows all substitutes for qn, and is well informed in the sense that 
they completely understand the outcomes of the proposed policy. Faced with 
supply uncertainty, several possible policy outcomes exist. Individuals are 
assumed to incorporate uncertainty in option prices formed via their probability 
weighted assessment of the utility of each possible outcome. This means the 
respondent is assumed to be capable of estimating a certainty equivalent 
willingness to pay (Boyle 2003a: 117). 
Extending this deterministic decision framework for uncertainty, Dubourg, 
Jones-Lee et al. (1997), Ready, Navrud et al. (2001), and Vossler, Ethier et al. 
(2003) separately proposed that individuals are likely to be certain about their 
WTP at very high and low bid prices relative to their own assessment of the 
intrinsic value of an asset, but are more likely to be uncertain at intermediate 
values. Alberini, Boyle et al. (2003) postulate that an individual will only answer 
yes to a presented bid if their utility for answering yes, plus an error factor from 
being wrong, equals or exceeds the utility from answering no 
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v{p,qn ,Y -B;Z)-v{p,q0 ,Y;Z)~ -q (83) 
Where i; is the loss from making an error. The i; for familiar private goods that 
are regularly purchased in a market will likely be small. As the good or service 
being valued becomes increasingly novel or uncertain, i; will likely increase. 
Public goods subject to free riding may also have higher i; values. The value of i; 
captures supply and demand uncertainty, as well as the individual's own socio-
economic, risk, and other attributes, and the likelihood of recourse from making 
an incorrect decision. 
Literature review 
Giving respondents that change to express preference uncertainty can be 
implemented in CVM questionnaires to parameterise the empirical error function 
from Equation (83) (Li and Mattsson 1995; Wang 1997) or control for the error 
loss term in willingness to pay central tendency calculations (Welsh and Poe 
1998). Contingent valuation studies that have incorporated respondent certainty 
strength measures predominantly either use a follow-up certainty question (FCQ) 
or multiple bounded discrete choice (MBDC) approach (Vossler et al. 2003). The 
FCQmethod has respondents first indicate their willingness to pay for a program, 
and then identify how certain they are about their stated willingness to pay using 
either a numeric or word scale. The MBDC approach embeds the preference 
certainty measurement within the bid elicitation format. Respondents are 
presented with a bid value series, and to each bid responds whether they would 
pay the bid amount to secure the program, would not pay the amount, or are 
uncertain whether they would pay the bid amount. The MBDC approach 
therefore reflects aspects from both the payment card and dichotomous choice 
elicitation format (Welsh and Poe 1998: 172; Vossler et al. 2003). 
Two MBDC presentation formats can be classified from the applied CVM 
literature. The format of Welsh and Poe (1998) is consistent with the payment 
card approach, and presents respondents with all payment amounts and certainty 
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levels simultaneously. The approach is therefore potentially subject to the same 
range and anchoring biases as the standard payment card approach (Bateman et 
al. 2002: 139; Bateman et al. 2005). Range bias occurs when the final valuation 
estimate depends on the bid value range presented, whereas anchoring biases, 
which includes starting point bias, occurs when respondents are influenced by 
either the starting bid value or following bid values. Alberini et al. (2003) found 
starting point and potentially anchoring biases using the approach of Welsh and 
Poe, and Roach et al. (2002) found range bias using MBDC. 
The second MBDC presentation format is the randomised payment card approach 
(Bateman et al. 2005). The randomised payment card CVM approach is 
implemented by sequentially presenting respondents with bid cards, each 
presenting a single bid value. The respondent sorts each bid card into willing to 
pay, unwilling to pay, and uncertainty stacks. Respondents are allowed to shift 
cards between stacks during the value elicitation procedure. In this approach, 
range bias may be avoided by not presenting all bids simultaneously. Shuffling 
the bid cards in front of the respondent immediately prior to bid elicitation may 
also overcome anchoring bias by de-emphasising the importance of the first bid 
card (Bateman et al. 2005). By allowing the respondent to revise their preferences 
by moving cards between categories during the exercise, the approach is 
consiste.I).t with the Discovered Preference Hypothesis of Plott (1996), which 
suggests people define stable and theoretically consistent preferences through 
repeated purchases and learning in the market. Experimental economics shows 
respoooents can take up to ten payment rounds to discover their true preferences 
when dealing with unfamiliar goods or services (Loomis and Ekstrand 1998). The 
randomised payment card's repeated card-sorting design accommodates these 
experimental research findings. Smith (2004) found respondents in a randomised 
payment card approach had narrower willingness to·pay uncertainty ranges than 
respondents to the same survey instrument when implemented using a payment 
card elicitation format allowing for uncertain responses. Combined, these results 
suggest the randomised payment card approach allowing for preference 
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uncertainty may generate more unbiased and efficient willingness to pay 
estimates than the Welsh and Poe MDBC alternative. 
The contingent valuation literature shows not allowing respondents to express 
their preference uncertainty causes willingness to pay to be over-estimated for 
both public and private goods (Holmes and Kramer 1995; Champ et al. 1997; 
Welsh and Poe 1998; Ready et al. 2001; Vossler et al. 2003), however this 
literature is not equivocal (Carson et al. 1998; Alberini et al. 2003). Incorporating 
respondent uncertainty appears to improve criterion validity between the stated 
and real purchasing behaviour of individuals for both private and public goods. 
Experimental and field applications show that when respondents indicate they 
are at least '.probably sure' they would be willing to pay a stated amount for a 
good or service, their real purchases of private and public goods in FCQ, and 
private goods in MBDC (Vossler et al. 2003) will approximate their stated 
preference. Criterion validity does not appear to have been evaluated for the 
randomised payment card MBDC presentation format. 
Empirical application 
Survey procedure 
A randomised payment card contingent valuation approach was developed to 
estimate the monetised preference strength for additional water allocations in 
non-irrigation and non-household usages in the Plateau, and to determine the 
extent to which households in the Dak Lak Plateau were willing to pay for a 
irrigation water use efficiency training program on the Plateau's coffee 
smallholdings that would likely generate off-farm hydro-agro-environmental 
ecosystem benefits. 
Willingness to pay estimates from contingent valuation analyses are based on the 
content of the existing and future scenarios described in the survey. As a result, 
considerable time was spent designing an incentive_ compatible CVM survey 
instrument, with these procedures discussed in detail in Cheesman, Vu et al. 
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(2007b). The final survey instrument (Appendix 4) included three sections. The 
first section introduced the survey, and placed the survey research objective in 
broad public decision-making context. The survey research objective was 
described as wanting to understand household preferences for water resource 
management options in the Dak Lak Plateau. To control for strategic bias, 
respondents were told a large number of households were being interviewed. 
Following Banzhaf, Burtraw et al. (2004), respondents were encouraged to think 
about substitute public goods and trade-offs by identifying public policy issues of 
most concern to them in the Plateau. Subsequently, the survey collected 
household background data, including groundwater and surface water usage and 
perceptual data. Perceptual questions focused on respondents' views about 
regional dry season water availabil'ity and quality. Respondents were asked about 
their general perceptions of surface water quality in their reference surface 
waterway, defined as the natural surface water body they visited most frequently, 
and also whether dry season flows were 'sufficient' in their opinion. Where 
relevant, respondents were also asked about the historial trend in the elevation of 
the local groundwater table, and whether they had concerns with either the 
quality of availability of dry season groundwater. Households were also asked to 
identify the main determinants of local groundwater and surface water scarcity. 
Section one also sought to explore respondents' bequest, existence, and 
--development motivations. The bequest motivation question measured 
respondents' preferences for protecting water systems in the Plateau for the 
benefit of future generations. The existence motivation question measured 
whether respondents believed the functioning of water systems in the Plateau 
was important even if they had never visited them. The development motivation 
question gauged the extent to which respondents thought it was acceptable for 
water allocations for irrigated agriculture and other development activities to run 
groundwater and surface water systems dry during the dry season. 
The contingent valuation scenario was set out in the second section by describing 
a non-constant baseline scenario where escalating water demands in the Plateau 
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placed increasing stress on regional hydrologic system functioning. Respondents 
were introduced to the baseline scenario, which broadly described the Plateau's 
hydrodynamics as well as smallholder coffee irrigation practices. A causal 
relationship between wet season rainfall, groundwater recharge, and dry season 
baseflows was outlined. Dry season irrigation requirements for coffee were also 
presented in broad terms, as was the potential cumulative impact of current 
coffee irrigation practices on dry season groundwater stocks and baseflows. 
Future risks without policy intervention were defined in terms of decreasing 
groundwater head elevations, and continued and potentially increasing rates of 
failure in dry season baseflows. Casual linkages between hydrologic system states 
and broader agro-environmental ecosystem states were made. 
The policy intervention scenario was structured around an existing small scale 
training program to improve irrigation water use efficiency on smallholder coffee 
plantations in the Plateau (D'haeze 2005). Specialized training in sustainable 
coffee farming practices has been demonstrated to improve the irrigation water 
use efficiency of coffee smallholders over the short to medium term in Dak Lak 
(D'haeze 2006). Intensive training programs are costly to implement however and 
the local agencies responsible for agricultural extension have insufficient capacity 
to develop and sustain these programs independently. Currently, the irrigation 
water use efficiency training runs on a small participant scale in one 
subcatchment of the Plateau. A Plateau wide change in smallholder irrigation 
behaviour would he required if any Plateau-wide improvements in hydrologic 
balances are to occur however. 
The CVM survey outlined the existing irrigation water use efficiency program to 
respondents, including where the training had already occurred and the number 
of coffee smallholders who had already participated. Respondents were told that 
most participating coffee smallholders who transferred the irrigation practices 
they learned from the program to their own plots found they could reduce their 
dry season irrigation inputs without reducing output quantity or quality. The 
survey also highlighted that reducing water inputs reduced variable irrigation 
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costs. Large-scale reductions in dry season coffee irrigation volumes following 
from the successful implementation of an irrigation water use efficiency program 
in the Plateau were explicitly linked to a broader composite of hydrologic balance 
and agro-environmental ecosystem outcomes, including increasing the dry season 
watertable elevation in the unconfined aquifer and reducing well exhaustion, 
increasing dry season baseflows in larger rivers and streams in the Dak Lak 
Plateau, reducing the number of small streams running drying during the dry 
season, and improving water dependent agro-environmental ecosystem 
functioning. Focus groups and survey pre-testing showed respondents were much 
more receptive to short, general, qualitative types of outcome descriptions than to 
detailed, technical, quantitative or scientifically based descriptions. As a result, all 
on-farm cost reductions and ag'to-environmental ecosystem outcomes were 
clearly but broadly described, and the potential benefits of the hypothetical 
policy were not quantified in any way. The spatial variability and uncertainty in 
the flow of potential program benefits due to incomplete technical information 
and natural variability was also highlighted to the respondents. 
The payment vehicle was an annual fixed payment for the five-year duration of 
the project. All households in the Dak Lak Plateau would make these annual 
payments in December. Households were told payments would be made directly 
to a spegal water management board that would be established to implement the 
irrigation water use efficiency training policy. Participants in the focus groups 
and pre-survey work expressed concern about the capacity of local authorities to 
implement the proposed program and to use the monies collected for the 
intended purposes. As a result it was stressed that the program would be jointly 
implemented with a well-known international coffee company that has 
previously co-financed coffee smallholder training in the Dak Lak Plateau. This 
company would be involved in the annual collection of project monies, the 
training program's implementation, and fund auditing. 
Respondents were told that the program would only be implemented if sufficient 
funds could be raised from households in the Plateau to cover program 
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administration costs, net of the unspecified annual project contribution by the 
international donor. It was stressed that the program would not proceed if 
sufficient funds could not be raised locally, but the threshold amount the program 
needed to pass before being implemented was not stated. 
The randomised payment card elicitation format was then introduced. 
Respondents were told they would be presented with a series of cards with 
payment amounts written on them. The payment amount on each card was one 
of several potential annual tariffs being considered for implementing the 
irrigation water use training policy. Respondents were asked to sort the payment 
cards into three piles: one including all amounts the respondent was definitely 
sure they would pay, another for amounts they were definitely sure they would 
not pay, and the third for all amounts the household was uncertain about paying. 
Based on the focus groups and pre-tests, nine cards with were presented to each 
respondent with the annual payment values (VND): 5,000 I 7,500 I 10,000 I 
20,000 I 50,000 I 80,000 I 100,000/ 125,000 I 200,000. 
Respondents were told they could move the payment cards between any of the 
three stacks at any time during the elicitation process. To demonstrate that the 
card order was random, the enumerator shuffled the cards in front of the 
respondent before handing them over. To reduce yea-saying behaviour, which 
occurs when respondents indicate they would pay any amount presented to them 
(Blarney et al. 1999), respondents were reminded that they could allocate all 
payment amounts to the definitely not willing to pay stack, and that this would 
indicate they were not willing to pay at all for the proposed program to be 
implemented. To mitigate hypothetical bias arising from respondents misstating 
their true willingness to pay for a program because of the good or service's 
hypothetical nature, a positive ~heap talk script with substitute good and budget 
constraint reminders was used. The positive cheap talk script stated that people 
sometimes overstate their true willingness to pay for a program's implementation 
in CVM studies. This approach was favoured over the neutral cheap talk script 
alternative, because pre-survey work suggested respondents were more likely to 
- 205 -
overstate than understate willingness to pay, and also because recent research 
suggests neutral cheap talk scripts may generate inconsistent willingness to pay 
responses (Aadland and Caplan 2006). The efficacy of the cheap talk script in 
controlling response bias was not formally evaluated in this research. 
Immediately following the payment elicitation, respondents underwent 
debriefing with a series of questions identifying protest bids, true zero willingness 
to pay, checking for respondents' understanding, their conviction in the baseline 
scenario and future outcomes with and without the program, as well as their 
conviction that the proposed program could be successfully implemented. The 
final section collected household background data. 
The randomised payment card col'ltingent valuation survey was implemented in 
the Plateau in late 2006 using random sampling of households from the six 
Plateau's districts: Buon Don, Cu' m'gar, Krong Ana, Krong Buk, Krong Pak, and 
TP Buon Ma Thuot. Graduate students from Ho Chi Minh City University of 
Economics and Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands) University administered the 
final survey. The sampling strategy was based on a random sampling scheme 
based on household location. 
Results 
Descriplive statistics 
Usable responses were obtained from 166 households. Approximately 40 per cent 
of the respondents were farmers. The majority of farmers produced coffee as their 
main crop and the aveage farm size was 1.2 hectares (Table 7.1). For farmers 
whose main crop was not coffee, average land holdings are smaller, in the range 
of 0.6 hectares, and coffee is produced on around half of this land area on average. 
Average household size is 4.6 persons, and the average monthly household 
income just over VND2 million. Thus, the annual pa)rment range ofVNDS,000 to 
VND200,000 presented to respondents in the CVM scenario accounted for 
between two-tenths of one percent and ten percent of the average household's 
monthly income. 
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_ ....,:, 
Respondents have heterogeneous experience and understanding of the surface 
and groundwater systems of the Plateau. Approximately 30 per cent of the 
respondents visited their reference surface water system daily, while another 60 
per cent visited less than weekly. Around 30 per cent of respondents used their 
reference surface water system for irrigated agriculture, while a, surprisingly 
high, 67 per cent used the surface water system for transportation, and another 20 
per cent for entertainment. Nearly 30 per cent of respondents reported their 
reference surface water system dried out during the dry season. 
More than 90 per cent of respondents using groundwater reported that the dry 
season groundwater condition, expressed in terms of groundwater head elevation 
and well exhaustion, had deteriorated over the last five years. Most respondents 
using groundwater used this water in the household, and around 45 per cent for 
irrigated agriculture. Households that reported observing either reducing dry 
season low flows in their reference river or a worsening in the dry season 
groundwater condition mainly attributed these changes to either deforestation, 
natural variability in wet season rainfall, or irrigated agriculture. These results 
indicate that the respondents did not view dry season smallholder coffee 
irrigation as the primary cause of water shortages in the Plateau. Most 
Table 7.1 Household descriptive statistics 
Variable Unit of measure Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Household size Unit 165 4.59 1.96 1 20 
Monthly income VND'OOO 165 2,017 2,008 1 20,000 
Highest education level 
Secondary school or below l=Yes 165 13.3 n.a. 1 
High school l=Yes 165 40.0 n.a. 1 
Vocational school l=Yes 165 32.1 n.a. 1 
College and university l=Yes 165 14.5 n.a. 1 
Main household employment 
Farming - main crop is coffee l=Yes 165 31.5 n.a. 1 
Farming - main crop is not coffee l=Yes 165 8.4 n.a. 1 
Other l=Yes 165 60.0 n.a. 1 
Average land area allocated to coffee farming 
Farming - main crop is coffee 
-
Ha 52 0.96 0.68 .1 3 
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Table 7.1 Household descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Farming - main crop is not coffee 
River visit frequency 
D~ily 
Weekly 
Less than weekly 
Main activity at river 
Irrigated agriculture 
Entertainment 
Transport 
Other 
Dry season flows 
High or better 
Low 
Dry out 
Unsure 
Main uses 
Irrigated agriculture 
Household 
Other 
Groundwater water table 
Increasing or remaining stable 
Decreasing 
Unsure 
Existence motivation 
Bequest motivation 
Unit of measure Obs. Mean SD 
Ha 14 0.28 0.79 
Reference river situation 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
Groundwater situation 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
l=Yes 
Motivations 
165 0.27 n.a. 
165 0.11 n.a. 
165 0.62 n.a. 
165 0.29 n.a. 
165 0.20 n.a. 
165 0.67 n.a. 
165 0.13 n.a. 
165 0.12 n.a. 
165 0.55 n.a. 
165 0.30 n.a. 
165 0.03 n.a. 
165 0.45 n.a. 
165 0.98 n.a. 
165 0.32 n.a. 
165 0.07 n.a. 
165 0.92 n.a. 
165 0.02 n.a. 
Prioritise allocation to agriculture 
l=>Agreed 
l=>Agreed 
l=>Agreed 
165 0.95 n.a. 
165 0.95 n.a. 
165 0.52 n.a. 
Notes: -n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
Min 
.1 
Max 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
respondents did however view dry season irrigation of agriculture as one of the 
three main causes of dry season surface and groundwater conditions. 
Respondents demonstrated both existence and bequest motivations for 
maintaining water systems in the Dak Lak Plateau. Chapter 3 noted that passive 
use values can be motivated by a preference for the continued existence of the 
good for its own sake even though the respondent never intends to directly 
experience the good (existence value), or through non-reciprocal paternalistic 
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altruism for others wellbeing (Freeman 2003). Approximately 95 per cent of the 
respondents stated that water system health was important even if they had never 
visited or intended to visit the water system. Essentially all respondents at least 
agreed with the bequest statement that their current generation was responsible 
for maintaining the integrity of the water systems of the Plateau for future 
generations. 
In addition to expressing bequest and existence preferences, Respondents also 
recognised the role of dry season flow diversions to irrigated agriculture as an 
important development strategy. More than 50 per cent of respondents agreed 
that diversions to irrigated agriculture should occur even when these diversions 
resulted in the dry season surface flows in their reference river being exhausted. 
Thus, the potential for conflicting preferences in bequest, existence, and 
development motivations is evident from the descriptive statistics. Roughly half 
the respondents indicated bequest preferences but simultaneously agreed that dry 
season flow diversions to irrigated agriculture were acceptable even when this 
results in water systems running dry. It is reasonable to posit that social 
desirability bias may be motivating these responses in some cases. 
Virtually all respondents indicated they were willing to pay the lowest VNDS,000 
bid amount, and approximately 90 per cent of respondents were unwilling to pay 
the highest VND200,000 bid (Figure 7.1). Forty-two per cent of respondents 
answered at least once that they were uncertain whether they would be willing 
to pay a bid amount. Amongst these respondents, the average number of times 
that this payment uncertainty occurred was 2.2 with a 1.3 standard deviation. 
The incidence of respondent uncertainty peaks around the VNDS0,000 to 
VND80,000 range. In this range approximately 30 per cent of respondents 
indicated payment uncertainty. Seven respondents were willing to pay all bid 
amounts presented, while only one respondent was unwilling to pay even the 
lowest bid amount. 
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Figure 7.1 Willing~ss to pay response distribution 
200 
Following Alberini, Boyle et al. (2003), a robust multinomial logit model 
clustering on respondent was used to evaluate whether systematic relationships 
existed between the socio-economic, experiential, or attitudinal attributes of 
respondents and the likelihood of expressing payment uncertainty. Using 
uncertain as the reference category, results (Table 7 .2) show that virtually all 
experiential, socio-economic, and motivational attributes of respondents did not 
systeml:!!ically correlate with the incidence of payment uncertainty. Aging causes 
respondents to become increasingly more likely to reject a payment than state 
uncertainty. Further, respondents who stated in debriefing that they had prior 
knowledge about the groundwater and surface water systems of the Plateau were 
more likely to state uncertainty. This result may be causal to respondents who 
have existing views 
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Table 7.2 Willingness to pay certainty, multinomial logistic regression 
estimates 
Variable Coefficient z Coefficient z 
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
probability of a YES probability of a NO 
willingness to pay willingness to pay 
response response 
....................................... ......................... -...... 
-0.17 -0.75 -0.16 -0.65 
Visit river frequently (0.22) (0.24) 
0.19 0.73 0.41 1.33 
Use river for irrigation (0.26) (0.31) 
0.06 -0.25 0.17 0.67 
Use groundwater for irrigation (0.24) (0.26) 
-0.14 -0.29 0.17 0.31 
Nonuser (0.50) (0.57) 
-0.06 -0.23 -0.13 -0.47 
Coffee farmer (0.26) (0.29) 
-0.31 -0.75 -0.42 -0.90 
Non-coffee farmer (0.41) (0.46) 
0.01 1.20 0.02 b 1.96 
Age (0.01) (0.01) 
0.02 0.37 -0.02 -0.39 
Years of education (0.04) (0.05) 
0.34 1.58 0.08 0.35 
Gender (0.22) (0.24) 
0.12 1.43 0.04 0.39 
Income (VND) (0.08) (0.09) 
--~ 
-0.03 -0.20 -0.16 -1.14 
Existence motivation (0.14) (0.14) 
0.28 1.40 O.Dl 0.02 
Bequest motivation (0.20) (0.21) 
-0.05 -0.48 -0.18 -1.11 
Development motivation (0.10) (0.16) 
-0.53 b -2.15 -0.59 b -2.09 
Know about the water situation (0.24) (0.28) 
-0.31 -0.23 1.78 1.29 
Constant (1.34) (1.38) 
Log likelihood -1444.61 
Wald Chi2(28) 48.75 
Notes: •band c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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about the Plateau's water system somehow being challenged by the survey 
information, which may in tum result in these respondents being more uncertain 
about their pre-existing views. The fact that respondents without pre-conceptions 
of the causes of water shortages in the Plateau were more likely to give certainty 
equivalent willingness to pay responses likely indicates the preferences of these 
responses were being constructed during the survey using the information 
presented to them. This is the desirable state of affairs for a CVM application. 
Further, Wald tests reject the null hypothesis of equivalence between 'uncertain' 
and 'no' responses, significant at the ten per cent level. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis shows the probability of respondents stating uncertainty is not 
independent of age and assumed prior knowledge. 
Willingness to pay estimates 
Several coding and estimation approaches can be applied to polychotomous 
contingent valuation data (Alberini et al. 2003). Following Welsh and Poe (1998) 
and Ready, Navrud et al. (2001), all uncertain responses were re-coded as not 
willing to pay responses. The recoding approach assumes respondents who are 
'definitely sure' they would pay the hypothetical amount would pay this amount 
in a real marketplace. The coding approach results in a conservative willingness 
to pay estimate being made, given the evidence discussed earlier in this Chapter 
about the relationship between hypothetical and actual willingness to pay in 
-"-
hypothetical and real marketplaces. 
Willingness to pay central tendency is first estimated using a survivor function 
model, which expresses the probability that willingness to pay exceeds some 
value. In contingent valuation applications, survival is measured as a function of 
the increasing bid price. Consistent with microeconomic theory, the survival 
function assumes that the population percentage supporting a program decreases 
monotonically with increasing price (Carson et al. 2003). A parametric survivor 
function is subsequently estimated adding covariates. 
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Four observations were dropped from the dataset due to disproportionate 
influence on the WTP estimates. 
Non-parametric estimates. The Kaplan-Meier estimator provides an 
empirical approach for deriving a distribution free estimate of respondent 
willingness to pay. Using the Kaplan-Meier approach, survivor functions were 
estimated using the lower bound of the willingness to pay interval of each 
respondent. Estimates were obtained for the sample population as a whole, and 
separately for coffee and non-coffee smallholders. Log rank and Wilcoxon chi-
square tests did not reject the null hypothesis that coffee and non-coffee 
smallholders shared the same survival function, and only aggregate results are 
presented as.a result. Results (Table 7.3) demonstrate that more than 80 per cent 
of respondents' lower bound willingness to pay was equal to or less than 
VNDS0,000, and more than 95 per cent of respondents' lower bound willingness 
to pay fell below VND200,000. 
The Kaplan-Meier product limit estimate returns a lower bound mean willingness 
to pay ofVND37,242 per annum. This willingness to pay estimate is equivalent to 
the cost of one day of unskilled hired farm labour in 2006, and 1.8 per cent of the 
average household monthly income of the sample. The Kaplan-Meier survivor 
function suggested a lognormal distribution provided the best parameterisation of 
the underlying willingness to pay distribution. Maximising the log likelihood 
function assuming a lognormal distribution yields a mean and median willingness 
to pay of VND43,931 and VND26,860 respectively. Because the lognormal 
model's fitted distribution is asymmetric, the median willingness to pay estimate 
is the appropriate measure of central tendencey (Hanemann and Kanninen 1996; 
Kerr 2000). 
Valuation function. An interval-censored valuation function is specified. The 
interval censored function assumes the unknown true willingness to pay of an 
individual lies within the interval bounded at or above the highest bid price the 
respondent indicated they were willing to pay, and at or below the bid price the 
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respondent subsequently indicated they were not willing to pay or were 
uncertain about paying. The log-normal distribution function was assumed, 
which is consistent with utility requirement that willingness to pay is not 
negative (Hanemann and Kanninen 1996). Statistically, no respondents indicated 
a true zero willingness to pay for the proposed program. AB a result, a model that 
explicitly incorporated the the positive probability of zero willingness to pay 
(Kristrom 1997) was not required. 
The parametric valuation function included socio-economic, experiential, 
attitudinal, and scope sensitivity covariates in order to define the individual effect 
each of these covariates had on willingness to pay. Dummy variables were 
employed to estimate the marginal willingness to pay effect based on main 
surface and groundwater water usages, benefit part-whole bias, policy package 
part-whole bias, and probability of provision bias. Part-whole biases stem from 
respondents including a broader or narrower benefit range or policy package than 
intended (Bateman et al. 2002). Respondents with part-whole biases value a 
composite good different from the one intended, and as a result, construct 
validity is supported if the willingness to pay of these respondents differs 
systematically from respondents who valued the intended asset (Carson et al. 
2003). 
Covariates were also generated to identify willingness to pay shifters caused by 
respondents' own beliefs about the primary cause(s) for dry season surface and 
groun~water shortages in the Plateau. Dummy variables identified respondents 
who believed irrigation was one of the three main causes for dry season water 
shortages; deforestation was the main cause of dry season water shortages; and 
natural rainfall variability was the main cause. The working assumption was that 
respondents who believed that the hydrologic balance of the Plateau is at least 
partly manageable through increasing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee 
smallholdings should be more willing to pay for the proposed program, all other 
factors constant. On the other hand, respondents primarily attributing water 
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Table 7.3 Kaplan-Meier willingness to pay estimates 
Lower bound of 
interval (VND) Survival probability Change in density Failures 
0.97 0.03 5 
5,000 0.92 0.08 8 
7,500 0.90 0.10 4 
10,000 0.67 0.33 37 
20,000 0.41 0.59 43 
50,000 0.18 0.82 38 
80,000 0.10 0.90 14 
100,000 0.05 0.95 7 
125,000 0.04 0.96 2 
200,000 0.04 0.96 
Mean (VND) • 37,242 
Standard Error (VND) 2,634 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
shortages to deforestation or rainfall should be less willing to pay, as the proposed 
policy intervention does not address these issues. 
Linkages to coffee farming and general farming activities were also explored using 
dummy variables and interaction variables with the smallholding size variable. 
The coffee farmer dummy and interaction variables tested the hypothesis that 
coffee farmers would be willing to pay more than all other groups for the 
proposed program, and further that willingness to pay would be increasing in 
coffee smallholding size. The assumptions were based on the fact that coffee 
smallholders stood to gain the most from the program's implementation, because 
they would receive training that would potentially reduce their input costs, 
would potentially have more water available for irrigation after the project was 
implemented, and would potentially also gain hydro-agro-environmental 
ecosystem benefits. Similarly, the non-coffee farmer dummy and interaction 
variable tested that non-coffee farmers would be willing to pay more than non-
farmers, and that willingness to pay would be increasing with farm size, for the 
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same reasons as coffee smallholders excepting the irrigation water use efficiency 
training benefit. Respondents who identified that natural resource management 
issues were one of the Plateau's three most important challenges were flagged 
using a dummy variable. Finally, a variable for the value of the first random 
payment card drawn was used to detect starting point bias. An insignificant 
parameter estimate would fail to reject the null hypothesis that respondents' 
willingness to pay for the program was uninfluenced by the value of the first bid 
card. 
Categories with less than 15 observations were not included as covariates, and 
this threshold reduced the number of candidate variables for the valuation 
function. Further, more than 95 per cent of respondents claimed to have at least 
existence and bequest motivations, meaning dummy variables comparing 
respondents with versus without existence and bequest motivations could not be 
constructed. As a result, the existence and bequest covariates included in the 
valuation function tested for differences in willingness to pay of respondents who 
stated they had very strong bequest or existence motivations, compared to the 
baseline of respondents stating weaker but still positive bequest and existence 
motivations. 
Table 7.4 summarises the estimates of the preferred valuation function, estimated 
using -white's heteroskedasticity-consistent variances and standard errors. The 
last two variables are the location and scale parameters of the lognormal survival 
distribution. The first coefficient estimate shows that when all other factors are 
held constant, coffee smallholders are less willing to pay for the proposed 
irrigation efficiency program. This result runs contra to the null hypothesis that 
coffee smallholders would be more willing to pay for the program. The second 
coefficient demonstrates this negative main effect is countered by coffee 
smallholding size. As the coffee plantation area increases, so does the willingness 
to pay of coffee smallholders for the proposed program. Combined, the estimates 
suggest the roughly 80 per cent of coffee smallholder respondents cultivating less 
than 2.1 hectares of coffee are less willing than non-farmers to pay for the 
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smallholder coffee irrigation program and hydro-agro-environmental outcomes, 
whereas the 20 percent of smallholders operating more than 2.1 hectares coffee 
are willing to pay more. Analysis showed these differences were not correlated to 
household income. The willingness to pay of non-coffee farmers for the coffee 
training program and composite agro-environmental benefits is insignificant, 
meaning they have the same WTP as non-farmers, all other factors constant. 
Respondents mainly using their reference surface water system for recreational 
activities have a lower willingness to pay than respondents using the river for 
transport, irrigation, fishing, and other activities. This result may stem from 
entertainment having recreation substitutes or substitute sites compared to the 
other usages. There are no differences in willingness to pay as a function of 
groundwater usages. Willingness to pay increases with average monthly 
household income and years of education, and respondents around the 35-year 
age range have the highest willingness to pay, all other factors constant. The 
underlying motivations of respondents affect their willingness to pay for the 
program and its outcomes. Respondents who indicated natural resource 
management issues are one of the greatest challenges facing the Dak Lak Plateau 
have higher willingness to pay than otherwise equivalent respondents. 
Respondents stating very strong existence or very strong bequest motivations 
were also more willing to pay for the proposed program than respondents with 
weaker, but still positive, stated existence and bequest motivations, significant at 
the seventeen and fifteen per cent levels. Respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with the statement that local government should make policies 
encouraging water use for agriculture even when this can result in water systems 
failing during the dry season were also more willing to pay than respondents 
disagreeing with this statement, also significant at the 15 per cent level. 
Respondent views of the main causes of dry season water scarcity in the Plateau 
are causal to the amount respondents are willing to pay for the hypothetical 
program. Respondents believing irrigation was one of the three main factors 
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Table 7.4 Willingness to pay, lognormal survivor function 
Unit of 
Variable measure Coefficient z 
Coffee smallholder Yes=l -0.611 a -2.73 
(0.224) 
Coffee smallholding area ha 0.286 a 2.70 
(0.106) 
Norr-coffee smallholder Yes=l 0.089 0.30 
(0.302) 
Non-coffee smallholding area ha -0.105 -0.54 
(0.195) 
River entertainment Yes=l -0.337 b -2.10 
(0.160) 
River transport Yes=l -0.003 -0.02 
(0.149) 
Groundwater household usage Yes=l 0.049 0.26 
(0.187) 
Groundwater animal husbandry Yes=l 0.177 0.99 
(0.180) 
Income VND mill 0.080 a 2.84 
(0.028) 
Education Years 0.037 b 1.98 
(0.019) 
Age Years 0.030 1.36 
(0.022) 
Age2 Years -4.20E-04 d -1.55 
(2.70E-04) 
Male Yes=l 0.157 1.22 
(0.128) 
Environmental focus Yes=l 0.350 b 2.31 
(0.152) 
Existence: strongly agree Yes=l 0.203 1.36 
(0.149) 
Bequest: strongly agree Yes=l 0.228 d 1.52 
~·""' (0.150) 
Development: agree and strongly agree Yes=l 0.171 d 1.47 
(0.116) 
Irrigation one of the three main causes Yes=l 0.306 d 1.54 
-
(0.199) 
Deforestation the main cause Yes=l -0.241 d -1.51 
(0.160) 
Natural variability the main case Yes=l -0.422 a -2.82 
(0.150) 
Aware Yes=l -0.335 b -2.28 
(0.147) 
Fee collected Yes=l 0.205 0.94 
(0.219) 
Improve hydrologic balance Yes=l 0.707 a 2.82 
(0.250) 
No yield impact Yes=l 0.304 c 1.82 
(0.167) 
First card value VND'OOO 0.005 a 2.92 
(0.002) 
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Table 7.4 Willingness to pay, lognormal survivor function 
Unit of 
Variable measure Coefficient z 
Constant 8.086 a 13.37 
(0.605) 
Scale 0.741 
(0.042) 
Log-likelihood -281.68 
Wald chi2(25) 142.91 
Observations 166 
Right-censored 7 
Left-censored 3 
Interval-censored 156 
Notes: a be and dindicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 per cent levels respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
causing reduced groundwater and surface water availability during the dry 
season had higher willingness to pay for the proposed program, significant at the 
fifteen per cent level. Morover, respondents attributing the region's changing 
hydrologic balance to either deforestation or natural rainfall variability had lower 
willingness to pay, significant at the fifteen and one per cent levels respectively. 
Combined, the results show that respondents believing rainfall is the main 
determinant of dry season water shortages, and also that irrigation is one of the 
three main causes, have lower willingness to pay than the baseline, all other 
factors constant. When deforestation is seen as the main cause and irrigation as 
one of the three main causes, willingness to pay is reduced by around 80 per c;ent 
of the irrigation variable coefficient, all other factors constant. Respondents who 
stated they believed the hydrologic balance of the Plateau would be improved by 
implementing the irrigation water use efficiency program were more willing to 
pay for the proposed program compared to those who did not think the program 
would achieve this outcome. Further, respondents who indicated they believed 
that coffee smallholders could increase irrigation water use efficiency without 
having detrimental impacts on coffee output were also more willing to pay. Each 
of the above results support construct validity. 
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The coefficient for value of the first drawn card is positive and significant at the 
one percent level. The coefficient value shows that the willingness to pay of 
respondents was positively correlated with the value of the first bid card, and 
thereby shows that respondents were susceptible to starting point bias. The result 
shows the randomised payment card approach is vulnerable to starting point bias 
even when respondents are explicitly reminded immediately before starting their 
card-sorting that they can reallocate cards between their willingness to pay 
decision stacks at any time. The starting point bias suggests respondents did not 
learn their consistent and stable preferences for the composite hydro-agro-
environmental ecosystem good during the repetitive card sorting activity, which 
is inconsistent with expectations based on the Discovered Preference Hypothesis 
and from experimental economi~s, which were both discussed earlier in the 
Chapter. The result does not support the ascendency of the randomised payment 
card over the traditional payment card format for the control of starting point 
bias. The challenging implementation environment of the survey and the 
complex and uncertain asset being valued suggests more controlled experimental 
work is required to evaluate whether starting point bias persists in the 
randomised payment card contingent valuation format in more controlled 
settings. 
Valuati9]) function willingness to pay estimates. The distorting influence of bias 
on central tendency estimates of willingness to pay can be eliminated by setting 
the parameter values of the biased covariates to zero in the valuation function -
(Carson et al. 2003). Table 7.5 summarises median willingness to pay estimates for 
different covariate combinations. Evaluated at each covariate's sample mean, 
median willingness to pay for the program is VND34,267 per annum over the five 
year program. Willingness to pay reduces to VND27,357 per annum after 
removing starting point bias, a result that shows that starting point bias inflated 
the 'real' willingness to pay of respondents by approximately 25 percent. 
Applying a 7.5 per cent discount rate estimates respondents' discounted 
willingness to pay for the proposed five year program at VNDll0,683 (without 
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the starting point bias). From this bias-adjusted willingness to pay baseline, the 
influence of respondents' experiential, perceptual, and socio-economic attributes 
on willingness to pay can be analysed. For example, Table 8.7 shows non-farmers 
have a higher median willingness to pay per annum at VND28,970, and the 
median willingness to pay of coffee smallholders is VND24,193 per annum, with 
these estimates based on the sample averages for each subgroup. 
One objective of this Chapter was to estimate monetised preference strength for 
using water in non-irrigated agriculture and non-household uses. The survey 
dataset complicates this initiative by having small numbers in several response 
categories of interest, and also because what is being evaluated in the. CVM 
survey is the anticipated increase in utility from allocating more water to other 
usages as a result of the policy, not the total utility to the individual from all 
water in these other allocations. Despite this complication, some inferences about 
respondents' monetised preference strength for water in non-household and non-
irrigation usages are possible. If the non-farmer willingness to pay estimate is 
adjusted to remove the impacts of groundwater usage in the household and in 
animal husbandry, then an estimate of the central tendency willingness to pay for 
allocating additional water in-situ via implementation of the hypothetical 
irrigation water use efficiency program is obtained. This willingness to pay 
estimate is VND27,400 per annum. Second, while statistically all survey 
respondents stated having at least both bequest and existence motivations for 
maintaining the water systems of the Plateau, approximately 30 percent of the 
survey respondents stated they simultaneously held strong public good existence 
and bequest motivations for the Plateau's water systems. These strong 
simultaneous preferences, combined with the statistical significance of the 
bequest and existence covariates, show these respondents have a preference for 
increasing in-situ water allocations that maintain water system integrity for 
public good purposes. Assuming thus, the median monetised preference for 
additional water held in-situ to maintain water system integrity for public good 
existence and bequest purposes is VND8,350 per annum for the 30 per cent of 
- 221 -
Table 7.5 Subgroup median willingness to pay estimates 
Sample Sample Sample, Non- Coffee 
Parameter average no bias farmer farmer 
Coffee smallholder 
Coffee smallholding area 
Non.-coffee smallholder 
Non-coffee smallholding area 
0.31 
0.36 
0.11 
0.06 
River entertainment 0.21 
River transport 0.57 
Groundwater household usage 0.73 
Groundwater animal husbandry 0.24 
Income 2.00 
Education 9 .84 
Age 41.45 
Age2 1,918 
Male 0.45 
Environmental focus 0.28 
Existence: strongly agree 0.35 
Bequest: strongly agree 0.41 
Development: agree and strongly agree 0.44 
Irrigation one of the three main causes 0.71 
Deforestation the main cause 0.41 
Natural variability the main case 0.32 
Aware 0.58 
Fee collected 0.88 
Improve _!!Ydrologic balance 0.91 
No yield impact 0.81 
First card value 44.01 
-0.19 
0.10 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.07 
0.00 
0.04 
0.04 
0.16 
0.36 
1.23 
-0.81 
0.07 
0.10 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
0.22 
-0.10 
-0.14 
-0.20 
0.18 
0.64 
0.25 
0.23 
Median WTP per annum 
NPV WTP@ 7.5% 
VND'OOO 34.27 
VND'OOO 138.64 
-0.19 
0.10 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.07 
0.00 
0.04 
0.04 
0.16 
0.36 
1.23 
-0.81 
0.07 
0.10 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
0.22 
-0.10 
-0.14 
-0.20 
0.18 
0.64 
0.25 
27.36 
110.68 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
-0.08 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.17 
. 0.39 
1.19 
-0.76 
0.07 
0.11 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
0.17 
-0.08 
-0.14 
-0.19 
0.17 
0.67 
0.23 
28.97 
117.20 
-0.61 
0.34 
-0.05 
0.00 
0.04 
0.05 
0.17 
0.34 
1.25 
-0.86 
0.08 
0.11 
0.07 
0.10 
0.08 
0.29 
-0.12 
-0.11 
-0.22 
0.19 
0.61 
0.26 
24.19 
97.88 
respondents stating strong simultaneous public good bequest and existence 
preferences. This public good estimate is obtained by setting the bequest and 
existence covariates to one for the otherwise statistically average respondent. 
Note that the total monetised annual public preference for allocating water in-
situ in order to maintain the regional water system for existence and bequest 
purposes will likely be substantially greater than this estimate, for at least two 
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reasons. First, the approach implemented here is for the increment in in-situ 
water allocations. Second, respondents with weaker bequest and existence 
motivations likely also have a positive willingness to pay for these allocations. 
Because the survey dataset lacked respondents without bequest or existence 
motivations, the monetised preference for allocating water in-situ for existence 
and bequest purposes for all respondents with these motivations could not be 
estimated. 
Aggregation 
The second main research aim of the Chapter was to estimate aggregate 
willingness to pay for a Plateau-wide irrigation water use efficiency training 
program on .coffee smallholdings that would likely result in composite of, likely 
sum positive, hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem externalities. Assuming the 
survey respondents are a representative sample, and conservatively, that the 
willingness to pay of respondents is also their household's total willingness to pay, 
aggregate willingness to pay for the proposed program is obtained by multiplying 
the representative net present value of households for the the five year program 
by the number of households with standing in the Dak Lak Plateau. Assuming 
the statistically average household without starting point bias in Table 8. 7 
provides the best approximation of average household willingness to pay in the 
Plateau, and further assuming that there are 250,000 households with standing, 
total median willingness to pay is approximately VND6.8 billion per annum, and 
the discounted willingness to pay approximately VND27.7 billion for the five 
year program when using a 7.5 per cent discount rate. 
Because demographic data for the Plateau are unavailable, the representativeness 
of the survey population cannot be confirmed. Caution should therefore be 
exercised with the aggregate .willingness to pay estimates. Nevertheless, the 
aggregate estimates are based on a conservative estimate of total household 
willingness to pay for the program for four main reasons worth summarising. 
First, median household willingness to pay is derived from a payment card 
elicitation format, which obtains a more conservative willingness to pay estimate 
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than the single bounded, bidding card, and open ended CVM elicitation formats 
(Welsh and Poe 1998). Second, the approach provides a more efficient estimator 
than the single and double bound dichotomous CVM choice formats, because it 
narrows the interval within which the latent willingness to pay of a respondent is 
located, and also reduces the frequency of left and right censoring. Third, 
household willingness to pay is estimated using a conservative coding approach 
that categorises all uncertain responses as a rejection of the bid amount. Fourth, 
median willingness to pay is employed as the measure of central tendency, which 
is necessarily less than mean willingness to pay when respondents' willingness to 
pay is positively skewed. Fifth, the respondent willingness to pay is assumed to be 
the household total willingness to pay. Sixth, the willingness to pay estimates 
control for inflation caused by detected starting point bias. 
Policy implications 
The randomised payment card contingent valuation analysis in this Chapter 
imparts several key policy messages for strengthening hydro-agro-environmental 
functioning in the Dak Lak Plateau, and also about the strength of social 
preferences for allocating water in-situ in the Dak Lak Plateau. The statistically 
average respondent is willing to pay VNDll0,000 in discounted terms for the 
proposed policy to be implemented over a five year timeframe. Further, the 
--
aggregate discounted willingness to pay is VND27.7 billion for the project's 
lifecycle. Assuming the statistically average household is roughly representative 
of households of the Plateau, this baseline willingness to pay estimate can be 
compared to ex ante project implementation cost assessments to determine 
whether a proposed irrigation water use efficiency program on coffee 
smallholdings passes the cost benefit test. The estimates could also be used to 
encourage the private sector to participate in delivering fee-for-service extension 
to coffee smallholders in the Plateau, although free-riding problems may be 
encountered with this approach (Osgood 2002). 
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Coffee farmers cultivating on less than two hectares are less willing to pay for the 
proposed program than all other groups. This may flag challenges for 
implementing fee for training schemes, given coffee smallholders are the largest 
percentage of the Plateau's population outside urban centres, and are also the 
group targeted for training. Without overextending conjecture, explaining the 
coffee farmer parameter estimates is testing, given coffee smallholders likely 
stand to gain the most immediate and well-defined private benefits from the 
program. Historically however, coffee smallholders in Dak Lak have normally 
received farm extension gratis. Against this entitlement background, the lower 
willingness to pay of coffee smallholders for the program may signal an assumed 
right to receive the proposed training free from charge. Conjecture aside, the 
estimates suggest coffee smallholders' lower willingness to pay should be 
explicitly taken into account when implementing a fee for service irrigation 
water use efficiency training program. 
Finally, estimates show virtually all respondents simultaneously have bequest and 
existence motivations for maintaining the water systems of the Plateau. 
Combined with the qualified evidence of real increasing willingness to pay as 
existence and bequest motivations strengthen, these results suggest essentially all 
of the Plateau's households would gain increased utility from knowing that water 
is being allocated in-situ in order to maintain the hydrologic system of the 
Plateau for future generations, and also for the benefit of others in the current 
generation. If the dataset had contained a sufficiently large sample of respondents 
lacking either or both existence and bequest motivations, the monetised utility 
gain from increasing in-situ water system integrity to satisfy bequest and 
existence preferences could have been estimated using dummy coding. The 
partial willingness to pay estimated using this procedure would equal the 
monetised preference strength of individuals having bequest and existence 
motivations for indirectly allocating additional water in-situ through 
implementation of the irrigation water use efficiency ·program. The public good 
preference for allocating additional water in-situ for bequest and existence 
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purposes would then be estimated as the sum of the monetised individual 
preferences for all of the individuals holding these public good preferences in the 
Plateau. The main complication for this approach is that because the quantity of 
water gained in-situ by the implementation of the irrigation water use efficiency 
program is not estimated, neither marginal nor average economic measures for 
in-situ water allocation preferences can be estimated using this approach. This 
complication in tum prevents like-for-like economic comparisons being made 
between the social preferences for allocating water in-situ for bequest and 
existence purposes, and the economic value of water in extractive usage. 
Conclusion 
Estimates in this Chapter suggest households in the Dak Lak Plateau are willing 
to pay for a smallholder coffee irrigation water use efficiency program and its 
uncertain hydrologic balance and agro-environmental ecosystem outcomes. 
Estimates also suggest that, at a minimum, water in the Dak Lak Plateau has an 
in-situ utility that is motivated by respondent preferences for maintaining 
regional water system integrity and functioning for the current and future 
generations of the Plateau. Willingness to pay shifts as a function of socio-
economic, experiential, and attitudinal attributes in ways that generally support 
construct validity. Respondents appear 'reasonably certain' in their willingness to 
--
pay for the proposed program, with roughly sixty per cent of respondents not 
showing payment uncertainty, and respondents with payment uncertainty only 
beingXmdecided for two of the nine bid cards presented to them, on average. The 
Chapter shows that the randomised payment card contingent valuation method 
can be implemented in rural development environments to ascertain preference 
strengths for complex and novel goods and services. 
The complex system relationships between water, land, environment, and 
welfare in the Dak Lak Plateau mean most agricultural programs and policies will 
perturb the local environment. These pertubtions will generate system impacts 
that carry uncertain physical and social welfare implications. Estimating the 
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aggregate willingness to pay of households for a system of welfare impacts 
resulting from such a program, as this Chapter's analysis has done, avoids the 
challenges arising from attempting to separate and value the operating 
components of a complex system. The novel randomised payment card 
contingent valuation approach this Chapter developed obtains a certainty 
equivalent willingness to pay after conservatively controlling for respondent 
preference uncertainty and their biases. The Chapter shows this approach is 
effective in identifying respondents with uncertain preferences, thereby allowing 
them to be re-categorised to obtain conservative central tendency measures of 
willingness to pay. 
Contingent valuation scenario design calls for a plausible choice situation and that 
the asset being evaluated and its provision method are described so that "the 
respondents know what they will and what they will not get" (Carson et al. 
2003). The survey approach this Chapter employs explicitly incorporates supply 
uncertainty in its scenario description. It is debatable whether this approach is 
superior to the alternative of specifying a deterministic scenario to respondents. 
Willingness to pay for a program or project is necessarily conditional on expected 
outcomes and the demand certainty of each individual. When manipulating 
complex hydro-agro-environmental ecosystems through agricultural or water 
policy, it is highly unlikely that the impacts of the policy change will be known 
with certainty. Where the probability, scope, and magnitude of project benefits 
are uncertain, the analysis in this Chapter shows respondents do adjust their 
willingness to pay contingent on the subjective expectation of likely project 
outcomes. Contingent valuation approaches that elicit the preference certainty of 
respondents therefore provide a promising approach to analyse complex 
relationships between the probabilistic provision of goods and services, the public 
and private nature of these goods and services, and structure of individual 
willingness to pay. 
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8 
Welfare from water in the Dak Lak Plateau: an 
integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic 
analysis 
In_troduction 
The previous four Chapters have evaluated the economic value of water, and 
monetised preference strength for additional water allocations in-situ. The 
analyses of these Chapters concentrate on how welfare accrues at the individual 
or household level. The objective of this Chapter is to extend these individual and 
household level analyses to evaluate how reallocating the scarce water of the Dak 
Lak Platau affects the aggregate welfare of the Plateau's residents. 
The technical and allocative water use efficiency analyses of the coffee and wet 
rice smallholdings of the Dak Lak Plateau undertaken in Chpters 4 and 5 show 
that substantial scope exists to reduce the plot level water input of these sectors 
on average. These plot analyses do not demonstrate how aggregate social welfare 
would change in the Plateau after plot level irrigation water use efficiency was 
increased however as the analyses do not show how reducing dry season water 
input affects the dynamics of the surface and groundwater systems of the Plateau, 
nor ho'W ·these changing water dynamics impact on human wellbeing. The 
identification of the aggregate social welfare impact of global increases in water 
use efficiency on coffee and rice smallholdings of the Dak Lak Plateau requires a 
-
longer term, and system wide, social welfare analysis. In a complex and tightly 
integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic system such as the Dak Lak Plateau, 
these physical and social welfare relationships are best understood using an 
integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic modelling framework. 
In this Chapter an integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic model of the Dak 
Lak Plateau is developed. The integrated model is used to simulate the hydrologic 
balance and social welfare states of the Plateau that result from global increases in 
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the technical and allocative efficiency of irrigation water use on the coffee and 
rice smallholdings of the Plateau. The integrated analysis constitutes a large step 
towards the integrated river basin planning objective of the L WR (Article 20.1). 
Moreover, the integrated analysis also enables an economic assessment of the 
feasibility of Article 26 of the L WR, which implicitly requires that agricultural 
water use is efficient regardless of the implementation cost to the producer. The 
analysis of the Chapter also identifies whether increasing water use efficiency on 
coffee and rice smallholdings will move the Dak Lak Plateau towards a 
sustainable water regime, which is a high national priority of the 2006-10 
National Water Resources Strategy of Viet Nam. 
The distributed model that is developed in this Chapter integrates surface and 
groundwater subsystems with stream-aquifer interaction, land allocations, coffee 
and rice irrigation schedules, crop water production functions, and producer 
operating surpluses from the use of irrigation water as an intermediate input in 
coffee and rice production. The complexity of the hydrologic and agro-
environmental production systems of the Plateau and the desire for realistic 
policy simulation means that a physically distributed, compartmentally 
integrated, simulator-indicator modelling approach is favoured for the analysis 
over a holistic simulation-optimisation approach. Recall from Chapter 3 that the 
simulator-indicator modelling approach tests for potential Pareto improvements 
that result from the reallocation of water via the comparison of social welfare 
outcomes with and without the project. In other words, the simulator indicator 
approach compares the status quo social welfare outcome to the social welfare 
outcome realised in an alternative state of the universe. Because smallholder 
coffee and rice producers have by far the largest (and in-principle manageable) 
water usage of the Plateau, the modelling effort of this Chapter concentrates on 
the physical and economic consequences of irrigation decisions made by these 
keystone producers. 
The approach developed m this Chapter disaggregates changes in producer 
operating surpluses between the status quo and scenarios into (i) changes to the 
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irrigation cost to producers of using less water input; (ii) changes to the dated per 
cubic metre irrigation costs of producers that result from fluctuation in the 
pumping depth as a function of the water table elevation of the unconfined 
aquifer; and (iii) changes in the revenue of producers that results from shifts in 
marketable output due to dated water supply shortages that impose binding 
output constraints. 
In principle, it is preferable that the analysis of this Chapter would estimate a full 
cost-benefit analysis. A full cost-benefit analysis would involve the monetisation 
and inclusion of all of the distributed welfare affects that changes in the water 
dynamics of the Plateau have on the population with standing. While the urban 
and peri-urban household water demands and marginal values of water are well 
understood from the analysis of Chapter 6, hydrologic models, including the one 
this Chapter's analysis is based on, can only model dynamics in porous soils. The 
municipal water supplies of the Dak Lak are generally drawn from the deep 
confined aquifers of the Plateau which are located in fractured basalt. As a result, 
the response dynamics of these water stocks are unable to be modelled reliably. 
Consistently, while the monetised preference strength of households for the 
allocation of additional water in-situ is understood from the analysis of the 
previous Chapter, the welfare picture after this analysis remains incomplete. This 
is firstlyj)ecause the system relationships between hydrologic balances and agro-
environmental ecosystem functioning of the Plateau are incomplete, and 
secondly because understanding of the total net utility affects of changes to the 
hydro;agro-environmental system is also incomplete. The practical result is that 
neither of these components of aggregate social welfare can be reliably monetised 
and include in the cost benefit analysois of this Chapter. As a second best 
approach, in this Chapter the non-comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is 
supplemented with water balance indices taken from the hydrologic model. 
These physical indices are then used to reason the direction, but not the quantity, 
of the likely social welfare effects that water reallocation has on consumers, 
producers, and agro-environmental ecosystem functioning. 
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This Chapter is structured in five sections. Following this introduction, the 
integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic modelling framework is developed. 
Section three develops the empirical application. Results are discussed in section 
four, first at the aggregate Plateau level, and then for the subcatchments of the 
Plateau. Policy implications and further research opportunities are addressed in 
section five, and conclusions drawn in section six. 
Modelling framework 
Components 
The integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic model of the Dak Lak Plateau 
comprises (1) a deterministic, spatially distributed hydrologic model that 
simulates the entire land phase of the hydrologic cycle, and surface water 
hydraulics; (2) deterministic coffee and wetland rice crop water production 
functions; and (3) an economic subcomponent that estimates the short-run 
operating surpluses of coffee and rice smallholder producers. The components of 
the models are introduced in this section, and the compartmental procedure for 
the integration of the components is discussed in the subsequent section. 
Hydrologic component 
Hydrologic relations and processes in the Dak Lak Plateau are simulated using the 
MIKE SHE and MIKE 11 modelling applications (DHI Software 2005). MIKE SHE 
simulates the entire land phase of the hydrologic cycle, whereas MIKE 11 models 
surface water hydraulics. MIKE SHE is a distributed parameter model, using two 
analogous horizontal-grid networks for the surface and groundwater flow 
components. Each grid is a lumped parameter model, meaning modelling 
parameters do not change within the grid, and water dynamics within a grid are 
homogenous and isotropic. Water flow within and between cells is modelled 
using the finite difference solution of partial differential equations, with these 
describing overland and channel flows, unsaturated and saturated zone flows, and 
interception and evapotranspiration processes (Singh et al. 1999). MIKE 11 
calculates channel flow dynamics and is coupled to MIKE SHE. 
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Irrigation command areas provide the basis in MIKE SHE for the definition of 
local water demand and actual withdrawals. The water demand of crops within 
an irrigation command area are defined using thresholds triggered by simulated 
soil moisture content, surface water level (for crops with puddling such as rice), 
crop stress factors, or by irrigation scheduling timeseries files. Each irrigation 
command is coupled to a groundwater or surface water supply source. Inflow 
rates to irrigation command areas from rivers are defined at the lower bound by a 
discharge threshold below which water supplies cease, and a maximum inflow 
rate defined by the programmer at the upper bound. Irrigation command area 
inflows from groundwater sources are lower bound by a maximum depth to 
water table screen below which inflows cease, and an upper threshold defined by 
the well's maximum discharge flow rate. Water demand and supply imbalances 
are estimated hourly in MIKE SHE. More detailed descriptions of the MIKE SHE 
and MIKE 11 modelling systems can be obtained from the application manual 
(DHI Software 2005). 
Agronomic component 
The relationship between dated water input and crop production is needed to be 
able to simulate the dynamics of dated water stress on crop production. MIKE 
SHE estimates actual evapotranspiration based on simulated soil water content, 
but does not simulate crop biomass development as a function of dynamic soil 
-·-
moisture stress. Consequently, dated water production relationships for coffee 
and dry season irrigated rice are estimated using the water crop production 
functiGns from Chapter 4 for coffee, and Chapter 5 for irrigated rice. Because the 
marginal physical productivity of Robusta as a function of dated irrigation water 
deficit could not be defined in Chapter 4, it is assumed relative yield, which is the 
d Ya ratio of actual yiel and maximum potential yield y , follows the Weibull 
m 
distribution 
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where Wi is the per coffee tree irrigation depth for irrigation number i, Wo is the 
minimum possible water input, a is the shape parameter, and b the location 
parameter. The simulation assumes yield losses from soil water stress do not occur 
above 60 millimetres application depth, which is approximately 540 litres per tree 
per irrigation, and the irrigation depth D'haeze, Deckers et al. (2003) showed was 
the maximum irrigation required to maximise Robusta yield in the Dak Lak 
Plateau. 
Economic component 
The objective of the economic component of the integrated model is to estimate 
the change in short-run producer operating surplus under different irrigation 
input scenarios. A short-run operating surplus estimate is favoured for this 
analysis because it does not require that assumptions be made about the long-run 
decisions of smallholder producers. Assumptions about long-run producer 
decision can be tenuous when these producers participate in dynamic commodity 
markets, which is the case for the coffee smallholders of the Plateau. Regional 
instability of production conditions, such as the increased prevalence of drought 
in recent years, exassibate the difficulty of modelling long run producer decisions. 
Because fixed capital, and the pre-production stage costs for coffee, are treated as 
sunk costs in short-run analysis, the short-run operating surpluses estimated in 
this Chapter will be greater than an otherwise equivalent long-run measure. 
Moreover, because all non-water inputs are held constant in the analysis, 
estimated changes in operating surplus in the scenarios will be located towards 
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the lower bound of potential short-run operating surplus, due to the Le 
Chatelier's Principle. 
The operating surplus of producers is defined as the net returns over variable 
costs per unit of land (Young 2005b: 207). Operating surplus from producing 
irrigated rice is defined using Equation (65), noting FC that equals zero in this 
application. The operating surplus of coffee smallholders is defined by 
(85) 
y 
Where pc is the coffee output price, be is maximum possible biomass, _a is final 
Ym 
relative yield defined from Equation (84), c; is the volumetric-based irrigation 
cost that is unique to each irrigation decision stage, and v c encompasses all other 
variable production costs. 
Method of integration 
The hydrologic, agronomic, and economic models for the Dak Lak Plateau are 
compartmentally integrated. Recall from Chapter 3 that the compartmental 
modelling approach generally has the advantage of being able to model more 
complex hydrologic, agronomic, and economic relationships at the 
subcompartment level. A drawback of the approach is that it can suffer from 
limitations when transferring data between subcomponents. In particular, 
cropping and irrigation decisions are exogenous in compartmentally integrated 
models, which means these decisions are not defined endogenously in the model 
as a function of environmental, price, or other simulated production shocks. The 
limited evidence suggests coffee smallholders in the Dak Lak Plateau generally do 
not alter their dry season irrigation schedules, or at least do not engage in 
competitive pumping, except when extremely dry weather conditions prevail 
(Ahmad 2001). On this basis, and given the practical challenges of developing a 
fully integrated model for such a complex hydrologic-agronomic-economic 
system, the compartmental modelling approach is preferred. 
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A sequential process was used to integrate the hydrologic, agronomic, and 
economic models 
I. Irrigation schedules for coffee and rice were defined and input as timeseries 
files in the MIKE SHE hydrologic model, and the simulation run. 
2. The MIKE SHE simulation output includes timeseries for each computation 
grid for water balance, irrigation demand, irrigation shortage, confined 
aquifer leakage, baseflow and river drainage, and depth to groundwater table. 
These timeseries outputs were grouped into subcatchments and further 
grouped within each subcatchment into files for the coffee and rice crop area 
not experiencing water supply shortages and the coffee and rice crop area 
experiencing water supply shortages. This aggregation procedure resulted in 
the distributed MIKE SHE simulation data being transformed into statistically 
averaged lumped parameter estimates for rice and coffee areas by soil 
moisture condition in the subcatchment. 
3. Using the irrigation water demand and irrigation shortage timeseries output 
files from MIKE SHE, the annual operating surplus of each subcatchment 
from coffee and dry season rice production were estimated by 
3.1. Multiplying the crop area within a subcatchment unaffected by water 
shortages by that crop's maximum potential yield. This total yield was 
then multiplied by the crop output price to obtain a total annual revenue 
estimate for the crop area not subject to water supply shortage. 
Operating surplus was obtained for this area by subtracting other 
variable costs and the total variable irrigation cost, with the total variable 
irrigation cost estimated as the product of the dated irrigation volume for 
the area and the irrigation unit cost. 
3.2. Calculating the average actual crop yield for the area in the 
subcatchment affected by water shortage. Yield for irrigated rice in the 
water short area of each subcatchment was calculated by inputting the 
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MIKE SHE irrigation supply schedule into the BUDGET rice model of 
Chapter 5. Operating surpluses were calculated consistent with the 
procedure in 3.1. Coffee output from the water shortage affected area 
within each subcatchment was estimated by applying Equation (85) and 
the procedure in 3.1. 
Non-monetised changes to hydrologic balance indicators were measured using 
water balance indices detailed in the results section of this Chapter. 
Empirical application 
Set-up 
Hydrology 
The simulation runs from 15 December 1997 to 31 December 2003 and incudes 
two severe drought years in 1998 and 2003. Rainfall and reference 
evapotranspiration data came from the five State meteorological observation 
stations in the Plateau. The model simulates two reference evapotranspiration 
regions, one east and the second west of the central dividing range. 
Evapotranspiration is modelled by the F AO Penman-Monteith method. 
Vegetation parameters for crops other than coffee and irrigated rice are based on 
Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) and are adjusted for regional climatic conditions. 
Crop grc;wth parameters of irrigated rice are from Table 5.2 in Chapter 5. Crop 
parameters for Robusta are based on empirical estimates in D'haeze, Deckers et al. 
(2003)-1- as are the soil parameters for Rhodie Ferralsols. Soil parameters for 
irrigated rice are from Table 5.1 in Chapter 5. Land use is based on Landsat 7 
ETM+ images from the year 2000, interpreted by the National Institute for 
Agricultural Policy and Planning (Hanoi). 
The MIKE SHE simulation model includes one hundred and thirty irrigation 
command areas, which are defined from surveys completed by the Dak Lak 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in 1999, 2000, and 2002. The 
simulation uses a one square kilometre calculation grid, resulting in a total of 
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2,631 cells in the model, each with homogenous within grid water dynamics. 
While this is a coarse spatial resolution, using a finer grid resulted in a overly 
burdensome calculation time. For example, an attempt to simulate the hydrologic 
model using a 200-metre grid resulted in the calculation time of the model 
exceeding one week. 
Hydrologic model development, calibration to empirical data, statistical error 
analyses, and sensitivity analyses are detailed in Basberg, Hoc et al (2008). 
Summarising, the simulation model was calibrated to daily river gauge data from 
21 State observation stations, and also to 18 State observation wells. Given the 
Plateau covers 2,360 square kilometres, the river and groundwater gauge dataset 
is sparse. Th~ sparsity of the guage dataset is further compounded by the majority 
of observation wells being concentrated in the central and eastern regions of the 
Plateau. Substantial interpolation based on expert judgement was required to 
develop the hydrologic model in regions without observation data as a result. 
Calibration run statistics indicated the groundwater model generally performed 
well compared to the available observation data, with mean absolute error3 
averaging 2.5 metres. Calibrated river discharge simulations generally 
overestimated peak wet season flows but provided acceptable simulations of dry 
season flows, which is the main time period of interest to this research. 
Agronomics 
Table 8.1 summarises the location and scale parameters used in the Weibull 
function for Equation (86) to estimate the dated cumulative distribution function 
for the relative yield of coffee. The parameters are derived from best judgement 
informed by the coffee production frontier estimates from Chapter 4, D'haeze, 
Deckers et al (2003) and discussion with local coffee agronomists. The relative 
yield function is semi-dated, with the first and subsequent irrigations having 
different location and scale parameters. Compared to subsequent irrigation stages 
3 MAE; = ~ L/<hobs,, -h,;m;, )/ , where hobs;,, and hsim;,, are the observed and simulated values at 
t 
time "t" at location "i" and n is the number of observations at location "i". 
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Table 8.1 Relative yield parameters, semi-dated coffee 
Weibull function 
Parameter First Irrigation Subsequent irrigations 
Xo 
B 
A 
270 
2.50 
160 
1.75 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
these parameter differences result in water deficits in the first irrigation causing a 
more pronounced drop in relative yield. Relative yield does not start declining 
due to soil water stress in the initial and subsequent dry season irrigations until 
water content falls below 540 litres per tree. At 320 litres per tree, relative yield is 
78 per cent of maximum potential yield in the first irrigation, compared to 96 per 
cent in subsequent irrigations. Th~e latter estimates are therefore conservative in 
taking the upper bound of the theoretical maximum water requirements from 
D'haeze, Deckers et al. (2003) as the point at which crop stress commences. Table 
5.2 contains the parameters used to simulate yield response to dated soil water 
stress for irrigated rice. 
Economics 
Input and output prices and the quantieis of factor inputs are not available for all 
of the simulated years. Price and quantity estimates for the years that were 
missing__s!ata are constructed using several sources: (1) the 2005-06 coffee survey 
data from this thesis research (Tables 4.2 and 4.3); (2) coffee smallholder price and 
quantity data from 2003, detailed in Chi and D'haeze (2005); (3) coffee and rice 
farm audgets from a 2000 smallholder survey from Ea Tul completed by the 
Danish development agency, DANIDA in 2000; and (4) coffee and rice farm 
budgets from 1996 reported in a technical publication by COWI-Kruger Konsult 
(1996). 
Table 8.2 and Table 8.3 summarise the coffee and rice crop budgets from these 
surveys for comparative purposes. Table 8.2 shows fertiliser application rates 
broadly increasing and labour decreasing on coffee smallholdings over ·time. 
Excluding irrigation costs, fertiliser and labour inputs combine to total 80 to 85 
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per cent of annual variable production costs in the coffee production budgets, and 
total variable operating costs remain relatively constant between the survey years 
excepting 2005. Assuming that variable costs remain stable during the 
intervening years that lack survey data, total other variable costs are assumed to 
be in the range of VND16 million per hectare. Variable production costs for 
irrigated rice increase by 27 per cent between 1996 and 2004 (Table 8.3) or 4.5 
per cent per annum on average. Despite costs appearing to spike in 2000, variable 
costs are assumed in this analysis to rise at 4.5 per cent per annum from a VND8.5 
million base in 1998. 
Farm gate prices of rice range between VNDl,500 and VND2,000 per kilogram 
between 1996 and 2003 (Table 8.3). The output price is set at VND2,000 per 
kilogram as a result. Coffee farm gate prices in 1996, 2000, 2001, and 2003 (Table 
8.2) appear to track the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) Robustas group 
price, as well as the farm gate price paid to coffee producers in Viet Nam 
according to the ICO (Figure 8.1). Assuming the monthly farm gate price paid to 
Vietnamese coffee producers lags the prior month international Robustas group 
price, a Prais-Winsten FGLS AR(l) estimate (Table 8.4) shows the elasticity of the 
ICO Vietnamese farm gate price is 1.04. Thus, a one per cent change in the 
international Robustas group price is assumed to result in the farm gate price of 
Robusta changing by 1.04 per cent in the following month. Error terms are 
highly autocorrelated in this estimate, as is shown by the rho value. Using the 
lagged Vietnamese farm gate elasticity estimate, monthly coffee farm gate prices 
for the Dak Lak Plateau were predicated as a function of the international 
Robusta group price (Figure 8.1). Predicted farm gate prices closely correspond 
with the average farm gate prices from the 1996, 2000 and 2001 farm surveys, but 
underestimate the average surveyed farm gate price in 2003. As a result, in all 
years other than 2003, the annual average of the predicted farm . gate price for 
Robusta is used to estimate coffee revenue. 
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Table 8.2 Summary coffee crop budgets 
• Unit of VND VND VND VND VND VND VND VND 
measure Qty '000 '000 Qty '000 '000 Qty '000 '000 Qty '000 '000 
2005 a 2003 b 2000 c 1996 d 
Variable production costs 
Urea kg 369 4.9 1,808 398 4.3 1,706 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
SA kg 185 2.6 481 120 2.9 346 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Super Phosphate kg 473 1.3 605 288 1.2 339 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
NPK kg 1,450 4.5 6,525 789 4.6 3,655 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
KCl kg 281 4.3 1,208 225 3.6 804 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lime n.a. n.a. n.a. 588 0.4 244 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Manure MT n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 181.0 988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Fertiliser 2,758 10,628 2,414 8,085 2,584 2.4 6,289 1,301 3.3 4,290 
Pesticides lt 7 22.7 161 4 55.4 200 n.a. n.a. 532 n.a. n.a. 200 
Sacks (60 kg) Units n.a. n.a. 230 n.a. n.a. 201 n.a. n.a. 190 n.a. n.a. 180 
·Family Labour Day 106 37.0 3,922 164 24.8 4,069 227 20.6 4,686 355 20.0 7,100 
Hired Labour Day 78 40.6 3,164 62 24.5 1,505 73 20.6 1,507 145 20.0 2,900 
Processing n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 300 n.a. n.a. 285 n.a. n.a. 270 
Other n.a. n.a. 1,952 n.a. n.a. 1,632 n.a. n.a. 1,725 n.a. n.a. 1,748 
Total Costs 20,057 16,226 15,215 16,938 
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Table 8.2 Summary coffee crop budgets 
Unit of VND VND VND VND VND VND 
measure Qty '000 '000 Qty '000 '000 Qty t>oo '000 
2005 a 2003 b 2000 c 
Revenue 
Production ks 5,145 20.3 104,443 5,000 10.0 50,000 2,699 7.0 18,893 
Sources:• Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
hKham, T. N., ~003. Smallholder coffee survey results. Tay Nguyen University Research Papers, Buon Ma Thuot. 
<DANIDA, 2000. Report on agro-socio-economic survey in Ea Tul Catchment. SWRM, Buon Ma Thuot. 
VND VND 
Qty '000 '000 
1996 d 
2,100 15.0 31,500 
<lCOWI-Kruger Konsult, 1996. Economic analysis in water resource planning, Action Plan for Water Resources Development Phase III Upper 
Srepok Basin, Vietnam. Working Paper No. 12, Hanoi. 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
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Table 8.3 Summa!.Z: rice cro,e bud~ets 
Unit of VND VND VND VND VND VND 
Item measure Qty '000 '000 Qty '000 '000 Qtx: '000 '000 
2004 a 2000b • 1996 c 
Variable production costs 
Seeds kg 182 4.4 799 159 3.2 508 220 2,000 440 
Fertilisers kg 593 3.5 2,076 713 2.1 1,523 460 2,039 938 
Herbicides kg n.a. n.a. 422 n.a. n.a. 223 n.a. n.a. 206 
Pesticides kg 5 60.6 311 2 n.a. 115 n.a. n.a. 80 
Sacks(bags) and operating tools VND n.a. n.a. 150 n.a. n.a. 150 n.a. n.a. 150 
Labour cost per day 
Hired labour Day 54 23.8 1,280 29 21.0 608 20 40,000 800 
Family labour days Day 178 20.0 3,907 325 20.0 6,500 240 20,000 4,800 
Other n.a. n.a. 925 600 360 
---
Total Cost VND 9,872 10,077 7,774 
Revenue 
Production kgha-1 5,915 2.0 11,830 4,300 1.5 6,450 5,500 1.8 9,900 
Sources:• Kham, T. N., 2003. Smallholder rice survey results, Tay Nguyen University Research Papers, Buon Ma Thuot. 
b DANIDA, 2000. Report on agro~socio-economic survey in Ea Tul Catchment. SWRM, Buon Ma Thuot. 
c COWI-Kruger Konsult, 1996. Economic analysis in water resource planning, Action Plan for Water Resources Development 
Phase III Upper Srepok Basin, Vietnam. Working Paper No. 12, Hanoi. 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
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Table 8.4 ICO Vietnamese farm gate Robustas group price, 
Prais-Winsten AR(l) estimator 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Dependent variable: log of ICO Vietnamese monthly Robustas group 
farm gate price 
Leading monthly Robustas group price (log) 
Constant 
Rho 
F(l,278) 
Adjusted r-square 
Observations 
1.040 a 9.57 
(- .108) 
-0.442 -0.95 
(0.466) 
0.783 
172.54 
0.3807 
280 
Notes: a be and dindicate statistical significance at the l, 5, 10, and 15 per 
cent levels respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The variable irrigation costs of coffee smallholders are calculated using the fuel 
and labour input estimates to deliver one cubic metre of water from the source to 
site on the Plateau's coffee smallholdings from Chapter 4 (Table 4.8). Depth to 
water table from the hydrologic simulation model is substituted for well depth, 
which results in the irrigation cost per cubic metre varying as a dated function of 
simulated groundwater table depth in the hydrology model. The irrigation 
conditions in Ea Mroh and Ea Kmir are assumed to be similar to those in Buon 
Don, given these subcatchments are also comprised of largely shallow basalt and 
the local upper aquitard located approximately five metres below ground. 
Volumetric irrigation costs increase in these subcatchments as a result. The 
irrigation cost of wetland rice is assumed to be VND 142 per cubic metre, taken 
from Table 5.3. 
Discussion. The hydrologic model simulates water dynamics in the Plateau 
distributively, and outputs from this model are then aggregated at the 
subcatchment level by soil moisture stress condition for coffee and rice. The 
agronomic and economic models applied are consistent with the lumped 
parameter approach, assuming the same crop water production relationship and 
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16,000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Year.:Month 
.A. DLP farm.gate price, actual --DLP farmgate price. predicted --Robustas Group Price --ICO Vietnam farm.gate price 
Figure 8.1 Dak Lak farm gate prices, Robustas international group price, 
Viet Nam composite farm gate price, and predicted Dak Lak Plateau farm 
gate price 
Source: International Coffee Organisation, 2008. ICO Indicator prices (monthly averages). 
London: http://www.ico.org/historical.asp 
crop budgets are applicable Plateau-wide. Plainly these are sizable simplifications, 
especially when it was shown in Chapter 4 that coffee output is partly 
determined by exogenous regional agro-environmental production conditions. 
Echoing Jakeman and Letcher (2003) however, the objective of the integrated 
hydrologic-agronomic-economic model of the Dak Lak Plateau is to increase 
underst~ding of the direction and magnitude of hydrologic balance and social 
welfare changes likely to occur when water allocation deviates from the status 
quo, n_9t to precisely model the complex physical and social system and all of the 
possible interactions. The sparsity of groundwater and surface water observation 
data in the Plateau means it is unlikely that the outputs of the hydrologic model 
are precisely accurate for the entire Plateau in any event. AB a result, evaluating 
physical and social welfare changes at a spatial resolution finer than the 
subcatchment and crop-within-subcatchment levels may simply generate precice 
policy information input that are precicely misleading. Evaluating broader 
hydrologic balance and social welfare shifts at the subcatchment level assists in 
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the targeting of water management policies at this largely closed system level. 
The approach provides results that are sufficient to identify those subcatchments 
where it is worthwhile for the State to further evaluate intervention strategies for 
the management of the water resources of the subcatchment, and also 
subcatchments where the gains from State intervention are likely to be negligible. 
Scenarios 
Three scenarios were evaluated: a baseline status quo (BSQ) scenario and then 
two scenarios that are characterised by increasing irrigation water use efficiency 
on coffee and rice smallholdings. Because coffee smallholders generally irrigate 
earlier and more frequently following a dry wet season, different irrigation 
schedules were constructed for normal or wetter and dry or very dry rainfall 
conditions. Rainfall quintiles for very wet, wet, normal, dry, and very dry rainfall 
conditions were constructed using frequency analysis of daily rainfall records 
from 1994 to 2003 with Rainbow 2.2 software (Raes 2006) after confirming data 
homogeneity (Buishand, 1978). Table 8.5 shows the region to the east of the 
central range of the Plateau experienced drier conditions on average than to the 
west of the central dividing range. The 1998 and 2003 severe droughts are 
preceded by dry, but not very dry, previous year rainfall in both regions. 
Coffee irrigation schedules (Table 8.6) in the scenarios change annually 
depending on the rainfall condition in the preceding year. When the December 
to April irrigation season follows a dry or very dry wet season rainfall year, coffee 
smallholders were simulated beginning irrigation in the second half of December, 
followed by three irrigations spaced at 21-day intervals. When the previous wet 
season rainfall is normal or wetter, smallholders were simulated to commence 
their irrigation mid-January and to follow with two further irrigations at 21-day 
intervals. Irrigation input per tree for the BSQ scenario is based on the 
statistically average irrigation input from Chapter 4, and assumes a first irrigation 
totalling 1,050 litres per tree followed by 950 litre applications. In Scenario One a 
first irrigation of 550 litres per tree is assumned followed by 450 litres in the 
subsequent irrigations. 
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Table 8.5 Dak Lak Plateau rainfall classification, 1994-2003 
Annual precipitation 
Exceedence probability Type of year (mm) 
<20 Very wet >2722 
20-40 Wet 2028 
40-60 Average 1806 
60-80 Dry 1629 
>80 Very dry <1485 
Rainfall classification by region 1994-2003 
Rainfall year West of central range East of central range 
1998 Very Wet Dry 
1999 Wet Normal 
2000 Very Wet Normal 
2001 Wet Normal 
2002 Dry Dry 
2003 Wet Dry 
The irrigation schedule of Scenario Two is the most water conserving strategy. 
The first irrigation applies 550 litres applied per tree and subsequent irrigations 
total 400 litres per tree. This irrigation schedule approximates the simulated 
minimum water requirements for Robusta in Dak Lak that were estimated by 
D'haeze, Deckers et al. (2003). 
_ _,. 
Table 8.6 Coffee irrigation schedules 
Unit of 
measurem ESQ weather Scenario One Scenario Two 
Irrigation date ent condition weather condition weather condition 
Normal Normal Normal 
Dry year year Dry year year Dry year year 
20-Dec lt per tree 1,050 650 550 
10-Jan lt per tree 950 1,050 550 650 400 550 
31-Jan lt per tree 950 950 550 550 400 400 
21-Feb lt per tree 950 950 550 550 400 400 
Total lt per tree 3,900 2,950 2,300 1,750 1,750 1,350 
Trees per hectare 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Total irrigation m3 per ha 4,095 3,098 2,415 1,838 1,838 1,418 
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The water demand schedule for irrigated rice was defined using surface water 
depth thresholds. The BSQ scenario sets soil moisture at saturation for the ten 
days following establishment, then increses to 10 centimetres surface water for 
twenty days, then increases to 15 centimetres surface water until immediately 
before harvesting. Scenario One and Scenario Two simulated surface water depth 
being maintained at three centimetres following the initial 10-day saturation 
period until immediately before harvesting. This is a shallow, but not very 
shallow, rice irrigation strategy (Won et al. 2005). While the three-centimetre 
surface water depth irrigation schedule is a less efficient allocation than the profit 
maximising A WD irrigation schedule that was defined in Chapter 5, the setting 
allows some realistic room for risk aversive water stocking, and also for the 
transferral of water between plots within irrigation schemes. 
Results 
Plateau results 
Without water deficit, 5.2 metric tons of coffee is produced per hectare, meaning 
approximately 760,000 metric tons would be produced annually on the 147,000 
hectares of coffee in the Plateau. Moreover, between 1998 and 2003 a total of 
roughly 4.5 million metric tons would be produced. In addition, without water 
deficit 1.5 million metric tons of irrigated rice would be produced per annum 
during the dry season at 6.5 metric tons per hectare. Revenue from coffee 
cultivation would total VND40. 7 trillion between 1998 and 2003, with a further 
VNDl.5 trillion in revenue from 78,000 metric tons of rice production. Total 
operating surplus for the Plateau from coffee production before irrigation costs 
would total VND26.5 trillion for the six years. 
In Scenarios One and Two approximately 55,000 hectares of coffee area in the 
Plateau experienced irrigation water supply shortages in the simulation, 
compared to 66,000 hectares in the BSQscenario. Water supply shortages reduce 
the average simulated coffee output of the Plateau in the BSQ scenario to 4.1 
metric tons per hectare, compared to 4.8 metric tons in Scenario One and 4.6 
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metric tons in Scenario Two. Total output for 1998 to 2003 in the BSQscenario is 
approximately 3.6 million metric tons, compared to 4.3 million metric tons in 
Scenario One and 4.05 million metric tons in Scenario Two. Because irrigation 
water deficits are responsible for all of the simulated reduction in coffee output, 
these results show the BSQ irrigation schedule generates almost one million 
metric tons less coffee output than if the Plateau was without water deficit. The 
BSQresult compares to output being reduced by 200,000 metric tons compared to 
maximum potential output in Scenario One, and 450,000 metric tons less than 
maximum potential output in Scenario Two. The standard deviation in annual 
output in the BSQ scenario is 57,000 metric tons, reducing to 7,000 tons in 
Scenario One and 21,000 metric tons in Scenario Two. Collectively, these results 
show the irrigation schedule of Sc~nario One minimises the yield losses caused by 
water deficits in coffee production in the Plateau, and also minimises output 
variability caused by stochastic weather conditions for the period simulated. At 
the Plateau level, simulation results show rice yields are essentially unaffected by 
water deficits in all scenarios. 
The simulated coffee yields are generally higher than the empirical yields articled 
in Chapter Two, and also approximate the five kilogram maximum potential yield 
that is possible for Dak Lak {Luu, 2002 #1147}. There are several bases for the 
differe~~ in the simulated versus articled coffee output. First, the maximum 
potential yield of 4.9 kilograms per tree used in the simulation is the estimated 
per tree output for a teehnically efficient coffee smallholder who faces the 
statisti:Cally average agro-environmental production conditions, uses the 
statistically average factor inputs in Chapter 4, and is a technically efficient 
irrigator. Second, the simulated output is the maximum harvestable yield of each 
tree. This yield will normally be greater than the quantity the smallholder sells at 
their farm-gate due at least to incomplete picking and post harvest wastage. 
Third, simulated coffee yields do not adjust for the lower outputs that persist for 
several years after Robusta experiences severe water stress, such as may have 
occurred following the severe drought in 1998, for example. Simulated coffee 
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output also does not adjust for lower yields in the years following a coffee 
smallholder cutting back their Robusta to minimize water stress damage, which is 
a standard drought management response in the Dak Lak Plateau. Finally, 
simulated coffee output assumes all coffee is in production stage. Because there is 
no information about the distribution of juvenile and production age coffee in the 
Plateau, downward adjustments to account for non-productive coffee area are not 
made. Jointly, the above factors mean the simulated per tree and total coffee 
output for the Plateau will exceed the historically observed output. 
The Plateau level aggregation for operating surplus (Table 8.7) and hydrologic 
balance (Table 8.8) estimates for the three irrigation scenarios show the economic 
benefits from water usage in smallholder coffee and dry season rice production 
are largest in Scenario One, totalling approximately VND24.3 trillion between 
1998 and 2003. The next highest operating surplus is realised in Scenario Two 
(VND22.6 trillion), and the lowest operating surplus is the BSQ scenario 
(VND17.4 trillion). Excepting 2002, coffee production accounts for more than 95 
per cent of annual operating surplus in each scenario. Coffee irrigation 
expenditure accounts for 15 per cent, 12 per cent, and 9 per cent of total 
operating expenditure in the BSQ, Scenario One, and Scenario Two 
consecutively. Less than five per cent of the irrigated rice area in the model is 
impacted by water deficits in all three Scenarios. Further, the irrigation deficit 
effect on aggregate smallholder operating profit is equal across Scenarios. 
Annual groundwater recharge in the Plateau averages 1.2 million ML in the BSQ 
scenario, which is identical to the average recharge estimates of Moller (1997) 
mentioned in Chapter 2. Seventy to 90,000 ML more recharge occurs annually on 
average in the BSQ scenario compared to Scenario One and Two, with this 
difference being the return flows from excess coffee irrigation. The Plateau wide 
demand for water for dry season coffee irrigation averages 515,000 ML per 
annum in the BSQ scenario, exceeding the 360,000 ML volume Moller (1997b) 
estimated becomes available per annum in the upper unconfined aquifer of the 
Plateau on average by a factor of 1.43 times. Simulated coffee water extractions in 
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the BSQscenario are 370,000 ML per annum on average, which is around 70 per 
cent of the aggregate water demand of coffee smallholders. Combined with the 
assessment of Moller (1997) of the accessible groundwater resource, these results 
point to the accessible resource of the unconfined aquifer being fully exploited by 
coffee irrigators in the BSQ scenario, on average. Despite this exhaustion pattern, 
the· average saturated zone storage in the Plateau is simulated to increase by 
around 796,000 ML between 1998 and 2003. Between 1999 and 2001, the average 
annual saturated zone storage increases by around 2.5 per cent per annum before 
shifting to a zero growth rate in 2002 and 2003. The pattern of saturated zone 
storage change is positively correlated to rainfall intensity (Table 8.8). Average 
Plateau-Wide depth to the groundwater table fluctuates within a 1.5 metre range 
around 13 metres each year in the·BSQscenario, and is generally increasing over 
time, consistent with increasing saturated zone storage. 
Comparatively, demand for water in coffee irrigation in Scenario One and Two 
average 305,000 ML and 230,000 ML per annum respectively. Both of these 
demands are less than the estimated average accessible groundwater resource of 
360,000 ML in the upper unconfined aquifer. Withdrawals average 272,000 ML 
in Scenario One and 209,000 ML per annum in Scenario Two. The result shows 
that around 90 per cent of coffee smallholder water demand is met in the 
simulati_gns. Between 1998 and 2003 the upper unconfined aquifer stock increases 
by 808,000 ML in Scenario One and by 822,000 ML in Scenario Two. Between 
1998 and 2003, an additional 19,000, 25,000, and 27,000 ML of surface water is 
simulated coming into storage in the BSQ, . Scenario One, and Scenario Two. 
Thus, the total conjoined change in the water stock of the Plateau is 815,000 ML 
in the BSQ scenario, compared to an 833,000 ML stock increase in Scenario One 
and a 849,000 ML increase in Scenario Two. 
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Table 8.7 Operating surplus estimates for coffee smallholdings, Dak Lak Plateau 1998-2003 
Variable Unit of 
measurement 1998 1999 2000 2001 
• 
2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
--1. Assumptions 
Coffee 
Area ha '000 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Trees ha 1,050 1,050 1,050 l ,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 l ,050 1,050 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Irrigations # 4 4 4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Maximum yield kg per tree 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 29 29 29 
Output price per kg VND'OOO 13.4 13.4 13.4 12.2 12.2 12.2 8.4 8.4 8.4 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Variable costs per ha VNDMIL 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Rice 
Area ha '000 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Maximum yield MTha-1 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 39 39 39 
Output price per kg VND'OOO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Variable cost per ha VNDMIL 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.9 8.9 8.9 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.1 10.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Irrigation cost per m3 VND 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2.0perating surplus 
Coffee 
No shortage area ha'OOO 103 106 106 103 106 106 103 106 106 103 106 106 103 106 106 103 106 106 103 106 106 
Shortage area ha '000 44 41 41 44 41 41 44 41 41 44 41 41 44 41 41 44 41 41 44 41 41 
Output MT '000 535 700 640 677 718 692 652 717 691 621 716 687 609 714 684 545 711 661 3,639 4,276 4,056 
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Table 8.7 Operating surplus estimates for coffee smallholdings, Dak Lak Plateau 1998-2003 
Variable Unit of 
measurement 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
Revenue VNDBIL 7,529 9,848 9,009 8,674 9,197 8,864 5,753 6,325 6,097 3,388 3,907 3,752 2,880 3,376 3,233 5,722 7,4646,943 33,946 40,117 37,898 
Production costs VNDBIL 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 14,141 14,141 14,141 
Irrigation costs VNDBIL 476 360 274 459 322 247 392 285 220 387 284 219 379 282 218 489 371 281 2,581 1,904 1,459 
Operating surplus VNDBIL .4,696 7,132 6,379 5,859 6,518 6,260 3,004 3,684 3,520 645 1,2661,176 144 737 658 2,877 4,737 4,306 17 ,224 24,073 22,299 
Ave. output per hectare MT 3.63 4. 75 4.35 4.60 4.87 4.70 4.43 4.87 4.69 4.21 4.86 4.67 4.14 4.85 4.65 3.70 4.83 4.49 4.12 4.84 4.59 
Rice 
Output MT'OOO 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 78 78 78 
Revenue VNDBIL 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 1,490 1,490 1,490 
Production costs VNDBIL 162 162 162 170 170 170 177 177 177 185 185 185 185 185 185 194 194 194 1,07 4 1,07 4 1,07 4 
Irrigation costs VNDBIL 33 24 24 33 24 24 33 24 24 33 24 24 33 24 24 33 24 24 195 146 146 
Operating surplus VNDBIL 53 61 61 46 54 54 38 46 46 30 39 39 30 39 39 22 30 30 220 269 269 
Total VNDBIL 4,749 7,193 6,440 5,905 6,572 6,314 3,042 3,730 3,567 675 1,305 1,214 174 775 697 2,899 4,767 4,336 17 ,444 24,342 22,568 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion 
c Unconfined Aquifer 
d Surface Water Storage 
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Variable 
•Water Table depth 
Unit of 
measurement 
I I 
Table 8.7 Operating surplus estimates for coffee smallholdings, Dak Lak Plateau 1998-2003 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
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2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
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Table 8.8 Water balance and hydrologic indicator estimates, Dak Lak Plateau 1998-2003 
Variable UoM 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
• BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
--
1. Irrigation demand 
Coffee ML '000 586 346 263 506 299 229 444 263 203 444 263 203 444 263 203 586 346 263 3,009 1,780 1,364 
Rice ML '000 229 172 172 229 . 172 172 229 172 172 229 172 172 229 172 172 229 172 172 1,375 1,031 1,031 
2. Inflow terms 
Precipitation ML '000 4,289 4,289 4,289 4,655 4,655 4,655 4,805 4,805 4,805 4, 155 4, 155 4, 155 3,671 3,671 3,671 3,868 3,868 3,868 25,444 25,444 25,444 
Infiltration ML '000 3,169 3,048 3,040 3,382 3,281 3,256 3,334 3,280 3,265 3,008 2,966 2,973 2,907 2,826 2,824 2,961 2,923 2,879 18,760 18,324 18,238 
Recharge ML '000 1,227 1,168 1,176 1,551 1,432 1,400 1,534 1,433 1,406 1,129 1,068 1,081 925 872 883 959 944 906 7,325 6,917 6,851 
Evapotranspiration ML '000 2,887 2,777 2,734 3,010 2,999 2,983 2,930 2,922 2,911 3,162 3,126 3,100 3,210 3,125 3,091 2,971 2,883 2,842 18,170 17,83117,660 
3. Outflow terms 
Coffee irrigation ML '000 411 308 234 393 276 212 333 241 186 329 241 186 324 239 185 418 314 238 2,219 1,635 1,253 
Rice irrigation ML '000 208 153 97 204 152 96 205 152 96 206 152 96 206 152 96 208 153 96 1,375 1,031 697 
Total ML '000 619 461 331 598 428 307 538 393 282 535 393 282 531 392 281 626 467 335 3,595 2,666 1,949 
4. Hydrologic balance indicators 
Average SZS ML'OOO 8,258 8,312 8,331 8,581 8,629 8,650 8,818 8,846 8,866 9,077 9,091 9,106 9,104 9,128 9,147 9,054 9,120 9,153 796 b 808 b 822 b 
swsc change ML '000 140 145 147 -41 -45 -46 62 59 60 -90 -81 -83 -57 -62 -60 6 9 9 19 25 27 
Baseflow-> River ML '000 489 511 518 725 730 734 732 731 731 622 613 616 502 518 522 463 480 492 3,533 3,583 3,613 
Avera~e WTDd m -14.5 -14.2 -14.1 -13.2 -13.0 -12.9 -12.7 -12.6 -12.6 -12.3 -12.2 -12.2 -12.6 -12.4 -12.3 -12.9 -12.5 -12.4 -13.0 -12.8 -12.7 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion •Average bDifference 2003-1998cSurface Water Storage ct Water Table Depth 
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Chapter 7 showed that groundwater and surface water have positive in-situ 
utility in the Plateau, at a minimum for the satisfaction of bequest and existence 
preferences. As a result, even without monetising all of the stock and flow values 
of water in the Plateau, the conclusion can be drawn from these simulations that 
the aggregate monetised and non-monetised social welfare changes in Scenarios 
One and Two exceed the BSQ case. Aggregate operating surplus in Scenario One 
and Scenario two exceed the BSQcase, further, around 2.2 per cent more water is 
added to the conjunctive water stock of the Plateau in Scenario One compared to 
the BSQ case, and 4.2 per cent in Scenario Two. Lacking knowledge of the path-
dependent utility that is generated from the allocation of the additional water 
stocks in Scenario One and Scenario Two, a conclusion cannot be drawn whether 
Scenario One or Scenario Two generates the greatest aggregate social welfare 
however. 
Subcatchment results 
Detailed simulation results for the six subcatchments that are entirely within the 
boundaries of the Plateau, being Krong Buk, Ea Mroh, Ea Tul, West BMT, Ea 
Tam, and Ea Pour (Figure 8.2), are set out in Appendix 4. Combined, these 
subcatchments encompass around 80 per cent of the Dak Lak Plateau, and include 
approximately 125,000 hectares of coffee and 12,900 hectares of irrigated rice. 
Appendix 4 includes one summary table per subcatchment. Each table consists of: 
(1) subcatchment area and area allocated to coffee and rice production; (2) 
summary operating surplus estimates for coffee production, detailing (i) 
subcatchment level revenue, operating expenditure, and operating surpluses for 
1998 to 2003, and (ii) per hectare estimates of operating surpluses, averaged for 
regions experiencing water shortages and those not experiencing water shortages; 
(3) summary estimates for dated per tree water input in the water shortage 
region; (4) summary estimates of the volumetric irrigation cost per cubic metre in 
the irrigation shortage and non-shortage areas; and (5) summary hydrologic 
balance indicators. Rice is set aside in the analysis .because the difference in 
operating surpluses and water usage between the scenarios is numerically 
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immaterial. The issue of whether water should be allocated to dry season irrigated 
rice production is considered in the policy implications section of this Chapter. 
The summary results reveal several commonalities between the subcatchments. 
Differences in coffee operating surpluses within each catchment are 
predominantly caused by declining output due to water stock shortages. 
Groundwater pumping depths vary by less than one per cent between scenarios 
within each subcatchment (refer section 4 in Appendix Tables). There are two 
causes for this result. First, the irrigation cost function is insensitive to changing 
pumping depths (Table 4.8). Second, there is generally little difference in the 
weighted average depth to water table of the irrigation shortage and non-shortage 
regions between scenarios. The second common feature between subcatchments 
is that differences between scenarios in hydrologic balance measures (section 5.iii 
from Appendix Tables) are generally minor. Aggregated dry season baseflows 
typically vary by less than ten per cent between scenarios, and the average dry 
season and annual depths to the unconfined aquifer water table vary within one 
metre between the scenarios. Further, between 1998 and 2003 the groundwater 
stock in the upper unconfined aquifer increases by consistent volumes. 
Hydrologic indicators differ on three main dimensions between the 
subcatchments. First, annual groundwater recharge varies notably from the 460 
millimetre statistical average between subcatchments. West BMT and Ea Mroh, 
both located in the Plateau:s western region, average 230 millimetres and 280 
millimetres per annum respectively. In West BMT and Ea Mroh subcatchments, 
lower recharge is primarily caused by the upper confining aquitard being located 
less than five metres below the land surface. Evapotranspiration exceeds 
infiltration in these subcatchments, showing substantial surface water 
evaporation occurs, which is consistent with expectations for a shallow aquitard 
region. Secondly, storage in the upper unconfined aquifer varies widely between 
subcatchments, from around 800 millimetres on average in West BMT to 6,400 
millimetres in Krong Buk (Table 8.9). Thirdly, average and minimum dry season 
flows in the Krong Buk and Ea Tul river improve when efficient irrigation 
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schedules are in use by coffee and rice smallholders. The dry season average and 
minimum flows of Krong Bruk river (Appendix Table 5.1, section 5.iii) increase 
by around 11 per cent on average between the BSQ scenario and Scenario One, 
from around 3.5 to 3.9 cubic metres per second, and minimum baseflows increase 
by around 22 per cent. The increases in Scenario Two are marginally higher, with 
dry season average and minimum flows increasing to 4 and 3.1 cubic metres per 
second. Between early January and mid-April this increases total flows in Krong 
Buk river from 32,000 ML in the BSQ case to 35,000 ML in Scenario One and 
36,600 ML on average in Scenario Two. Dry season flows increase in Ea Tul river 
(Appendix Table 5.3) from 1.6 to 1.9 cubic metres per second on average, roughly 
lifting average dry season flows from 14,700 ML in the BSQ case 17,200 ML in 
Scenario One and 18,200 ML in Scenario Two. Flow differentials are greatest 
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Table 8.9 Average saturated zone storage BSQscenario, millimetres 
Year West BMT Ea Mroh Ea Tam Ea Tul Ea Pour Krong Buk 
1998 706 1,715 2,257 2,643 3,334 6,043 
1999 771 1,814 2,478 2,792 3,521 6,172 
2000 798 1,847 2,602 2,891 3,636 6,339 
2001 848 1,898 2,723 3,006 3,750 6,521 
2002 824 1,934 2,671 3,036 3,717 6,625 
2003 801 1,981 2,593 3,037 3,658 6,678 
Total weighted average 
operating surplus per ha, 67 90 120 100 120 162 
1998-2003 VND million 
during the 1998 and 2003 droughts. Together, these flow results indicate moving 
from the BSQ to the more efficient coffee irrigation schedules in either Scenario 
One or Two contributes towards increasing surface water flows on average and 
also to flow stabilisation during very dry years. 
On a per hectare basis, Krong Buk is the most profitable coffee-producing 
subcatchment in the BSQsimulation, with a weighted average operating surplus 
totalling VND162 million per hectare for 1998 to 2003 (Appendix Table 5.1, 
section 3.ii). The weighted average total BSQ operating surplus in the 
neighbouring Ea Tam and Ea Pour subcatchments are VND 120 million, falling to 
VND lOlJ million per hectare in Ea Tul, VND90 million in Ea Mroh, and VND67 
million per hectare in the shallow basalt subcatchment of West BMT. In Krong 
Buk, t:Jie approximately 50 per cent (22,200 ha) of coffee area affected by 
irrigation water demand shortages achieve higher operating surpluses than the 
subcatchment's unconstrained coffee area by having average water input per tree 
constrained to between 450 and 650 litres each irrigation (Appendix Table 5.1, 
section 3). This input level results in negligible yield reductions due to soil water 
stress, given the assumed parameters for the Weibull water-coffee production 
function. For water shortage affected smallholdings in Krong Buk, the revenue 
declines due to yield losses from water stress are more than offset by irrigation 
cost savings from using less water, resulting in these smallholders achieving 
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higher operating surpluses than Krong Buk's unconstrained coffee irrigators, and 
also resulting in Krong Buk having the largest average operating surplus per 
hectare in the Plateau. 
The BSQ simulations for Krong Buk are atypical of the Plateau, and irrigation 
water shortages impose notable yield and revenue losses in all other 
subcatchments simulated. In Ea Tam and Ea Pour, approximately 23 per cent of 
the total coffee area is affected by water shortages, and affected coffee trees 
achieve only 40 per cent of their maximum potential yield on average. Annual 
output in Ea Tam and Ea Pour is highly variable, with a standard deviation of 
around 1.3 kilograms. Coffee output declines from water shortages are most 
pronounced. during the 1998 and 2003 drought seasons, when yields are 
simulated being virtually eliminated in Ea Tam and reduced to less than one 
kilogram per tree in Ea Pour. With the exception of 2000, irrigations are always 
less than the 320 litres per tree D'haeze, Deckers et al (2003) concluded was 
Robusta's theoretical maximum required irrigation depth for maximum tree 
productivity in Ea Tul. In 2001 and 2002, despite output averaging roughly 2.5 
kilograms per tree, smallholders facing water shortages in Ea Tam and Ea Pour 
incur operating losses due to a depressed Robustas price. The cumulative effect of 
water shortages and Robusta group price fluctuations results in smallholders in 
the water shor region of Ea Tam incurring a per hectare operating loss of VND7.1 
million for 1998 to 2003, and a VND13.7 million operating surplus in Ea Pour. 
For the same period, coffee smallholdings unaffected by water shortages achieve 
an operating surplus totalling VNDlSS million per hectare. 
The pattern of coffee yield and operating surplus declines that are observed in Ea 
Tam and Ea Pour repeats in the reamining subcatchments in the BSQscenario. In 
Ea Tul, yield per tree averages .2.8 kilograms on the 15,300 hectares (roughly 50 
per cent) of coffee plantation area experiencing water supply shortages. The 
water short area of Ea Tul achieves a VND45 million per hectare operating 
surplus during the simulation, incurring operating losses in 1998, 2002, and 2003 
for the same causes as Ea Tam and Ea Pour. Irrigation approximates or exceeds 
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450 litres per tree in the first irrigation, excepting in 1998 when it averages 350 
litres. On subsequent irrigations however the supplied water is normally below 
320 litres per tree. In Ea Mroh, 75 per cent of coffee area is impacted by water 
shortages, but the yield impact of these shortages is less severe. The water short 
region of Ea Mroh averages 3.6 kilograms yield per tree between 1998 and 2003, 
and· has an output standard deviation of 1.3 kilograms. Yield falls to lows of 1.5 
kilograms per tree in 1998 and 2.4 kilograms per tree in 2003. Coffee 
smallholdings affected by dry season water shortages earn a per hectare operating 
surplus of VND75 million during the simulation period, compared to VND140 
million per hectare earned on coffee smallholdings in Ea Mroh that did not have 
water scarcity. Approximately 45 per cent of the coffee area in West BMT is 
affected by dry season water s~arcity, and yield per tree averages just 1.4 
kilograms during the simulation period. With a 1.3 kilogram standard deviation, 
output is also extremely variable. Subsequent to the first irrigation, which is 
nearly always greater than 320 litres per tree, irrigation water supply falls sharply 
in all years, resulting in subsequent irrigations always supplying less than 200 
litres per tree, and frequently less than 100 litres per tree after 2000. The 
unreliable water supplies in the water shortage area cause coffee smallholders to 
incur an operating loss of approximately VND25 million per hectare in the BSQ 
scenario during the simulated period, and to just break even or incur losses 
annually excepting in 1999. 
Increasing irrigation efficiency on coffee smallholdings increases the .simulated 
weighted average operating surplus per hectare in Scenario One and Scenario 
Two in all subcatchments, with the excepotion of Krong Buk in Scenario Two. 
For 1998 to 2003, the average per hectare operating surplus in Scenario One totals 
VND166 million in Krong Buk, Ea Tul, Ea Pour, and Ea Tam, VND155 million in 
West BMT, and VND142 million in Ea Mroh. Lower profitability in West BMT 
results from higher volumetric irrigation costs, whereas Ea Mroh's results from 
higher irrigation costs combining with a slightly lower average yield per tree of 
4.6 kilograms. Higher per hectare operating surpluses in Scenario One and also 
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Scenario Two result from output reductions caused by water stress being 
effectively eliminated. In Scenario One, yield averages 4.8 kilograms or greater 
per tree in the coffee area experiencing water shortages in all subcatchments 
other than Ea Mroh, where yields average 4.4 kilograms per tree. Annual output 
variability is also virtually eliminated from the water short coffee areas. Water 
supplies remain constant at around 80 per cent of average demand in Krong Buk, 
Ea Tul, and Ea Pour, including during 1998 and 2003, lower from around 75 per 
cent of the first irrigation demand in Ea Tul and Ea Mroh to around 65 per cent 
in latter irrigations, and decline rapidly from around 65 per cent in Ea Mroh for 
the first irrigation to around 50 per cent by the final irrigation. Irrigation costs are 
reduced in Scenario One by between VND3 and VND6 million compared to the 
BSQ scenario, predominantly resulting from reducing water inputs, not 
differences in volumetric irrigation costs resulting from pumping depths varying. 
Total operating surplus per hectare in Scenario Two equal those in Scenario One 
for Krong Buk, Ea Pour and Ea Tam, are ten per cent lower in Ea Tul (VND148 
million) and West BMT (VND141 million), and thirty per cent lower in Ea Mroh 
(VNDlOO million). In Krong Buk, Ea Pour, and Ea Tam, reducing irrigation costs 
from using less irrigation input offsets weakening revenue caused by soil water 
stress. Ea Tul, West BMT, and Ea Mroh's losses occur because revenue lost from 
yield declines exceeds the irrigation cost savings from using less water. The 
pattern of supply shortages defined by the ratio of irrigation water supplied versus 
demanded is nearly identical to those in Scenario One in Ea Tul, West BMT, and 
Ea Mroh, as are groundwater extraction depths. The amount of water applied per 
tree per irrigation is lower in Scenario Two than in Scenario One however. This 
result is unanticipated given an expectation that at least the same irrigation input 
would be supplied per tree in Scenario Two as in Scenario One, given that 
Scenario Two is the more water conserving irrigation strategy. 
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Policy implications 
The results of the integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic model simulations 
impart several key policy messages for the management of the scarce water 
resources of the Dak Lak Plateau. First, the simulations answer the benefits side 
of the underlying policy research question posed by this thesis, which is whether 
the reallocation of water during the dry season in the Dak Lak Plateau increases 
aggregate social welfare relative to the baseline status quo water allocation. The 
analysis in this Chapter shows increasing dry season irrigation water use 
efficiency on the coffee smallholdings of the Plateau does increase aggregate 
social welfare in the Plateau relative to the status quo water allocation. Setting 
total dry season irrigation water demand per coffee tree at 2,300 litres during a 
dry year and 1,750 litres during a normal or wetter year results in total operating 
surpluses from coffee increasing by a factor of 1.4 times for the Plateau compared 
to the BSQ case, from VND 17.4 trillion to VND24.3 trillion between 1998 and 
2003. Lowering seasonal demand per tree to 1,750 litres during dry years and 
1,350 during normal or wetter years increases total operating surpluses in the 
Plateau to VND22.5 trillion. Recall these estimates do not account for incomplete 
picking, post harvest wastage, and other factors previously discussed. The 
simulations show that increasing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee 
smallhotaings obviates water supply shortages for 10,000 hectares of coffee in the 
Plateau, and also reduces the incidence and severity of water supply shortages on 
the remaining 55,000 hectares of coffee where dry season water supply shortages 
-
persist. Reducing the severity of water shortages in Scenario One lifts annual 
aggregate coffee output to 95 per cent of maximum output when water supplies 
are non-limiting, and to 90 per cent of the maximum in Scenario Two, compared 
to 80 per cent in the BSQ case. Increasing irrigation water use efficiency also 
stabilises output in all subcatchments with the exception of Krong Buk, which is 
not adversely affected by water scarcity. Production stability is an important 
outcome for smallholders, and may stimulate capital investment and longer term 
planning, which could in tum be beneficial for thes agro-environment (Hardaker 
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et al. 2004). Increasing irrigation water use efficiency also marginally increases 
the conjunctive water balance in the Plateau relative to the BSQ case, by around 
2.2 per cent in Scenario One and 4.3 per cent in Scenario Two for 1998-2003. 
Expressed as a per cent of total groundwater recharge, these total differences are 
statistically immaterial however. Minimum and average dry season flows in two 
of the largest rivers of the Plateau are increased and potentially stabilised during 
severe drought periods. Assuming these two rivers are indicaive, a reasonable but 
not testable assumption is that minimum and average dry season flows in other 
rivers in the Plateau will also increase in aggregate. These results provide weak 
support for an argument that increasing water use efficiency on the coffee 
smallholdings of thePlateau should also marginally increase hydro-agro-
ecosystem resilience, productivity, and stability. The cumulative of monetised 
and non-monetised estimates shows aggregate welfare is increased in both 
Scenario One and Scenario Two relative to the status quo case. These hydrologic 
results present a strong benefit side case for programs to increase irrigation water 
use efficiency on coffee and rice smallholdings in the Dak Lak Plateau. 
The results show that stock effects eliminate or reduce the GSE m all 
subcatchments in the Dak Lak Plateau excepting Krong Buk. Recall from Chapter 
2 that stock effects increase when demand exceeds the accessible water stock, 
which would occur when the aquifer is nearly exhausted (Burt 1993), and when 
water users withdraw from a thin aquifer (Brill and Burness 1994: 1876). In the 
Plateau, demand for irrigation water in coffee production normally exceeds half 
of the annual recharge of the previous wet season in all subcatchments other than 
Ea Tul and Ea Tam. Further, Krong Buk does not experience the stock effects 
because it has a thicker aquifer than other subcatchments. Saturation zone storage 
in Krong Buk is more than double that of all other catchments other than Ea Pour 
(Table 8.9). Total operating surplus per hectare from coffee production, which is 
included in Table 8.9 for comparison, clearly correlates with average saturated 
zone storage, directly supporting the positive relationship between aquifer 
thinness and production losses from stock effects. In this analysis, stock effects 
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generate virtually all of the aggregate welfare gains achieved by reallocating 
water in the Plateau. They do this by reducing the severity and spread of 
production losses caused by binding dated water constraints, with these binding 
dated water constraints being caused by the confluence of demand simultaneity 
and thin aquifer effects. Consistent with the GSE literature, the linear pumping 
cost function, combined with little change in the depth to the water table 
between scenarios, makes numerically no difference to the aggregate welfare 
outcomes between the scenarios. 
The second core policy implication is that most of the welfare gains from 
increasing allocative irrigation efficiency on coffee smallholdings accrue to coffee 
smallholders. The result that welfare gains from increasing irrigation efficiency 
appear to be largely isolated to near where the more efficient irrigation water use 
is being practiced has policy implications for targeting who should potentially pay 
for these programs. The lack of responsiveness in the hydrologic system to 
changing irrigation water use efficiency is likely causal to excess water from 
coffee irrigation returning to the water table in the BSQ scenario. As a result of 
the repercolation, there is essentially no net difference in the water stock in the 
unconfined aquifer between the scenarios. Approximately 100,000 ML more 
groundwater is extracted from unconfined aquifer every year in the BSQscenario 
compar~,9. to Scenario One, and 160,000 ML more compared to Scenario Two. 
The higher extraction rate in the BSQ scenario is partially offset by 70,000 ML 
additional recharge on average in the BSQ scenario compared to Scenario One, 
and 89,000 ML compared to Scenario Two. These higher recharge rates in the 
BSQ scenario mean the effective difference in extractions in the BSQ is roughly 
30,000 ML more per annum compared to Scenario One, and 80,000 ML more per 
annum compared to Scenario Two. This Plateau level pattern also generally holds 
in each of the subcatchments. 
A third core policy implication is that some subcatchments appear to stand to 
gain more from programs to increase irrigation water use efficiency on coffee 
smallholdings and, in parallel, that the water availability of some subcatchments 
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make them clearly more marginal for coffee production. Noting that the 
following discussion is based on averages and therefore should be viewed as broad 
observations, the simulation results suggest all subcatchments other than Krong 
Buk would benefit from programs that could effectively increase irrigation water 
use efficiency on coffee smallholdings. The simulation results suggest Krong Buk 
has effectively no marginal coffee producing land area in terms of the irrigation 
water needs of Robusta. Increasing irrigation efficiency in Krong Buk would have 
effectively no change on production or welfare outcomes within the 
subcatchment, other than potentially marginally increased welfare from 
increasing dry season river flows. 
In Ea Tam and Ea Pour, one out of every four hectares have water abvailability 
that makes them marginal for coffee production. In years when wet season 
rainfall is above average, such as in 2000 and 2001, these marginal areas average 
3.5 metric tons output, meaning their output is still substantially reduced by 
water supply shortages even when following on from larger than average wet 
season rainfalls. Shifts towards increasing irrigation efficiency on coffee 
smallholdings in these subcatchments could generate pronounced welfare 
changes for drought affected coffee farmers by lifting their average output to 
around five metric tons on average. Similarly, in Ea Tul, one in every two 
hectares of coffee is on marginal but potentially sustainable land. Increasing 
irrigation water use efficiency within the subcatchment would also increase these 
smallholde-rs average annual output to around five metric tons per hectare. Water 
shortages affect one out of every two hectares in West BMT, with production in 
this shallow basalt subcatchment likely unsustainable over the long-run, because 
output averages less than 1.5 metric tons per hectare. Output within the drought-
affected region is also highly variable. A collective increase in irrigation efficiency 
in this subcatchment to the levels simulated lifts output to 4.5 metric tons per 
hectare on average, including during dry and very dry years. 
The fourth policy issue is that of dry season irrigated rice production. The 
simulation estimates show operating surpluses for dry season irrigated rice do not 
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change except for the reduced volumetric irrigation costs between the scenarios. 
Moreover, reducing surface water depths has no observable impact on the 
hydro logic balance indicators of the Plateau. Water allocated to dry season 
irrigated rice production averages 230 million cubic metres per annum in the 
Plateau in the BSQ case, which is roughly 45 per cent of the average irrigation 
water allocation to coffee. An economic rationale for allocating this water into 
higher value usages exists. In Ea Kmir for example, coffee smallholders affected 
by water supply shortages incurred a production loss between 1998 and 2003. Dry 
season irrigation water supplies for coffee production fell short of demand by 
approximately 4.5 million cubic metres on average in the BSQ scenario, peaking 
in the 1998 and 2003 drought years at six million cubic metres. On average, the 
coffee water demand shortfall is tess than 20 per cent of the 28 million cubic 
metres of water used in dry season rice irrigation per annum on average in Ea 
Kmir. Reallocating dry season surface water from rice to fully satisfy coffee 
demands would have increased the total operating surplus of the Plateau for 1998 
to 2003 to VND570 billion from VND275 billion in the BSQ scenario at an 
opportunity cost of around VND14 billion in foregone rice production. Equation 
(13) from Chapter 2 establishes the litmus test for deciding whether such 
transfers should actually take place is whether the economic surplus remaining 
after the rice to coffee transfer offsets the transfer, transaction, and additional 
costs ofphysically redistributing the water resource. 
The policy implications of this Chapter are hedged by several caveats. First, the 
hydrolOgic model used in the integrated analysis is based on sparse groundwater 
and surface water observation data. While interpolation between well and surface 
water gauge stations was based on the expert judgement of senior hydrologists 
who were familiar with the Dak Lak Plateau, these interpolations, and therefore 
the hydrologic simulations, may be inconsistent with the hydrologic reality. 
Second, it is worth recalling that the yield and operating surplus of coffee are 
likely inflated for the reasons discussed earlier in this Chapter. However, recalling 
the Le Chatelier's Principle, because all production inputs other than water and 
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production processes other than irrigation scheduling are fixed in the analyses, 
the operating surpluses estimated in the scenarios are constrained. Third, the 
analyses assume the average production processes and agro-environmental 
production conditions hold on average throughout the Plateau; it is possible 
however that regional variation exists that will impact output and producer 
surplus. The final caveat is that this analysis assumes changing coffee and rice 
output does not impact prices in secondary markets, in particular secondary 
markets for factor inputs. If this assumption does not hold, impacts will not be 
fully measured as surplus changes in the primary market (Boardman et al. 1996). 
Conclusion 
A compartmentally integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic model developed 
was developed in this Chapter and used to evaluate whether increasing plot level 
irrigation efficiency on coffee and rice smallholdings of the Dak Lak Plateau 
would lead to improvements in social welfare and hydrologic balances. The 
integrated model includes essential atmospheric, climatic, hydrologic, hydraulic, 
agronomic, and economic relationships, and reflects interrelationships between 
these subsystems. Simulation outputs from the physically distributed hydrologic 
model are lumped using common subcatchment, crop, and water shortage 
condition identifiers in order to make the hydrologic and social welfare analyses 
more manageable, and also to crystallise regional policy implications. 
The analysis of this Chapter shows that increasing irrigation water use efficiency 
primarily on the coffee smallholdings of the Plaetau would have generated 
substantial aggregate welfare gains between 1998 and 2003. These gains would 
have accrued primarily to coffee smallholders. When a technically efficient 
micro-basin irrigation schedule is used, applying 2,300 litres of irrigation per 
coffee tree during the irrigation season when dry climatic conditions prevail, and 
1,750 litres per tree when normal or wetter conditions prevail results in total 
operating surpluses increasing by 1.4 times compared to the BSQ case. An 
irrigation strategy of applying a total of 1,750 litres per coffee tree during very dry 
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years and 1,350 litres per tree during normal or wetter years causes a 1.3 time 
increase in operating surpluses relative the status quo. In all cases the gain in 
operating surpluses are primarily caused by the reduction in the incidence and 
severity of stock externalities. These stock externalities are the basis for not 
observing a GSE-type result in the Plateau, other than in Krong Buk. Simulation 
estimates show increasing irrigation water use efficiency will not fundamentally 
change the hydrologic balance of the Plateau, nor its subcatchments. This result 
likely comes from there being little difference between scenarios in terms of the 
total groundwater stock extracted for coffee irrigation after the return flow from 
over-irrigation is accounted for. Caution needs to be exercised with these 
interpretations however given the hydrologic model is developed from sparse 
observation data. 
The estimates in this Chapter are fundamental inputs for the integrated water 
resource planning of the Dak Lak Plateau that is required by the Vietnamese Law 
on Water Resources and the National Water Resources Strategy of Viet Nam for 
2006-10. AB noted in Chapter 2, a rationale for State intervention to manage 
water resources to increase social welfare requires that the sum of social benefits 
exceeds the sum of social costs. The evaluation of this Chapter provides a 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the monetised and non-monetised 
social b~efits from the reallocation of the scarce dry season water resources of 
the Plateau. 
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9 
Summary and conclusions 
Introduction 
In the Dak Lak Plateau of Viet Nam the confluence of economic and population 
growth, a mature water supply economy, an aquifer system that limits the readily 
accessible groundwater resource to 30 metres depth, high private well density, 
and effectively no control over water usage outside urban areas means that the 
availability of water has become a key constraint to regional sustainability. The 
State in Viet Nam recognises the advantages of a long-run sustainable water 
management regime in the Dak Lak Plateau. The National Water Resources 
Strategy for 2006-10 targets the realisation of a sustainable water management 
regime in Dak Lak as a national project of high priority (Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam 2006). The now ten-year old Law on Water Resources establishes a 
legislative framework for the efficient, rational, fair, and sustainable usage of 
water resources in Viet Nam. The Law is yet to be effectively implemented 
however. The limited implementation of the L WR may stem in part from its 
ambiguity. For example, neither the Law nor its supporting Decrees provide clear 
guidance on how to prioritise its efficiency, economy, sustainability, fairness, and 
equity water management objectives when these conflict. The limited 
implementation of the L WR also results from a generally paucity of the 
information needed fcir implementation. In the Dak Lak Plateau, the 
implementation of demand side water management consistent with the L WR has 
been partially held back by the sparsity of regional information about the 
economic value of water, limited understanding of how the surface and 
groundwater systems of the Plateau would respond to water reallocation, and 
circumscribed knowledge of sectoral water use efficiencies. 
The research of this thesis contributes to moving the L WR and the National 
Water Resources Strategy of Viet Nam for 2006-10 from principles towards 
implementation in the Dak Lak Plateau by 
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1. estimating the marginal economic value of irrigation water in smallholder 
coffee production, dry season irrigated rice production, and household usages; 
2. estimating monetised preference strength for allocating additional water in-
situ for public good and other purposes; 
3. .evaluating the potential for increasing irrigation water use efficiency over the 
short-run on the Plateau's coffee and rice smallholdings; 
4. evaluating willingness to pay to support public programs that strengthen the 
hydro-agro-environmental ecosystem functioning of the Plateau; and 
5. estimating the change to aggregate social welfare from the reallocation of 
water during the dry season. • 
The overarching resource management objective adopted for the thesis was 
aggregate economic efficiency. The aggregate economic efficiency resource 
management objective provided the organising framework to formally evaluate 
the research objectives of the thesis. An array of theoretical frameworks and 
analytic methods were applied, drawn from the non-market valuation, 
production economics, cost-benefit analysis, New Institutional Economics, and 
integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic analysis literature. In Chapter 4 the 
stochastic production frontier analysis approach was used to estimate the value 
--
marginal product of irrigation water to the coffee smallholders of the Plateau, and 
defined the technically effici~nt irrigation schedule of coffee smallholders using a 
semi-dated production frontier specification. In Chapter 5 the marginal economic 
value of water in dry season irrigated rice production was estimated and the 
economically efficient irrigation schedule was defined using a combination of 
agronomic simulation and non-linear mathematical programming. In Chapter 6 
an inductive approach was used to estimate the marginal economic value of 
municipal and private household well water to urban and peri-urban households. 
In Chapter 7 a randomised payment card contingent valuation approach was 
developed to evaluate willingness to pay for irrigation water use efficiency 
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programs that would likely generate positive hydrologic balance and agro-
environmental ecosystem externalities. The integrated hydrologic-agronomic-
economic analysis in Chapter 8 coupled a physically distributed hydrological 
model with deterministic agronomic and economic models to evaluate, relative to 
a status quo, changes to aggregate operating surpluses from coffee and rice 
production that resulted from the reallocation of water within the Plateau over a 
six-year period, and also changes in non-monetised hydrologic indicator 
variables. 
General conclusions 
The economic value of water in the Dak Lak Plateau 
The research of this thesis shows that there is no single economic value of water 
in the Dak Lak Plateau. The economic value of water changes as a function of its 
usage, the timing of its usage, the total quantity already used, the availability of 
substitutes, and also as a function of the socio-economic, technological, 
behavioural, and other attributes of the individual. This section discusses ranges 
of values estimated in this thesis as a result. 
In terms of water planning and demand side management, the understanding of 
the marginal economic value of irrigation water in the coffee is perhaps the most 
important output of the research of this thesis. The empirical analysis of Chapter 
4 shows the value marginal product of water in dry season irrigation in 
smallholder coffee production is zero when more than 550 litres of water is 
applied per tree per irrigation. Irrigation in excess of this conservative threshold is 
irrational because above 550 litres smallholders incur short-run irrigation costs 
without generating additional revenue. Imperfect information about the 
irrigation water requirements of production stage Robusta and risk aversion are 
both plausible explanations for the observed result. 
During a normal climatic year, the value marginal product of irrigation water 
during the dry season is zero to a lowland rice smallholder operating on one fixed 
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hectare when in-season water stock falls below 5,650 cubic metres. During a 
normal climatic year, this dry season water allocation is insufficient for even the 
technically efficient rice smallholder practicing A WD irrigation to generate an 
operating surplus. Above the breakeven seasonal supply threshold the marginal 
value of irrigation water ranges from around VND3,500 per cubic metre at 5,700 
cubic metres of seasonal stock, to VND700 per cubic metre when the known 
seasonal allocation is around 6,800 cubic metres per hectare. Demand is nearly 
perfectly inelastic when water is priced below VND700 per cubic metre. Both of 
these results stem from the demand function estimated in the Chapter being near 
linear. 
The marginal economic value of municipal water in household usage varies 
between urban and peri-urban households and principally as a function of 
whether the household has access to substitute well water. For municipal water 
supplies an average household using municipal water exclusively and consuming 
11.5 cubic metres per month would be willing to pay VND125,000 for 3.5 cubic 
metres of additional monthly supply. The comparative figure for households also 
drawing groundwater from a private well is VND 14, 100. Own price elasticity is 
inelastic for household water irrespective of the source and the number of sources 
the household consumes water from. Own price inelasticity shows that a one 
percent _ _,increase in the (shadow) water price causes less than a one percent 
decrease in total monthly household consumption. Households that were aware 
of the municipal water price were more responsive to price signals than the 85 
percent of respondents who did not know the municipal water price. 
The contingent valuation analysis of the monetised preferences for allocating 
water in non-agricultural and non-household uses shows foremost that in-situ 
water generates positive utility by maintaining the water systems of the Dak Lak 
Plateau for bequest and existence purposes. The fact that all respondents held 
both bequest and existence motivations indicates water has a public good in-situ 
utility to likely all households of the Dak Lak Plateau. For the composite hydro-
agro-environmental good described in the survey, respondents were willing to 
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pay around VND27,000 per annum. Willingness to pay for the composite good is 
a function of individual socio-economic, experiential, and attitudinal factors. 
Moreover, the changes in willingness to pay support scope sensitivity. 
Potential for increasing irrigation water use efficiency in 
the Dak Lak Plateau 
The semi-dated production frontier estimated in Chapter 4 shows technical 
efficiency exceeds 90 per cent amongst idiosyncratically defined coffee 
smallholders. Coffee smallholder productivity differs on the basis of irrigation 
scheduling behaviours, as well as agro-environmental production conditions. On 
average, shifting to the technically and allocatively efficient irrigation schedule 
lifts forecas~ed yield per tree by approximately half a kilogram from 4.34 
kilograms to 4.9 kilograms, and reduces seasonal irrigation input per tree from 
4,000 litres to 1,700 litres, on average. The empirical analysis of this thesis, 
combined with other research discussed in the Chapter, suggests the empirically 
defined allocatively efficient water input is approximately 550 litres per tree per 
irrigation. The technically efficient irrigation schedule for smallholder Robusta 
using the micro-basin irrigation method is characterised by irrigation that 
commences no later than the middle of January in a normal climatic year and the 
middle of December in a dry climatic year, by tha application of more water on 
the first irrigation, and by scheduling irrigations approximately 20 days apart. 
In normal climatic conditions, increasing irrigation water use efficiency on 
lowland rice plots by adopting the economically efficient A WD irrigation 
strategy has the potential to reduce water inputs by 2,300 cubic metres per 
hectare in the Dak Lak Plateau during the dry season. This 24 per cent reduction 
in total water usage is consistent with water savings of 30 per cent reported from 
empirical research comparing CS and A WD irrigation water utilisation in heavy 
soils in South East and South Asia (Tuong and Bhuiyan 1999). While the A WD 
strategy is technically feasible at the plot level, a rationale for maintaining some 
surface water ponding is discussed in the Chapter. On this basis, it is likely that 
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the achievable reduction in irrigation water demand on irrigated rice 
smallholdings will be less than 2,300 cubic metres per hectare. 
The efficient boundaries of the State the Dak Lak Plateau 
Chapter 2 established that the central questions posed by New Institutional 
Economics are (1) given the physical resource and its accessibility attributes, 
existing formal and informal institutions, and the evolving interdependencies and 
attributes of individuals with standing, which institutional bundle will be the 
most cost effective in achieving a policy objective; and (2) relative to the status 
quo, will the most cost effective and successfully implemented institutional 
intervention yield a social welfare surplus. The research of this thesis partially 
answers these two questions by estimating the magnitude of social welfare gains 
from water transfers over time in the Dak. Lak. Plateau. Because conveyance costs 
are nil in the water allocation scenarios of Chapter 8, the missing element from 
Equation (13) are the transition and transaction costs of implementing the 
institutional regime capable of effecting the water redistribution. 
This thesis purposely leaves the issue of institutional transaction cost aside. Inter-
temporal transaction and transition costs are difficult to measure ex ante. In part 
the difficulty of measing transaction costs occurs because a standard and widely 
accepted framework for defining and measuring transaction and transition costs 
does not exist (Coase 2000). Moreover, measurement is further complicated by 
jointness between production and transaction costs, and the fact that transition 
and tr~nsaction costs do not take place in open markets. The opportunity costs of 
measuring the opportunity costs of changing water allocations by increasing 
water use efficiency are likely to be high in the Dak Lak Plateau, and are outside 
the scope of this thesis research. 
In spite of not having estimates of institutional information costs, the analysis of 
Chapter 8 shows that the magnitude of aggregate social welfare changes from 
implementing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings varies 
widely between the Plateau's subcatchments. These wide welfare variations can 
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be used as a basis for targeting subcatchments where the aggregate social welfare 
margins from intervention are likely to be greatest, all other factors assumed 
constant. The scenario analyses show that a GSE outcome persists in Krong Buk. 
On these estimates, the aggregate social welfare gains from intervening in Krong 
Buk are likely to be numerically insignificant. In turn the result implies 
institutional costs will likely exceed the social welfare gains of intervention in 
Krong Buk. The social welfare wedge between uncoordinated and regulated 
irrigation scheduling increases markedly in the other subcatchments of the 
Plateau. In these subcatchments the divergence results from demand simultaneity 
and the unconfined aquifer conforming to being a thin dry season resource. Thus, 
in all catchments other than Krong Buk, intervention strategies to increase 
irrigation water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings deserve more 
consideration. 
Practical relevance of this thesis 
The practical objective of this thesis research was to close fundamental 
information gaps that are currently hindering the development of demand side 
and integrated water management policies in the Dak Lak Plateau. The estimates 
of the marginal economic value of water in coffee and irrigated rice production, 
household, and other usages developed through the research of this thesis provide 
a basis for formally evaluating the social welfare trade-offs of reallocating scarce 
water in the Plateau. The water demand estimates in smallholder coffee and rice 
production and household usage can be used for demand planning in the Plateau, 
and also for the setting of efficient water prices. By identifying the sources of 
inefficient water usage in smallholder coffee and rice production, opportunities 
have been identified to increase on-farm irrigation water use efficiency, 
smallholder return on investment, and also to potentially reduce total on-farm 
water usage. 
Showing that households in the Dak Lak Plateau are willing to pay for public 
programs that will likely return positive hydro-agro-environmental externalities, 
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and that this willingness to pay is often based in a social concern for others and 
for future generations, provides a clear signal to Provincial authorities about the 
capacity for such a program to be both self-financing and welfare increasing. 
Formally showing that water generates social welfare in-situ also shows that 
households in the Plateau have a social preference for stewardship programs that 
directly or indirectly support the functioning of water systems, as well as 
environmental systems that are water dependent. Krutilla and Fisher (1975) show 
that preferences for maintaining undeveloped environmental assets increase over 
time due to their lack of substitutes, limited opportunities for generating 
substitutes through technological development, and the tendency of people to 
value environmental amenity services more with economic growth and 
technological advancement. Tue· significant positive income elasticity effect 
observed in the valuation function of Chapter 7 is consistent with the Krutilla-
Fisher model assumption. 
Finally, the integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic analysis in Chapter 8 
provides an integrated basis for the evaluation of the efficiency, equity, and 
sustainability of water allocation in the Dak Lak Plateau, as us required by the 
L WR. The partial social welfare estimates and supporting non-monetised 
hydrologic balance indicators establish a comprehensive evaluation framework 
for uncl~standing the social welfare implications of reallocating scarce water in 
the Dak Lak Plateau. The integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic model 
gives regional economic and water resource planners the minimum 
under-Standing required to implement the water allocation policies defined in the 
Articles of the Law on Water Resources. 
Opportunities for future research 
Several additional research opportunities are evident from the research of this 
thesis. First, there is a clear need to understand the institutional options for 
increasing irrigation water use efficiency on coffee smallholdings in the Plateau, 
and to generae some estimate of the transaction costs of each intervention. An 
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extensive literature exusts on water institutions and this literature can be drawn 
on for the analysis. The water institution literature includes work that develops 
conceptual models for framing policy problems of institutional choice at different 
levels of the institutional hierarchy (Challen 2002); that establishes frameworks 
for measuring the transaction and transition costs of alternative water allocation 
mechanisms (McCann and Easter 2004); evaluating potential water allocation 
mechanisms and institutions (Easter et al. 1997; Johansson 2000; Saleth and Dinar 
2005); and for measuring the success of water management institutions at 
different levels within the institutional hierarchy (Pagan 2003; Saleth and Dinar 
2004). In addition to the international literature on water institutions, the 
development of institutions to effect increasing water use efficiency and efficient 
water allocations in the Dak Lak Plateau can also drawn on a body of applied 
literature from Viet Nam (Chien 2001; Herath 2001; Turral and Malano 2001). 
Complementarity between formal and informal institutions is an important 
dimension of successful water governance frameworks (Keefer and Shirley 2000). 
While Viet Nam's Law on Water Resources, its supporting Decrees, and the 
various Ministries, Departments, Agencies, and Institutes charged with 
implementing the Law establish a formal set of institutions to manage national 
water resources, there is little evidence to date that this formal institutional level 
interacs effectively with water users and their informal institutions. For example, 
local authorities in Dak Lak have previously attempted to manage groundwater 
withdrawals using both permit and pricing approaches, but these attempts have 
failed completely in their application (Ahmad 2000). Ostrom (1992) distinguishes 
institutions as the working rules in use for a water resource, and the fact that 
institutions are distinct from formal rules of law and supporting administrative 
agencies. In the Dak Lak Plateau, there is strong separability between the 
working rules in use for water resources and the formal rules of Law. 
Several clear opportunities for extending the integrated hydrologic-agronomic-
economic model in Chapter 8 are evident. A priority should be to update the 
simulation model with hydrologic and land allocation data until 2006. This would 
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allow for an analysis of the physical and social welfare outcomes of increasing 
irrigation water use efficiency during times of extreme drought. Secondly, the 
social welfare and hydrologic impacts of shifting marginal coffee producing areas 
into less water intensive and more drought resistant crops such as citrus, black 
pepper or cacao could be evaluated. A third prospective research avenue is the 
investigation of the hydrologic interrelationships between subcatchments of the 
Plateau. Krong Buk encompasses the Dak Lak Plateau's northern uplands region, 
and groundwater recharge from this region drains to the east and west from its 
northern regions and to the south from its southern region. While the analysis of 
Chapter 8 shows increasing irrigation efficiency in Krong Buk makes little 
difference to the welfare of coffee smallholders and hydrologic balance indicators 
of Krong Buk, increasing irrigatton water use efficiency in Krong Buk may 
contribute meaningfully towards changing hydrologic balances and welfare in 
downstream subcatchments. Hydrologic and welfare interrelationships between 
subcatchments can easily be modelled using the integrated hydrologic-
agronomic-econornic model this Chapter has developed. 
Another main avenue for future empirical research is evaluating the feasibility of 
A WD irrigation on wetland rice smallholdings in the Plateau. Other potential 
developments to the simulation-optimisation model for rice irrigation are noted 
in Char~rS. 
Conclusion 
The research in this thesis aims to shift national water policy in Viet Nam from 
principles towards working rules in use in the Dak Lak Plateau. The research of 
this thesis suggests increasing irrigation water use efficiency, primarily on the 
coffee smallholdings of the Plateau, could effect Pareto improvements. Increasing 
irrigation water use efficiency on coffee and rice smallholdings would increase 
the operating surpluses of these smallholders by reducing irrigation costs and 
increasing output. Freeing up the over-allocated water in smallholder coffee 
would either keep this water in-situ, or make it available for other uses. This 
-278-
thesis has shown that keeping water in-situ has a positive marginal utility for the 
satisfaction of bequest and existence preferences. Morover, the freed up water 
substantially reduces the incidence and magnitude of negative stock externalities 
in all subcatchments other than Krong Buk. The process of determining 
(potential) Pareto improving water allocations developed in this thesis provides 
much of the information needed to formulate water policies and programs that 
increase aggregate social welfare in the Dak Lak Plateau, and also to increase the 
resilience, productivity, and stability of the hydro-agro-environmental 
ecosystems of the Plateau. 
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Appendix 1: Smallholder coffee survey 
QUESTIONAIRE FOR DAKLAK FARM SURVEY 
Questionnaire ID: .................................. . 
I. GENERAL INFORMATION ON HOUSEHOLD 
Address: .......................... . Village ........................ . 
Commune ............. district 
Name of respondent: 
Information about household head 
(HH head is the person who is responsible for managing the farm) 
Name of HH head: .................................................. 
1. Age 
················· 
2. Gender: Male D FemaleD 
3. Ethnicity: Kinh D Ede D M'Nong D Nung D 
Tay D 
4. Highest level of education: 
D a. Primary 
D b.Secondary 
-- D c. High school 
D d. Vocational school 
D e. College 
D f. University 
D g. Post-graduate 
D h. No formal schooling 
5. Years of schooling: ................... 
6. Origin: Local residents D Migranto 
7. If migrant, years of arrival ......................... 
About Household: 
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8. Number of members in the household: 
(member is the person who is living in the house in the past 6 months) 
a. Adult (16 - 60): ................. . 
b. Minor (5 - 16) ................... . 
c. Children ( <5) ..................... . 
9. Number of members working full time on farm 
Income: 
10. Total estimated farm income in 2005(VND): 
11. Total estimated farm income in 2006(VND) 
12. Main non-farm activities: 
D a.Non 
D b. Non-farm labor 
D c. Farm labor 
D d. Sales man 
D e. Official 
D f. State-owned business 
D g. Private business 
D h. Self-employment 
D i. Other 
Farming" activities: 
13. How many plots do you farm: .................. . 
14. Jotal land (ha) .................... . 
15. Sum of all plots ................... . 
16. Do you plant coffee only? D Yes 
17. If not coffee only: 
NoD GotoQ.17 
a. How many other crops do you grow during winter/spring? 
b. How many other crops do you grow during summer/autumn? 
c. How many plots are planted with coffee? 
d. What is the total coffee area (ha)? 
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Farm-related assets: 
18. Number of hand tractors: 
19. Total tractor purchase costs: 
20. Number of pumps: 
21. Total purchase costs of pumps: 
22. Number of private well: 
23. Drying yard: 
24. Farm building estimated value 
25. Tools and machinery estimated value 
(excluding tractor and pump) 
Livestock estimated value 
26. Farm debt estimated value 
II. PRODUCTION STAGE COFFEE 
Have the respondent identify the most important coffee plot. Ask to go to 
this plot with the farmer. The following questions are on this most 
important plot. 
Details about the plot: 
27. Number of coffee trees: 
28. Planting area(ha): 
29. Ownership: 
D a.Own 
D b. Hired 
D c. Purchased land 
D d. Government allocated 
D e. Other 
30. Registered with red certificate: Yes DNo D 
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31. Distance from HH to plot (metres): 
32. Does the coffee plot have shade trees: Yes D No D 
33. Do you intercrop coffee with other crops: 
With others 
34. Soil type: 
D Ferrasol 
D Acrisol 
D Luvisol 
D Other specify 
D Don't know/not sure 
35. Land slope: 
D Steep >30% 
D Moderate > 15%<30% 
D Flat <15% 
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No D With pepper D D 
I I 
\ 
Production inputs 
Fertilisers: 
TYPE 36. QUANTITY 37. COST (VND/unit) 38. FAMILY LABOR 39. HIRED LABOR 40. COST PER 
• 
(KG) (mandays) (mandays) MANDA Y (VND) 
a. Urea 
b. SA 
c. Thermo-
phosphate 
d. Super 
phosphate 
e.NPK 
f. KCl 
g. Lime 
h. Manure 
(m3) 
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I I 
\ 
TYPE 36. QUANTITY 37. COST (VND/unit) 38. FAMILY LABOR 39. HIRED LABOR 40. COST PER 
(KG) (mandays) (mandays) MANDA Y (VND) 
. 
i. Other 
organic 
fertilisers 
Pesticide inputs: 
Pesticide type 41. Total 42. Pesticide cost per litre 43. Do you apply 44. Why 45. Family labor time 46. Hire labor time 
pesticide use (litre) pesticide reactively after do you apply pesticide required to apply required to apply 
infestation (") ( .. ) pesticide (days) pesticide (days) 
1. Funguran oh 50 wp 
2. Danawin 
3. Round up 
4. Viben C 
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I I 
Pesticide type 41. Total 42. Pesticide cost per litre 43. Do you apply 44. Why 4S. Family labor time 46. Hire labor time 
pesticide use (litre) pesticide reactively after do you apply pesticide required to apply required to apply 
infestation (•) ( .. ) pesticide (days) pesticide (days) 
• 
S. Vicarben 
6. Vicarben SO Hp 
7. Dibamirin SEC 
8. Supracide 40EC 
9. Supracide 40FC 
10. Vifosat 
11. DiMix-Top 
12.Boocdo 
13. Ofatox; 
14. Oxitos; 
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I I 
\ 
Pesticide type 41. Total 42. Pesticide cost per litre 43. Do you apply 44. Why 45. Family labor time 46. Hire labor time 
pesticide use (litre) pesticide reactively after do you apply pesticide required to apply required to apply 
infestation (*) (**) pesticide (days) pesticide (days) 
• 
15. Suprathion 40EC 
16. Vidithoate 40ND 
17.Sunfatdong 
18. Ba Sa 
19. Kali 58% 
20. Furadan 
21. Other, specify 
(*) Yes = 1; No = 0 
(**) Hemilea vastatrix (coffee leave rust)= 1; Cercospora sp. (leave spot)= 2; Root fungus= 3; Aphids (different species)= 4; Leave scales (different species)= 5; Waxy scales= 6; Root 
nematodes= 7; Biting ants= 8; Stem borer= 9; Other= 10, specify. 
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Dry season irrigation 
47. Dry season irrigation water source: 
D a. River/stream 
D b. Natural lake 
D c. Reservoir/pond 
D d. Hand dug well 
D e. Deep well 
D f. Irrigation scheme 
D g. Dug well + river 
D h. Dug well + natural lake 
D i: Dug well + reservoir 
D j. Dug well + irrigation scheme 
D k. Deep well + river 
D 1. Deep well + natural lake 
D m. Deep well + reservoir 
D n. Deep well + irrigation scheme 
D 0. Other 
48. The irrigation source used for irrigating: 
_ _,. D This plot only 
D Other plots as well 
49. If irrigating from a well, is it private or communal? 
Private D Communal D 
50. Distance from the main dry season water source to the plot (m) 
51. Approximate irrigation start date ( dd/mm) 
52. Approximate irrigation end date (dd/mm) 
53. Irrigation method: Sprinkler D Basin D 
54. Number of irrigations during the dry season: 
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55. Are the irrigations spaced approximately the same number of days 
apart? 
Yes D NoO 
56. Do you apply more irrigation water to the tree in the earlier (first and 
second) irrigations? 
Yes D NoO 
57. How long on average does it take to irrigate the plot (days)? 
58. Calculate total irrigation time for the dry season here(= number of 
irrigations • the average irrigation time 
59. Of the total irrigation time, 
a. How much family labor time was used to irrigate the crop 
b. How much hired labor time was used to irrigate the crop 
60. Cost of hired labor for irrigation per day 
Coffee irrigation basin observations 
This data is obtained to enable estimation of the total plot irrigation volume 
- THIS MUST BE DONE IN THE COFFEE FIELD AND OBSERVATIONS 
MUST BE SPACED APART FROM ONE ANOTHER 
-
61. Basin observations: 
Basin observation Basin observation Basin observation Basin observation 
1 2 3 4 
-
-
Width (rn) 
Length (rn) 
Depth (rn) 
Average 
irrigation depth 
(rn) (farmer to 
show with hand) 
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Basin observation Basin observation Basin observation Basin observation 
1 2 3 4 
Average time to 
fill to irrigation 
depth (rnins) 
62. STOP AND CHECK TOTAL TIME TO IRRGATE 
(The figure should be approximately the same as the total labor time for 
irrigation given previously. IF IT IS NOT GO BACK AND ASK FARMER 
WHICH ONE IS MORE CORRECT AND REVISE) 
. 
a. Calculate the average time to irrigate one tree from the 4 
basin observations 
a. Calculate the total time to irrigate the plot = number of trees 
in the plot x average time to irrigate). 
63. STOP AND CHECK TOTAL IRRIGATION 
a. Calculate the average volume per tree per irrigation time = 
Ave base x Ave width x Ave depth 
b. Calculate the total volume per tree per dry season = Ave 
volume per tree per time x Number of irrigations 
c. Calculate the total irrigation volume for the plot = Trees x 
Total volume per tree per dry season 
Irrigation for plot 
Note: enumerator should ask to go to where the pipes and pump are stored and look at 
them 
64. Do you have any tube for irrigation? Yes 0No D 
(If no go to Q.71) 
65. Length of irrigation tubes used to irrigate the plot (m) 
66. Number of irrigation tubes 
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67. Average tube purchase cost (per meter) 
68. Average tube diameter (centimetre) (enumerator to measure) 
69. Minimum tube diameter (centimetre) (enumerator to measure) 
70. Do you have any pump for irrigation? Yes DNo D 
(If no go to Q81) 
71. Pump type ............................................................................................................................... . 
(if using more than one pump, ask farmer to give details of the pump they use most 
often to irrigate the plot) 
72. Pump used to irrigate this field only or other fields as well: 
OnlyD Aswell D 
73. Pump purchase cost 
74. Pump capacity (HP) 
75. Intake diameter (centimetres) 
(enumerator to measure) 
76. Average standard dry season discharge per hour (cubic meters) 
77. Average actual dry season discharge per hour 
_...., 
CHECK REPORTED ACTUAL DRY SEASON DISCHARGE AGAINST ESTIMATED TIME TO 
IRRIGATE THE PLOT. 
78. Calculate: 
a. Time to irrigate plot based on discharge== total time to 
irrigate plot I ave. actual dry season discharge per hour 
b. compare to the labor time to irrigate plot figure) 
79. Average fuel use (litres/hour) 
80. Fuel cost (VND I litre) 
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Questions about water adequacy 
Groundwater - enumerator to go to well 
81. Enough water for irrigation? 
82. Difficulties with water provision (specify) 
83. Estimated yield reduction (percent) 
84. Current depth to water table (meters) 
85. Depth to the bottom of the well (meters) 
(enumerator to measure with tape) 
86. Estimated dry season depth to the water table (meters) 
(enumet"ator to estimate with the farmer) 
87. If using a drilled well, cost of drilling well 
Surface water - enumerator to go to water source 
88. Enough water for irrigation? 
89. Difficulties with water provision (specify) 
90. Estimated yield reduction (percent) 
91. Irrigation fee VND 
Labour (mandays) 
Note enumerator to introduce topic saying "we have already talked about fertiliser, 
pesticide and irrigation mandays. Now I want to talk about labor for other activities 
performed on this plot 
92. Pruning mandays 
93. Weeding mandays 
94. Harvesting mandays 
95. Drying Mandays 
96. Husking Mandays 
97. Family mandays 
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98. Hired Labour mandays 
99. Hired labour cost per day 
Transporting mandays 
100. Other mandays 
Other costs: 
101. Coop fee 
102. Loan interest 
103. Sacks (60kg), small tools and other small costs (VND) 
104. Husking machine hire cost 
105. Land tax 
106. Other 
Production and income 
107. Total production from the plot (kg) 
108. Selling price (VND/kg) 
109. Was production hit by a natural calamity? 
Yes D No D 
110. T_>.'.}'e of calamity 
Flood D 
Hail D 
Insect I pest D 
Drought D 
Wind D 
111. Percentage yield reduction compared to normal year 
Agricultural extension services 
112. Have you ever received extension services? 
NoD 
Yes, state extension service D 
Yes,NGO D 
Yes, Other D 
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113. If yes, in what year did you last receive AES? 
114. Have you ever received extension on good coffee irrigation practices 
115. Would you be willing to pay to receive agricultural extension for 
irrigation management? 
Ill. FARM WATER SITUATION 
Groundwater 
116. Well run dry in 2005? 
117. Well run dry in 2004? 
118. Well Q.ln dry in 2003? 
119. Trend in gw table: 
D a. Same 
D b. Decrease 
D c. Increase 
D d. Don't know 
Yes D 
Yes D 
Yes D 
120. Farmer's reaction to GW table decrease 
D a. Try to save water 
D b. Get water from other well 
D c. Adjust crop structure 
D d. Investing in better pumping technology 
D e. Use SW 
D f. Decrease cropped area 
D g. Other 
D h. Do nothing 
121. Pumping GW affects the GW level of HH's well 
NoD 
NoD 
NoD 
Yes D No D Don't know D 
122. Pumping of GW affects water table in surrounding areas 
Yes D No D Don't know D 
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123. Pumping GW from surrounding areas affects level of HH's well 
Yes D No D Don'tknow D 
124. Pumping GW affects the flow rate in local rivers and streams 
Yes D No D 
125. Reasons for changes of GW level 
D a. Pumping more water 
D b. More farms 
D c. Less rain 
D d. Other 
D e. De-forestation 
D f. Too many deep v:ells 
Surface water 
126. Channel run dry in 2005 
127. Channel run dry in 2004 
128. Channel run dry in 2003 
129. Main reason for no water in channel 
Don'tknow D 
0Yes 
0Yes 
DYes 
D a. Lack of water in reservoir I river 
D b. Lack of dam 
--D c. Lack of electricity 
D d. Didn't clean delivery canals 
D e. Poor distribution from pump/weir station 
D f. No operation of weir/pump station 
D g. Breakdown on weir/dam 
D h. Dispute over water supply 
D i. More farms 
D j. Less rain 
D k. De-forestation 
130. Trend in SW supply 
D a. Same 
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D No 
D No 
D No 
D b. Decrease 
D c. Increase 
D d. Don't know 
131. Farmer's reaction to insufficient canal water 
D a. Try to save water 
D b. Get water from GW well 
D c. Adjust crop structure 
D d. Investing in on-farm water storage 
D e. Upgrade irrigation system 
D f. Decrease cropped area 
D. g. Other 
D h. Do nothing 
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Appendix 2: Soil moisture transition function estimates, regression-through-origin method 
Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
Irrigation decision stage 2 
AWn-1 0.75 3 0.05 13.91 
AW 2n-1 -1.74E-03 1.21E-03 -1.44 
Irrigation d 0.86 3 0.03 29.16 
F-statistic .5,906.98 
Irrigation decision stage 3 
AWn-1 0.65 3 0.08 8.41 
AW 2n-1 -8.14E-04 l.63E-03 -0.5 
Irrigation 0.84 3 0.06 13.83 
F -statistic 2,070.01 
Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
Irrigation decision stage 4 
AWn-1 0.53 b 0.1 5.52 
AW 2n-1 1.lOE-03 1.86E-03 0.59 
Irrigation 0,77 3 0.08 10.03 
F-statistic 1,632.42 
Irrigation decision stage 5 
AWn-1 0.44 3 0.07 6.03 
AW 2n-1 3.29E-03 b 1.30E-03 2.53 
Irrigation 0.71 3 0.06 12.42 
F-statistic 3,162.90 
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Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
AWn-1 
AW 2n-1 
Irrigation 
F-statistic 
AWn-1 
AW 2n-1 
Irrigation 
F -statistic 
Irrigation decision stage 6 
0.21 3 0.06 
6.46E-03 b 1.15E-03 
0.8 3 0.05 
3,521.70 
Irrigation decision stages 7 and 8 
0.31 3 0.03 
3.89E-03 • 4.87E-04 
0.81 3 0.03 
46,914.42 
3.33 
5.61 
17.22 
9.4 
7.99 
28.34 
Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
Irrigation decision stage 9 
AWn-1 0.26 a 0.03 9.79 
AW 2n-1 3.22E-03 • 4.57E-04 7.05 
Irrigation 0.94 a 0.02 40.58 
F-statistic 18,529.88 
Irrigation decision stage 10 
AWn-1 0.38 a 0.04 9.43 
AW 2n-1 2.SlE-03 8.20E-04 3.06 
Irrigation .0.92 a 0.03 35.33 
F-statistic 10,827.50 
Irrigation decision stage 11 
AWn-1 0.39 a 0.03 13.51 
I\ 
Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE ·' t-rat10 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
AW 2n-1 2.75E-03 b 5.70E-04 4.83 
Irrigation 0.91 a 0.03 35.94 
F -statistic 18,585.15 
Irrigation decision stage 12 
AWn-1 0.38 a 0.02 15.31 
AW 2n-1 3.02E-03 b 4.66E-04 6.48 
Irrigation 0.93 a 0.02 42.28 
F-statistic 21,504.20 
Irrigation decision stage 13 
AWn-1 0.34 a 0.03 12.77 
AW 2n-1 3.47E-03 • 5.11E-04 6.79 
Irrigation 0.98 a 0.02 43.27 
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Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
F -statistic 20,786.86 
Irrigation decision stages 14 and 15 
AWn-1 0.32 a 0.02 19.71 
AW 2n-1 3.55E-03 • 2.84E-04 12.52 
Irrigation 0.97 a O.Ql 75.21 
F -statistic 65,177.12 
Irrigation decision stage 16 
AWn-1 0.29 a 0.03 9.98 
AW 2n-1 4.lOE-03 • 5.38E-04 7.62 
Irrigation 0.99 a 0.02 48.36 
F-statistic 25,257.02 
Irrigation decision stages 17-19 
Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE 
I\ 
t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
AWn-1 0.31 a O.ol 25.1 
AW 2n-1 3.31E-03 a 2.43E-04 13.59 
Irrigation 0.98 8 0.01 102.54 
F -statistic 96,412.62 
Irrigation decision stage 20-23 
AWn-1 0.28 a 0.01 28.21 
AW 2n-1 3.81E-03 8 l.81E-04 21.06 
Irrigation 0.99 a 0.01 123.94 
F -statistic 76,432.15 
Irrigation decision stage 24 and 25 
AWn-1 0.28 a 0.01 28.21 
AW 2n-1 3.81E-03 a l.81E-04 21.06 
Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
Irrigation 0.99 a O.ol 123.94 
F-statistic 68,849.58 
Irrigation decision stage 26 
AWn-1 0.22 a O.ol 18.29 
AW 2n-1 3.79E-03 • 2.45E-04 19.67 
Irrigation 1.00 8 0.01 92.54 
F -statistic 45,631,94 
Irrigation decision stage 27 
AWn-1 0.19 8 0.02 10.68 
AW 2n-1 5.62E-03 • 2.92E-04 19.22 
Irrigation 1.00 a 0.02 66.76 
F-statistic 39,522.38 
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Appendix Table 2.1 Soil moisture transition 
function regression-through-origin estimates 
Variable Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: initial soil moisture, irrigation decision 
stage K , millimetres 
Irrigation decision stage 28 
AWn-1 0.28 8 O.ol 25.11 
AW 2n-1 3.79E-03 • 2.45E-04 15.46 
Irrigation 1.00 8 O.ol 120.6 
F-statistic 27,385.45 
Irrigation decision stage 29 
AWn-1 0.29 a 0.01 31.11 
AW 2n-1 4.54E-03 a l.84E-04 24.7 
Irrigation 1.00 8 0.01 138.6 
F-statistic 19,886.34 
Irrigation decision stage 30 
AWn-1 0.36 a 0.02 15.97 
AW 2n-1 
Irrigation 
F-statistic 
4.0lE-03 • 4.76E-04 
0.97 a 0.02 
19,417.39 
8.42 
52.83 
I I 
Notes: •band c indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per 
cent levels respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
d Irrigation = !Rl( 
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Appendix Table 2.2 Yield ratio function Appendix Table 2.2 Yield ratio function Appendix Table 2.2 Yield ratio function 
regression-through-origin estimates regression-through-origin estimates regression-through-origin estimates 
• 
Coefficient SE t-ratio Coefficient SE t-ratio Coefficient SE t-ratio 
Dependent variable: relative yield, irrigation decision stage Irrigation decision stage 9-10 AW' 0.09 a l.18E-03 76.11 
K AW' 0.10 a 1.26E-03 78.58 AW' -3.l lE-03 a 7.99E-05 -38.92 
Irrigation decision stage 1-6 AW' 
-3.81E-03 a l.09E-04 -34.80 AW' 5.03E-05 a 1.83E-06 27.55 
AW'' 0.12 a 4.92E-03 28.75 AW' 6.92E-05 a 3.27E-06 21.18 AW' -3.67E-07 a l.63E-08 -22.46 
AW' 
-0.01 a 5.22E-04 -15.06 AW' 
-5.88E-07 a 3.95E-08 -14.88 AW' 9.54E-10 a 4.81E-11 19.85 
AW' l.29E-04 • 1.98E-05 10.31 AW' 1.88E-09 • 1.64E-10 11.42 F-statistic 49,881.24 
AW4 
-1.36E-06 • 3.17E-07 -7.57 
F-statistic 92,639.16 Irrigation decision stage 16 
AW' 5.36E-09 • 1.83E-09 5.69 
Irrigation decision stage 11-13 AW' 0.04 • 2.SlE-03 15.77 
F-statistic 24,301.06 0.09 a 9.90E-04 93.76 AW' -3.33E-04 b 1.53E-04 -2.17 AW' 
Irrigation decision stage 7 -8 
AW' AW' 
-3.32E-03 • 7.13E-05 -46.63 -3.24E-06 3.17E-06 -1.02 
AW' o.n a 1.85E-03 58.69 
AW' 5.57E-05 • 1.74E-06 31.97 AW' 5.38E-08 b 2.58E-08 2.09 AW' 
-4.66E-03 • 1.52E-04 -30.63 
AW4 
-4.27E-07 a 1.69E-08 -25.27 AW' -1.72E-10 b 6.88E-11 -2.51 AW' 9.68E-05 • 4.47E-06 21.63 
AW' 1.20E-09 • 5.SlE-11 21.70 F-statistic 9,107.86 AW' 
-9.58E-07 a 5.58E-08 -17.18 
AW' 3.62E-09 • 2.49E-10 14.53 F-statistic 
Irrigation decision stage 1 7 -19 
Irrigation decision stage 14-15 AW' 0.05 • 1.75E-03 26.58 
F-statistic 99,065.76 
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Appendix Table 2.2 Yield ratio function Appendix Table 2.2 Yield ratio function 
regression-through-origin estimates regression-through-origin estimates 
Coefficient SE t-ratio Coefficient SE t-ratio 
- ------- -
AW' 
-8.06E-04 • l.03E-04 -7.82 AW' 1.12E-04 • 6.44E-06 17.38 
AW' 7.31E-06 a 2.02E-06 3.61 AW' -1.17E-06 • 8.91E-08 -13.13 
AW' 
-3.28E-08 b 1.54E-08 -2.13 AW' 4.63E-09 • 4.35E-10 10.63 
AW' 5.65E-11 3.81E-11 1.48 F-statistic 79,580.82 
F-statistic 11,338.92 Irrigation decision stage 26-30 
Irrigation decision stage 20-23 AW' 0.17 a 6.31E-03 27.12 
AW1 0.12 a 4.81E-03 24.56 AW' -1.20E-02 • 8.76E-04 -13.70 
AW2 
-0.01 a 5.26E-04 -11.09 AW' 4.18E-04 • 4.42E-05 9.44 
AW' 1.44E-04 • 2.07E-05 6.96 AW' -7.15E-06 • 9.65E-07 -7.41 
AW' 
-l.74E-06 • 3.47E-07 -5.02 AW' 4.82E-08 • 7.69E-09 6.27 
AW' 8.27E-09 • 2.lOE-09 3.94 F-statistic 
F-statistic - .l\btes: •band c indicate statistical significance at the l, 5, and 10 
Irrigation decision stage 24-25 per cent levels respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
AW1 0.11 a 2.07E-03 54.13 dAWn =AW;: 
AW' 
-5.08E-03 • l.95E-04 -26.11 
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SETS 
i crops I rice I 
j irrigation interval I 11 *130 I 
jfirst first irri period ; 
*Part 1 
jfirst(j) = yes$(ord(j) eq l); 
display jfirst; 
I\ 
Appendix 3: Rice irrigation GAMS code 
TABLE smcons(i,j) (mm) This coefficient describes constant on the residual soil moisture carryover from 
the previous week. 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
10.91 
rice 1.000 1.594 3.865 6.928 9.550 9 7.532 4.080 0.000 0.000 2.564 3.097 6.627 4.227 3.921 5.147 5.462 4.599 9.678 6.476 4.013 4.013 4.013 7.088 5.598 3.004 3.004 3.004 3.004 -3.00; 
10.91 
•rice 1.000 1.594 3.865 6.928 9.550 9 7.532 4.080 3.073 4.459 2.564 3.097 6.627 4.227 3.921 5.147 5.462 4.599 9.678 6.476 4.013 4.013 4.013 7.088 5.598 3.004 3.004 3.004 3.004 -3.003; 
TABLE smcoeff(i,j) (mm) This coefficient describes residual soil moisture carryover from the previous week. 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
rice 1.000 0.713 0.721 0.784 0.782 0.756 0.691 0.510 ·0.430 0.539 0.559 0.577 0.679 0.581 0.558 0.583 0.585 0.571 0.703 0.668 0.546 0.546 0.546 0.661 0.551 0.560 0.560 0.560 0.560 
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I\ 
0.56 
•rice 1.000 0.713 0.721 0.784 0.782 0.756 0.691 0.510 0.477 0.607 0.559 0.577 0.679 0.581 0.558 0.583 0.585 0.571 0.703 0.668 0.546 0.546 0.546 0.661 0.551 0.560 0.560 0.560 0.5600.56 
TABLE irrcoeff(i,j) irrigation coefficients week j (mm). Describes a linear soil moisture recharge from 
irrigation 
II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
rice 0.919 0.919 0.897 0.795 0.851 0.852 0.797 0.894 0.867 0.829 0.914 0.930 0.959 0.977 0.984 0.993 0.991 0.973 1.006 0.902 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.930 1.007 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.9690.97 
•rice 0.919 0.919 0.897 0.795 0.851 0.852 0.797 0.894 0.933 0.925 0.914 0.930 0.959 0.977 0.984 0.993 0.991 0.973 1.006 0.902 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.930 1.007 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.9690.97 
TABLE yldcoeff(i,j) crop relative yield response to soil moisture "1 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
rice 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.108 0.108 0.099 0.099 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.090 0.090 0.040 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.112 0.112 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.1710.17 
TABLE yldcoeff2(i,j) crop relative yield response to soil moisture "2 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
rice -0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.01 
TABLE yldcoeff3(i,j) crop relative yield response to soil moisture "3 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
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\ 
1.3E- 1.3E- 1.3E- 1.3E- 1.3E- 9.7E- 9.7E- 6.9E- 6.9E- 5.6E- 5.6E- 5.6E- 5.0E- 5.0E- 3.2E- 7.3E- 7.3E- 7.3E- 1.4E- 1.4E- 1.4E- 1.4E- 1.lE- 1.lE- 4.2E- 4.2E- 4.2E- 4.2E- 4.2E-
rice l.3E-04 04 04 04 04 04 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 06 06 06 06 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 
TABLE yldcoeff4(i,j) crop relative yield response to soil moisture A4 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
1.4E- 1.4E- 1.4E- 1.4E- l.4E- 9.6E- 9.6E- 5.9E- 5.9E- 4.3E- 4.3E- 4.3E- 3.7E- 3.7E- 5.4E- 3.3E- 3.3E- 3.3E- 1.7E- 1.7E- 1.7E- 1.7E- 1.2E- 1.2E- 7.2E- 7.2E- 7.2E- 7.2E- 7.2E-
rice -1.4E-06 06 06 06 06 06 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 
TABLE yldcoeff5(i,j) crop relative yield response to soil moisture AS 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110 Ill 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 
5.4E- 5.4E- 5.4E- 5.4E- 5.4E- 3.6E- 3.6E- 1.9E- 1.9E- 1.2E- 1.2E- 1.2E- 9.SE- 9.SE- 1.7E- 5.7E- 5.7E- 5.7E- 8.3E- 8.3E- 8.3E- 8.3E- 4.6E- 4.6E- 4.8E- 4.8E- 4.8E- 4.8E- 4.8E-
rice 5.4E-09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 10 10 10 11 11 11 09 09 09 09 09 09 08 08 08 08 08 
PARAMETERS 
MaxBiomass(i) maximum crop biomass I rice 6500 I 
smO(i) initial avail soil moisture (mm) (saturation) I rice 32 I 
R(i) sales revenue per kg (VND'OOO) I rice 2 I 
IrrCost Variable irrigation cost (VND'OOO) per ha mm I 1.420 I 
FIC(i) fixed per irrigation cost (VND'OOO) I rice 0 I 
FC(i) fixed cost per ha - all other costs (VND'OOO) I rice 8505 I 
TWW total water available mm I 625 I 
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T AL ha land available I 1 I 
VARIABLES 
FY(i) final relative multiplicative yield 
FB(i) final biomass 
GM(i) gross margin 
NM(i) net margin 
obj OBJECTIVE 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
is Yld(i,j) 
fin Yld(i,j) 
Irr(i,j) mm irrigation per crop i week j 
sm(i,j) soil moisture crop i week j (mm) 
A(i) land allocation (ha) 
I I 
\ 
Irrc(i,j) variable irrigation costs per ha for crop i week j per cubic meter 
EQUATIONS 
IrrCst(i,j) Irrigation cost per ha crop i in week j 
sminitial(i,j) Soil moisture transition equation initial 
smtrans(i,j) Soil moisture transition equation (Equation 5) 
is Yield(i,j) 
fin Yield(i,j) 
Fin Y(i) final relative yield for inclusion in net benefit model - product of the stage yields 
FinBiomass(i 
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GrossMargin(i) 
NetMargin(i) 
objective function 
*objective .. obj =E= sum(i, A(i)*(FB(i))) 
*the real objective is .... 
I\ 
\ 
objective .. obj =E= sum(i, A(i)*(FB(i)*R(i)-(sum(j,Irrc(i,j)+ FIC(i))) )-FC(i)) 
* soil moisture transition equation Part 2 
sminitial(i,j)$(jfirst(j)) .. sm(i,j) 
=E= smO(i)+(irrcoeff(i,j)*Irr(i,j) ) 
smtrans(i,j)$(not jfirst(j)) .. sm(i,j) 
=E= smcons(i,j) + (smcoeff(i,j)*sm(i,j-1) ) + 
(irrcoeff(i,j)*lrr(i,j) ); 
*this is the relative yield calculated as a polynomial 
function of the soil moisture 
is Yield(i,j) .. is Yld(i,j) 
=e= (yldcoeff(i,j)*sm(i,j)) 
+ (yldcoeff2(i,j)*(sm(i,j)**2)) 
+ (yldcoeff3(i,j)*(sm(i,j)**3)) 
+ (yldcoeff4(i,j)*(sm(i,j)**4)) 
+ (yldcoeff5(i,j)*(sm(i,j)**5)) 
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*this is the smoothed yield function 
fin Yield(i,j) .. fin Yld(i,j) 
=E= -(SQRT(sqr(-(is Yld(i,j)) 
+ l)+sqr(0.001))-(is Yld(i,j)) +1)/2+1 
* Irrigation cost converted to cubic meters 
IrrCst(i,j) .. lrrc(i,j) =E= IrrCost*Irr(i,j) 
FinY(i) .. FY(i) =E= (prod(j,finYld(i,j))) 
I I 
FinBiomass(i) .. FB(i) =e= (MaxBiomass(i)*FY(i)) 
GrossMargin(i) .. GM(i) =e= FB(i)*R(i)-(sum(j,Irrc(i,j))) 
NetMargin(i) .. NM(i) =e= GM(i):-FC(i) 
*Static constraints 
land .. sum(i, A(i)) =L= TAL 
water .. sum((i,j), Irr(i,j)) =L= TWW 
MODEL DakLakEToSO_Rice I ALL I 
sm.lo(i,j) = 20 ; 
*option nlp=minosS; 
*DakLakEToSO_Rice.optfile=l ; 
SOLVE DakLakEToSO_Rice USING NLP 
MAXIMISING obj 
\ 
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Appendix 3: Household water demand survey 
Name of interviewee: _______ _ 
Date of interview: _______ starting time: ____ ending time: ___ _ 
Address: ________ _ 
Code: ___ _ (interviewer to fill) 
Introduction 
Dear sir/madam, 
This is a survey done by HCM University of Economics with collaboration of Tay Nguyen 
Uni. Its purpose is to understand the usage and water quality at your household. 
In this research, we ask many households in Buon Ma Thuat. Now we like to ask you 
some questions. Please be assured that the information you provide will only be used for 
this research. 
If there is anything unclear, please let us know. We will try to explain. 
There is no wrong or right answer. We just like to know about your current water usage. 
[For enumerator: if possible both wife and husband of the household should be invited to 
attend] 
1. Source and usage of domestic water: 
1. Sources of 
water that are 
available to Private 
your Pipe drilled Public Bottled Water 
River Other household. water well well water Container 
(Circle water 
appropriate 
boxes) 
2. Sources of Private 
water that 
Pipe drilled Public Bottled Water 
currently are River Other 
water well well water Container 
used by your 
water household? 
2. Sources and expenses of domestic water 
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[Enumerator: the purpose of this section is to investigate expenses of domestic water use 
for the sources that are currently in use (results in box 2 above) 
3. In the dry season, does your household use D Yes 
similar amount of water as in the rainy season? D No 
DNotsure 
2.1.Pipe water 
4. Does your household share the water use DYes 
measuring equipment with the neighbour DNo 
(or use pipe water from the neighbour)? 
5. What do you think about the overall D:cy: season Rain;y season 
quality of pipe water (turbidity, odour, 0 Very good 0 Very 
taste) in the dry and rainy seasons? 0 Good good 
0 Average 0 Good 
0 Bad 0 Average . 
0 Bad 
6. Can you tell me the tariff for pipe water? D Correct description 
[Enumerator: ask respondents to answer D Incorrect description (note 
without looking at the water bill. Compare the down the answer) 
answer with the standard rate of 
2,250VND/cm3] D Can't describe/do not know 
7. Can you tell me about the monthly bills Amount Cost 
from March to July this year? (m3) (VND) 
[Enumerator: ask the respondents to show the Jul 
bills, note down amounts of water used and 
Jun 
costs} 
May 
Apr 
_ ...., 
Mar 
8. Have you experienced water shortage in the past DYes 
12 months? DNo 
-
-9. How do these water outages D Substantial inconvenience 
inconvenience you D Some inconvenience 
D Limited inconvenience 
D No inconvenience 
10. What did you do to cope with the water D Did nothing (storage capacity 
shortage? in house is enough) 
.0 Saved water 
D Changed to another source 
D Other 
2.2 Well water 
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[Enumerator: ask this section if the household uses well water} 
11. Which type of well does your household D dug well 
have: drilled well or dug well? D drilled well 
12. What do you think about the overall Dry: season Rain)!: season 
water quality (turbidity, odour, taste) in 0 Very good 0 Very good 
dry and rainy seasons? 0 Good 0 Good 
0 Average 0 Average 
0 Bad 0 Bad 
13. Do you use hand pump or motorised D motorised pump (go to Q 14) 
pump to bring the water up? D hand pump (go to QI 9 & 20) 
14. Do you use a separate pump for sucking DYes 
groundwater and another pump for 
transporting water to different rooms (which DNo 
means you use two motorised pumps)? 
15. If you have a motorised pump for your 
well what is the HP? 
16. What year was the pump installed? 
(record the year) 
17. What was the approximate cost of the 
pump?(VND) 
18. Approximately how much water do you 
pump each day? (m3) 
19. If you use a hand pump or a 
bucket, how many buckets a day do you 
draw? (unit/day) 
20. What is the capacity of the bucket? (litre) 
21. Have you experienced water shortage in the D Yes-> go to Q22 
past 12 months? D No -> go to Q24 
--
22. How do these water outages D Substantial inconvenience 
inconvenience you D Some inconvenience 
D Limited inconvenience 
D No inconvenience. 
23. What did you do to cope with the water D Used more pipe water 
shortage? D Saved well water 
D Dug new well 
D Other 
3. Water storage tanks 
24. Do you have in- house water shortage? DYes 
D No (Go to Q30) 
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25. Which water goes to the in-house D Pipe water 
storage? D Ware from private wells 
D Water from public wells 
D River water 
D Water bought from water 
containers 
D Other 
26. What type(s) of storage do you have? D Storage tank for booster pump 
D Storage tank no booster pump 
DDrum 
D Bucket 
D Other 
27. What is the total volume of storage 
(m3)? 
28. What year was it installed? 
29. What was the cost for its installation 
(VND)? 
4. Domestic water treatment 
. 
For Meal Drinking Cleaning Laundry Gardening 
bathing preparation 
30. Sources 
Can you tell me the treatment methods for each activity 
31. Do not 
D D D D D D 
treat 
32. Running 
water until it 
becomes D D D D D D 
clean. 
33. Running 
water into 
the stei"age 
and wait until D D D D D D 
impurities 
sink 
38. J3oiling 
-
D D D D D D 
water 
39. Using a 
fabric filter D D D D D D 
cloth 
40. Using a 
filter (other) D D D D D D 
[Pipe water=l; well water=2; public well water=3; bottled water=4; water bought 
from water container=5; river water=6; other=7] 
5. Alternatives of water use 
We suppose that the water price changes (increases or decreases), and when the· water 
price changes, we would like to know 1) whether your household will change the 
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amount of water and 2) if yes, we will work with you to estimate how much the change 
will be. 
Scenario 1 
Suppose that: 
Pipe water price increase from 2,250 to 15,000 VND/m3• 
Costs of water from other sources stay the same. (Cost of pumping water from 
drilled well remains unchanged, cost of buying bottled water remains unchanged 
etc.) 
If your household pipe water usage stay the same, .... m3/month, the cost for pipe water 
increases from VND/month to ..... VND/month 
[Enumerator: calculate the new cost by multiplying 15,000 VND by the amount of water 
usage] 
37. At this cost, will you change the water consumption (i.e. use more or less water for a 
certain activity)? 
DYes 
D No Why not? ........................................... . 
[Enumerator: note that if the respondent says no, need to ask for sure whether the 
household will change water usage] 
[Ifyes]we will work with you to estimate how the amount of water changes and how the 
total cost of water use a month changes. 
[Enumerator: go to the table in the next page, help the respondent complete column 1 to 
8] 
Scenario 2 
Suppose that: 
Pipe water price increase to 25,000VND/m3• 
Costs of water from other sources stay the same. (Cost of pumping water from 
drilled well remains unchanged, cost of buying bottled water remains unchanged 
etc.) 
If your household pipe water usage stays the same, .... m3/month, the cost for pipe water 
increases from .... VND/month to ..... VND/month [Enumerator: calculate the new cost by 
multiplying 25,000 VND by the amount of water usage] 
38. Will you change water consumption (i.e. use more or less water for a certain activity)? 
DYes 
D No Why not? ........................................... . 
[Enumerator: note that if the respondent says no, need to ask for sure whether the 
household will change water usage] 
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[Ifyes]we will work with you to estimate how the amount of water changes and how the 
total cost of water use a month changes. 
[Enumerator: go to the table in the next page, help the respondent complete column 9 to 
12] 
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Ba thin 
the meals 
Hygiene/W ashing/cleani 
ng 
Business 
Total 
Scenario 1: Pipe water price increases 
Source I Cost I Amoun I Cost(VND 
(VND/m3 t of ' ) 
) 
(5) (6) 
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water 
used a 
day 
(m3) 
(7) (8) 
Scenario 2: Pipe water price decreases 
Source I Cost I Amoun I Cost(VND/mont 
(VND/m3 t of h) 
) 
(9) (10) 
water 
used a 
day 
(m3) 
(11) (12) 
[Enumerator: column (4), (8), (12) calculate for 1 month. Should estimate cost for 1 
day and multiply by 30, i.e (4)=(2)x(3}x30xl000 and (8}=(6)x(7)x30 and 
(12}=(10}x{ll}x30x1000} [Pipe water price is 2,250 VNDI m3 j 
f Source Pipe water=l; well water=2; public well water=3; bottled water=4; water 
bought from water container=5; river water=6; other=7} 
37.1 When the pipe water price increases to 15,000 VND, with the new monthly water 
cost-as calculated, you 
D would change consumption 
D reconsider and would not change consumption 
38.1 When the pipe water price increases to 25,000 VND, with the new monthly water 
cost as calculated, you 
D would change consumption 
D reconsider and would not change consumption 
Scenario 3 (for households use drillM well) 
Suppose that: 
Cost for pumping well water increases from 450VND/m3 to 1,500 VND/m3 Now 
the cost for drilled well water will be higher. 
Price of pipe water remains unchanged. Costs of water from other sources remain 
unchanged. 
The amount of well water consumed by your household a day is ... m3 (Q 18) 
If your well water usage stays the same, ... m3/month, the cost for pumping well water 
will increase from VND/month to ..... VND/month [Enumerator: calculate the new cost by 
multiplying 15,000 VND by the amount of well water usage} 
39. At this cost, will you change well water usage (i.e. use more or less water for a certain 
activity or change to another source)? 
DYes 
DNo 
[Enumerator: note that if the respondent says no, need to ask for sure whether the 
household will change water usage} 
[Ifyes}we will work with you to estimate how the amount of water changes and how the 
total cost of water use a month changes. 
[Enumerator: go to the table in the next page, help the respondent complete column 1 to 
BJ 
Scenario4 
Suppose that: 
Cost for pumping well water increases from 450VND/m3 to 2,500 VND/m3 Now 
the cost for drilled well water will be higher. 
Price of pipe water remains unchanged. Costs of water from other sources remain 
unchanged. 
The amount of well water consumed by your household a day is ... m3 (Q 18) 
If your household well water usage stays the same, ... m3/month, the cost for pumping 
well water will increase from VND/month to ..... VND/month [Enumerator: calculate the 
new cost by multiplying 25,000 VND by the amount of well water usage j 
40. At this cost, will you change well water usage (i.e. use more or less water for a certain 
activity)? 
DYes 
DNo 
[Enumerator: note that if the respondent says no, need to ask for sure whether the 
household will change water usage j 
[If yes j we will work with you to estimate how the amount of water changes and how the 
total cost of water use a month changes. 
[Enumerator: go to the table in the next page, help the respondent complete column 9 to 
12] 
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Scenario 3: Cost for pumping well water increases Scenario 2: Cost for pumping well water 
(1,500 VND/m3 ) increases (2,500 VND/m3 ) 
Source• I Cost I Amount Cost(VND) Source• Cost Amount I Cost(VND) 
(VND/m3) of water (VND/m3) of water 
used a used a 
day day 
(m3) (m3) 
(5) I (6) I (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) I (12) 
Business 
Total 
[Enumerator: column (4), (8), (12) calculate for I month. Should estimate cost for 1 day and multiply by 30, ie (4)=(2)x(3)x30x1000 and (8)=(6)x(7)x30 and 
(12)=(10)x(JJ)x3x1000} [Pipe water price is 2,250 VND/m3} 
f Source Pipe water=]; well water=2; public well water=3; bottled water=4; water bought from water container=5; river water=6; other=7} 
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39.1 When the pipe water price increases to 15,000 VND, with the new monthly water 
cost as calculated, you 
D would change consumption 
D reconsider and would not change consumption 
40.1 When the pipe water price increases to 25,000 VND, with the new monthly water 
cost as calculated, you 
D would change consumption 
D reconsider and would not change consumption 
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6. Socio-economic profile 
41. How old are you? Man 
Woman 
42. Gender DMale 
D Female 
D Both joined the interview 
43. Household size (number of members Number Adult (age>16) 
living in the past five months) 
Number minors (age 6- 16) 
Number children (age <6) 
44. What is your main occupation? (the D Farming- main crop is coffee 
occupation that earns most) D Farming - planting just some coffee 
D Official 
D State-owned business 
D Private business 
. 
D Self- employed 
D Student 
DOther 
45. If a farmer, approximately how many 
hectares do you farm? 
46. Highest education level DPrimary 
D Secondary 
D High school 
D Vocational school 
D College 
D University 
D No official schooling 
47. What is your approximate monthly 
household income from all sources? 
(Including money transfers from the outside) 
48. Do you have business at home? DYes 
DNo 
49. Type of business? D selling goods/tailor/bike fixing 
D Cafe/restaurant 
D Car/bike washing 
D Other 
Appendix 4: Randomised payment card 
contingent valuation survey 
QUESTIONNAIR ON WATER SOURCE IN DAKLAK 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Thi~ is a survey done by HCM University of Economics in collaboration with Tay Nguyen 
University, Australian National University and Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment of Vietnam. The objective of this survey is to understand your view on 
water management plan in Dak Lak. 
You are one of a large number of households chosen to be asked. The interview may last 
for about 60 minutes. The information you provide will only be used for this research. 
Throughout the interview, please do not hesitate to ask if you have any question. We 
would try to explain. 
There is no wrong or right answer. We just would like to know your view. 
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Full Name of interviewee: 
Address: 
Date of interview: 
No: ___ _ 
Section I: Water source information 
1) In your opinion, what is the most important matter in Dak Lak? 
Jn the right column complete 1= the most important; 2= the second important; 3= the 
third important 
Matter Rank 
a. Education 
b. Hunger elimination and poverty reduction 
c. Economic development and employment 
d. Agriculture encouraging programs and seminars 
e. Govetnment management 
f. Anti- crime programs 
g. Health care 
h. Natural resource preservation 
i. Implementation of programs on controlling pollution and waste 
j. Infrastructure (road, electricity and water) 
k. Others, please specify: 
Can you tell us your understanding of rivers and streams in Dak Lak 
Dry season Rainy season 
(From April to November) 
1) How often do 
you go to these D Everyday D Everyday 
rivers or streams? D Every week D Every week 
D Every fortnight D Every fortnight 
D Every month D Every month 
D Several times D Several times 
D Once D Once 
D Never D Never 
Go to QI 0 if the respondent says "Never" for both two seasons. 
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2) Do you often go to only one or many 
river(s)/stream(s)? 
D Only one main river/stream 
D Many rivers/streams 
3)Can you tell us your main objective when 
going the river/stream? 
D Use water for agricultural 
cultivation 
can choose more than one answer D Use water for non- agricultural 
activities (washing) 
D Use water for domestic 
activities 
D Entertainment 
D River transportation 
D Fishing 
D Others, please 
4) About the river/stream you often go to D Big river 
most, we would call it your main 
river/stream. Can you tell us its most likely D Average river 
Enumerator: choose one appropriate answer. If D 
the respondent knows the name of his/her 
main river/stream, what is it D 
Small river/big stream 
Average stream 
D Small stream 
5) What do you think about the main D Very good 
river/stream in general? 
D Good 
D Average 
D Bad 
D Verybad 
D Do not know, not sure 
6) ~at do you think about the flow of the D Increase substantially 
main river/stream in dry season for the 
past 5 months? D Increase minimally 
D Notchange 
D Decrease minimally 
D D_ecrease substantially 
D Do not know, not sure 
7) What do you think about the flow of the D Very high 
main river/stream in dry season 
Go to Q9 if the respondent chooses ''Low';· 
D High 
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specify 
Go to QJO if the respondent chooses other 
options. 
7) In your opinion, what is the cause for the 
low flow in the main river? 
D Low 
D Dryout 
D Donotknow 
_No cause, just 
phenomenon 
Complete 1= the most important cause; 2= the 
_Small water amount 
second important cause; 3= the third important 
cause. _Irrigation 
_For municipal water 
_Lake storage 
_Deforestation 
_Do not know 
_Other 
natural 
Now, we would like to know your opinion about water resource management plan. The 
following questions are about not only your local water resources but also other water 
things in Dak Lakin general. Please tell us whether you Strongly agree, Agree, Neither 
agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree with the following statements. 
8) The good functioning of D Strongly agree 
rivers/streams and water systems rn 
Dak Lak are important despite the 
fact I have never visited them. 
9) We are responsible for protecting 
water system for our future 
generations. 
10) The Dak Lak local government should 
make policy on encouraging the 
water use for agriculture even when 
this can result in water source 
running out in dry season 
D Agree 
D Neither agree nor disagree 
D Disagree 
D Strongly disagree 
D Strongly agree 
D Agree 
D Neither agree nor disagree 
D Disagree 
D Strongly disagree 
D Strongly agree 
D Agree 
D Neither agree nor disagree 
D Disagree 
D Strongly disagree 
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Now, we would like to know your opinion about ground water in Dak Lak and your 
understanding about ground water management. 
11) What sources of ground water do you 
D Pipe water 
use? 
Tick the appropriate boxes. D Private well 
Go to Ql 4 if the household uses well D Public well 
water (private or public). If not, go to 
Section2 D Bottled water 
D Water Container 
D River water 
12) What do you use ground water for? D Irrigation 
Can choose more than one answer 
13) Artesian water in dry season is 
getting fewer and it is more difficult to 
draw water for the past 5 years? 
Go to Q16 if the respondent chooses 
"Strongly agree" or "Agree"; Go to Q16 if 
the respondent chooses other option 
14) In your opinion, what are the three 
most important causes for the change 
in ground water 
--Complete 1 for the most important cause, 
2 for the second and 3 for the third . 
15) How often does your well get dry for 
the past 3 years? 
D Household activities 
D Animal raising 
D Other 
D Strongly agree 
D Agree 
D Neither agree nor disagree 
D Disagree 
D Strongly disagree 
D Do not know/ not sure 
_ Use water for agricultural cultivation 
_ Change in number of farmers 
_ Water for municipal use 
_ Decrease in rainfall 
_ Change in rainfall 
_ Deforestation 
__ Not sure 
D Never 
D Once 
D Twice 
D Three times 
D More than 3 times 
16) Do you think that pumping water D Yes 
from your well will affect the water 
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reserve of neighbouring well? 
D No 
D Notsure 
SECTION 2: WATER QUALITY IMPROVING PROGRAM IN DAKLAK 
This section provides information about the current water use in Dak Lak and a water 
improving program in Dak Lak .. 
THE CURRENT SITUATION 
• The increasing population results in the densely located wells. 
• The land for planting coffee accounts for 55% and agriculture land 75%. 
Coffee plants require huge amount of water for their best output. 
• More than half of irrigation water in dry season is from ground water source. 
The rest comes from natural lakes, streams or artificial lakes. Ground water is 
constituted from rain water in rainy season. 
• Deforestation reduces the ability to absorb water of soil. 
• Water sources of most of rivers and current in Dak Lak are from ground 
water. The decrease in river/stream flow results from the decreasing ground 
water amount. 
FUTURE RISKS 
The increasing demand for water places huge burden on water sources, especially ground 
water. According to experts, if the demand for water in dry season continues increasing in 
future: 
• Ground water level will continue decreasing, leading to the increase in the 
number of running out wells. 
• Many currents will become arid in dry season, causing water level in 
rivers/streams get even lower, and many rivers/streams become more 
exhausted in dry season. 
• The decrease in river/stream flow can lead to the decrease in water quality. 
Besides, this can have bad impacts on the environment such as: decreasing 
the habitat of fish and other aquarium and degrading environmental 
functions. 
water source management program proposal 
There have been studies on improving the water shortage in dry season in Dak Lak. 
Residents are encouraged to use water more effectively. However, since water is one of 
their necessities, it is hard to make these people reduce their water consumption. 
Several studies on agriculture in Dak Lak show that many coffee farmers can reduce their 
irrigation in dry season without affecting the coffee output. The study has been carried 
out in 6 farm samples in Kron Pak district. About 150 coffee planting households attended 
this seminar. Most of them found that they could reduce their irrigation in dry season 
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without reducing the coffee output and quality. These household also saved themselves 
from cost and labour for irrigation. Most of coffee farmers do not know this result. 
A water management program can be implemented to improve the water situation in Dale 
Lale. The program will introduce a successful model of Krong Pale. In particular, the 
program will organise seminars for coffee farmers. Its objective is to provide farmers with 
skills to use water effectively including optimal irrigating time, irrigating techniques and 
optimal irrigating water and knowledge about the negative effects of over irrigation. The 
program involves seminars, visits to the model province and real life training. 
The' program lasts for 5 years. An organisation needs established to implement the above 
activities. It is proposed that Dale Lale people committee assign a management board of the 
Dale Lale water management program. This board is responsible for supervising the 
program. Seminars in the program will be hold by successful organisations or bodies in 
KrongPale. 
According to experts, the water management program can play a substantial role in the 
protecting water sources in Dale Lale. One of the main interests of the program is to 
improve coffee farmers' irrigation habits in Dale Lak. 
If successful, the program will bring a"l?out the following benefits: 
• More ground water in dry season and less drying out wells; 
• Increase in water flow in several big rives in dry season; 
• Water all year round in the current drying out streams in dry season; 
• Increase in water flow means enhancement in water quality, more fish in 
dry season and environmental functions. 
With the current complicated hydrography in Dak Lale, experts cannot be sure about the 
success in most of places in Dale Lale and the exact improvement level. Moreover, the 
results can vary from places to places, years to years, seasons from seasons and depend on 
the annual rainfall. 
Summary of the situation before and after the Program 
--
Ground water reserves Water flow in rivers and 
in dry season streams in dry season 
-WithoUt the program Less ground water Low water flow 
( The current situation) More dry wells Many dry streams 
Dale Lak water Increase Ill ground Increase in water flow in dry 
management program water season in big rivers 
Less dry wells Less dry small streams 
Willingness to pay for The program 
We would like to know what are you willing pay for 
- 356-
We would like to know how much you are willing to pay for the program described 
above. The implementation of the proposed program requires a huge sum of money. 
Several organisations such as Nestle can sponsor the program. However, these 
organisations require the involvement of residents and Dak Lak authorities. When 
mobilized funds are not enough, households in Dak Lak will be asked to pay the same 
amount of money. 
Please note that the objective of this survey is to collect your opinions. We would like to 
know the amount of money that can be mobilized among residents to implement the Dak 
Lak water management program. 
How to collect and manage the money? 
Residents can contribute to the program through the local government. In particular, the 
local government and a representative of the program will collect the money at your 
house in December annually. All the contributed money will be used for the Dak Lak 
water management program. All the receipts, expenditures and the progress of the project 
will be supervised by the Dak Lak People Committee and sponsors such as Nestle. 
Payment mode and time for the collection 
Suppose you are asked to pay a fixed amount annually in December for 5 years. Other 
households in Dak Lak have to pay the same amount. The money will be given to the Dak 
Lak water source management program to organise seminars for coffee farmers. 
Things to consider before answering the questions 
It is said that the residents can say the amount more that they are willing to pay for such a 
program. Perhaps, they won't give a right answer if they don't believe that they have to 
pay for the program, or their answers will minimally affect the policy making. Another 
reason is that they ignore the effect of the payment on their budget. We would like you to 
ask yourself frankly how much you are willing to pay for the program. Before answering 
the questions, consider your income and the amount you are willing to pay. This amount 
will reduce other expenditures in your family. 
I am going to give you 9 payment cards indicating a certain amount of money on each. 
Please classify these cards into 3 groups. The first group indicates the amount you are 
willing to pay for the program for 5 years. The second indicates the amount you are not 
willing to pay. The third group indicates the amount you are not sure whether you are 
willing to pay or not. You can change the category of the payment cards. Please note that 
if you are not willing to pay any amount, you can put the 9 cards in group "Not willing to 
pay" 
19. Amount of money to be willingly paid: Enumerator: record the rates and fill in the 
appropriate box 
Willing to pay Not willing to pay Not sure 
Rates 
(VND/year, for 5 
months) 
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Record the first 5 rates chosen in the following table 
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 5 
20. Please tell us why you are willing to pay for the program Enumerator ask this 
question if the respondent fill in the boxes ''Not willing to pay" with all the rates. 
Tick only one reason for this question 
I do not want to pay for improving the water reserves D a. 
b. I support the water flow improving program, but I can't D 
afford it. 
. 
I support the water flow improving program, but I don't D c. 
think I have to pay for it. The government should use the 
current tax revenue to pay for it. 
d. I support the water flow improving program, but I disagree D 
the payment in December. 
I don't think the collected by the People D e. money 
Committee will be used for the water flow improving 
program. 
f. I don't think the program will be successful as described. D 
I don't think I truly have to pay this amount of money. D g. 
Before the end of the interview, we would like to understand your opinions about this 
survey --
21. Before the interview, do you know D Yes 
about the current ground water aJ1.d 
river water in Dak Lak D No 
-
22. When deciding the rate you willing to D Yes 
pay, do you believe in the information 
D about the current situation of water No 
sources in Dak Lak? 
23. When deciding the rate you willing to D Yes (Go to Q25) 
pay, do you believe in the description 
D of water sources in future if the No.(Go to 24) 
program on Dak Lak water source 
management is not implemented? 
24. If the program is not implemented, D Better than what is described in 
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how do you describe the water source the questionnaire 
in the dry season in the future? 
D Worse 
D Like the description 
25. When deciding the rate you willing to D Yes (Go to Q27) 
pay, do you believe in the expected 
results if the program on Dak Lak D No (Go to26) 
water source management is 
implemented? 
26. If the program on Dak Lak water D Better than what is described in 
source management is implemented the questionnaire 
how do you describe the ground water 
reserve and river water flow in the dry D Worse 
season in the future? D Like the description 
27. When deciding the rate you willing to D Yes 
pay, do ypu believe that the program 
D No on Dak Lak water source management 
can improve the ground water reserve 
and river water flow effectively? 
28. When deciding the rate you willing to D Yes 
pay, do you think that the Dak Lak 
People Committee approve the fee D No 
collection for the program on Dak Lak 
water source management? 
29. When deciding the rate you willing to D Yes 
pay, do you believe that coffee farmers 
will reduce their irrigation water after D No 
the seminars without affecting the 
coffee output and quality 
Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements 
D Strongly agree 
30. I do not understand the 
D Agree 
information in the D Neither agree nor disagree 
questionnaire 
D Disagree 
D Strongly disagree 
D Strongly agree 
31. I need more information to D Agree 
make decision. D Neither agree nor disagree 
D Disagree 
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D Strongly disagree 
D Strongly agree 
D Agree 
32. Qµestion about the payment 
D Neither agree nor disagree 
cards is too complicated. 
D Disagree 
D Strongly disagree 
Before the end of the interview, we would like to know about you and your family. 
SECTION 3: HOUSEHOLD PROl<'ILE 
33. Age ofrespondent(s) Age of male 
Age of female 
34. Gender 
D Male 
D Female 
D Both join the interview 
35. Household size (number of Number adults (>16 years) ___ 
members living in the past Number minors (5 to 16 years) ___ 
five months) Number children ( <5 years) 
36. Main occupation (i.e. main __ Farming - main crop is coffee 
source of income) __ Farming - main crop not coffee 
Enumerator completes 'F" if the __ Official 
respondent is female, and ''M" if __ State-owned business 
: the respondent is male in the __ Private business 
appropriate boxes __ Self-employed 
__ Student 
__ Other 
37. If a farmer, approximately 
how many hectares do you 
--
ha 
cultivate (including leased 
land) 
38. How many hectares are 
used for coffee planting? 
--
ha 
39. What is your highest __ Primary 
education level? __ Secondary 
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Enumerator completes 'F" if the __ High school 
respondent is female, and ''M" if __ Vocational school 
the respondent is male in the __ College 
appropriate boxes __ University 
__ No official schooling 
40. Number of schooling years Male: __ year(s) 
Female: __ year(s) 
41. What is your approximate 
monthly household __ VND. 
income? 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
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Appendix 5: Subcatchment social welfare and hydrologic balance estimates 
• 
Appendix Table 5.1 Krong Buk subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
- --
1. Background data 
Catchment area ha'OOO 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 
Coffee area ha'OOO 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 
Rice area ha'OOO 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Potential coffee yield MT '000 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 1,338 1,338 1,338 
2. Subcatchment-level coffee operating surplus 
Actual yield MT '000 212 212 203 213 212 208 213 212 209 213 212 209 213 212 209 213 212 208 1,276 1,274 1,246 
Revenue VNDBIL 2,989 2,978 2,862 2,724 2,720 2,659 1,876 1,874 l,844 l,161 1,160 1,143 1,005 1,004 988 2,233 2,230 2,180 11,987 11,965 11,676 
Production cost VNDBIL 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 4,166 4,166 4,166 
Irrigation cost VNDBIL 142 101 77 154 104 79 113 79 61 114 79 61 114 79 61 149 105 80 786 547 419 
Fuel VNDBIL 121 86 66 131 88 67 96 67 52 98 68 52 98 68 52 127 89 68 671 466 357 
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Variable 
Labour 
Operating surplus 
Area 
Yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
Area 
Yield per tree 
Yield 
1998 
BSQ Sl S2 
VNDBIL 21 15 12 
VNDBIL 2,153 2,182 2,091 
ha'OOO 21.2 29.3 29.3 
MT 5.1 5.1 5.1 
VNDMIL 68.9 68.9 68.9 
VNDMIL 16.0 16.0 16.0 
VNDMIL 4.4 2.6 2.0 
VNDMIL 48.6 50.4 51.0 
ha'OOO 
kg 
MT 
22.2 
4.9 
5.1 
14.1 14.1 
4.8 4.2 
5.1 4.5 
I I 
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1999 
BSQ Sl S2 
23 15 12 
1,876 1,922 1,886 
21.2 29.3 29.3 
5.1 5.1 5.1 
62.8 
16.0 
4.4 
42.4 
22.2 
4.9 
5.1 
62.8 62.8 
16.0 16.0 
2.6 2.0 
44.2 44.8 
14.1 
4.9 
5.1 
14.1 
4.5 
4.8 
2000 2001 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
16 12 9 17 12 9 
1,068 1,100 1,089 352 386 387 
3. Per hectare coffee operating surplus estimate 
i. No irrigation shortage region 
21.2 29.3 29.3 21.2 29.3 
5.1 
43.2 
16.0 
3.3 
23.9 
22.2 
4.9 
5.1 
5.1 
43.2 
16.0 
2.0 
25.2 
5.1 
43.2 
16.0 
1.5 
25.7 
5.1 
26.8 
16.0 
3.3 
7.4 
5.1 
26.8 
16.0 
2.0 
8.8 
ii. Irrigation shortage region 
14.1 14.1 22.2 14.1 
4.9 4.6 4.9 4.9 
5.1 4.9 5.1 5.1 
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29.3 
5.1 
26.8 
16.0 
1.5 
9.2 
14.1 
4.7 
4.9 
•BSQ 
16 
196 
21.2 
5.1 
23.2 
16.0 
3.3 
3.8 
22.2 
4.9 
5.1 
2002 
Sl 
12 
230 
29.3 
5.1 
23.2 
16.0 
2.0 
5.2 
14.1 
4.9 
5.1 
S2 
9 
233 
29.3 
5.1 
23.2 
16.0 
1.5 
5.6 
14.1 
4.7 
4.9 
2003 
BSQ Sl S2 
21 15 12 
1,389 1,431 1,406 
21.2 
5.1 
51.5 
16.0 
4.4 
31.0 
22.2 
4.9 
5.1 
29.3 
5.1 
51.5 
16.0 
2.6 
32.8 
14.1 
4.9 
5.1 
29.3 
5.1 
51.S 
16.0 
2.0 
33.5 
14.1 
4.5 
4.8 
BSQ 
115 
7,035 
21.2 
30.6 
276.3 
96.0 
23.2 
157.1 
22.2 
29.4 
30.9 
Total 
Sl S2 
81 62 
7,251 7,091 
29.3 
30.6 
29.3 
30.6 
276.3 276.3 
96.0 96.0 
13.7 10.S 
166.6 169.8 
14.1 
29.2 
30.7 
14.1 
27.3 
28.6 
Variable 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
Weighted average 
operating surplus 
20-Dec 
10-Jan 
31-Jan 
21-Feb 
Total 
20-Dec 
I I 
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1998 
BSQ Sl S2 
VNDMIL 68.8 67.9 59.7 
VNDMIL 16.0 16.0 16.0 
1999 
BSQ Sl S2 
62.8 62.5 58.2 
16.0 . 16.0 16.0 
2000 
BSQ Sl 
43.2 
16.0 
43.1 
16.0 
S2 
41.0 
16.0 
VNDMIL 2.2 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.0 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 
VNDMIL 50.6 . 50.1 42.3 44.0 44.5 40.6 25.3 25.6 23.8 
VNDMIL 49.6 50.3 48.2 43.2 44.3 43.5 24.6 25.4 25.1 
2001 
BSQ Sl 
26.8 
16.0 
2.0 
8.8 
8.1 
26.7 
16.0 
1.5 
9.2 
8.9 
S2 
25.4 
16.0 
1.2 
8.3 
8.9 
2002 
BSQ Sl 
23.1 
16.0 
1.9 
5.2 
4.5 
23.1 
16.0 
1.5 
5.6 
5.3 
S2 
22.0 
16.0 
1.2 
4.8 
5.4 
3. Per tree irrigation supply schedule in irrigation deficit area 
i. Irrigation demand 
1,050 650 550 
950 550 400 
950 550 400 
950 550 400 
1,050 650 550 
950 550 400 
950 550 400 
950 550 400 
1,050 650 550 
950 550 400 
950 550 400 
1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 
950 550 400 950 550 400 
950 550 400 950 550 400 
2003 
BSQ Sl 
51.4 
16.0 
51.2 
16.0 
S2 
47.7 
16.0 
2.5 2.0 1.5 
32.9 33.2 30.2 
32.0 33.0 32.4 
1,050 650 550 
950 550 400 
950 550 400 
950 550 400 
BSQ 
276.1 
96.0 
Total 
Sl S2 
274.4 253.9 
96.0 96.0 
13.3 10.3 7.9 
166.8 168.1 150.1 
162.1 167.1 163.4 
3,150 1,950 1,650 
6,000 3,600 2,850 
5,700 3,300 2,400 
5,700 3,300 2,400 
lt 
lt 
'lt 
lt 
lt 3,900 2,300 1,750 3,900 2,300 1,750 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 3,900 2,300 1,750 20,550 12,150 9,300 
ii. Supply ratio 
Percent 54% 76% 76% 74% 87% 87% 61% 83% 83% 63% a 82%• 82%• 
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Variable 
10-Jan 
31-Jan 
21-Feb 
20-Dec 
10-Jan 
31-Jan 
21-Feb 
Total 
20-Dec 
10-Jan 
31-Jan 
I I 
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1998 1999 2000 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
Percent 53% 76% 76% 66% 82% 82% 62% 80% 80% 
Percent 53% 76% 76% 61 % 79% 79% 58% 80% 80% 
Percent 52% 76% 76% 57% .79% 79% 57% 80% 80% 
2001 
BSQ Sl S2 
63% 81% 81% 
61% 82% 82% 
58% 81% 80% 
iii. Irrigation supply 
562 495 419 
501 418 304 
500 417 303 
782 566 480 
631 453 329 
577 436 317 
647 523 442 666 527 446 
553 440 320 576 448 326 
2002 
•BSQ Sl S2 
62% 81% 81% 
59% 81% 81% 
58% 80% 80% 
655 529 448 
562 443 322 
2003 
BSQ Sl S2 
58% 82% 81% 
56% 81% 80% 
56% 80% 80% 
642 537 455 
546 449 325 
536 447 321 
Total 
BSQ Sl S2 
61%• 80%• 80%• 
58%• 80%• 80%• 
56%• 79%• 79%• 
1, 985 1,598 1,353 
3,647 2,899 2,295 
3,304 2,632 1,910 
lt 
lt 
lt 
lt 
lt 
497 416 302 542 437 318 545 440 320 551 444 320 551 440 320 528 441 320 3,214 2,618 1,900 
m 
m 
m 
2,061 1,745 1,328 2,531 1,891 1,444 1,745 1,402 1,082 1,793 1,420 1,092 1,768 1,413 1,091 2,252 1,875 1,421 12,151 9,747 7,458 
4. Volumetric irrigation cost estimates 
No irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
-21.6 -21.6 -21.6 -21.0 -20.9 -20.8 -20.0 -20.0 -20.0 -19.0 -19.2 -19.2 -18.8 -19.0 -19.0 
-21.6 -21.5 -21.5 -21.l -21.0. -20.9 -20.1 -20.1 -20.1 -19.1 -19.2 -19.2 -18.8 -19.0 -19.0 
-21.9 -21.7 -21.6 -21.3 -21.2 -21.l -20.4 -20.3 -20.2 -19.2 -19.4 -19.4 -19.0 -19.1 -19.1 
- 365 -
-18.7 -18.7 -18.7 -19.9• -19.9• -19.9• 
-19.0 -18.9 -18.8 -20.0• -19.9• -19.9• 
-19.2 -19.0 -18.9 -20.2• -20.1" -20.1• 
Variable 
21-Feb 
20-Dec 
10-Jan 
31-Jan 
21-Feb 
20-Dec 
10-Jan 
31-Jan 
21-Feb 
20-Dec 
10-Jan 
I I 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
m -22.1 -21.8 -21.7 -21.5 -21.3 -21.2 -20.5 -20.4 -20.3 -19.5 -19.5 -19.5 -19.3 -19.3 -19.2 -19.4 -19.2 -19.1 -20.4• -20.3• -20.2• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
VND 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,070 1,071 1,071 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,076• 1,075• 1,076• 
VND 1,067 J,068 1,068 1,070 1,070 1,071 1,074 1,074 1,075 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,075 a 1,075 a 1,075 a 
VND 1,066 1,067 1,068 1,069 1,070 1,070 1,073 1,07 4 1,07 4 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,080 1,07 4 a 1,07 4 a 1,075 a 
VND 1,065 1,067 1,067 1,068 1,069 1,069 1,073 1,073 1,073 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,079 1,073• 1,074• 1,074• 
Irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
m -29.8 -37.1 -37.1 -28.9 -36.0 -36.0 -27.9 -34.9 -34.9 -26.5 -33.7 -33.7 -25.7 -32.9 -33.0 -25.2 -32.2 -32.2 -27.3• -34.5• -34.5• 
m -29.6 -36.8 -36.8 -28.9 -36.0 -36.0 -27.8 -34.9 -34.9 -26.5 -33.6 -33.6 -25.9 -32.9 -32.9 -25.3 -32.2 -32.2 -27.4• -34.4• -34.4• 
m -29.6 -36.8 -36.8 -29.0 -36.0 -36.0 -27.9 -34.8 -34.9 -26.5 -33.6 -33.7 -26.1 -32.9 -32.9 -25.6 -32.4 -32.3 -27.5• -34.4• -34.4• 
m -29.7 -36.8 -36.8 -29.0 -36.0 -36.0 -27.9 -34.9 -34.9 -26.6 -33.6 -33.6 -26.0 -32.9 -32.9 -25.5 -32.3 -32.3 -27.5• -34.4• -34.4• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
VND 1,029 996 996 1,034 1,001 1,001 1,038 1,005 1,005 1,045 1,011 1,011 1,048 1,015 1,015 1,051 1,018 1,018 1,041 • 1,008• 1,008• 
VND 1,030 997 997 1,034 1,001 1,001 1,038 1,006 1,006 1,044 1,012 1,012 1,047 1,015 1,015 1,050 1,018 1,018 1,041 • 1,008• 1,008• 
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Variable 
31-Jan 
21-Feb 
Coffee 
Rice 
Precipitation 
Infiltration 
Recharge 
Evapotranspiration 
Extraction terms 
Coffee irrigation 
No shortage area 
I I 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 •BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
VND 1,030 997 997 1,033 1,000 1,001 1,038 1,006 1,006 1,045 1,012 1,011 1,046 1,015 1,015 1,049 1,017 1,018 1,040• 1,008• 1,008• 
VND 1,030 997 997 1,033 1,000 1,001 1,038 1,006 1,006 1,044 1,012 1,012 1,047 1,015 1,015 1,049 1,018 1,018 1,040• 1,008• 1,008• 
5. Hydrologic balance analysis 
i. Irrigation water demand 
ML'OOO 178 105 80 178 105 80 
ML'OOO 29 22 22 29 22 22 
134 
29 
80 
22 
62 
22 
134 
29 
80 
22 
62 
22 
ii. Inflows and outflows 
ML'OOO 917 917 917 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,080 1,080 1,080 
ML'OOO 798 771 770 989 958 955 913 892 888 
ML'OOO 278 268 270 415 382 378 386 351 341 
ML'OOO 785 746 732 
ML'OOO 135 97 74 
ML'OOO 87 71 54 
779 775 769 
146 
87 
99 
71 
75 
54 
738 736 734 
106 
66 
75 
54 
58 
42 
-367 -
919 919 919 
779 768 766 
297 272 266 
792 785 779 
107 
66 
75 
54 
58 
42 
134 
29 
80 
22 
62 
22 
906 906 906 
768 747 747 
250 235 239 
815 784 772 
107 
66 
75 
54 
58 
42 
178 105 
29 22 
80 
22 
904 904 904 
776 759 756 
231 217 215 
784 758 744 
139 
87 
99 
71 
75 
54 
936.5 553.7 423.8 
172.8 129.6 129.6 
5,879 5,879 5,879 
5,022 4,895 4,883 
1,858 1,724 1,709 
4,694 4,585 4,530 
741 
457 
518 397 
374 286 
I I 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
• 
ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 
Shortage area ML'OOO 48 26 20 59 28 21 41 21 16 42 21 16 41 21 16 52 28 21 283 144 110 
Rice irrigation ML'OOO 29 22 22 29 22 22 29 22 22 29 22 22 29 22 22 29 22 22 173 130 130 
iii. Hydrologic balance indicators 
Average UA0 balance ML'OOO 3,723 3,736 3,741 3,802 3,813 3,819 3,905 3,905 3,908 4,017 4,005 4,005 4,081 4,070 4,070 4,113 4,115 4,120 3,940 a 3,941 8 3,944 a 
SWSdchange ML'OOO 15 16 17 4 4 3 10 10 10 -16 -15 -16 -9 -9 -8 -1 0 0 4 5 6 
Baseflow->River ML'OOO 141 143 144 209 207 207 202 198 197 183 177 176 160 159 160 132 132 134 1,027 1,016 1,017 
Average WT• m -22.0 -21.7 -21.6 -20.9 -20.8 -20.7 -20.1 -20.1 -20.0 -19.3 -19.3 -19.3 -19.1 -19.1 -19.1 -19.1 -18.9 -18.8 -20.1 8 -20.0• -19.9• 
Average dry season WT m -22.1 -21.8 -21.7 -21.5 -21.3 -21.2 -20.5 -20.4 -20.3 -19.5 -19.5 -19.5 -19.4 -19.3 -19.3 -19.4 -19.2 -19.0 -20.4• -20.3 a -20.2 a 
Average dry season SF m3 sec-1 3.7 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.7 3.7 3.8 3.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 2.9• 3.3• 3.5 a 3.5 a 3.9• 4.0• 
Min. dry season SF m3 sec-1 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.6 2.6 3.0 3.2 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.3• 2.8• 3.0• 2.4• 2.9• 3.1 a 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion 
•Average hSaturated Zone Storage 0 Unconfined Aquifer d Surface Water Storage •Water Table depth rseason Flow 
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Variable 
Catchment area 
Coffee area 
Rice area 
Potential coffee yield 
Actual yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Fuel 
Labour 
Operating surplus 
I I 
1998 
ESQ Sl S2 
ha'OOO 11.9 11.9 11.9 
ha'OOO 10.2 10.2 10.2 
ha'OOO 0 0 0 
MT '000 52 52 52 
MT '000 24 42 31 
VNDBIL 343 588 429 
VNDBIL 163 163 163 
VNDBIL 36 34 26 
VNDBIL 34 31 24 
VNDBIL 21 21 21 
VNDBIL 143 391 240 
\ 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 
ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2' ESQ Sl S2 
11.9 11.9 11.9 
10.2 10.2 10.2 
0 0 0 
52 52 52 
1. Background data 
11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 
10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
52 52 52 52 52 52 
2. Subcatchment-level coffee operating surplus 
49 49 45 48 49 43 40 47 41 
633 629 574 423 429 383 221 259 221 
163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
41 29 22 36 29 22 34 28 21 
37 27 21 33 26 20 31 26 20 
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
430 437 388 224 237 198 24 68 37 
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11.9 11.9 11.9 
10.2 10.2 10.2 
0 0 0 
52 52 52 
38 47 40 
178 222 187 
163 163 163 
30 27 21 
28 25 19 
21 21 21 
-15 32 3 
2003 
ESQ Sl S2 
11.9 11.9 11.9 
10.2 10.2 10.2 
0 0 0 
52 52 52 
31 46 34 
328 482 354 
163 163 163 
39 36 27 
36 33 25 
21 21 21 
126 283 164 
Total 
ESQ Sl S2 
11.9 11.9 11.9 
10.2 10.2 10.2 
0 0 0 
315 315 315 
231 280 233 
2127 2608 2149 
979 979 979 
216 182 139 
199 168 128 
21 21 21 
932 1448 1031 
I\ 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
3. Per hectare coffee operating surplus estimate 
i. No irrigation shortage region 
Area ha'OOO 2.6 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.7 3.7 
Yield MT 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 30.6 30.6 30.6 
Irrigation cost VNDM!L 8.1 4.8 3.6 6.1 3.6 2.8 6.1 3.6 2.8 6.2 3.7 2.8 6.2 3.6 2.8 8.1 4.8 3.7 40.9 24.2 18.6 
Operating surplus VNDMIL 44.8 48.2 49.3 40.6 43.1 44 21.1 23.6 24.4 4.6 7.1 7.94 1.0 3.5 4.34 27.3 30.7 31.8 139.4 156.1 161.7 
ii. Irrigation shortage region 
Area ha'OOO 7.6 6.5 6.5 7.6 6.5 6.5 7.6 6.5 6.5 7.6 6.5 6.5 7.6 6.5 6.5 7.6 6.5 6.5 45.6 39.0 39.0 
Yield per tree kg 1.5 3.6 1.9 ·4.8 4.8 4.1 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.7 4.5 3.4 3.3 4.4 3.3 2.4 4.3 2.4 20.4 26.3 19.1 
Yield MT 1.6 3.8 2.0 5.1 5.0 4.3 4.9 4.9 4.1 3.8 4.7 3.6 3.5 4.7 3.5 2.6 4.5 2.5 21.4 27.6 20.0 
Revenue VNDMIL 21.5 51.2 26.8 61.9 61.1 52.5 40.9 41.4 34.3 19.9 24.6 18.8 15.6 20.9 15.6 25.6 44.9 25.2 185.3 244.0 173.3 
Production cost VNDMIL 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ' ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 ESQ Sl S2 
Irrigation cost VNDMIL 2.0 2.4 1.9 3.2 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.6 2.4 2.8 2.0 14.4 14.2 10.8 
Operating surplus VNDMIL 3.5 32.8 8.9 42.7 42.7 34.7 22.2 23.1 16.5 1.6 6.4 1.1 -2.3 2.9 -2.0 7.2 26.1 7.2 74.9 133.9 66.5 
Weighted average VNDMIL 14.1 38.3 23.6 42.1 42.8 38.0 21.9 23.3 19.4 2.4 6.7 3.6 -1.5 3.1 0.3 12.3 27.7 16.1 91.4 141.9 101.0 
operating surplus 
3. Per tree irrigation supply schedule in irrigation deficit area 
i. Irrigation demand 
20-Dec It 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,050 650 550 3,150 1,950 1,650 
10-Jan It 950 550 400 950 550 400 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 950 550 400 6,000 3,600 2,850 
31-Jan It 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
21-Feb It 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
Total It 3,900 2,300 1,750 3,900 2,300 1,750 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 3,900 2,300 1,750 20,550 12,150 9,300 
ii. Supply ratio 
20-Dec Percent 45% 64% 64% 71% 71% 76% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 51% 68% 68% 560/oa 680/oa 700/oa 
- 371 -
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
• 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
10-Jan Percent 19% 47% 47% 64% 69% 69% 55% 69% 69% 54% 68% 68% 45% 64% 64% 24% 61% 54% 43% 3 63% 3 62% 3 
31-Jan Percent 17% 47% 47% 56% 68% 68% 44% 65% 65% 38% 61% 61% 25% 57% 57% 21% 54% 48% 34% 3 59% 3 58% 3 
21-Feb Percent 16% 46% 46% 37% 62% 62% 30% 57% 57% 19% 50% 49% 19% 49% 49% 18% 48% 46% 23% 3 52% 3 51% 3 
iii. Irrigation supply 
20-Dec lt 475 419 354 740 465 418 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 536 443 375 1,751 1,327 1,147 
10-Jan lt 177 260 189 608 382 278 577 451 382 562 443 375 469 416 352 224 336 214 2,593 2,276 1,766 
31-Jan lt 164 256 187 536 372 270 419 359 261 364 336 245 241 313 228 201 294 193 1,925 1,931 1,383 
21-Feb lt 154 252 183 349 339 246 283 312 227 185 273 196 185 270 196 175 265 186 1,330 1,711 1,235 
Total lt 970 1,187 913 2,233 1,557 1,212 1,279 1,122 870 l,110 1,053 816 895 999 776 1,136 1,339 968 7,599 7,245 5,531 
4. Volumetric irrigation cost estimates 
No irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
20-Dec m -10.5 -10.5 -10.5 -9.8 -9.8 -9.8 -9.6 -9.6 -9.6 -9.1 -9.1 -9.1 -9.6 -9.6 -9.6 -9.8 -9.6 -9.6 -9.7 a -9.7 a -9.7 a 
10-Jan m -11.2 -11.1 -11.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.1 -10.0 -10.0 -9.5 -9.5 -9.5 -9.8 -9.8 -9.8 -10.2 -10.1 -9.9 -10.1 a -10.1 a -10.0 3 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2' BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
31-Jan m -11.5 -11.4 -11.3 -10.5 -10.5 -10.4 -10.7 -10.6 -10.5 -9.9 -9.9 -9.9 -10.4 -10.4 -10.3 -10.4 -10.3 -10.2 -10.6 a -10.5 a -10.4 a 
21-Feb m -11.7 -11.6 -11.5 -11.0 -10.9 -10.9 -10.9 -10.9 -10.8 -10.4 -10.4 -10.3 -10.8 -10.6 -10.5 -10.7 -10.5 -10.3 -10.9" -10.8"-10.7" 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
20-Dec VND 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,988 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,990 1,992 1,992 1,992 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989" 1,989" 1,989" 
10-Jan VND 1,982 1,983 1,983 1,987 1,988 1,987 1,987 1,987 1,988 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,989 1,988 1,989 1,987 1,987 1,988 1,987 a 1,987 a 1,987 a 
31-Jan VND 1,980 1,981 1,981 1,985 1,985 1,986 1,984 1,985 1,985 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,985 1,986 1,986 1,985 1,986 1,987 1,985 a 1,985 a 1,985 a 
21-Feb VND 1,979 1,980 1,980 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,984 1,986 1,986 1,986 1,984 1,984 1,985 1,984 1,985 1,986 1,983" 1,984" 1,984" 
Irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
20-Dec m -12.8 -14.7 -14.7 -12.1 -13.9 -13.8 -11.6 -13.4 -13.4 -11.l -12.8 -12.8 -11.8 -13.5 -13.4 -11.8 -13.3 -13.2 -11.9" -13.6" -13.6" 
10-Jan m -14.0 -15.8 -15.7 -12.4 -14.2 -14.2 -12.2 -13.9 -13.9 -12.0 -13.7 -13.6 -13.0 -14.5 -14.4 -12.2 -13.8 -13.6 -12.6" -14.3" -14.2" 
31-Jan m -13.7 -15.4 -15.4 -12.8 -14.6 -14.5 -13.2 -15.0 -14.9 -11.5 -13.1 -13.1 -13.0 -14.6 -14.5 -12.6 -14.1 -14.0 -12.8 a -14.5 a -14.4 a 
21-Feb m -14.2 -15.9 -15.9 -13.5 -15.2 -15.1 -13.0 -14.6 -14.5 -12.7 -14.3 -14.2 -13.2 -14.7 -14.6 -12.5 -14.0 -13.8 -13.2" -14.8" -14.7" 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
• 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
20-Dec VND 1,974 1,966 1,966 1,978 1,970 1,970 1,980 1,972 1,972 1,982 1,974 1,975 1,979 1,971 1,972 1,979 1,972 1,972 l,979a 1,971a1,971 a 
10-Jan VND 1,969 1,960 1,961 1,976 1,968 1,968 1,977 1,969 1,969 1,978 1,970 1,971 1,974 1,967 1,967 1,977 1,970 1,971 1,975 a 1,967 a 1,968 a 
31-Jan VND 1,970 1,962 1,963 1,974 1,966 1,967 1,973 1,964 1,965 1,981 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,966 1,966 1,975 1,968 1,969 l,974a 1,967a l,967a 
21-Feb VND 1,968 1,960 1,960 1,971 1,963 1,964 1,973 1,966 1,966 1,975 1,967 1,968 1,973 1,966 1,966 1,976 1,969 1,970 1,973 a 1,965 a 1,966 a 
5. Hydrologic balance analysis 
i. Irrigation water demand 
Coffee ML'OOO 42 25 19 32 19 14 32 19 14 32 19 14 32 19 14 42 25 19 210 124 95 
Rice ML'OOO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ii. Inflows and outflows 
Inflow terms 
Precipitation ML'OOO 180 180 180 203 203 203 214 214 214 204 204 204 195 195 195 182 182 182 1,177 1,177 1,177 
Infiltration ML'OOO 134 131 131 122 120 119 135 133 133 138 137 137 130 128 128 130 129 128 790 779 776 
Recharge ML'OOO 30 29 29 41 37 36 39 36 35 35 30 30 30 29 28 31 30 30 206 192 188 
Extraction terms 
Coffee irrigation ML'OOO 18 17 13 20 15 11 18 14 11 17 14 11 15 14 11 20 18 13 109 92 70 
-374-
I\ 
\ 
Appendix Table 5.2 Ea M'roh subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2' BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
No shortage area ML'OOO 11 9 7 8 7 5 8 7 5 8 7 5 8 7 5 11 9 7 54 45 35 
Shortage area ML'OOO 8 8 6 12 8 6 10 8 6 9 7 6 7 7 5 9 9 7 55 47 36 
Rice irrigation ML'OOO 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Evapotranspiration ML'OOO 143 139 138 152 152 151 154 154 154 171 170 169 163 160 159 152 149 148 935 925 919 
iii. Hydrologic balance indicators 
Average UA< balance ML'OOO 314 317 318 332 334 336 344 346 347 358 359 360 361 363 364 361 365 367 345a 347a 349• 
SWSd change ML'OOO 5.8 5.9 6.0 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Baseflow->River ML'OOO 8.8 9.1 9.2 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.2 10.1 10.2 9.7 9.7 9.8 10.0 10.1 10.2 8.7 8.9 9.0 57.7 58.3 58.7 
Average WP ID -11. 7 -11.5 -11.5 -10.1 -10.2 -10.1 -10.2 -10.2 -10.1 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.3 -10.2 -10.1 -10.2 -10.0 -9.9 -10.4 a -10.3 a -10.3 a 
Average dry season WT ID -11.8 -11.6 -11.5 -10.9 -10.9 -10.8 -10.8 -10.8 -10.7 -10.4 -10.3 -10.3 -10.7 -10.6 -10.5 -10.7 -10.5 -10.3 -10.9" -10.8" -10.7 3 
Notes: n.a. not applicp.ble, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion 
•Average b Saturated Zone Storage <Unconfined Aquifer d Surface Water Storage eWater Table depth fSeason Flow 
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Catchment area 
Coffee area 
Rice area 
Potential coffee yield 
Actual yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Fuel 
Labour 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
1. Background data 
ha'OOO S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 
ha'OOO 33.1 33.1 33.1 
ha'OOO 
MT '000 
S.2 
170 
MT '000 99 
S.2 S.2 
170 170 
1S7 137 
1,93 
VNDBIL 1,388 2,202 0 
VNDBIL S30 S30 S30 
VNDBIL 92 73 SS 
VNDBIL 80 63 48 
VNDBIL 12 10 8 
33.1 33.1 33.1 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
33.1 33.1 33.1 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
33.1 33.1 33.1 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
2. Subcatchment-level coffee operating surplus 
1S4 161 lSS 149 161 lSS 139 161 1S4 
1,970 2,066 1,979 
S30 S30 S30 
80 S8 4S 
69 so 39 
11 8 6 
1,314 1,423 1,364 
S30 S30 S30 
79 S9 4S 
68 Sl 39 
11 8 6 
760 880 841 
S30 S30 S30 
77 S9 4S 
67 Sl 39 
10 8 6 
3. Per hectare coffee operating surplus estimate 
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2002 
BSQ Sl S2 
S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 
33.1 33.1 33.1 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
136 161 1S3 
64S 761 724 
S30 S30 S30 
76 S8 4S 
66 so 39 
10 8 6 
2003 
BSQ Sl S2 
S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 
33.1 33.1 33.1 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
S.2 
170 
99 160 146 
1,043 1,682 l,S31 
S30 S30 S30 
9S 
82 
12 
76 
66 
10 
S7 
so 
8 
Total 
BSQ Sl S2 
S3.3 S3.3 S3.3 
33.1 33.1 33.1 
S.2 
1,022 
776 
S.2 S.2 
1,022 1,022 
962 899 
7,119 9,0lS 8,370 
3,178 3,178 3,178 
498 
432 
66 
382 
331 
S2 
293 
2S4 
39 
Variable 
Area 
Yield 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
Area 
Yield per tree 
Yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
Weighted average 
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1998 1999 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
ha'OOO 17.3 17.8 17.8 2.6 3.7 3.7 
MT 5.1 5.1 5.1 . 5.1 5.1 5.1 
VNDMIL 4.5 2.7 2.0 3.4 2.0 1.6 
VNDMIL. 48.4 50.3 50.9 43.3 44.7 45.2 
ha'OOO 
kg 
MT 
15.8 15.3 15.3 
0.9 4.5 3.3 
0.9 4.8 3.4 
15.8 15.3 15.3 
4.4 4.8 4.4 
4.6 5.1 4.6 
VNDMIL 12.3 63.7 45.9 56.0 62.0 56.3 
VNDM!L 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 
VNDMIL 0.9 1.6 1.2 
VNDM!L -4.5 46.1 28. 7 
1.3 1.4 1.1 
38.7 44.6 39.2 
VNDM!L 23.1 48.3 40.6 41.1 44.7 42.4 
2000 2001 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
i. No irrigation shortage region 
2.6 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.7 3.7 
5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 
3.4 2.0 1.6 3.5 2.1 1.6 
23.8 25.2 25.6 7.3 8.7 9.2 
ii. Irrigation shortage region 
15.8 15.3 15.3 
4.1 4.8 4.4 
4.3 5.1 4.6 
35.9 42.7 38.9 
16.0 16.0 16.0 
1.2 1.4 1.1 
18.6 25.3 21.8 
21.3 25.2 23.9 
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15.8 15.3 15.3 
3.4 4.8 4.4 
3.6 5.1 4.6 
18.8 26.4 23.8 
16.0 16.0 16.0 
1.1 1.4 1.1 
1.7 9.0 6.7 
4.6 8.8 8.0 
2002 
BSQ Sl S2 
2.6 3.7 3.7 
5.1 5.1 5.1 
3.5 2.1 1.6 
3.7 5.1 5.6 
15.8 15.3 15.3 
3.3 4.8 4.3 
3.4 5.1 4.5 
15.5 22.8 20.4 
16.0 16.0 16.0 
1.0 1.4 1.1 
-1.5 5.4 3.3 
1.2 5.2 4.5 
2003 
BSQ Sl S2 
2.6 3.7 3.7 
5.1 5.1 5.1 
4.6 2.7 2.1 
30.9 32.8 33.4 
15.8 15.3 15.3 
0.9 4.8 3.8 
1.0 5.0 4.0 
9.7 50.1 40.2 
16.0 16.0 16.0 
1.0 1.8 1.4 
-7.3 32.3 22.9 
12.6 32.5 28.5 
Total 
BSQ Sl S2 
2.6 3.7 3.7 
30.6 30.6 30.6 
22.9 13.6 10.4 
157.4 166.7 169.9 
94.8 
16.9 
17.8 
91.8 
28.6 
30.1 
91.8 
24.6 
25.8 
148.1 267.8 225.6 
96.0 96.0 96.0 
6.5 9.2 7.0 
45.6 162.6 122.6 
104.0 164.8 148.0 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
operating surplus 
3. Per tree irrigation supply schedule in irrigation deficit area 
i. Irrigation demand 
20-Dec lt 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,050 650 550 3,150 1,950 1,650 
10-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 950 550 400 6,000 3,600 2,850 
31-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
21-Feb lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
--
1,75 
Total lt 3,900 2,300 0 3,900 2,300 1,750 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 3,900 2,300 1,750 20,550 12,150 9,300 
ii. Supply ratio 
20-Dec Percent 32% 67% 67% 43% 75% 76% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 42% 75% 75% 39%• 72%• 73%• 
10-Jan Percent 18% 63% 63% 50% 75% 75% 49% 76% 76% 45% 76% 76% 42% 75% 75% 18% 71% 67% 37%• 73%• 72%• 
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I998 I999 2000 200I 2002 2003 Total 
ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI ~2 ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 
3I-Jan Percent I5% 6I% 6I% 40% 74% 74% 35% 74% 74% 
23% 69% 69% 
29% 73% 73% 
I9% 68% 68% 
25% 70% 70% 
I9% 68% 68% 
I4% 67% 65% 
I2% 65% 63% 
26%• 70%• 69%• 
I9%• 66%• 66%• 2I-Feb Percent I3% 60% 60% 26% 69% 69% 
20-Dec 
10-Jan 
3I-Jan 
lt 
lt 
lt 
2I-Feb lt 
lt 
20-Dec m 
10-Jan m 
3I-Jan m 
337 
I7I 
I4I 
436 369 
344 250 
337 245 
I25 330 240 
I,10 
454 
474 
383 
487 
4I5 
404 
4I9 
302 
294 
244 379 275 
0 
5I9 
330 
iii. Irrigation supply 
0 0 0 
494 4I8 477 
406 295 273 
0 
493 
399 
0 
4I7 
290 
2I9 38I 277 I83 372 27I 
774 I,448 5 I,554 I,685 I,290 I,068 I,28I 990 934 I ,264 978 
4. Volumetric irrigation cost estimates 
No irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
0 
445 
24I 
0 
486 
385 
0 
411 
280 
I83 373 27I 
870 I ,243 962 
436 
I73 
I36 
485 
392 
37I 
411 
270 
260 
118 357 253 
863 I,606 I,I93 
I,227 I,409 I,I99 
2,233 2,6I6 2,053 
I ,504 2,302 I ,665 
I ,072 2, I 92 I ,587 
6,037 8,5 I 9 6,503 
-I2.6 -I2.6 -I2.6 -I 1.7 -I 1.5 -I 1.5 -I 1.3 -I 1.2 -I 1.2 -10.3 -10.3 -10.3 -10.4 -10.4 -10.3 -10.8 -10.7 -10.6 -I 1.2 a -11.1 a -I 1.1 a 
-I3.0 -I2.8 -I2.8 -I2.0 -Il.8 -Il.8 -Il.6 -Il.5 -Il.4 -10.5 -10.5 -10.5 -10.5 -10.5 -10.5 -Il.2 -Il.O -10.8 -Il.5• -Il.4• -Il.3• 
-I3.4 -I3.0 -I3.0 -I2.5 -I2.2 -I2.I -I2.I -Il.8 -Il.7 -Il.O -10.9 -10.8 -10.9 -10.8 -10.8 -Il.6 -Il.2 -Il.O -Il.9• -Il.7• -Il.6• 
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21-Feb m 
20-Dec VND 
10-Jan VND 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
-13.7 -13.3 -13.2 -12.8 -12.4 -12.3 -12.4 -12.1 -11.9 -11.5 -11.2 -11.1 -11.4 -11.1 -11.0 -11.9 -11.5 -11.3 -12.3• -12.0• -11.8• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
1,109 1,109 1,109 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,115 1,116 1,116 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,119 1,120 1,120 1,118 1,118 1,119 1,116• 1,116• 1,116• 
1,108 1,108 1,108 1,112 1,113 1,113 1,114 1,114 1,115 1,119 1,119 1,119 1,119 1,119 1,119 1,116 1,117 1,118 1,115• 1,115• 1,115• 
31-Jan VND 1,106 1,107 1,108 1,110 1,111 1,112 1,112 1,113 1,113 1,117 1,117 1,118 1,117 1,117 1,118 1,114 1,116 1,117 1,113• 1,114• 1,114• 
21-Feb VND 1,104 1,106 1,106 1,108 1,110 1,111 1,110 1,111 1,112 1,114 1,116 1,116 1,115 1,116 1,117 1,112 1,114 1,115 1,111 • 1,112• 1,113• 
Irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
20-Dec m -18.7 -20.9 -20.9 -17.4 -19.4 -19.4 -17.0 -19.0 -18.9 -16.1 -18.0 -18.0 -16.3 -18.1 -18.0 -16.3 -17.8 -17.8 -17.0• -18.9• -18.8• 
10-Jan m -19.2 -21.0 -21.0 -17.7 -19.7 -19.6 -17.3 -19.2 -19.2 -16.9 -18.6 -18.5 -17.0 -18.5 -18.4 -16.5 -18.0 -18.0 -17.4• -19.2• -19.1 a 
31-Jan m -19.0 -20.9 -20.9 -18.1 -19.9 -19.8 -17.9 -19.6 -19.6 -16.4 -18.3 -18.2 -17.2 -18.7 -18.6 -16.8 -18.2 -18.2 -17.6• -19.3• -19.2• 
21-Feb m -19.3 -21.1 -21.1 -18.2 -20.1 -20.0 -17.8 -19.5 -19.4 -17.2 -18.8 -18.7 -17.2 -18.6 -18.6 -16.7 -18.1 -18.1 -17.7• -19.4• -19.3• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
20-Dec VND 1,081 1,071 1,071 1,087 1,078 1,078 1,089 1,080 1,080 1,093 1,084 1,084 1,092 1,084 1,084 1,092 1,085 1,085 1,089• 1,080• 1,080• 
10-Jan VND 1,079 1,070 1,070 1,085 1,077 1,077 1,087 1,079 1,079 1,089 1,081 1,082 1,089 1,082 1,082 1,091 1,084 1,084 1,087 • 1,079 • 1,079 • 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl 52 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
31-Jan VND 1,080 1,071 1,071 1,084 1,075 1,076 1,084 1,077 1,077 1,092 1,083 1,083 'l,088 1,081 1,081 1,090 1,083 1,083 1,086• 1,078• 1,079• 
21-Feb VND 1,078 1,070 1,070 1,083 1,075 1,075 1,085 1,077 1,078 1,088 1,081 1,081 1,088 1,081 1,082 1,090 1,084 1,084 1,085 a 1,078 a 1,078 a 
5. Hydrologic balance analysis 
i. Irrigation water demand 
Coffee ML'OOO 136 80 61 103 61 47 103 61 47 103 61 47 103 61 47 136 80 61 681 403 309 
Rice ML'OOO 62 47 47 62 47 47 62 47 47 62 47 47 62 47 47 62 47 47 374 281 281 
ii. Inflows and outflows 
Inflow terms 
Precipitation ML'OOO 978 978 978 1,023 1,023 1,023 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,020 1,020 1,020 864 864 864 902 902 902 5,942 5,942 5,942 
Infiltration ML'OOO 791 755 757 873 841 830 903 901 899 817 811 821 768 744 749 764 769 748 4,916 4,822 4,804 
Recharge ML'OOO 315 296 302 421 387 375 439 427 423 294 290 304 263 246 251 272 282 265 2,004 1,927 1,920 
Extraction terms 
Coffee irrigation ML'OOO 84 66 so 73 53 41 71 53 41 69 53 41 68 53 41 85 69 52 450 347 266 
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Variable 
No shortage area 
Shortage area 
Rice irrigation 
Evapotranspiration 
Average UA< balance 
SWSd change 
Baseflow- >River 
Average WP 
Average dry season WT 
Average dry season SF 
Min. dry season SF 
1998 
ESQ Sl S2 
ML'OOO 71 43 33 
ML'OOO 13 23 18 
ML'OOO 62 47 47 
ML'OOO 625 600 590 
ML'OOO 1,409 1,420 1,424 
ML'OOO 26 27 27 
ML'OOO 216 228 231 
m -13.3 -13.0 -12.8 
m -13.7 -13.4 -13.2 
1999 
ESQ Sl 
54 
19 
62 
33 
20 
47 
S2 
25 
16 
47 
675 670 665 
1,488 1,498 1,504 
-14 -15 -15 
316 320 322 
-11.9 -11.7 -11.7 
-12.8 -12.4 -12.3 
m3 sec1 0.61 0.82 0.88 2.14 2.58 2.71 
m3 sec1 0.33 0.57 0.61 0.85 1.57 1.63 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion 
2000 
ESQ Sl 
54 
18 
62 
33 
21 
47 
S2 
25 
16 
47 
681 676 672 
2001 
ESQ Sl 
54 
15 
62 
33 
20 
47 
S2 
25 
16 
47 
744 731 723 
iii. Hydrologic balance indicators 
1,541 1,549 1,555 
20 20 20 
330 330 330 
-11.5 -11.3 -11.2 
-12.4 -12.1 -11.9 
1.94 2.17 2.30 
0.83 1.15 1.37 
1,602 1,608 1,614 
-12 -6 -8 
269 266 269 
-11.1 -10.9 -10.8 
-11.5 -11.2 -11.1 
2.19 2.70 2.69 
1.24 1.71 1.77 
•Average b Saturated Zone Storage <Unconfined Aquifer ct Surface Water Storage •Water Table depth rseason Flow 
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2002 
ESQ Sl 
54 
14 
62 
33 
20 
47 
S2 
25 
15 
47 
725 707 697 
1,618 1,625 1,632 
-8 -12 -10 
214 225 226 
-11.2 -11.0 -10.9 
-11.4 -11.2 -11.1 
1.69 1. 79 2.06 
0.88 1.04 1.37 
2003 
ESQ Sl 
71 
14 
62 
43 
26 
47 
S2 
33 
19 
47 
665 642 631 
1,619 1,635 1,644 
1 2 2 
210 219 226 
-11.3 -11.0 -10.8 
-11.9 -11.5 -11.3 
1.15 1.34 1.43 
0.67 1.00 0.98 
ESQ 
356 
94 
374 
Total 
Sl S2 
217 166 
130 100 
281 281 
4,114 4,026 3,979 
1,546• 1,556• 1,562• 
14 16 16 
1,555 1,587 1,603 
-11.7• -11.5• -11.4• 
-12.3• -12.0• -11.8• 
1.62 a 1.90 8 2.01" 
0.80 • 1.17 a 1.29 a 
I\ 
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Appendix Table 5.4 West BMT subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable I998 I999 2000 200I ' 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 
--
1. Background data 
Catchment area ha'OOO 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 
Coffee area ha'OOO 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.1 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 4.I 
Rice area ha'OOO 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.30 2.30 2.30 
Potential coffee yield MT '000 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 I27 I27 I27 
2. Subcatchment-level coffee operating surplus 
Actual yield MT '000 I2 20 I7 I8 . 20 I9 I6 20 I9 I3 20 I9 I2 20 I9 I2 20 I8 83 119 11 I 
Revenue VNDBIL I64 275 245 226 256 247 I38 I76 I68 74 109 103 59 94 88 I22 208 I89 783 I,117 I,04I 
Production cost VNDBIL 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 394 394 394 
Irrigation cost VNDBIL 2I I7 I3 20 I4 11 I9 I4 11 I7 I3 10 I6 I3 10 2I I7 I3 115 88 68 
Fuel VNDBIL 20 I6 I2 I8 I3 10 I7 I3 10 I6 I2 10 I5 I2 9 20 I6 I2 106 82 63 
Labour VNDBIL 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 2 I I 8 6 5 
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Appendix Table 5.4 West BMT subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
Operating surplus VNDBIL 77 193 167 141 177 171 54 97 92 -9 30 27 -23 15 13 35 125 111 275 636 580 
3. Per hectare coffee operating surplus estimate 
i. No irrigation shortage region 
Area ha'OOO 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Yield MT 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 30.6 30.6 30.6 
Irrigation cost VNDMIL 8.2 4.9 3.7 6.2 3.7 2.9 6.2 3.7 2.9 6.2 3.7 2.9 6.2 3.7 2.9 8.2 4.9 3.7 41.4 24.5 18.8 
Operating surplus VNDMIL 44.7 48.1 49.2 40.5 43.1 43.9 21.0 23.5 24.4 4.5 7.0 7.9 0.9 3.5 4.3 27.2 30.6 31.8 138.9 155.8 161.5 
ii. Irrigation shortage region 
Area ha'OOO 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 
Yield per tree kg 0.2 4.6 3.4 3.5 4.8 4.5 2.4 4.8 4.3 1.2 4.8 4.2 0.7 4.8 4.1 0.2 4.7 3.8 8.3 28.6 24.3 
Yield MT 0.2 4.8 3.6 3.7 5.1 4.7 2.5 5.1 4.5 1.3 5.0 4.4 0.7 5.0 4.3 0.2 5.0 3.9 8.7 30.0 25.5 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2' BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
Revenue VNDMIL 3.0 64.8 48.3 45.4 62.1 57.1 21.4 42.6 38.2 6.7 26.2 23.0 3.2 22.6 19.4 2.3 49.6 39.4 82.0 267.8 225.3 
Production cost VNDMIL 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 
Irrigation cost VNDMIL 1.3 3.2 2.4 3.1 3.0 2.3 2.4 2.9 2.3 1.5 2.7 2.1 1.0 2.5 1.9 1.4 3.3 2.5 10.8 17.6 13.6 
Operating surplus VNDMIL -14.3 45.7 29.8 26.3 43.1 38.8 3.0 23.7 19.9 -10.8 7.5 4.9 -13.9 4.1 1.5 -15.1 30.3 20.9 -24.8 154.2 115.8 
Weighted average VNDMIL 18.8 47.0 40.7 34.3 43.1 41.7 13.1 23.6 22.4 -2.2 7.2 6.6 -5.6 3.7 3.1 8.6 30.4 27.0 67.0 155.1 141.4 
operating surplus 
3. Per tree irrigation supply schedule in irrigation deficit area 
i. Irrigation demand 
20-Dec lt 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,050 650 550 3,150 1,950 1,650 
10-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 950 550 400 6,000 3,600 2,850 
31-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
21-Feb lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
Total lt 3,900 2,300 1,750 3,900 2,300 1,750 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 3,900 2,300 1,750 20,550 12,150 9,300 
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Appendix Table 5.4 West BMT subcatchment 1998-2003 
1998 1999 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
20-Dec Percent 32% 73% 73% 0% 0% 0% 
10-Jan Percent 11% 62% 62% 79% 91% 91% 
31-Jan Percent 10% 62% 62% 48% 82% 82% 
21-Feb Percent 10% 61% 61% 19% 67% 67% 
20-Dec It 
10-Jan It 
31-Jan It 
21-Feb It 
It 
333 477 403 
101 340 248 
98 339 246 
95 338 246 
0 0 0 
748 498 362 
460 449 326 
176 367 267 
628 1,494 1,143 1,383 1,314 956 
2000 2001 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
ii. Supply ratio 
0% 0% 0% 
76% 95% 95% 
21% 72% 72% 
16% 66% 66% 
0% 0% 0% 
45% 83% 83% 
17% 68% 68% 
11% 64% 64% 
iii. Irrigation supply 
0 0 0 
799 618 523 
195 393 286 
152 365 266 
1,146 1,377 1,075 
0 0 0 
470 541 458 
160 373 271 
100 352 257 
730 1,266 986 
4. Volumetric irrigation cost estimates 
No irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
20-Dec m -4.7 -4.7 -4.7 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -3.9 -3.9 -3.8 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 
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2002 
BSQ Sl S2 
0% 0% 0% 
26% 73% 73% 
11% 64% 64% 
11% 64% 64% 
0 0 0 
277 475 402 
100 354 257 
100 354 257 
477 1,182 916 
-3.6 -3.5 -3.5 
2003 
BSQ Sl S2 
37% 79% 79% 
10% 66% 64% 
10% 64% 64% 
10% 64% 64% 
387 515 435 
97 364 257 
97 353 256 
92 352 254 
Total 
BSQ Sl S2 
34%• 76%• 76%• 
41%• 78%• 78%• 
19%• 69%• 68%• 
13%• 64%• 64%• 
1,080 1,487 1,258 
2,467 2,820 2,223 
1,109 2,261 1,643 
716 2,128 1,547 
673 1,584 1,202 5,373 8,696 6,672 
-4.7 -4.3 -4.2 -4.0 a -3.9 a -3.9 a 
I I 
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Appendix Table 5.4 West BMT subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2' BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
10-Jan m -5.2 -5.2 -5.l -4.2 -4.1 -4.0 -4.2 -4.2 -4.1 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -5.2 -4.8 -4.7 -4.4• -4.3• -4.2 • 
31-Jan m -5.7 -5.4 -5.4 -4.5 -4.5 -4.4 -4.9 -4.7 -4.6 -3.9 -3.9 -3.8 -4.4 -4.2 -4.1 -5.6 -5.2 -5.0 -4.8• -4.6• -4.6• 
21-Feb m -6.2 -5.9 -5.7. -5.1 -5.0 -4.8 -5.4 -5.1 -5.0 -4.6 -4.4 -4.3 -5.1 -4.7 -4.6 -6.0 -5.5 -5.3 -5.4• -5.1 a -4.9• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
20-Dec VND . 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,017 2,017 2,018 2,012 2,014 2,014 2,015 a 2,016 a 2,016 a 
10-Jan VND 2,010 2,010 2,010 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,014 2,015 2,015 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,016 2,016 2,017 2,010 2,011 2,012 2,014• 2,014• 2,014• 
31-Jan VND 2,007 2,009 2,009 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,011 2,012 2,013 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,013 2,014 2,015 2,008 2,010 2,011 2,011 a 2,012 a 2,013 a 
21-Feb VND 2,005 2,007 2,007 2,010 2,011 2,011 2,009 2,010 2,011 2,012 2,014 2,014 2,010 2,012 2,013 2,006 2,008 2,009 2,009 a 2,010 a 2,011 a 
Irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
20-Dec m -4.8 -4.8 -4.8 -3.9 -3.9 -3.7 -3.8 -3.8 -3.7 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.8 -3.8 -3.5 -4.0 -4.0 -3.4 -3.9• -3.9• -3.7 a 
10-Jan m -5.6 -5.5 -5.4 -4.2 -4.1 -3.9 -4.6 -4.5 -3.9 -4.4 -4.3 -3.7 -4.5 -4.5 -4.3 -4.3 -4.3 -4.0 -4.6• -4.5 a -4.2 a 
31-Jan m -5.4 -5.4 -4.8 -4.8 -4.8 -4.l -5.3 -5.2 -5.0 -3.7 -3.7 -3.2 -4.6 -4.6 -4.5 -4.5 -4.5 -4.4 -4.7• -4.7 a -4.3• 
21-Feb m -5.6 -5.6 -5.6 -5.1 -5.1 -4.7 -5.1 -5.1 -4.5 -4.7 -4.6 -4.3 -4.6 -4.5 -4.4 -4.4 -4.3 -4.2 -4.9• -4.9• -4.6• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
- 387 -
I\ 
Appendix Table 5.4 West BMT subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
• 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
20-Dec VND 2,012 2,012 2,012 2,016 2,016 2,017 2,017 2,017 2,017 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,016 2,016 2,018 2,015 2,015 2,018 2,016• 2,016• 2,017• 
10-Jan VND 2,008 2,008 2,009 2,015 2,015 2,016 2,013 2,013 2,016 2,014 2,014 2,017 2,013 2,013 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,015 2,013• 2,013• 2,014• 
31-Jan VND 2,009 2,009 2,012 2,012 2,011 2,015 2,010 2,010 2,011 2,017 2,017 2,019 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,014 2,012• 2,012• 2,014• 
21-Feb VND 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,010 2,010 2,012 2,010 2,010 2,013 2,012 2,012 2,014 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,011 a 2,011 a 2,013 a 
5. Hydrologic balance analysis 
i. Irrigation water demand 
Coffee ML'OOO 17 10 8 13 8 6 13 8 6 13 8 6 13 8 6 17 10 8 14 50 38 
Rice ML'OOO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ii. Inflows and outflows 
Inflow terms 
Precipitation ML'OOO 184 184 184 185 185 185 216 216 216 183 183 183 143 143 143 161 161 161 1,073 1,073 1,073 
Infiltration ML'OOO 75 73 72 63 62 62 71 69 69 73 72 72 73 72 71 69 67 66 425 415 413 
Recharge ML'OOO 23 21 22 24 22 21 29 26 25 20 19 18 11 10 10 16 15 14 122 113 111 
Extraction terms 
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Variable 
Coffee irrigation 
No shortage area 
Shortage area 
Rice irrigation 
Eva potranspiration 
Average UAc balance 
SWSd change 
Baseflow->River 
Average WT< 
Average dry season WT 
1998 
ESQ Sl 
ML'OOO 11 
ML'OOO 9 
ML'OOO 
ML'OOO 28 
8 
6 
3 
21 
S2 
6 
4 
2 
21 
ML'OOO. 104 103 102 
1999 
ESQ Sl 
10 
7 
3 
28 
7 
4 
3 
21 
S2 
5 
3 
2 
21 
113 113 113 
ML'OOO 62.9 63.6 63.8 68.6 69.3 69.5 
ML'OOO 9.4 9.5 9.5 -4.6 -4.6 -4.6 
3.5 3.5 3.5 ML'OOO 3.0 3.1 3.1 
m -5.4 -5.2 -5.1 -4.3 -4.2 -4.2 
m -6.1 -5.8 -5.7 -5.1 -4.9 -4.8 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion 
2000 
ESQ Sl 
9 
7 
2 
28 
7 
4 
3 
21 
S2 
5 
3 
2 
21 
114 114 113 
2001 
ESQ Sl 
9 
7 
28 
7 
4 
2 
21 
S2' 
5 
3 
2 
21 
123 122 121 
iii. Hydrologic balance indicators 
71.0 71.5 71.8 
3.3 3.3 3.3 
3.9 3.8 3.8 
-4.2 -4.2 -4.1 
-5.1 -5.0 -4.9 
75.S 76.1 76.8 
-4.5 -4.5 -4.S 
3.1 3.2 3.2 
-4.2 -4.0 -3.9 
-4.6 -4.4 -4.3 
•Average bSaturated Zone Storage cunconfined Aquifer d Surface Water Storage <Water Table depth rseason Flow 
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2002 
ESQ Sl 
8 
7 
28 
6 
4 
2 
21 
S2 
5 
3 
2 
21 
123 122 121 
73.4 74.4 74.9 
-3.S -3.5 -3.5 
2.9 3.0 3.0 
-4.7 -4.5 -4.4 
-5.0 -4.7 -4.6 
2003 
ESQ Sl 
11 
9 
28 
9 
6 
3 
21 
S2 
6 
4 
2 
21 
110 109 108 
71.3 73.1 73.7 
1.5 1.5 1.5 
2.8 2.9 2.9 
-4.9 -4.6 -4.S 
-5.9 -5.4 -5.2 
Total 
ESQ Sl 
44 
28 
16 
S2 
34 
21 
12 
57 
47 
10 
166 124 124 
688 682 679 
70.4• 71.4• 71.7• 
1.6 1.6 1.6 
19.1 19.4 19.6 
-4.6 a -4.4 a -4.4 a 
-5.3 a -5.1 a -4.9 a 
I 
~ 
Variable 
Catchment area 
Coffee area 
Rice area 
Potential coffee yield 
Actual yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Fuel 
Labour 
Operating surplus 
I\ 
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Appendix Table 5.5 Ea Tam subcatchment 1998-2003 
I998 I999 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 
ha'OOO 26.I 26.I 26.I 26.1 26.I 26.1 
ha'OOO I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 
ha'OOO 2 2 2 
MT '000 8~ 8I 8I 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
2000 200I 2002 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 ' BSQ SI S2 
1. Background data 
26.1 26.I 26.I 
I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
26.I 26.I 26.I 
I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
26.I 26.I 26.I 
I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
2 
8I 
2. Subcatchment-level coffee operating surplus 
MT '000 60 77 75 
I,05 
VNDBIL 842 I ,080 8 
VNDBIL 25 I 25 I 25 I 
VNDBIL 58 4I 3I 
VNDBIL 51 35 27 
VNDBIL 7 5 4 
VNDBIL 533 . 788 776 
7I 77 76 
906 985 975 
25I 25I 25I 
46 
40 
6 
3I 
27 
4 
24 
2I 
3 
609 702 700 
69 77 76 
6I2 678 672 
25I 25I 25I 
46 
40 
6 
3I 
27 
4 
24 
2I 
3 
3I5 395 397 
- 39I -
69 77 76 
379 420 4I7 
25I 25I 25I 
46 
40 
6 
32 
28 
4 
24 
2I 
3 
8I I37 I4I 
69 77 76 
327 363 36I 
25I 25I 25I 
46 
40 
6 
30 
32 
28 
4 
80 
24 
2I 
3 
85 
2003 
BSQ SI S2 
26.1 26.I 26.1 
I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 
2 
8I 
60 
2 
8I 
77 
2 
8I 
76 
630 807 797 
25I 25I 25I 
59 
5I 
7 
4I 
36 
5 
32 
28 
4 
320 5I5 5I4 
Total 
BSQ SI S2 
26.I 26.I 26.1 
I5.7 I5.7 I5.7 
2 
485 
399 
2 
485 
46I 
2 
485 
456 
3,697 4,333 4,280 
I ,507 I ,507 I ,507 
300 
262 
38 
208 
I82 
26 
I60 
I40 
20 
I,889 2,6I8 2,6I3 
Variable 
Area 
Yield 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
Area 
Yield per tree 
Yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
I I 
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Appendix Table 5.5 Ea Tam subcatchment 1998-2003 
I998 I999 2000 200I 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 
3. Per hectare coffee operating surplus estimate 
i. No irrigation shortage region 
ha'OOO I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 13.9 
MT 5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 
VNDMIL 4.6 2.7 2.I 3.5 2.I 1.6 
VNDMIL 48.3 50.2 50.9 43.2 44.7 45.2 
ha'OOO 3.5 3. I 3. I 
kg 0.0 4.8 4.3 
MT 0.0 5.I 4.6 
VNDMIL 0.2 68.2 61.2 
VNDMIL I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
VNDMIL 0.4 2.0 1.5 
VNDMIL -I6.2 50.2 43.7 
3.5 3.I 3.I 
3.I 4.9 4.6 
3.3 5.I 4.9 
40.2 62.6 59.5 
I6.0 16.0 I6.0 
0.8 1.6 1.2 
23.4 44.9 42.3 
I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 
5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 
3.5 2.I 1.6 3.5 2.I 1.6 
23.7 25.I 25.6 7.2 8.6 9.I 
ii. Irrigation shortage region 
3.5 
2.7 
2.9 
24.2 
I6.0 
0.8 
7.3 
3.I 3.I 
4.9 4.7 
5.I 4.9 
43.I 41.2 
I6.0 I6.0 
1.6 1.3 
25.4 23.9 
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3.5 3.I 3.I 
2.7 4.9 4.7 
2.9 5.I 4.9 
I4.9 26.7 25.6 
I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
0.8 I.7 I.3 
-1.9 9.0 8.4 
2002 
BSQ SI S2 
I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 
5.I 5.I 5.I 
3.5 2.I 1.6 
3.6 5.I 5.5 
3.5 3.I 
2.7 4.9 
2.9 5.I 
I2.8 23.I 
I6.0 I6.0 
0.8 1.7 
-3.9 5.4 
3.I 
4.7 
4.9 
22.2 
I6.0 
1.3 
4.9 
2003 
BSQ SI S2 
I3.9 I3.9 I3.9 
5.I 5.I 5.I 
4.6 2.8 2.I 
30.8 32.7 33.4 
3.5 3.I 3.I 
O.I 4.9 4.6 
O.I 5.I 4.8 
0.8 51.3 48.0 
I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
0.6 2.2 1.7 
- I5.8 33. I 30.3 
Total 
BSQ Sl S2 
83.4 83.4 83.4 
30.6 30.6 30.6 
23.4 I3.9 10.7 
I56.9 I66.4 I69.6 
21.0 
I 1.4 
I2.0 
93.I 
96.0 
4.2 
-7.I 
I8.6 
29.3 
30.7 
274.9 
96.0 
10.8 
I68.I 
I8.6 
27.6 
29.0 
257.7 
96.0 
8.3 
I53.4 
I I 
Appendix Table 5.5 Ea Tam subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 'BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
--
Weighted average VNDMIL 33.9 50.2 49.4 38.8 44.7 44.6 20.1 25.2 25.3 5.2 
operating surplus 
8.7 9.0 1.9 5.1 5.4 20.4 32.8 32.8 120.3 166.7 166.4 
3. Per tree irrigation supply schedule in irrigation deficit area 
i. Irrigation demand 
20-Dec lt 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,050 650 550 3,150 1,950 1,650 
10-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 950 550 400 6,000 3,600 2,850 
31-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
21-Feb lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
--
1,75 
Total lt 3,900 2,300 0 3,900 2,300 1,750 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 3,900 2,300 1,750 20,550 12,150 9,300 
ii. Supply ratio 
20-Dec Percent 17% 78% 78% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 86% 86% 22%• 82%• 82%• 
10-Jan Percent 11% 78% 78% 29% 82% 82% 34% 85% 85% 26% 84% 84% 28% 85% 85% 13% 83% 82% 24%• 83%• 83%• 
31-Jan Percent 6% 78% 78% 23% 80% 80% 22% 81% 81% 22% 83% 83% 21% 83% 83% 7% 82% 81% 17%• 81%• 81%• 
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Appendix Table 5.5 Ea Tam subcatchment 1998-2003 
I998 I999 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 
2I-Feb Percent 5% 78% 78% 2I% 80% 80% 
20-Dec lt 
10-Jan lt 
3I-Jan lt 
2I-Feb lt 
lt 
20-Dec m 
10-Jan m 
3I-Jan m 
2I-Feb m 
I77 509 43I 
107 428 311 
6I 
49 
430 3I2 
427 310 
I,36 
395 I,794 5 
-7.3 -7.3 -7.3 
-8.I -7.9 -7.8 
-8.9 -8.3 -8. I 
-9.6 -8.8 -8.5 
0 0 0 
279 453 329 
2I6 440 320 
I95 440 320 
69I I,333 969 
-5.5 -5.3 -5.2 
-6. I -5.8 -5. 7 
-6.8 -6.4 -6.2 
-7.6 -6.9 -6.7 
2000 200I 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 
I7% 8I% 8I% I8% 83% 83% 
iii. Irrigation supply 
0 0 0 
359 555 470 
2I2 447 325 
I65 445 324 
0 0 0 
274 544 460 
211 455 33I 
I74 455 33I 
2002 
BSQ SI S2 
I8o/o 83% 83% 
0 0 0 
295 553 468 
202 458 333 
I74 455 33I 
2003 
BSQ SI S2 
6% 8I% 8I% 
283 557 47I 
I27 457 328 
69 45I 325 
52 447 324 
Total 
BSQ SI S2 
I4%• 8I%• 8I %• 
690 I ,599 I ,353 
I,424 2,984 2,357 
97I 2,68I I,947 
809 2,669 I,940 
735 I,447 I,118 658 I,454 I,I23 672 I,466 I,I32 53I I,9I2 I,448 3,894 9,933 7,598 
4. Volumetric irrigation cost estimates 
No irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
-5.3 -5.2 -5.I -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 
-5.7 -5.6 -5.5 -4.3 -4.2 -4.2 
-6.7 -6.2 -6.I -5.2 -4.9 -4.8 
-7.5 -6.7 -6.5 -6.0 -5.4 -5.3 
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-4.4 -4.3 -4.3 -5.8 -5.4 -5.3 -5.6 a -5. I a -4.9 a 
-4.6 -4.6 -4.5 -6.7 -6.0 -5.8 -5.9• -5.7• -5.6• 
-5.5 -5.2 -5. I -7.5 -6.6 -6.2 -6.8 a -6.2 a -6. I a 
-6.4 -5.8 -5.6 -8.2 -7.I -6.7 -7.6• -6.8• -6.5 a 
Variable 
20-Dec VND 
10-Jan VND 
31-Jan VND 
21-Feb VND 
20-Dec m 
10-Jan m 
31-Jan m 
21-Feb m 
I I 
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Appendix Table 5.5 Ea Tam subcatchment 1998-2003 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 ' BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
1,134 1,134 1,134 1,142 1,143 1,144 1,143 1,144 1,144 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,141 1,143 1,143 1,143• 1,144• 1,144• 
1,130 1,131 1,132 1,140 1,141 1,141 1,141 1,142 1,142 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,146 1,147 1,147 1,137 1,140 1,141 1,140• 1,141 a 1,142• 
1,126 1,129 1,130 1,136 1,138 1,139 1,137 1,139 1,140 1,144 1,145 1,146 1,142 1,144 1,144 1,133 1,137 1,139 1,136• 1,139• 1,140• 
1,123 1,127 1,128 1,133 1,136 1,137 1,133 1,137 1,138 1,140 1,143 1,143 1,138 1,141 1,142 1,130 1,135 1,137 1,133• 1,136• 1,138• 
Irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
-18.5 -20.2 -20.2 -16.0 -17.9 -17.9 -16.0 -17.5 -17.5 -14.3 -15.5 -15.5 -14.3 -15.3 -15.2 -15.3 -16.0 -15.9 -15.7• -17.1 a -17.0• 
-20.0 -20.4 -20.4 -17.1 -18.4 -18.4 -16.6 -18.0 -17.9 -15.4 -16.1 -16.1 -15.7 -15.7 -15.7 -16.0 -16.2 -16.1 -16.8• -17.5• -17.5• 
-19.1 -20.3 -20.3 -17.7 -18.8 -18.7 -18.3 -18.4 -18.3 -14.8 -16.0 -15.9 -16.5 -16.1 -16.1 -17.1 -16.5 -16.4 -17.2• -17.7• -17.6• 
-20.5 -20.5 -20.5 -18.4 -19.0 -19.0 -17.4 -18.1 -18.1 -16.2 -16.3 -16.3 -16.5 -15.9 -15.9 -16.8 -16.4 -16.3 -17.6• -17.7• -17.7• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
20-Dec VND 1,082 1,07 4 1,07 4 1,093 1,085 1,085 1,094 1,087 1,087 1, 102 1,096 1,096 l, 101 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,094 1,094 1,095 • 1,089 • 1,089 • 
10-Jan VND 1,075 1,073 1,073 1,088 1,082 1,082 1,091 1,084 1,085 1,096 1,093 1,093 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,090• 1,087• 1,087• 
31-Jan VND 1,079 1,074 1,074 1,086 1,081 1,081 1,083 1,082 1,083 1,099 1,094 1,094 1,091 1,093 1,093 1,088 1,091 1,091 1,088• 1,086• 1,086• 
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Appendix Table 5.5 Ea Tam subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl $2 BSQ Sl $2 BSQ Sl $2 BSQ Sl $2 BSQ Sl $2 BSQ Sl $2 
21-Feb VND 1,072 1,073 l,073 l,082 1,079 1,080 1,087 1,084 l,084 1,093 1,092 1,092 1,091 l,094 1,094 1,090 1,092 l,092 1,086 a 1,086 • 1,086 a 
S. Hydrologic balance analysis 
i. Irrigation water demand 
Coffee ML'OOO 64 38 29 49 29 22 49 29 22 49 29 22 49 29 22 64 38 29 323 191 147 
Rice ML'OOO 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 144 108 108 
ii. Inflows and outflows 
Inflow terms 
Precipitation ML'OOO S36 S36 S36 S31 S31 S31 621 621 621 S31 S31 S31 416 416 416 473 473 473 3,108 3,108 3,108 
Infiltration ML'OOO 369 34S 343 3SS 336 33S 371 363 3S8 34S 337 340 327 314 313 346 340 329 2,113 2,03S 2,017 
Recharge ML'OOO 1S4 142 142 189 166 163 208 192 186 142 132 138 102 9S 9S 132 133 124 926 8S9 848 
Extraction terms 
Coffee irrigation ML'OOO Sl 36 28 40 28 21 40 28 21 40 28 22 40 28 22 S2 37 28 26S 184 141 
No shortage area ML'OOO so 30 23 38 23 18 38 23 18 38 23 18 38 23 18 so 30 23 2Sl 1S3 118 
-396-
I I 
Appendix Table 5.5 Ea Tam subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 ' BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
Shortage area ML'OOO 1 6 4 3 5 4 3 5 4 2 5 4 2 5 4 2 6 5 14 31 24 
Rice irrigation ML'OOO 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 24 18 18 144 108 108 
Evapotranspiration ML'OOO 320 304 299 339 338 337 341 340 338 371 365 362 376 364 360 339 325 320 2,086 2,037 2,015 
iii. Hydrologic balance indicators 
Average UA c balance ML'OOO 58.9 599 602 647 656 659 679 687 690 711 717 721 697 707 711 677 694 700 667• 677• 680• 
SWS<l change ML'OOO 22 23 24 -12 -13 -14 11 11 11 -14 -13 -13 -9 -10 -10 3 3 3 1 2 2 
Baseflow->River ML'OOO 68 72 74 99 101 101 104 105 106 83 83 83 60 63 64 63 66 69 477 491 497 
Average WP m -8.5 -7.9 -7.7 -6.2 -5.9 -5.8 -5.6 -5.3 -5.2 -5.3 -5.0 -4.9 -6.1 -5.7 -5.5 -6.8 -6.0 -5.7 -6.4• -6.0• -5.8• 
Average dry season WT m -9.6 -8.8 -8.5 -7.4 -6.8 -6.6 -7.2 -6.7 -6.4 -6.0 -5.5 -5.3 -6.4 -5.8 -5.6 -8.1 -7.0 -6.6 -7.4• -6.8 a -6.5 a 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion 
•Average b Saturated Zone· Storage c Unconfined Aquifer <l Surface Water Storage• Water Table depth f Season Flow 
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Variable 
Catchment area 
Coffee area 
Rice area 
Potential coffee yield 
Actual yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Fuel 
Labour 
Operating surplus 
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Appendix Table 5.6Ea Pour subcatchment 1998-2003 
1998 1999 2000 2001 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
1. Background data 
ha'OOO 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
ha'OOO 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 
ha'OOO 
MT '000 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
2. Subcatchment-level coffee operating surplus 
MT '000 73 92 91 93 91 86 92 81 93 80 93 92 
VNDBIL 1,023 1,301 1,275 1,185 1,169 755 809 444 505 380 437 433 
VNDBIL 302 302 302 302 302 302 
VNDBIL 70 49 37 
VNDBIL 61 42 32 
VNDBIL 9 6 5 
49 
43 
6 
37 54 
33 48 
5 7 
VNDBIL 651 949 935 834 829 398 
302 302 302 
29 
25 
4 
54 38 
47 33 
7 5 
477 87 165 
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302 302 302 
54 38 29 
47 33 25 
7 5 4 
24 97 102 
2002 2003 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
24 24 24 24 24 24 
18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 
97 97 97 97 97 
93 91 481 548 0 
972 959 4,495 5,145 0 
302 302 1,814 1,814 0 
49 38 375 199 0 
43' 33 327 174 0 
6 5 48 26 0 
620 619 2,306 3,131 0 
97 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
BSQ Sl S2 
24 24 24 
18.9 18.9 18.9 
583 583 583 
399 461 456 
3,697 4,333 4,280 
1,507 1,507 1,507 
300 208 160 
262 
38 
182 
26 
140 
20 
1,889 2,618 2,613 
Variable 
Area 
Yield 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
Area 
Yield per tree 
Yield 
Revenue 
Production cost 
Irrigation cost 
Operating surplus 
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Appendix Table 5.6 Ea Pour subcatchment 1998-2003 
I998 I999 2000 200I 2002 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 BSQ SI S2 ' BSQ SI S2 
3. Per hectare coffee operating surplus estimate 
i. No irrigation shortage region 
ha'OOO I4.4 I4.8 I4.8 I4.4 I4.8 I4.8 
MT 5.I 5.I 5.1 5.I 5.I 5.I 
VNDMIL 4.6 2.7 2.I 4.6 2.7 2.I 
VNDM!L 48.3 50.2 50.9 42.1 44.0 44.7 
ha'OOO 4.5 4.I 4.I 
kg 0.5 4.9 4.4 
MT 0.5 5.I 4.6 
VNDMIL 6.8 68.3 62.0 
VNDM!L I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
VNDMIL 0.7 2.I 1.6 
VNDMIL -9.9 50.3 44.4 
4.5 4.I 4.I 
3.5 4.9 4.6 
3.7 5.I 4.8 
44. 7 62.5 58.5 
I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
1.2 2.I 1.6 
27.5 44.4 40.9 
I4.4 I4.8 I4.8 I4.4 I4.8 I4.8 
5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 5.I 
3.5 2.I 1.6 3.5 2.I 1.6 
23.7 25.I 25.6 7.2 8.7 9.I 
ii. Irrigation shortage region 
4.5 4.I 4.I 
3.3 4.9 4.7 
3.5 5.I 4.9 
29.5 43.I 41.3 
I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
0.9 I.7 I.3 
I2.6 25.5 24.0 
- 399-
4.5 4.I 4.I 
2.4 4.9 4.7 
2.5 5.I 4.9 
I3.0 26.7 25.6 
I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
0.7 I.7 I.3 
-3.7 9.0 8.3 
I4.4 I4.8 I4.8 
5.I 5.I 5.I 
3.5 2.I 1.6 
3.6 5.I 5.5 
4.5 4.I 4.I 
2.2 4.9 4.7 
2.3 5.I 4.9 
10.4 23.I 22.1 
I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
0.7 I.7 I.3 
-6.3 5.4 4.9 
2003 
BSQ SI S2 
I4.4 I4.8 I4.8 
5.I 5.I 5.I 
4.6 2.7 2.I 
30.8 32. 7 33.4 
4.5 4.I 4.I 
I.O 4.9 4.6 
1.0 5.I 4.8 
10.5 51.3 48.I 
I6.0 I6.0 I6.0 
0.9 2.2 1.7 
-6.4 33.I 30.4 
Total 
BSQ SI S2 
I4.4 I4.8 I4.8 
30.6 30.6 30.6 
23.4 I3.9 10.7 
I55.9 I65.8 I69.2 
27.0 24.6 24.6 
2.I 4.9 4.6 
2.3 5.I 4.8 
I I4.9 275.0 257.6 
96.0 96.0 96.0 
5.I I 1.3 8.7 
I3.7 I67.7 I52.9 
I\ 
Appendix Table 5.6 Ea Pour subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
• 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
--
Weighted average 34.5 50.2 49.5 38.6 44.1 43.9 21.1 25.2 25.3 4.6 8.7 9.0 1.3 5.1 5.4 22.0 32.8 32.7 122.0 166.2 165.7 
operating surplus VNDMIL 
3. Per tree irrigation supply schedule in irrigation deficit area 
i. Irrigation demand 
20-Dec lt 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,050 650 550 3,150 1,950 1,650 
10-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 1,050 650 550 950 550 400 6,000 3,600 2,850 
31-Jan lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
21-Feb lt 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 950 550 400 5,700 3,300 2,400 
Total lt 3,900 2,300 1,750 3,900 2,300 1,750 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 2,950 1,750 1,350 3,900 2,300 1,750 20,550 12,150 9,300 
ii. Supply ratio 
20-Dec Percent 23% 80% 80% 26% 83% 84% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 85% 85% 27%• 83%• 83%• 
10-Jan Percent 17% 80% 80% 33% 83% 83% 34% 85% 85% 28% 83% 83% 27% 84% 84% 20% 83% 83% 26%• 83%• 83%• 
31-Jan Percent 13% 79% 79% 25% 80% 80% 24% 82% 82% 22% 83% 83% 20% 82% 82% 15% 83% 82% 20%• 81%• 81%• 
21-Feb Percent 13% 79% 79% 22% 80% 80% 21% 82% 82% 16% 82% 82% 16% 82% 82% 12% 82% 81% 17%• 81%• 81%• 
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Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 'BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
--
iii. Irrigation supply 
20-Dec It 241 518 438 278 542 462 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 316 551 466 835 1,611 1,367 
10-Jan It 164 437 318 309 457 332 353 554 469 292 542 459 287 544 460 186 454 330 1,582 2,985 2,363 
31-Jan It 128 435 316 237 442 322 227 449 326 209 454 330 188 451 328 145 454 328 1,134 2,685 1,951 
21-Feb It 120 435 316 211 442 322 200 449 327 149 452 328 149 452 328 116 451 325 945 2,681 1,946 
1,38 
Total It 654 1,825 9 1,035 1,884 1,438 779 1,452 1,122 650 1,448 1,117 624 1,447 1,117 763 1,910 1,449 4,496 9,962 7,626 
4. Volumetric irrigation cost estimates 
No irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
20-Dec m -8.5 -8.5 -8.5 -7.3 -7.2 -7.2 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -5.8 -5.7 -5.7 -6.3 -6.2 -6.2 -7.1 -6.8 -6.7 -6.3• -5.9 a -5.8• 
10-Jan m -9.0 -8.9 -8.8 -7.7 -7.5 -7.5 -7.2 -7.1 -7.1 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 -6.5 -6.4 -6.4 -7.6 -7.3 -7.1 -7.4• -7.2 a -7.1 a 
31-Jan m -9.5 -9.2 -9.1 -8.2 -7.9 -7.8 -7.8 -7.5 -7.5 -6.6 -6.5 -6.4 -7.0 -6.9 -6.8 -8.1 -7.6 -7.4 -7.9 a -7.6• -7.5 a 
21-Feb m -10.0 -9.5 -9.3 -8.7 -8.3 -8.1 -8.2 -7.9 -7.7 -7.2 -6.9 -6.8 -7.6 -7.2 -7.1 -8.6 -7.9 -7.6 -8.4• -7.9• -7.8• 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
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Appendix Table 5.6Ea Pour subcatchment 1998-2003 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
BSQ SI S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
20-Dec VND 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,134 1,134 1,135 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,141 1,141 1,141 1,139 1,139 1,139 
10-Jan VND 1,126 1,127 1,127 1,132 1,133 1,133 1,134 1,135 1,135 1,140 l,140 1,140 1,138 1,138 1,138 
31-Jan VND 1,124 1,125 1,126 1,130 1,131 1,131 1,132 1,133 1,133 1,137 1,138 1,138 1,135 1,136 1,136 
21-Feb VND ·1,121 1,124 1,125 1,127 1,129 1,130 1,130 1,131 1,132 1,134 1,136 1,136 1,133 1,134 1,135 
Irrigation shortage region 
i. Average depth to groundwater table 
2003 Total 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
1,135 1,136 1,137 1,135• 1,136• 1,136• 
1,132 1,134 1,135 1,134• 1,134• 1,135• 
1,130 1,133 1,134 1,131 • 1,133• 1,133• 
1,128 1,131 1,132 1,129• 1,131 • 1,132• 
20-Dec m -19.0 -20.3 -20.3 -17.5 -18.6 -18.6 -17.0 -17.9 -17.9 -15.7 -16.7 -16.6 -15.8 -16.7 -16.6 -15.9 -16.5 -16.5 -13.4• -13.7• -13.7• 
10-Jan m 
31-Jan m 
21-Feb m 
20-Dec VND 
10-Jan VND 
31-Jan VND 
21-Feb VND 
-19.5 -20.4 -20.4 -17.8 -18.9 -18.8 -17.3 -18.2 -18.2 -16.1 -17.0 -16.9 -16.7 -17.0 -16.9 -16.4 -16.7 -16.7 -17.3• -18.0• -18.0• 
-19.2 -20.4 -20.4 -18.1 -19.1 -19.1 -18.0 -18.6 -18.5 -15.9 -16.9 -16.8 -17.0 -17.1 -17.0 -17.0 -17.0 -16.9 -17.5• -18.2• -18.1• 
-20.1 -20.5 -20.4 -18.5 -19.3 -19.2 -17.7 -18.4 -18.4 -16.7 -17.2 -17.1 -17.1 -17.0 -16.9 -16.8 -16.9 -16.8 -17.8• -18.2• -18.1 a 
ii. Irrigation cost per cubic metre 
1,080 l,074 1,074 1,087 1,081 1,082 1,089 1,084 1,085 1,095 1,090 1,091 1,095 1,090 1,091 
1,077 1,073 1,073 1,085 1,080 1,080 1,087 1,083 1,083 1,093 1,089 1,089 1,090 1,089 1,089 
1,078 1,073 1,073 1,084 1,079 1,079 1,084 1,081 1,082 1,094 1,089 1,090 1,089 1,088 1,089 
1,075 1,073 1,073 1,082 1,078 1,078 1,085 1,082 1,083 1,090 1,088 1,088 1,089 1,089 1,089 
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1,094 1,091 1,091 1,090• 1,085 a 1,085 a 
1,092 1,090 1,090 1,087• 1,084• 1,084• 
1,089 1,089 1,089 1,086 a 1,083 a 1,084 a 
1,090 1,089 1,090 1,085• 1,083• 1,084• 
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Appendix Table 5.6 Ea Pour subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable I998 I999 2000 200I 2002 2003 Total 
ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 ' ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 ESQ SI S2 
5. Hydrologic balance analysis 
i. Irrigation water demand 
Coffee ML'OOO 77 46 35 77 46 35 59 35 27 59 35 27 59 35 27 77 46 35 408 24I I85 
Rice ML'OOO I2 9 9 I2 9 9 I2 9 9 I2 9 9 I2 9 9 I2 9 9 72 54 54 
ii. Inflows and outflows 
Inflow terms 
Precipitation ML'OOO 504 504 504 510 510 510 494 494 494 435 435 435 389 389 389 395 395 395 2,726 2,726 2,726 
Infiltration ML'OOO 3I6 299 295 3I2 302 297 30I 288 287 27I 262 262 276 266 264 284 275 270 I,760 I,692 I,675 
Recharge ML'OOO I26 116 114 I58 I46 I39 I56 I39 I36 114 103 104 87 82 83 102 96 92 742 68I 668 
Extraction terms 
Coffee irrigation ML'OOO 62 44 33 64 44 33 48 33 26 48 33 26 48 33 26 63 44 33 332 232 I77 
No shortage area ML'OOO 59 36 27 59 36 27 45 27 2I 45 27 2I 45 27 2I 59 36 27 311 I89 I45 
Shortage area ML'OOO 3 8 6 5 8 6 4 6 5 3 6 5 3 6 5 4 8 6 2I 43 33 
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Appendix Table 5.6Ea Pour subcatchment 1998-2003 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
• 
BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 BSQ Sl S2 
Rice irrigation ML'OOO 12 9 9 12 9 9 12 9 9 12 9 9 12 9 9 12 9 9 72 54 54 
Evapotranspiration ML'OOO 317 304 299 . 310 310 309 291 290 289 312 308 305 334 325 321 305 295 291 1,870 1,832 1,814 
iii. Hydrologic balance indicators 
Average UAc balance ML'OOO · 800 808 811 845 852 855 873 879 881 900 906 909 892 901 905 878 893 899 865• 873• 877• 
SWSd change ML'OOO 25 26 26 -9 -10 -10 6 5 5 -15 -13 -13 -8, -8 -8 0 0 1 -0 0 1 
Baseflow->River ML'OOO 47 50 52 81 82 83 75 78 78 68 68 68 49 52 53 42 45 47 362 375 381 
Average WP m -9.4 -9.0 -8.9 -7.8 -7.6 -7.5 -7.3 -7.2 -7.1 -6.9 -6.7 -6.6 -7.4 -7.1 -7.0 -7.9 -7.4 -7.2 -7.8• -7.5 a -7.4• 
Average dry season WT m -10.0 -9.5 -9.4 -8.6 -8.2 -8.1 -8.1 -7.8 -7.7 -7.2 -6.9 -6.8 -7.6 -7.2 -7.1 -8.4 -7.8 -7.6 -8.3 • -7.9• -7.8 • 
Notes: n.a. not applicable, .. not available, - zero, . insignificant. 
MIL=Million BIL= Billion 
•Average b Saturated z·one Storage cunconfined Aquifer d Surface Water Storage •Water Table depth £Season Flow 
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